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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
MILL'S "VERY SIMPLE PRINCIPLE'*: LIBERTY. UTILITARIANISM AND SOCIALISM
1 The thesis aims to examine the political consequences of applying 
J.S. Mill's "very simple principle" of liberty in practice: 
whether the result would be free-market liberalism or socialism, 
and to what extent a society governed in accordance with the 
principle would be free.
2 Contrary to Mill's claims for the principle, it fails to provide a 
clear or coherent answer to this "practical question". This is 
largely because of three essential ambiguities in Mill's
formulation of the principle, examined in turn in the three 
chapters of the thesis.
3 First, Mill is ambivalent about whether liberty is to be promoted 
for its intrinsic value, or because it is instrumental to the 
achievement of other objectives, principally the utilitarian
objective of "general welfare". The possibility that he might mean 
the latter implies that, because liberty and utilitarian objectives 
are at least potentially incompatible, application of the principle 
does not preclude the sacrifice of individual liberty in the 
pursuit of general welfare, and therefore does not preclude 
paternalistic (and illiberal) state socialism.
4 Arguments advanced by commentators, notably Gray, to suggest that 
there is no inconsistency between the liberal and utilitarian
objectives in Mill's writing, are not sustainable.
5 Secondly, the principle's criterion for sanctioning interference in 
liberty - the prevention of "harm to others" - is so vague and 
elastic as to be compatible with almost any degree of
interventionism and indeed totalitarianism. Because of the 
interdependence of men in society, there is virtually no limit to 
the classes of activity which can be said to cause harm to others, 
and hence no limits to the interference sanctioned by Mill's 
principle. Thus the principle does not preclude the suppression of 
legitimate economic activity by a socialist state committed to 
preventing economic "harm".
6 Attempts by commentators such as Rees and Ten to show that Mill's 
use of "harm" is narrower and more specific, are not supported by 
either textual or logical analysis.
7 Thirdly, Mill's principle fails to make clear whether "liberty" 
should be understood to mean classical ("negative") liberty or some 
form of "positive liberty" such as ability/power. It therefore 
does not preclude the adoption of socialist measures to promote 
"ability". On examination, "ability" can be seen to be an entirely 
different phenomenon from liberty. The promotion of "ability" 
(attainable through central allocation of material resources) can 
only be undertaken at the expense of liberty, particularly economic 
liberty. The justification for safeguarding economic liberty lies 
in respect for private property rights, the absence of which 
entails enslavement and inhumanity.
8 If a principle were to be framed avoiding these three ambiguities, 
it could serve as a firmer foundation for the protection and 
promotion of liberty.
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A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY 
LIBERTY, LIBERALISM AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE
I always think it's comical
How Nature does contrive 
That every boy and every gal
That's born into the world alive 
Is either a little Liberal
Or else a little Conservative.
W.S. Gilbert, Iolanthe.
Anyone who attempts to write about political liberty, 
which is the subject of this thesis, finds his task 
compounded by a terminological difficulty. Not only are 
the issues themselves a matter of controversy, but so too 
is the very language in which the issues are debated. For 
one reason or another, various crucial words in this area 
have come to be used by some people to mean things quite 
different from - or even the exact opposite of - what they 
mean when used by other people. This is particularly true 
of the words "liberalism", "laissez-faire" and "liberty".
First, "liberalism". Not everyone likes to call 
himself a "liberal". Ronald Reagan, when President of the 
United States, spoke disparagingly of liberalism as "the 
L-word"a. For him, and generally in modern American 
parlance, "liberalism" is identified with a 
"progressivist" reformist position which holds that 
liberty, and particularly economic liberty ("market 
forces") should be tempered with elements borrowed from 
socialism and social-democracy: government
interventionism to promote social objectives such as 
equality and welfare. It is this definition of 
liberalism, widely used in British political discourse as 
well, which enables Senator Edward Kennedy in America and 
The Guardian newspaper in London to be described (by 
friend and foe) as "liberal"13 and Mr Peter Walker to have 
been characterised as one of the more "liberal" members of 
Mrs Margaret Thatcher's governments - by comparison with, 
say, Sir Keith Joseph or Mrs Thatcher herself.
However in this thesis the terms "liberalism" and 
"liberal" will be taken to mean something altogether 
different, indeed virtually the opposite of "Guardian 
liberalism". The thesis will use "liberalism" in the 
traditional, classical sense - meaning a set of beliefs 
tending towards the promotion of political arrangements 
which recognise individual liberty as the supreme 
political value, not to be subordinated to the pursuit of 
"social" objectives like welfare or equality. Liberalism 
in this sense holds that the range of functions of the 
state ought accordingly to be limited. It insists,
moreover, that individual liberty must extend to the 
economic sphere, so that free enterprise, the operation of 
markets, and capitalism, are preferred to state ownership 
and dirigisme. It will be appreciated that on this 
definition the political approach of President Reagan, 
summed up in his own words as being that "government is 
not the solution to our problem; government is the 
problem"*, was a lot more liberal than that of Senator 
Kennedy, while in Britain what is called "Thatcherism" is 
thoroughly infused with the tenets of liberalism. This is 
what Lord Harris of High Cross, a Thatcherite sympathiser, 
meant when he said on BBC radio in 1984 that Mrs Thatcher 
was "held back by the conservative element in the Tory 
Party, because in my view she is the liberal element"*1.
The point is perhaps most strikingly demonstrated in 
the thought of, and in the contemporary reactions to, 
Friedrich von Hayek, surely the twentieth century's 
foremost exponent of liberalism (on the definition adopted 
by this thesis). He himself has bemoaned the way that the 
term "liberalism", as it "in the past was widely and 
correctly understood", has "as a supreme but unintended 
compliment been appropriated by opponents of this ideal"*. 
Hayek is self-avowedly a liberal. At the same time he 
once recommended "another 20 years of Mrs Thatcher" in 
Britain and acknowledged that she "agrees with my basic 
concepts"£. The compliment was mutual, and Mrs Thatcher 
was always been happy to associate herself with Hayek's 
thought®. So too Ronald Reagan who, when President, was 
known to admire Hayek, and cited with approval Hayek's 
political tract The road to serfdom1 All this in spite 
of Mr Reagan's professed hostility to "the L-word" and his 
eagerness to identify himself with conservatism; in 
spite, also, of Mrs Thatcher having been leader of 
Britain's Conservative Party. To Hayek the liberal what 
they called themselves did not matter; their "basic 
concepts" and his were the same; ergo Reaganism and 
Thatcherism were, properly speaking, liberal programmes. 
And here lies the explanation for Lord Harris' s remark 
that Mrs Thatcher was "held back by the conservative 
element". For conservatism, by its nature hostile to any 
doctrinal commitment, sits uneasily with the doctrinal 
commitment to liberty, free markets and limited government 
which is implicit in Hayekian - and hence Thatcherite - 
liberalism. In its respect for tradition tempered by 
organic change, conservatism rejects the promotion of 
abstract ideas such as freedom. This is what Hayek means 
when he describes conservatism as "contentless" and when 
he explains "why I am not a conservative"1-.
It is easy to trace the historical reasons for the 
term liberalism coming to be appropriated, as Hayek puts 
it, by opponents of the free market/limited government 
ideal. In the United States, as S.M. Lipset has said, 
"the term 'liberal', first used to describe the ideology 
of the American Revolution, changed its meaning when it 
became associated with the New Deal and became the 
American variant of social democracy"3. In Britain the
v
terminological change can be attributed to the evolution 
of the Liberal Party from its Gladstonian days of free 
trade and "retrenchment", through Lord Rosebery's 1903 
Cheltenham speech calling for a "clean slate" for the 
Party*, to the welfarist "New Liberalism" of Lloyd George 
and his People's Budget - and, eventually, in its death 
throes to electoral alliance in the 1980s with a self- 
proclaimed social-democratic party.*
Would it not be better, then, to avoid the 
terminological confusion and abandon the term liberal in 
its free market/limited government sense? The answer must 
be no, for two main reasons. One is that the New/social- 
democratic/Guardian "liberals" do not deserve to have 
ceded to them a noble name which, to repeat Hayek's point, 
they have illegitimately appropriated. The other, more 
practical, reason is simply that no other term will do. 
Some people like to describe the free-market version of 
liberalism as "nineteenth-century liberalism", reflecting 
its Gladstonian connotations. But doing so can have the 
unfortunate effect (fortunate to some) of conjuring up 
images of workhouses, squalor and children down the mines 
- the less attractive side of pre-welfarist Victorian 
Britain. It also enables it to be derided as outdated and 
hence irrelevant to modern times, whereas many liberals 
(in the free-market sense) regard their philosophical 
ideals of liberty as timeless and universal. (By the same 
token, one might just as well call socialism "nineteenth- 
century socialism", on account of its provenance from the 
teachings of Marx, Robert Owen and so on.) Consequently, 
"nineteenth-century liberalism" is not a particularly 
happy expression. Equally unfortunate is the use of the 
term "libertarianism" for the free-market version of 
liberalism. "Libertarianism" is actually the term which 
some free-market liberals themselves prefer - Robert 
Nozick for instance1 - since they are unwilling to 
associate themselves with the dreaded "L-word". However 
it is actually an inaccurate use of the word. 
Libertarianism, properly speaking, entails opposition not 
just to legal coercion but to moral constraints as wellm , 
thus confusing liberty with licence (as to which see 
chapter one, section 3.1 of this thesis).
* But as early as 1884 Herbert Spencer had detected a trend by 
which, whereas "in past times Liberalism habitually stood for 
individual freedom versus State coercion... Liberalism, getting more 
and more into power, has grown more and more coercive". He noted 
that a Conservative organisation was adopting the motto 
"Individualism versus Socialism", and predicted (with remarkable 
insight) that "if the present drift of things continues, it may by 
and by really happen that the Tories will be the defenders of 
liberties which the Liberals, in pursuit of what they think popular 
welfare, trample under foot". (Herbert Spencer; The man versus the 
state; Penguin (Harmondsworth 1969/1884); pages 66 and 81.)
So what remain are the terms liberalism and liberal. 
And in this thesis "liberalism" will be used to mean a 
commitment to individual liberty, free markets and limited 
government ("Thatcherite" liberalism rather than 
"Guardian" liberalism), and "liberals" to mean those who 
advocate this view.
The second terminological problem is with "laissez- 
faire". "Laissez-faire" is often associated with crude, 
and easily caricatured, economic theory. As Hayek notes, 
it "never provided a criterion by which one could decide 
what were the proper foundations of government" and the 
expression "laissez-faire" is "more popular with the 
enemies than with the defenders of a free system"®. For 
these reasons it would be preferable for this thesis to 
avoid it altogether, and certainly not to use it as 
synonymous with liberalism. The trouble is that several 
major writers on Mill do use "laissez-faire" in this 
sense, including John Gray**, C.L. Ten® and Gertrude 
Himmelfarb^. Perhaps more importantly, Mill himself uses 
the term, with approval, to define the proper scope of 
governmental interferences, and indeed has been credited 
with being one of the first English theorists to do so^ 
On account of this, but with reluctance, this thesis will 
use the term "laissez-faire" occasionally when what is 
really meant is liberalism.
There remains the third terminological problem, what 
is meant by the word "liberty". This, however, is not 
merely a matter of semantics, but of substance. It is a 
question which requires a great deal more consideration 
than there is space for in this Note. Chapter three of 
the thesis will be devoted to such a consideration.
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INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
The object of this essay is to assert one very 
simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely 
the dealings of society with the individual in the 
way of compulsion and control, whether the means 
used be physical force in the form of legal 
penalties or the moral coercion of public opinion. 
That principle is that the sole end for which 
mankind are warranted, individually or 
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of 
action of any of their number is self-protection. 
That the only purpose for which power can be 
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others.
John Stuart Mill, On Libertyx.
Mill's principle of liberty is not "very simple" at 
all. The terse, emphatic maxim quoted above, upon which 
the whole political philosophy of On Liberty is supposed 
to rest, in fact conceals a host of complexities and 
ambiguities. This ought not to be wondered at, for Mill's 
project in formulating the principle was highly ambitious. 
It was an attempt to supply a coherent criterion for 
determining in practice whether, and when, an individual's 
freedom might legitimately be restrained. In any given 
situation, the principle was to furnish a ready-made 
answer to the "practical question" of "where to place the 
limit between individual independence and social 
control"2. It thus aimed to define and delineate the 
proper scope of human freedoms and, Mill insisted,
No society in which these liberties are not, on the 
whole, respected is free, whatever may be its form 
of government; and none is completely free in 
which they do not exist absolute and unqualified.3
Unfortunately, however, the nature of the "free 
society" which Mill envisages is far from clear. In order 
to "illustrate" his principle and bring it into "greater
2
clearness''4, Mill offers some examples of how it might be 
applied in practice. Yet, if anything, these examples 
seem to obscure the vision more than they clarify it. 
Mill's free society, he tells the reader, would be one 
where smoking5, gambling and fornication6 were permitted, 
while heavy taxation was levied on alcohol consumption to 
discourage drunkenness7. There would be few nationalised
industries - Mill opposes state ownership of railways, for
example8 - and there would be no state schools, although 
the education of children would be compulsory, and the 
government would give grants to parents who could not 
afford school fees9. People might "rightfully be
compelled" to perform "certain acts of individual
beneficence", including "interposing to protect the 
defenceless against ill usage"10. Sunday trading would 
generally be forbidden11; and free trade would on the 
whole be encouraged, although "on grounds different from, 
though equally solid with, the principle of individual 
liberty asserted in this essay"12.
A selection of modern responses to Mill bears witness 
to this lack of clarity. According to Geraint Williams, 
Mill's attitude to "the socialist alternative" was, in 
1848, "sympathetic if critical"13; and John Gray has 
written of Mill's "vision of a decentralised market 
socialism" such as "has been attempted. . . in 
Yugoslavia"14. Yet Mill has also been cited with apparent 
approbation by Mrs Margaret Thatcher who, speaking more 
than ten years before she became prime minister, declared 
Mill's views on "choice of way of life" to be "as relevant 
as ever"16. John Gray insists that Mill's principle 
"contains no commitment to any principle of laissez- 
faire"15 and C.L. Ten claims to see "no necessary 
connection" between Mill's views and "a doctrine of 
economic laissez-faire"16A. Gertrude Himmelfarb, on the 
other hand, contends that "Mill, after all, was a laissez- 
fairist"17.
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The object of this thesis will be to try to 
disentangle all the confusion, and so to discern the real 
character of what is being prescribed by Mill's principle 
of liberty. The principle is intended to have practical 
effects it is, in Mill's words, a response to a 
"practical question"2; and the whole of the last 
chapter of On Liberty is devoted to the "applications" of 
the principle3-7A. This thesis will endeavour to ascertain 
what are the consequences of applying Mill's principle in 
practice. Mill claims that applying the principle results 
in a "free society"3. This thesis will examine whether, 
and to what extent, a society governed in accordance with 
the principle would, indeed, be free.
Before proceeding any further, a minor caveat ought 
perhaps to be inserted. Mill's principle, of course, 
addresses itself to two distinct issues regarding the 
"dealings of society with the individual". One is what it 
describes as coercion "in the form of legal penalties": 
that is, interference with individual liberty by the 
state, the government and the law. This might be termed 
the "political" aspect of the principle. The other aspect 
relates rather to the individual's subjection to, and 
independence from, more general "social" pressures, the 
"moral coercion of public opinion", an issue which does 
not really have a bearing on the sort of political 
arrangements which are to obtain in society. At least one 
commentator has seen this latter aspect as the main 
concern of Mill's principle, which (he writes) was not 
chiefly directed towards limiting the acts of public 
authorities3-8, while Mill himself describes the tyranny of 
social pressures as being "more formidable than many kinds 
of political oppression"2. However, this thesis is to be 
a study in political theory, and it is concerned primarily 
with Mill's attitude to political liberty. Accordingly, 
it will deal almost exclusively with the former, 
political, aspect of the principle; and the latter,
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''social'’f aspect will be largely outside its ambit (except 
insofar as it may help shed light on the political issue).
It is, then, the nature of Mill's political vision 
which is under scrutiny. Is it a prescription for 
liberalism and ''laissez-faire"*, for socialism, or for 
what? In examining this, the thesis will concentrate in 
particular on three ambiguities arising from the very 
simple principle. These are: first, the extent to which
liberty is to be promoted for its intrinsic value, or is 
rather to be seen merely as instrumental to some other, 
ulterior "end"; secondly, the meaning of the limitation 
on liberty which the principle proposes, expressed by the 
words " to prevent harm to others"; and, thirdly, the 
meaning of "liberty" itself as envisaged by the principle.
The first of these, the question of liberty as an 
intrinsic or an instrumental value, will have to be 
explored in order to understand clearly how effective 
Mill's principle would be in safeguarding liberty (and, 
therefore, just how "free" would be the society which it 
prescribes). For if individual liberty is to be protected 
simply as a means to another, prior objective, then there 
would be absolutely no reason not to jettison liberty the 
moment a more effective way of attaining that same 
objective were found. The point is thus one of 
fundamental importance, and yet within just two paragraphs 
after enunciating his apparently simple principle, Mill 
muddies the waters. Having declared that the principle of 
liberty is intended to "govern absolutely"1, and that an 
individual's independence "is, of right, absolute"19, he 
then sows confusion by adding that he repudiates the idea 
of liberty as an "abstract right... a thing independent of 
utility"19. In other words, he seems to add the 
qualification that liberty is to govern only if, and 
insofar as, it promotes a further value, utility - the
* as to which terms, see the Note on Terminology at the beginning of 
the thesis.
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objective, or at least a variant of the objective, sought 
by the utilitarian movement. Some critics have chosen to 
ignore this qualification altogether20, while others have 
seen it as negativing almost entirely the principle's 
tendency to promote liberty21. The picture is further 
obscured by the way that Mill elsewhere seems to justify 
liberty not for its own sake, nor yet as instrumental in 
promoting the utilitarian ideal, but on other grounds, 
such as its unique ability to preserve peace between 
men22, or (incongruously with other elements of his 
writing) as a function of scepticism in Mill23. It will 
be necessary to consider which, if any, of these reasons 
for liberty is pre-eminent. Chapter one of this thesis 
attempts to do this.
The second source of confusion in understanding the 
sort of society proposed by Mill lies in the apparently 
innocuous phrase "to prevent harm to others"1. This is 
offered as the justification for legitimate restraints of 
an individual's freedom and, consequently, the scope of 
such freedom will be directly and inversely proportionate 
to how widely "harm" is interpreted. In some ways, this 
point relates to the earlier question of whether liberty 
is dependent on an ulterior, utilitarian goal; for the 
overriding objective (overriding and pre-eminent over 
liberty) of preventing harm is of a similar nature to that 
of promoting happiness, the essence of utilitarianism. 
And once again it is possible to interpret the 
qualification on liberty as entirely negativing liberty, 
in that, as Mill himself acknowledges, no man is entirely 
isolated* and therefore "it is impossible for a person to 
do anything seriously or permanently hurtful to himself 
without mischief reaching at least his near connections, 
and often far beyond them"24. In that case, if every 
"self-regarding" harmful action also causes harm to 
others, and freedom is to be restricted to prevent this,
* or, in Donne’s celebrated expression, "no man is an island".
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then this contradicts Mill's original assertion (in the 
paragraph where the principle is set out) that an 
individual's "own good, either physical or moral, is not a 
sufficient warrant"3- for interfering in his liberty. 
Moreover, many beneficial self-regarding actions can have 
a harmful impact on others: for instance, when someone
sells a lot of shares in a company on the stock exchange 
in order to secure a profit for himself, this can 
depress the price of all that company's shares, causing 
losses to other people who continue to hold them. If all 
these actions (which, one way or another, cause harm to 
others) are to be restricted, it is evident that not very 
much will be left of liberty! The nature of the "free 
society" therefore depends on defining more precisely than 
the simple words of the principle, what kind of harm is to 
be prevented by restraint. This point will be explored in 
chapter two of the thesis.
Thirdly, and finally, there is the question of what 
kind of "liberty" is meant. It has been argued by some 
that the promotion of liberty requires not merely 
"protection... from deliberate restriction but also 
opportunities and resources for its exercise"25*, 
necessitating large-scale state interventionism to 
"redistribute" wealth, guarantee employment, and so on. 
Other commentators have, with some textual 
justification27, understood Mill to be concerned with 
protecting an individual's freedom to choose according to 
his "real" desires, which may differ from his expressed 
desires if he is not (economically) "in control of his 
situation": for example, the car driver who has not been 
provided with seat belts by the manufacturers, or the 
employee who accepts a low wage3-7. This too entails state 
interference (to compel the manufacturer to supply seat 
belts, to impose a minimum wage, and so on), and again 
Mill's principle is invoked to justify such paternalism.
* This is the classic equation of liberty with "ability" or "power" 
criticised more than three centuries ago by Hobbes26.
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By contrast, as has been seen, Himmelfarb understands the 
principle to imply laissez-faire and non-intervention17. 
These very different interpretations of the concept of 
liberty, which will be the subject of chapter three, imply 
very different types of political arrangement. Without 
further explanation or amplification, Mill's "very simple" 
principle can give precious little guidance as to which 
one is to be adopted.
Some of the ambiguities and contradictions in Mill 
are perhaps no more than might be expected of someone 
whose works spanned over half a century. A thinker is not 
like an abstract theory, which is required to maintain 
stringent standards of consistency and internal coherence. 
He is a human being who, as he grows older, matures, 
reflects, reconsiders, changes his mind. In Mill's case, 
there is said to be a considerable "biographical" impact 
on his writings; and in particular much has been made of 
the "mental crisis" which he suffered at the age of twenty 
and which supposedly produced in him a modification of, or 
even a revulsion against, his utilitarian upbringing28.
Not everything can be explained away in these terms, 
however. (The "mental crisis", which occurred in 1826, 
cannot for instance account for the allegedly fundamental 
discrepancies between On Liberty, published in 1859, and 
Utilitarianism, published two years later20*.) It will be 
the contention of this thesis that the confusion about how 
exactly to apply Mill's principle arises chiefly from the 
ambiguous formulation of the principle itself: ambiguity
about the reasons for liberty, about the type of "harm" to 
be prevented, and about the type of "liberty" to be 
promoted. These three points will be examined in turn in 
chapters one, two and three of the thesis. Lastly, in the 
conclusion, consideration will be given to whether such
* They were both written between 1854 and 18592®.
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ambiguities are inevitable, given the ambitiousness of 
Mill's project (which amounts to saying that any attempt 
to formulate a coherent principle of liberty is bound, by 
its nature, to fail); or whether, on the contrary, it is 
possible to devise a simple criterion for delineating the 
scope of individual liberty and the limits of state power, 
which, more precisely than Mill's, could determine the 
nature of a free society.
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CHAPTER ONE - WHY FREEDOM?
1. LIBERTY AS INTRINSIC OR INSTRUMENTAL?
The grand, leading principle, towards which every 
argument unfolded in these pages directly 
converges, is the absolute and essential importance 
of human development in its richest diversity.
These words are not Mill's, but Wilhelm von 
Humboldt's; and by "these pages" von Humboldt meant a 
work of his entitled Spheres and Duties of Government, 
Nevertheless Mill saw fit to quote the sentence on the 
cover page of On Liberty, clearly intending it to be seen 
as equally applicable to his own essay. What is striking 
about this, of course, is that the sentence says something 
rather different from the very simple principle which is 
the subject of this thesis.
Mill spells out the very simple principle less than a 
dozen pages after citing von Humboldt's sentence. Yet 
whereas the very simple principle stresses the central 
importance of liberty from coercion - the individual's 
"independence" is stated to be "absolute"3- - von 
Humboldt's formulation asserts the "absolute and essential 
importance" of human "development". The former is stated 
to be "one" principle, "entitled to govern absolutely"2; 
the latter claims to be "the grand, leading principle". 
The former constitutes "the object of this essay" [On 
Liberty]2; the latter is "the point at which every 
argument unfolded in these pages [Spheres and Duties - 
but, by unavoidable implication, On Liberty] converges".
So which of these positions is, for Mill, paramount? 
Is liberty really "absolute"? Is it to be promoted and
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protected for its own sake, because liberty is right in 
itself, as an intrinsic value? Or rather because it 
produces certain beneficial outcomes and ulterior ends, 
and is instrumental towards achieving some other "grand, 
leading principle"?
Answering these questions, about the intrinsicality 
or instrumentality of liberty, is fundamental to an 
understanding of the political implications of Mill's 
principle. As was mentioned in the introduction, the very 
simple principle is not only concerned with political 
liberty and the relationship of government with the 
individual. Some commentators have gone further and said 
that this issue was not even Mill's chief concern in 
devising the principle3; and, indeed, that the principle 
is "silent about the proper limits of state activity"4. 
This last claim at least is belied by Mill's citation of 
von Humboldt on the cover page of On Liberty: the work
being quoted is about the "spheres and duties of 
government". Moreover, in the paragraph immediately 
preceding the one where the principle is first asserted, 
Mill writes of the need for a "recognized principle by 
which the propriety or impropriety of government 
interference is customarily tested"5; and, when he 
actually spells out the principle, he says that it is 
applicable, inter alia, to the issue of coercion by means 
of "legal penalties"2.
1.1. A free society: government interference versus
individual liberty
In short, the very simple principle is at least 
partly concerned with the issue of political liberty and 
the limits of government power. The issue can perhaps 
best be approached by imagining two polar extremes of 
political arrangement, diametrically opposed conceptions 
of the way society should operate.
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At one extreme, one can imagine an all-powerful 
government, in the control of a dictator or an oligarchy 
or simply administered according to some dominant 
conception or plan, which (for whatever reason) acted as 
though it were entitled to regulate and/or direct every 
aspect of human activity in society. There would be no 
inhibition or limitation on the range of functions 
accorded to the state, and no form of coercion of 
individuals which would be "beyond bounds" to the 
government, the state and the law. Accordingly there 
could not sensibly be said to be individual liberty in 
such a society, for there would be no field of activity in 
which the individual was entitled to direct his destiny by 
himself - no private sphere in which the individual was 
immune from governmental interference and, to use Mill's 
word, "sovereign". This would be absolute, totalitarian, 
tyranny (whether or not it is practically feasible is a 
different matter).
At the opposite extreme to all-powerful government, 
one can imagine anarchy or the " state of nature", where 
there would be no state, no government, no laws to 
prohibit murder or theft or assault - and where 
individuals would be entitled to do what they wanted to 
themselves and to each other, totally without coercive 
restraint by any public authority. In the latter kind of 
society, the sphere of individual activity would be as 
limitless as the sphere of governmental activity in the 
former.
Of course many political thinkers over the centuries 
have refused to recognise this kind of polarity, and have 
seen no tension between liberty on the one hand and the 
state and laws on the other. Rousseau, for instance, 
believed that the state and the law could embody freedom, 
through the collective expression of individuals' free 
wishes - the "general will" - such that "each, uniting
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with all, nevertheless obeys only himself, and remains as 
free as before"6. This was so even if the law rode 
roughshod over the particular wishes and choices expressed 
by individuals, since those choices might not be for the 
best, whereas what people really wanted was "the best". 
In The Social Contract Rousseau wrote of "the general 
will, which is the law" and commented:
by themselves the people always want what is good, 
but by themselves they do not always see it6A.
That is to say, obedience to the state and its laws would 
supply the means by which people were enabled to "see" 
what they "really" wanted. In much the same way, Hegel 
depicted citizens of the modern state as identifying their 
individual interests with the collective common interest, 
such that they were each possessed of a "fundamental sense 
of order"7: their will embodied as restraint, their
freedom expressed as obedience to the law.
These kinds of argument embody certain assumptions 
which bear further examination. Upon further examination, 
they turn out to contain much that is potentially inimical 
to liberty. Implicit in the notion that people's liberty 
can be fulfilled through the realisation of a "general 
will", is the presupposition that "people" (that is, 
individuals) are to be identified with "the people" as a 
collective entity, and that the wishes of each are best 
expressed as the will of the whole. The problem with this 
is that, since people - individual people - typically have 
different wishes and opinions from each other, it will not 
always be the case that each one can "unite with all" and 
at the same time "obey only himself"6. There will always 
be people, even if only minorities, whose interests and 
views do not coincide with the "general will". That being 
so, it cannot be assumed that governments (even 
governments representing the majority of an electorate) 
which act in the name of "the people" - or that laws which 
purport to express the "general will" - will never snuff 
out the freedoms of minorities and individuals. Of course
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it all depends on how the "general will" expresses itself; 
but if, as Rousseau suggests, each individual "puts in 
common his person and his whole power under the supreme 
direction of the general will"6®, that individual cannot 
be assured, in the absence of other safeguards*, that his 
liberty as an individual (to express heretical views, for 
example) will be respected. Political arrangements which 
attempt to realise the "general will", and the freedom of 
"the people" collectively, thus offer little ultimate 
protection of the freedom of people individually. Mill 
makes this point effectively in the opening paragraphs of 
On Liberty:
Such phrases as "self-government", and "the power 
of the people over themselves", do not express the 
true state of the case. The "people" who exercise 
the power are not always the same people with those 
over whom it is exercised; and the "self- 
government" spoken of is not the government of each 
by himself, but of each by all the rest. The will 
of the people, moreover, practically means the will 
of the most numerous or the most active part of 
the people - the majority, or those who succeed in 
making themselves accepted as the majority; the 
people, consequently, may desire to oppress a part 
of their number, and precautions are needed against 
this as against any other abuse of their power.8
No less potentially inimical to liberty are the 
implications of Rousseau's point that people "do not 
always see" what they want. This presupposes that people 
have "real" wishes and desires which are different from 
what they themselves perceive to be their wishes and 
desires, and hence different from their expressed wishes 
and desires. Accordingly people's expressed wishes can be 
ignored, and their actual free choices thereby overridden
* For example liberal constitutional arrangements reflecting some 
sort of liberty principle which, like Mill’s, draws a boundary 
between the individual and the state.
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- without, on this analysis, there being any negation of 
their "real" free choices. Moreover, this concept of 
"real" free choices, being choices other than what people 
think they want, carries with it the further implication 
that what a person wants is not a matter for self-
assessment but rather something which can be deemed
objectively, and hence externally to that person. Thus 
when Rousseau says that people really want "what is good", 
he means that they want what is deemed to be good for 
them: for instance, a "beneficial" or "rational" plan
devised by the state. It follows that people's freedom 
may be realised by their conforming to a plan which the 
state imposes on them! In this way, tyranny can be (and 
often has been) advanced in the name of "liberty".
The view that there is no contradiction between
liberty on the one hand, and the state and its laws on the 
other, has been propagated not only by Rousseau and Hegel 
but also, in varying forms, by Spinoza, Locke, 
Montesquieu, Kant and Burke®. From Hobbes, however, there 
is a different emphasis with the acknowledgement, in 
Leviathan, that civil laws are "artificial chains"10 and 
that rights (or liberty) and law are "in one and the same 
matter inconsistent"11.
And Mill, too, recognises that there is such an 
"inconsistency": a tension between the operation of laws
by the state and the exercise of freedom by the individual 
(or, as he puts it at the very beginning of On Liberty, a 
"struggle between liberty and authority"SA-) . This tension 
attains its extremes in the polarity between tyranny and 
anarchy. Mill presupposes that neither extreme is 
acceptable as the basis for political society. In the 
former, with a limitless sphere of governmental activity, 
there is no liberty, which is dreadful. And in the 
latter, with a limitless sphere of individual activity, 
there is nothing to prevent murder, theft, assault, and so 
on, which is also dreadful. ("All that makes existence
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valuable to anyone", Mill writes, "depends on the 
enforcement of restraints upon the actions of other 
people"13.) Moreover, when individuals cannot walk the 
streets without fear of being assailed by a murderer, 
thief, etc., they are not truly free. So a "free 
society", which is what Mill expressly states in On 
Liberty that he seeks*, is one which lies somewhere 
between the two extremes, which contains both a sphere of 
individual activity and a sphere of governmental activity, 
each one limiting the other. The question which this 
raises is, where ought the line properly to be drawn? 
Mill's position is that there should be a balance: with
some, but not limitless, individual liberty, and some, but 
not limitless, governmental interference. But - putting 
the question in a different way - how much of each?
The "very simple principle" was an attempt by Mill to 
provide a simple criterion for answering this question. 
The criterion was to be applied in practice to any given 
situation where the issue arose as to whether or not the 
government ought to interfere in individual liberty. In 
Mill's words, the principle would answer
the practical question where to place the limit - 
how to make the fitting adjustment between 
individual independence and social control.13 
If it were applied properly and consistently, Mill's 
vision of a "free society" would obtain.
The aim of this thesis, as stated in the 
introduction, is to understand the nature of the society 
which would in fact ensue if the principle were applied 
properly and consistently. Would the application of the 
principle really guarantee a truly free society? The 
first part of the answer to this lies in the question of
* "No society in which these liberties are not, on the whole, 
respected is free, whatever may be its form of government; and none 
is completely free in which they do not exist absolute and 
unqualified."12
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intrinsicality or instrumentality - in why freedom was to 
be promoted.
1.2. An intrinsic value?
Any textual analysis of On Liberty, let alone Mill's 
other works, can give rise to quite a number of different 
answers to this question, some perhaps surprising. 
Gertrude Himmelfarb is convinced that Mill sees liberty as 
an intrinsic value "not... subject to other more proximate 
purposes"14. Certainly the absolutist language in which 
the very simple principle itself is couched lends credence 
to this view. Mill says that the principle of liberty is 
entitled to govern "absolutely"2; that preventing harm to 
others is the "sole" end2 and the "only purpose"2 
justifying restraint; that individual independence in 
self-regarding actions must be "absolute"1; and, most 
compellingly, that such independence exists "of right"1. 
In similar vein, a couple of pages earlier, Mill cites 
with approval
the great writers to whom the world owes what 
religious liberty it possesses [who] have mostly 
asserted freedom of conscience as an indefeasible 
right and denied absolutely that a human being is 
accountable to others for his religious belief15*. 
Accordingly, Himmelfarb concludes, Mill's view is that 
liberty and individuality are to be established "firmly 
and absolutely in and for themselves" and they are 
"necessary and sufficient ends"14. Likewise John Gray 
contends that in Mill's moral system "the right to liberty 
is accorded priority"16**.
* Emphasis added.
** although, as will be seen, Gray does not regard this as 
inconsistent with the primacy of utilitarianism in Mill’s theories.
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1.3. An instrumental value?
%
However, one does not have to read very far from the 
assertion of the very simple principle before the 
"intrinsic” interpretation begins to look a bit unsteady. 
Within a page of Mill's assertion that an individual's 
absolute independence exists "of right", Mill warns:
It is proper to state that I forego any advantage
which could be derived to my argument from the idea
of abstract 
right...x*
What follows, virtually throughout the rest of the book, 
is a series of instances of the ulterior benefits which
liberty can produce. The suggestion, at least in some
passages, seems to be that liberty's principal value lies 
in its being instrumental to achieving those benefits.
1.3.1. Scepticism
First, in chapter 4, entitled "Of the limits to the 
authority of society over the individual", Mill appears to 
say that scepticism about human conduct is the main reason 
for promoting liberty. This view, which has a long 
pedigree in the history of political thought, recognises 
that a central government or plan is no wiser and no more 
rational than the individual human beings who comprise or 
conceive it, and, human beings being fallible, the extent 
of its powers ought to be strictly circumscribed. This 
view has a central place in conservative thought, 
expressed for instance by Burke in his attack on the 
French revolution:
The science of government being... a matter of 
experience, and even more experience than any 
person can gain in his whole life, however
* But see below, section 2.2.2.
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sagacious and observing he may be, it is with 
infinite caution that any man ought to venture upon 
pulling down an edifice which has answered in any 
tolerable degree for ages the common purposes of 
society, or on building it up again...17
But it is also one of the chief justifications for 
liberty advanced by Friedrich von Hayek, who explicitly 
places himself outside the conservative tradition18. 
Hayek argues that liberty is necessary because individual 
human activity is so complex and varied that no central 
planner(s) can possibly know or understand the activity of 
the vast numbers of individuals who make up a society; 
consequently, any attempt to direct "society" will 
inevitably be based on a travesty of understanding and 
will thus be doomed to failure. He writes:
What we must ask the reader to keep constantly in 
mind. . . is the fact of the necessary and 
irremediable ignorance on everyone's part of most 
of the particular facts which determine the actions 
of all the several members of human society. . . 
[This] makes both our attempts to explain and our 
attempts to influence intelligently the processes 
of society very much more difficult, and... places 
severe limits on what we can say or do about 
them.19
In chapter 4 of On Liberty the "sceptical" view of 
liberty finds expression in the argument that, when "the 
public" interferes with individual conduct
the odds are that it interferes wrongly and in the 
wrong place... The opinion of... [an overruling] 
majority, imposed as a law on the minority, on 
questions of self-regarding conduct is quite as 
likely to be wrong as right, for in these cases 
public opinion means, at the best, some people's 
opinion of what is good or bad for other people.20
23
In Mill's view, this is "the strongest of all the 
arguments" against interference in purely personal
conduct20.
1.3.2. Hobbesian social cohesion
In chapter 5 of Utilitarianism, however, Mill
advances a second, altogether different, reason. He
writes that respect for each individual's inviolable 
sphere of self-regarding activity - the essence of the 
very simple principle - is the necessary precondition for 
social cohesion, harmony and peace, and the principal 
safeguard against perpetual warfares
The moral rules which forbid mankind to hurt one 
another (in which we must never forget to include 
wrongful interference with each other's freedom*) 
are more vital to human well-being than any maxims, 
however important, which only point out the best 
mode of managing some department of human 
affairs.21 
They are so "vital" because
It is their observance which alone preserves peace 
among human beings: if obedience were not the
rule, and disobedience the exception, every one 
would see in every one else a probable enemy, 
against whom he must be perpetually guarding 
himself.21
This second view belongs to a rather different tradition 
from the first, and closely echoes Hobbes's justification 
for the role and scope of government in Leviathans
It is manifest that during the time men live 
without a common Power to keep them all in awe, 
they are in a condition which is called war; and, 
such a war, as is of every man against every 
man...22 The final cause, end or design of men... 
in the introduction of that restraint upon 
themselves (in which we see them live in
* Emphasis added.
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commonwealths) is the foresight... of getting 
themselves from that miserable condition of war, 
which is naturally consequent... to the natural 
passions of men.23*
Moreover, it is significant that this second view, 
that respecting each other's independence is the only way 
out of war and into social harmony, not only supplies a 
theoretical justification for liberty, but also can claim 
to have some actual historical validity. It can be argued 
that this is how individual liberty was in fact first 
established in England and Europe: out of the horrific
religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
there emerged a recognition that peace could only come 
through mutual religious tolerance, which meant respecting 
liberty of conscience. The point to note here is that 
Mill subscribes to this account of liberty's development, 
and indeed recounts it in the crucial opening paragraphs 
of On Liberty just before setting out the very simple 
principle. He writes that almost the only field in which 
individual liberty has been consistently respected in 
modern times has been on the question of "religious 
opinion", and he explains this by describing how, after 
the religious wars
when the heat of conflict was over, without giving 
a complete victory to any party... minorities, 
seeing they had no chance of becoming majorities, 
were under the necessity of pleading to those whom 
they could not convert for permission to differ.23
* In this context it is interesting to note that, in at least one 
published work, Mill actually quoted Hobbes's description, in 
Leviathan, of the miserable condition of war where man’s life is 
"solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short"2*.
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1.3.3. Utilitarianism
So, in separate passages, Mill can be seen to draw on 
two distinct traditions to provide ulterior justifications 
for his very simple principle. First, there is the 
"sceptical" view of human capability which says that 
freedom is necessary because human beings are fallible and 
therefore ought not to have too much power. Secondly, 
there is the "Hobbesian" line that freedom is necessary 
because it preserves peace and, indeed, has actually 
brought peace out of (religious) warfare. Both of these 
"reasons" explain and justify liberty in terms ulterior to 
itself, suggesting that, in those terms, liberty's value 
is purely instrumental.
But the most common view of Mill, of course, is that 
he justifies liberty not by appealing to the "sceptical" 
or to the "Hobbesian" view, but in terms of another
ulterior value - utilitarianism. (It is arguable that the 
sceptical analysis and the Hobbesian analysis are 
themselves instrumental means to the utilitarian end. )
Himmelfarb strenuously denies this, claiming that
"whatever Mill's intentions elsewhere... it was not his 
intention here, in On Liberty, to rest his case on
utilitarian principles"26.
However, this assertion flies in the face of plenty 
of textual evidence which is to be found in On Liberty 
itself. Just two paragraphs after he first asserts the 
very simple principle, at the point (already referred to) 
where he seems to deny* that he conceives liberty as an 
abstract right, Mill says that it is not "independent of 
utility"27. He reaffirms his belief in utility as "the 
ultimate appeal on all ethical questions"27.
* But see below, section 2.2.2.
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After this, in the text, there is a semi-colon, and 
the next words are crucial:
but it must be utility in the largest sense27.
It is utility "in the largest sense" that Mill advocates 
BOTH in On Liberty AND in his other works, such as 
Utllitarianismi a utilitarianism which inherits from his 
father James Mill and from Bentham the belief that the 
general happiness ought to be maximised, but which defines 
happiness in a "larger" (or more refined) way to encompass 
nobility, virtue, truth, beauty and individuality. In 
chapter 2 of Utilitarianism, Mill declares that
Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds 
that actions are right in proportion as they tend 
to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce 
the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended 
pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, 
pain, and the privation of pleasure.28 
He reasserts moreover, crucially for the argument of this 
thesis, that pleasure and the absence of pain are "the 
only things desirable as ends"28. But he says that this 
formulation does not answer everything, and "much more 
requires to be said; in particular, what things it 
includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure"28. He answers 
his own question just a few pages later, contending that 
"utilitarianism... could only attain its end by the 
general cultivation of nobleness of character"29.
This, then - the "general cultivation of nobleness of 
character" - is what Mill means by utility in the largest 
sense. And there is plenty in the text of On Liberty to 
suggest that he sees liberty as instrumental to achieving 
that (larger) utilitarian end.
In chapter 2, for instance, Mill argues the case for 
"the liberty of thought and discussion". His case is not 
that freedom of thought and discussion is good in itself. 
Instead he contends that freedom of thought and discussion 
is good because it produces truth. He portrays the world,
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not unreasonably, as one where there is both truth and 
falsehood; and, confident that men's "errors are 
corrigible"30, he argues that liberty of thought and 
discussion - free competition in ideas - is the most 
efficient corrective mechanism for enabling truth to 
prevail. Mill states that on any issue where there is a 
division of opinion, one of three situations must obtain. 
In each one, he contends, liberty is beneficial in 
producing truth. First, there is the situation where A's 
opinion is false and 's is true. In that case, it is 
self-evidently detrimental to the increase of truth if A, 
enjoying power, were to suppress B's freedom to assert his 
opinion31. Secondly, A 's opinion may be true and B's 
false and, although it might be thought that nothing would 
then be lost by suppressing B's views, Mill believes that, 
without the stimulus of free debate, A's opinion would 
after a time lapse into the "deep slumber of a decided 
opinion" which is mouthed parrot-fashion but no longer 
understood. The truth of the opinion is lost, and it 
becomes an empty platitude32. Lastly - and, in Mill's 
estimation, most often - is the situation where each 
opinion is partially but not wholly true. The free 
interchange of ideas allows the parties to correct the 
respective shortcomings in their understandings, with the 
consequence that the two views are synthesised as a whole 
truth33.
Freedom of thought and discussion is thus justified 
in chapter 2 of On Liberty as the means of attaining 
truth. Chapter 3, headed "Of individuality, as one of the 
elements of well-being", justifies freedom of action on 
almost identical grounds. Just as competition between 
different opinions will enable the truth to prevail, so 
too, Mill argues, competition between a wide variety of 
ways of life will lead to the general adoption of "more 
enlightened conduct"34 and "better modes of action"35. 
Moreover, when people choose their own ways of life rather 
than blindly following custom, they employ all their
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faculties and so enhance their faculties36. Even people 
who do not themselves practise a novel or unconventional 
way of life will benefit from the existence of those who 
do, for the whole tone of life throughout society will be 
stimulated by the "mere example of nonconformity"37. And, 
because people are made happy in different ways, a wide 
choice of different "sources of pleasure" cannot but 
enhance the general sum of happiness3®.
The common strand running through all these arguments 
for liberty of thought, discussion and action is that they 
are all utilitarian arguments. Mill is apparently 
justifying freedom as the means to happiness, although of 
course he means happiness in the larger, more refined 
sense. The triumph of truth, more enlightened conduct, 
the enhancement of an individual's faculties and the 
stimulation of the tone of life throughout society all 
constitute that "general cultivation of nobleness of 
character" which, for Mill, is the essence of 
utilitarianism. At various points in chapters 2 and 3 
Mill seems quite explicit about this. He says in chapter 
2 that
the truth of an opinion is part of its utility39 
and he expresses the advantages of freedom of discussion 
in terms of their propensity to enhance character, well­
being and (hence) happiness among humanity generally. 
Silencing the expression of an opinion, he says, has the 
effect of
robbing the human race, posterity as well as the 
existing generation40.
The price to be paid is
the sacrifice of the entire moral courage of the 
human mind41.
By contrast, competition between ideas serves
to enable average human beings to attain the mental 
stature which they are capable of42.
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Chapter 2 concludes with an assertion of
the necessity to the mental well-being of mankind 
(on which all their other well-being depends*) of 
freedom of opinion43.
Likewise, in chapter 3, freedom of action is justified as 
a necessary part and condition of... civilization, 
instruction, education, culture44; 
and Mill cites with approval von Humboldt's argument that 
the development of an individual' s powers to a complete 
and consistent whole is
"the end of man"... "towards which every human 
being must ceaselessly direct his efforts"45.
The role of liberty seems to be simply instrumental 
towards attaining this "end":
for this there are two requisites, "freedom and 
variety of situations"45*.
Elsewhere in On Liberty, when Mill argues in favour 
of other aspects of political liberty such as free trade, 
competitiveness and limited government, he likewise 
appears to base his arguments on the grounds that they 
will have beneficial effects rather than that they are 
intrinsically good. Free trade, for example, is to be 
commended because it means that "the cheapness and the 
good quality of commodities are most effectively provided 
for"46, while competitiveness for admission to the 
professions and so on is "better for the general interest 
of mankind"46. In chapter 5, entitled "Applications", 
Mill lists three "objections to government interference", 
which are: first, that things are usually "better done"
by individuals (who have a vested interest in their 
consequences) than by governments; secondly, that 
individual action and initiative strengthen people's 
"active faculties"; and - the third and "most cogent
* Emphasis added.
* Emphasis added.
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reason" - that government interference leads to a vast 
bureaucracy/ with power concentrated in the hands of 
hangers-on who have no incentive to carry out reforms or 
improvements which might threaten their entrenched 
power4 7.
Mill's attitude to socialism is obviously crucial to 
understanding the sort of free society which he envisages 
and (in particular) whether or not it is to be based on 
the principles of liberalism**. This will be explored in 
more depth later in the thesis. Socialism is mentioned by 
name only once in On Liberty, and then with antipathy:
We have only... to suppose a considerable diffusion 
of Socialist opinions, and it may become infamous 
in the eyes of the majority to possess more 
property than some very small amount, or any income 
not earned by manual labour. . . It is known that 
bad workmen who form the majority of the operatives 
in many branches of industry are decidedly of the 
opinion that bad workmen ought to receive the same 
wages as good.. . And they employ a moral police, 
which occasionally becomes a physical one, to deter 
skilled workmen from receiving... a larger 
remuneration for a more useful service48.
In 1879 the Fortnightly Review posthumously published some 
writings by Mill in which he gives more comprehensive 
consideration to the subject of socialism. In these, he 
appears less hostile, arguing that, in assessing the 
merits of socialism,
the question to be considered is, whether [it]... 
is likely to be as efficient and successful as the 
managements of private industry by private 
capital49***.
** What Himmelfarb, Gray and others call "laissez-faire". See the 
Note on Terminology at the beginning of this thesis.
*** This contradicts Geraint Williams’s view that Mill’s "attack on 
paternalism is not that it will not work but that it depends for its 
working on the servility of those who might benefit"30.
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The significant point about this attitude to socialism is 
that, once again, it is utilitarian effect, rather than 
intrinsic goodness, which is paramount. Socialism, Mill 
is saying, is to be judged in terms of its 
instrumentality, of what it brings.
So if instrumentality is Mill's criterion for judging 
socialism as a political arrangement, is instrumentality 
also the criterion by which all other types of political 
arrangement, including liberty, are to be measured? 
Perhaps the most convincing textual evidence to suggest 
that this is so, is to be found in chapter 3 of On 
Liberty, where Mill asks rhetorically:
what more or better can be said of any condition of 
human affairs than that it brings human beings 
themselves nearer to the best thing that they can 
be?51
1.4. A middle way?
There is, then, textual evidence to suggest that 
liberty is regarded by Mill as an intrinsic value, and 
that the very simple principle takes priority over 
anything else. On the other hand, as has been shown, 
there is also textual evidence to suggest the opposite: 
that the very simple principle is subject to ulterior 
"ends", and specifically utilitarianism. It is even 
possible to find, as C.L. Ten does, support in Mill's 
writings for a third interpretation, a "middle way". This 
is the view that Mill regards utilitarian considerations 
as irrelevant when addressing the question of the liberty 
to engage in "self-regarding" actions (where the very 
simple principle reigns supreme); but that, when "other- 
regarding" actions are at stake, utilitarianism becomes a 
prime criterion. Ten quotes Mill in On Liberty:
As soon as any part of a person's conduct affects 
prejudicially the interests of others, society has
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jurisdiction over it and the question whether the 
general welfare will or will not be promoted by 
liberty becomes open to discussion. But there is 
no room for entertaining any such question when a 
person's conduct affects the interests of no 
persons beside himself... In all such cases there 
should be perfect freedom52*.
The "perfect freedom" of self-regarding action is fully 
spelled out in the paragraph of On Liberty where the very 
simple principle itself appears:
[A man] cannot rightfully be compelled to do or 
forbear... because, in the opinion of others, to do 
so would be wise or even right. These are good 
reasons for remonstrating with him, or entreating 
him, but not for compelling him or visiting him 
with any evil in case he do otherwise2.
However, Ten's understanding of this sphere of self- 
regarding action as totally immune from utilitarian 
considerations is not borne out by the following passage 
in Utilitarianism:
...this distinction lies at the bottom of the 
notions of right and wrong; that we call any 
conduct wrong. . . according as we think that the 
person ought, or ought not, to be punished for it; 
and we say that it would be right to do so and 
so.. . according as we would wish to see the person 
whom it concerns, compelled, or only persuaded and 
exhorted, to act in that manner.53
* Emphasis added.
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2. TRYING TO EXPLAIN THE INCONSISTENCY
Professor Himmelfarb, confronted with textual 
evidence which contradicts her own interpretation of 
Mill's liberty as an intrinsic value, dismisses such 
evidence as rooted in readings of "isolated sentences of 
On Liberty"5*. The trouble is, of course, that her own 
evidence likewise consists in lifting "isolated sentences" 
from the text and ignoring the many passages which (as 
shown above) lend credence to alternative interpretations. 
The plain fact is that it is possible to find quotations 
in On Liberty, as well as in Mill's other writings, which 
support any and all of the three interpretations outlined 
here: the "intrinsic" view, the "instrumental" view, and
Ten's middle way. Because of this it is clearly unhelpful 
for commentators to throw gobbets of text at each other to 
"prove" their particular interpretation when, self- 
evidently, doing so involves selecting suitable passages 
and wilfully turning a blind eye to unsuitable ones. When 
a view is taken of the whole, the inescapable conclusion 
is that Mill has failed to provide a clear, coherent, 
unambiguous answer to the question of whether he regards 
liberty as valuable intrinsically or only by virtue of its 
instrumental role in advancing utility. He has considered 
the question, and he has pronounced on it, but his 
pronouncements are hopelessly inconsistent.
How is this inconsistency to be explained?
2.1. "Two Mills"
One traditional explanation is a psychological/ 
biographical one, based largely on the account in Mill's 
Autobiography of the "mental crisis" he supposedly 
suffered in 1826. The story, or at least its caricature,
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is well-known: Mill, brought up according to the rigid
utilitarian principles of his father James Mill and of 
Bentham, grows up an unquestioning, unimaginative child 
prodigy (plenty of reason and very little sentiment), 
burns himself out by the age of twenty, endures a nervous 
breakdown, and only recovers when he discovers that there 
is more to life than just calculating the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number. Encouraged by the 
poetry and the friendship of Wordsworth and Coleridge, he 
"awakens" to a less grey, Romantic world where feeling, 
nobility, virtue, the individuality of the human spirit - 
and, by extension, liberty - play an important part. The 
beauty of the story, for students of Mill, is that it 
offers a convenient explanation for the apparent 
inconsistencies in his work - the differences, for 
instance, between what Himmelfarb calls Mill's "intentions 
here, in On Liberty" and his "intentions elsewhere"26. 
Thus, thanks to the caricature, the utilitarianism in Mill 
can be ascribed to his "pre-crisis" life as a Benthamite 
prodigy, and the espousal of liberty to his "post-crisis" 
awakening. On this account, the problem of whether Mill's 
commitment to liberty is merely instrumental to his 
commitment to utility can be neatly circumvented with the 
glib assertion that there were (psychologically) "two 
Mills", and that he thought utility paramount at some 
times, and liberty at others - notably in On Liberty, and 
the very simple principle in particular.
Of course, no modern commentator has put it quite as 
crudely as the above paragraph, but it is probably not an 
injustice to say that some have come fairly close. Thus 
Geraint Williams writes:
His mental crisis, beginning in 1826, shattered 
this simple confidence; the end which he had been 
pursuing so vigorously "ceased to charm"... The 
general good and its calculations no longer 
attracted him.55
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Himmelfarb insists that the mental crisis was the 
"decisive experience"56 of Mill's life. On Liberty, 
moreover, was a "decisive rebuttal of his father"57. 
Parts of it, she says, "read as if they had been written 
under the direct inspiration or the most vivid memory of 
this crisis"57.
The trouble with the "two Mills" explanation is, 
quite simply, that it does not tally with the facts, 
either textual or biographical. It is certainly true that 
Mill's utilitarianism is recognisably different from his 
father's or Bentham's, and that (as has been seen) it is 
self-consciously "utility in the largest sense"27, 
encompassing many of the ideals of nobility, virtue, 
truth, beauty and individuality which Mill may well have 
acquired under the influence of Wordsworth and Coleridge. 
It is, moreover, plausible to suggest that this 
represented a reaction against (and even a revulsion from) 
the narrow brand of utilitarianism in which Mill had been 
schooled from infancy, and indeed that the alleged mental 
crisis may have had a part to play here.
But none of this can satisfactorily account for the 
inconsistencies WITHIN On Liberty itself. There is no 
evident sharp contrast between Mill's "intentions here, in 
On Liberty" and his "intentions elsewhere". Himmelfarb 
instances Mill's book Utilitarianism as one of the works 
in which he seeks to "rest his case on utilitarian 
principles"26. However, there are several passages in On 
Liberty where Mill likewise seeks to rest his case on 
utilitarian principles, not least when he describes 
utility as "the ultimate appeal on all ethical 
questions"27. Of course, Mill is writing in On Liberty of 
the larger, more refined version - "utility in the largest 
sense"27 - but this is no less the case in Utilitarianism, 
where Mill depicts utilitarianism as concerned with "the 
general cultivation of nobleness of character"29.
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More damaging for the "two Mills" explanation is the 
chronology of the thing. The mental crisis occurred, Mill 
claims, in 1826. He began to write On Liberty during 
1855; it was not published until 1859 - that is, more 
than three decades after the crisis. Of course, as 
Himmelfarb notes, Mill's "vivid memory" of the crisis
would have been resuscitated by his writing the
Autobiography "during the same years" that he wrote On 
Liberty22. He wrote the first draft of the Autobiography 
in 1853, rewrote it during the late 1850s, and then began 
working on it again after 1861. It was not published 
until 1873, just before Mill died. If, as Himmelfarb 
claims, this was enough to inspire a non-utilitarian 
strain in On Liberty, it remains to be answered why it did 
not have the same effect on Mill in Utilitarianism. For 
Utilitarianism was published in 1861, and Mill was working 
on it at the same time as he was writing On Liberty58. At 
this point, the usefulness of the mental crisis theory 
begins to appear rather limited.
2.2. "No inconsistency"
The inconsistency between the intrinsic and the 
utilitarian elements in Mill's attitude to liberty thus 
remains unresolved by these considerations. In recent 
years this question has been approached, or rather 
sidestepped, with the radical claim from some commentators 
that there is no inconsistency at all! For John C. Rees, 
in the development of Mill's thinking:
the way to On Liberty is a comprehensible growth
and. . . the work is a part of his outlook - not at
odds with it59.
Here again reference is made to Mill's biographical 
history, and indeed to the celebrated "mental crisis" - 
with, it must be said, more plausibility than the "two 
Mills" explanation. The argument is that, in the 
aftermath of the crisis, psychologically torn between the
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demands of loyalty to his father's doctrines and the 
appeal of new ideas, Mill did everything in his power to 
reconcile the two within the framework of a broad, all- 
embracing and consistent doctrine. Such an eclectic
attitude certainly finds expression in Mill's description, 
in chapter 2 of On Liberty, of the way truth is attained
(see section 1.3.3. above), by synthesising the partial
truths of two opposing opinions into a whole truth33. And 
in his Autobiography Mill writes that, after the mental 
crisis:
When I had taken in any new idea, I could not rest 
till I had adjusted its relation to my old
opinions... I found the fabric of my old and
taught opinions giving way in many fresh places,
and I never allowed it to fall to pieces, but was
incessantly occupied in wearing it anew.60
But did Mill succeed in establishing such a
consistent whole? John Gray is emphatic: On Liberty, he
writes, is
consistent almost to a fault16.
In a major work, entitled Mill on liberty: a defence, Gray 
has put forward a set of highly ingenious arguments with 
the aim of refuting wholesale what he calls the 
"traditional view"61 and the "received view"62 of Mill's 
On Liberty - namely the view, to which this thesis 
subscribes, that Mill's apparent commitment to liberty as 
an intrinsic value cannot be reconciled with his
assertions that liberty is subject to utilitarianism. 
Gray's arguments are worth examining in detail, not least 
because they identify the central issues in this debate.
Gray's arguments rest on two main pillars. The first 
is that there is no contradiction between the primacy, or 
absoluteness, of the liberty principle and the primacy of 
the utility principle - because they are, in Gray's words, 
principles of "a radically different kind"63 and therefore 
cannot meaningfully be compared to each other on the same
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scale (in much the same way, presumably, as a mother's 
love for her children cannot be compared with her love for 
her husband; they are of "a radically different kind" and 
the paramountcy of one does not conflict with the 
paramountcy of the other). Secondly, Gray contends that, 
in any case, there is not such a great distinction as is 
normally supposed between the essence of Mill's 
utilitarianism and the essence of his liberty principle... 
and, hence, no sharp contradiction between the 
absoluteness of liberty and its dependence on 
utilitarianism. This is because Mill's utility "in the 
largest sense" is centred on the notion of cultivating 
individual human character, while his concept of liberty 
is closely bound up with ideas of human autonomy and 
individual self-realisation: ideas which, if not quite
synonymous, greatly overlap. Lest this paraphrase of the 
second pillar of Gray's case be thought to be an unfair 
travesty of his actual views, it should be said here that 
this thesis finds a great deal more sympathy for the 
second pillar than for the first.
2.2.1. Gray's first pillar
The first pillar, the claim that Mill's liberty 
principle is of "a radically different kind" from his 
utility principle, is - according to Gray - largely based 
on Mill's own attempt to classify and categorise various 
kinds of principle, in section vi of chapter 12 of book VI 
of his System of Logic (published in 1843)64. In this, 
Mill writes about an all-embracing "Art of Life". The Art 
of Life, Mill says, can be divided into three 
compartments, each a different facet or type of principle. 
There is the aesthetic aspect of life, which Mill calls 
the "Beautiful" or the "Noble". Then there are prudential 
types of principle, which can be called "Prudence" or 
"Policy" or "Expediency". Lastly there is the moral 
aspect, "Morality", in which are to be found the 
principles that guide people as to how they should act.
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Mill states, further, that the Art of Life, taken as a 
whole, can be regarded as a "Teleology", of which the end, 
or ultimate value, is the utility principle65. Therefore, 
it could be deduced, the utility principle is not a part 
of morality, guiding people as to how they should act. 
Utility is, instead, an axiological value which 
underscores life as a whole.
Gray seizes on this to argue that, whereas Mill's 
liberty principle is a "practical" axiom, providing 
guidance as to how people ought to act, and thus involving 
a type of moral obligation or duty, Mill's utilitarianism 
(by contrast) imposes no moral obligation at all. In 
Gray's view, the liberty principle says, You should act in 
such a way that freedom is maximised (that is, you should 
refrain from interfering with anyone's freedom except to 
prevent harm to others). However, utility, which is an 
axiological principle, does not do this:
Those writers of the traditional school in Mill 
criticism are in error who suppose that the utility 
principle must impose a moral duty of utility- 
maximisation on agents66.
In other words, utilitarianism does not say, You should 
act in such a way that utility is maximised (that is, you 
should promote happiness, pleasure and the absence of 
pain). Utilitarianism, indeed, does not say anything 
about what you should do; it merely states an ultimate 
value. There is thus a
sharp contrast between utility as an axiological 
principle and liberty as a practical (action- 
guiding) principle67.
This is what Gray means when he says that they are 
"principles of a radically different kind". If the 
liberty principle tells you what you should do, and the 
utility principle does not say that you should do 
something else (indeed, is silent about what you should 
do), then surely - Gray argues - there is no 
inconsistency.
40
Gray props up this first pillar with both logical and 
textual analysis. He is convincing in neither. The 
logical analysis begins with a vivid example to "prove" 
that a statement of value or standard of value (an 
axiological principle) must be, of its nature, radically 
different from the kind of moral principle which states 
what you should do (a determinant of action) - and 
therefore that the liberty principle, as a determinant of 
action, logically cannot be subject to the utility 
principle, which is purely and simply axiological. Gray 
says that utility, being a standard of value rather than a 
determinant of action,
would enable us to judge a state of affairs in 
which a solitary wild animal dies slowly of a 
painful disease a bad state of affairs, though it 
is one that no one's actions have produced or could 
alter*9*.
From this example, it is true, one can infer that: 
standards of value are not synonymous with determinants of 
action. To say that the animal's pitiful death is bad is 
(of course) not the same as saying, You should do such- 
and-such to prevent this. However, it is not possible to 
infer from the example that: standards of value and
determinants of action are so radically different that 
determinants of action (like the liberty principle) 
logically cannot be subject to standards of value (like 
utilitarianism). Gray has succeeded in proving that not 
all standards of value yield determinants of action. 
("The animal's death is bad" does not yield "You should do 
such-and-such".) But it does not follow from this that 
not all determinants of action are rooted in standards of 
value. On the contrary, they must be. Although not 
every "bad state of affairs" is produced by people's 
actions, the question of whether people should act in one 
way or another is intimately connected with whether it
* Emphasis added.
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will produce a bad state of affairs. Indeed, this is 
virtually the definition of what one "should" do. For 
example, the determinant of value which says that "You 
should not set fire to an old widow's cottage" is nothing 
unless it is rooted in standards of value such as "It is a 
'bad state of affairs' when an old widow's cottage has 
been burned to the ground" (which themselves may be rooted 
in one or more other standards of value such as the 
inviolability of property, a person's right to shelter, 
respect for and care of the elderly, and so on). To sum 
up: determinants of action can be - and, really, must be
- subject to standards of value.
That being so, it cannot be troublesome to assert 
that, if the utility principle is the ultimate value of 
the Teleology of life and thus the ultimate "good state of 
affairs" (which Mill asserts in System of Logic and which 
Gray readily acknowledges), then it follows that all 
actions should be determined according to whether they 
ultimately promote utility: in other words, it follows
that all actions should be utility-maximising. The 
utility principle thus turns out to be a determinant of 
action just as the liberty principle is. They are not 
"radically different" kinds of principle. And if utility 
is the ultimate determinant of action, this is potentially 
inconsistent with liberty being the paramount determinant 
of action. Gray's logical analysis fails, in short, to 
support his first pillar.
The textual analysis is likewise flawed. Gray 
directs his readers' attention to one particular paragraph 
in chapter 5 of Utilitarianism, a chapter "whose saliency 
to On Liberty" (he says) "has long been neglected"69. The 
crucial passage from Utilitarianism is this:-
We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to 
imply that a person ought to be punished in some 
way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the 
opinion of his fellow creatures; if not by
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opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience. 
This seems the real turning point of the 
distinction between morality and simple 
expediency.7 °
Gray interprets this to mean:
Mill contends that questions of value must be 
distinguished from questions of right and wrong... 
In Mill's own conception of morality, indeed, in 
which it is necessarily connected with 
punishability, Utility cannot be a moral 
principle.7X
That is to say, of course: the utility principle cannot
be a determinant of action and is thus radically different 
from the liberty principle.
Gray does seem to be exercising a certain 
interpretative licence here. It is puzzling. Certainly 
the passage from chapter 5 in Utilitarianism says that 
morality is necessarily connected with punishability. But 
Mill does not mention "Utility" or "questions of value" in 
the passage. The point of the passage, as is apparent 
when it is read in context, is to assert that, because 
morality is so closely connected with punishability, the 
idea of penal sanction does not of itself serve to 
distinguish justice from moral obligation in general70. 
The context is a discussion of how best to define 
"justice"; chapter 5 is headed "On the Connection between 
Justice and Utility".
Moreover, a less selective reading of Utilitarianism, 
and indeed of Mill's other works, rather undermines much 
of what Gray has to say. Thus Gray claims that
the Principle of Liberty... cannot by itself impose 
obligations or yield judgments about right 
action*Q*
* Emphasis added.
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and refers to
Mill's denial that utility... has any direct 
application to the wrongfulness of acts72*.
But, looking at Mill's own words in Utilitarianism, it is 
impossible to find any such denial. Rather the opposite; 
as has been noted, Mill writes in chapter 2 that 
utilitarianism
holds that actions are right in proportion as they 
tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to 
produce the reverse of happiness2®*.
To give him his due, Gray does actually consider these 
words. But he dismisses them as "not altogether 
perspicacious"58 and "somewhat murky"68. This is odd. By 
contrast to the passage from Utilitarianism which Gray 
chooses to concentrate on (the passage in chapter 5, cited 
above), these words are not tucked away at the back of the 
book. They are to be found in chapter 2 of
Utilitarianism, which is entitled "What Utilitarianism 
Is". Rhetorically this is the central chapter of the 
book, and the words which Gray dismisses so lightly appear 
in the crucial, definitional, paragraph - arguably the 
counterpart of the "very simple principle" paragraph in On 
Liberty. As such these words, which directly contradict 
Gray's sweeping assertions about the relationship of 
utilitarianism to questions of right and wrong, deserve 
considerably more attention than he is willing to pay 
them.
Similarly, Gray alleges that Mill's utilitarianism 
never acquires the character of a moral 
principle73.
Yet in the very same crucial paragraph in chapter 2 of 
Utilitarianism, Mill describes utilitarianism as a "theory 
of morality"28 and writes of "the moral standard set up by 
the theory"28.
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Gray claims that Mill
affirms that questions of utility and of morality 
must be distinguished73.
But Mill, in On Liberty, writes that liberty is not
independent of utility, which is
the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions27.
And, likewise, Gray's all-important distinction, 
between utility as an axiological value and liberty as a 
determinant of action, receives short shrift from Mill 
himself. Gray writes:
While [Mill] recognises utility as the supreme test 
of all conduct,... [utilitarianism] does not of
itself impose moral requirements upon action73. 
Mill, however, writes:
This [the maximisation of happiness], being, 
according to the utilitarian opinion, the end of 
human action, is necessarily also the standard of 
morality; which may accordingly be defined, the 
rules and precepts for human conduct29.
Indeed, even Mill's words in the System of Logic are 
unhelpful to Gray's distinction. Mill does not, it seems, 
take the view that, just because happiness is the ultimate 
value in the Teleology of the Art of Life, this in any way 
detracts from there being a practical obligation to act so
as to maximise utility. Mill's words, in section vii of
chapter 12 of book VI, are worth quoting in full:
For the remainder of the practice of life some 
general principle, or standard, must still be 
sought; and if that principle be rightly chosen, 
it will be found, I apprehend, to serve quite as 
well for the ultimate principle of Morality, as for 
that of Prudence, Policy or Taste...
I merely declare my conviction, that the general 
principle to which all rules of practice ought to 
conform, and the test by which they shall be tried, 
is that of conduciveness to the happiness of
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mankind or rather of all sentient beings; in other 
words, that the promotion of happiness is the 
ultimate principle of Teleology.74 
Here, then, in the very chapter of the very volume of 
System of Logic which is the foundation of Gray's first 
pillar, are the words which wholly undermine that pillar. 
Mill is saying, quite unequivocally, that utilitarianism 
is the "ultimate principle of Teleology" (an axiological 
principle), which at the same time serves as "the ultimate 
principle of Morality" (a moral principle) and also "the 
general principle to which all rules of practice ought to 
conform" (a determinant of action, a practical principle). 
Like the liberty principle, the utility principle tells 
you what you should do; they are not "radically 
different" kinds of principle. In that case, it remains 
difficult to see how the primacy of the liberty principle 
can be consistent with the primacy of the utility 
principle - or how Mill's apparent commitment to liberty 
as an intrinsic value can possibly be reconciled with his 
claims that it is subject to utilitarianism.
Where does this take matters? Unfortunately, not 
very far - for the charge of inconsistency, against which 
Gray seeks to defend Mill, appears to be as valid as ever. 
However, as has been mentioned, there is a second pillar 
on which Gray rests his defence. And this one is, at 
least, more plausible than the first.
2.2.2. Gray's second pillar
In a way, the second pillar says almost the opposite 
of the first. Far from emphasising a radical difference 
between the liberty principle and the utility principle, 
Gray comes close to arguing that there is not much to 
choose between them and that, consequently, they cannot be 
inconsistent.
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Gray's point is that Mill conceives both utility and 
liberty in such a broad sense that they almost wholly 
overlap; so that promoting one will not derogate from 
promoting the other, but, rather, promoting one will by 
definition serve to advance the other. As has already 
been discussed, Mill is at pains to emphasise that the 
utility he seeks is "utility in the largest sense"27. By 
this he means that utilitarianism does not aspire merely 
to a sterile type of happiness in which people are granted 
a mental state consisting of satisfaction, contentment and 
security, and are spared fear, danger, risk, suffering and 
so on. This sort of "lifeless" happiness is the lot of 
the well-fed, benevolently treated slave; and it is not 
what Mill has in mind*. As he says in Utilitarianism:
Few human creatures would consent to be changed 
into any of the lower animals, for the promise of 
the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures; no 
intelligent person would consent to be a fool... 
even though they should be persuaded that the 
fool... is better satisfied with his lot than they 
are with theirs.7 6 
On the contrary: the happiness envisaged by Mill is
something rich and vital which, in his words, "could only 
attain its end by the general cultivation of nobleness of 
character"29. In other words it is a happiness grounded 
in human self-development and the dignity of man. 
Moreover, when Mill tries to justify happiness (and this 
is a point which will be returned to later in this 
chapter) he does so in terms of individual free choice; 
he writes in Utilitarianism:
* In the parlance of modern moral theorists, this is the happiness 
produced by a "happiness drug" or a ”hedon machine". Thus Robert 
Nozick: "Suppose there were an experience machine that would give
you any experience you desired. Superduper neuropsychologists could 
stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel you were 
writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting 
book. All the time you would be floating in a tank, with electrodes 
attached to your brain. Should you plug into this machine for 
life...? What else can matter to us, other than how our lives feel 
from the inside?... What does matter to us, in addition to our 
experiences?"73
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No reason can be given why the general happiness is 
desirable, except that each person, so far as he 
believes it to be attainable, desires his own 
happiness*77.
Self-development, the dignity of man, free choice: these
are the terms in which Mill's advocacy of the utility 
principle is couched, and they are all concepts intimately 
linked to the idea of liberty.
This is all the more important because Mill's 
conception of liberty appears to embrace what Gray calls 
"autonomy”, as well as "security"*78. That means that it 
is concerned not only with removing impediments to the 
exercise of freedom, such as government repression, 
muggers in the street, foreign invaders - a traditional 
conception of liberty, which Isaiah Berlin calls "negative 
liberty"*79 - but also with encouraging freedom to be fully 
exercised, by living in as diverse and enriched a way as 
possible. Thus the type of liberty which involves 
"autonomy" is not very dissimilar to the type of happiness 
which is meant by utility "in the largest sense".
Gray's conclusion from this is that it makes no sense 
even to ask the question, Is liberty intrinsic or is it 
instrumental to the attainment of a utilitarian end? They 
are not alternatives, because they are not inconsistent. 
For a society to make the one its priority almost 
necessarily, in Gray's view, entails making the other its 
priority. As Gray puts it:
Mill's argument [is] that liberty of thought and 
expression is valuable, not just instrumentally as 
a means to the discovery and propagation of truth, 
but non-instrumentally, as a condition of that 
rationality and vitality of belief which he 
conceives of as a characteristic feature of a free 
man.80
The same point is made by Geraint Williams. He contends 
that to argue about whether liberty is an instrumental or
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an intrinsic value, a means or an end, is meaningless. In 
Mill's idea of liberty (he says) the categories of means 
and end are indistinct, and "the relationship is now more 
intimate". Williams insists that in On Liberty:
freedom is not just a means to progress, not just a 
precondition of improvement, but constitutive of 
them.81*
All this is very plausible. Unlike Gray's first 
pillar, it is supported by textual analysis of Mill's 
work, especially On Liberty. Here freedom is conceived in 
terms of utility in the largest sense: not as a means to
it, but as constitutive of it. Autonomy, self- 
development, human dignity - they are all part and parcel 
of the same broad idea in which utility, happiness and 
welfare are enmeshed with the concept of freedom.
Examples abound. Some have already been quoted. 
Thus, in On Liberty, Mill writes of
the necessity to the mental well-being of mankind 
(on which all their other well-being depends) of 
freedom of opinion43.
Similarly, in his Autobiography, he acknowledges the 
connection between individuality and welfare, writing that 
the "internal culture of the individual" is one of the 
"prime necessities of human well-being"82. In On Liberty, 
he emphasises the connection between free choice and human 
advancement:
The human faculties of perception, judgement, 
discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even 
moral preference are exercised only in making a 
choice.83
And, just a couple of pages before, Mill makes it 
absolutely clear that liberty is intimately bound up with 
is, in Williams's word, "constitutive" of - the
* Emphasis added.
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objective of utilitarianism (in the largest sense, of 
course):-
If it were felt that the free development of 
individuality is one of the leading essentials of 
well-being; that it is not only a co-ordinate
element with all that is designated by the terms
civilization, instruction, education, culture, but 
is itself a necessary part and condition of all 
those things, there would be no danger that liberty 
should be undervalued.84*
At this point, it is necessary to plead guilty to a 
small sleight-of-hand. In the introduction to this 
thesis, in order to provide an example of Mill regarding 
liberty as an instrumental (rather than intrinsic) value, 
it was alleged that Mill "repudiates the idea of liberty
as an 'abstract right... a thing independent of
utility'"**. The dots in the quotation concealed one 
rather important word, for what Mill actually says (the 
citation is from the opening paragraphs of On Liberty) is s 
I forego any advantage which could be derived to my 
argument [for the very simple principle] from the 
idea of abstract right as a thing independent of 
utility3-***.
The difference is significant because Mill is not saying 
that he repudiates the idea that liberty should be 
regarded as an abstract right tout court. He is saying, 
rather, that liberty should not be regarded as an abstract 
right which is independent of utility. In other words, he 
does not reject outright the concept of liberty as an 
intrinsic, absolute, abstract "right" (nor could he be 
expected to, since he writes just a paragraph earlier that 
a man's independence "is, of right, absolute"); but he 
insists that that intrinsicality must be dependent on
* Emphasis added.
** See also this chapter, sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.3.
*** Emphasis added.
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utility, must be bound up with instrumentality vis-a-vis 
utilitarianism. Again, then, just as Gray has argued, 
Mill in this quotation refuses to recognise any 
contradiction between liberty as an abstract right and 
liberty as dependent on utility. On the contrary, he
professes to see the one as constitutive of the other.
Gray's arguments in support of his second pillar are
therefore quite convincing. There is no significant 
contradiction between Mill's conceptions of liberty and of 
utility as ultimate objectives because, in effect, they 
mean the same thing: liberty-as-autonomy is almost equal
to utility in the largest sense, meaning individual self- 
development.
But this concept, once grasped, turns to dust in 
one's hands. However convincing or plausible Gray's 
arguments may be here - and indeed they are - on closer 
inspection they reveal themselves to be almost entirely 
without substance as a "defence" of Mill. This is
because, in order to achieve the overlap between the words 
"liberty" and "utility" (and hence between the concepts 
that they represent), it was necessary to redefine them so 
broadly and vaguely as virtually to rob them of their 
meaning. To say that "liberty", defined so that it does 
not exactly mean liberty, is virtually synonymous with 
"utility", defined so that it does not exactly mean
utility... is, in the end, to say nothing that means
anything at all.
"Liberty": As mentioned in the introduction to this
thesis, the question of what exactly Mill means by 
"liberty" is the last of the three main ambiguities which 
the thesis proposes to address, and will be more fully
discussed in chapter three. For the moment, however, it
suffices to reiterate that there are two, very different, 
conceptions of liberty in traditional political theory.
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One is the classical view, what Isaiah Berlin terms 
"negative liberty"84A. This allows the individual the 
greatest possible scope to shape his own life, by 
restricting the range of the state's functions to the 
minimum interference which is necessary for the protection 
of individual freedom. In other words, under this so- 
called "negative" conception of liberty, the government 
and laws are restrained from interfering with an 
individual's freedom of action, except to stop others 
interfering in that freedoms that is, to stop the mugger, 
the terrorist, the foreign invader and so on. This, then, 
is a conception of liberty in terms of non­
interference84-*, and it implies a state of the kind to be 
found in liberal societies* rather than in socialistic 
ones. The other view says almost exactly the opposite. 
It sees liberty not merely as non-interferences
not freedom from, but freedom to - to lead one's 
prescribed form of life84®.
It is, therefore, an active, rather than a passive, 
conception of freedoms Berlin calls it "positive 
liberty"**. It holds that liberty is pointless unless it 
can be acted upon or used. And a society based on the 
"positive" conception of liberty is one which holds that 
the state's responsibilities in safeguarding "freedom" are 
much wider than merely preventing interferences on the 
contrary, they involve active interference to enable 
freedom to be used. One example of a "positive" 
conception of liberty is Hegel's notion of freedom as 
self-realisation and self-knowledge. This is an active 
use of freedom, and Hegel sees the state as best placed to 
promote its the state, he writes in Philosophy of Right,
* "Liberal" here is used in the sense explained in the Note on
Terminology at the beginning of this thesis.
** Berlin's terminology of "negative liberty" and "positive liberty" 
is somewhat unhelpful, partly because "positive" has a more virtuous
connotation than "negative", and partly because (as will be
apparent) in the view of this thesis, so-called "positive liberty" is 
not, properly speaking, liberty at all.
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is "the actuality of concrete freedom" and he declares 
that:
In civilised nations true bravery consists in the 
readiness to give oneself wholly to the service of 
the state so that the individual counts but as one 
amongst many84c.
This, it will be appreciated, is a far cry from the
liberal conception of the state with a minimum range of
functions. Another aspect of positive liberty - liberty 
as pointless unless it can actually be used - finds 
expression in questions which are commonly asked in modern 
political discourse such as:
what is the point of having freedom of choice in
education, with the ("negative") liberty of not 
being compelled to educate one's children in the 
state sector, if one cannot afford to pay the fees 
of an independent school?
or:
what is the point of being free to negotiate the 
terms of one's employment, if one is so poor that 
one is desperate for work and thus in a weak 
bargaining position to obtain good pay and 
conditions from the employer?
These kinds of question imply the view that liberty only 
has any point where people have access to the material 
resources which enable them to use freedom. This leads on 
to a socialist way of organising society where the state 
is expected to pour funds into schooling, and the freedom 
to take children out of state education is considered 
unimportant; or where the state regulates employment by 
dictating wage levels, limiting working hours, and so on. 
The "positive" conception of liberty thus demands very 
substantial state intervention in the workings of society. 
In this respect it is very different from classical 
("negative") liberty, which accords the state a much more 
limited range of functions. Of course in exercising that 
narrow range of functions the classical liberal state may 
have cause to intervene quite a lot. If there is a crime
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wave, or an upsurge in terrorist activity, or a real 
threat of foreign invasion or subversion, the state's 
function - on the "negative”/liberal view - of protecting 
citizens from interference in their liberty involves a 
considerable amount of state and legal activity. It might 
entail, respectively, severe laws to restrain terrorism 
(perhaps denying terrorists the "oxygen of publicity"), or 
the strengthening of the police force and other crime 
prevention agencies, or censorship where this is necessary 
to ensure the maintenance of national security. But 
because the state upholding "negative liberty" has a 
narrower range of functions than the state upholding 
"positive liberty", then, all other things being equal, 
the "negative liberty" state is likely to be much less 
interventionist than the "positive liberty" state*. A 
state founded on the concept of "positive liberty" is 
therefore less inclined to acknowledge limitations on its 
range of functions and on its right to intervene in 
people's lives. For these reasons, in the view of many, 
"positive" liberty is not really liberty at alls thus 
Hobbes argued that the view that freedom requires more 
than just the absence of "external impediments" is an 
"abuse" of the word; and the demand for access to 
resources is a demand for "ability" and "power", but it is 
not a demand for liberty85.
Returning now to Gray's interpretation of liberty in 
Mill as "autonomy", it is apparent that this rather blurs 
the distinction between the two conceptions of liberty. 
In some ways it seems to echo the question asked by 
proponents of the "positive" conception - what is the 
point of liberty unless it can actually be used? Gray 
writes of the "capacities and opportunities" involved in 
"self-critical and imaginative" choice-making86. This
* Thus in the nineteenth century, Bismarckian Germany, drawing 
inspiration from Hegel’s concept of positive liberty, had far more 
state intervention than England where liberty was still conceived 
essentially in "negative" terms.
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suggests that simply having the liberty to make a choice 
is not enough; there must be something more active. 
Choice-making must be "self-critical and imaginative", and 
there must be the "capacities and opportunities" to make 
choices (rather than merely the absence of impediments to 
doing so). Gray elaborates further on this when he 
declares s
A society of autonomous agents, then, would be a 
society whose members enjoyed legal immunity in the 
exercise of certain important powers and of whom it 
was also true that they had developed these 
capacities and abilities up to at least a minimum 
level*7**.
But this is hopelessly vague. Is Gray talking about 
protecting the individual from state interference, as the 
expression "legal immunity" suggests; or about the 
promotion of "ability" or "power" ("capacities and 
abilities")? Is he speaking about the light hand of 
government or the heavy? There is the classical, 
"negative", liberty of liberal societies; and there is 
its "positive", statist (and often socialistic) opposite. 
The question of which of these is meant by liberty-as- 
autonomy is left open. In chapter three this question 
will be fully considered. At this stage suffice it to say 
that the "definition" of liberty as autonomy so bleeds the 
word of any clear or precise meaning that it is hardly 
surprising that it can be equated with utility.
"Utility": In much the same way, just as liberty-as-
autonomy is not recognisably liberty (or indeed anything 
very meaningful at all), so too utility "in the largest 
sense" is not recognisably utilitarian. As has been seen, 
utility is made to seem like liberty because its meaning 
is developed along two new paths. The first is the 
identification of happiness - the "end" or goal of 
utilitarianism - with the "general cultivation of
** Emphasis added.
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nobleness of character"29. The second path is Mill's 
claim, already quoted, that general happiness is what each 
person desires or chooses77.
These two points need to be examined carefully. The 
first, concerning happiness as the general cultivation of 
nobleness of character, is spelled out in more detail by 
Mill in chapter 2 of Utilitarianism:
Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who 
are equally acquainted with, and equally capable 
of appreciating and enjoying, both, do give a most 
marked preference to the manner of existence which 
employs their higher faculties... Whoever
supposes that this preference takes place at a 
sacrifice of happiness - that the superior being, 
in anything like equal circumstance, is not 
happier than the inferior - confounds two very 
different ideas, of happiness and content37*-.
It is unclear what is being said here. If Mill, and Gray 
in endorsing his position, are suggesting, as an assertion 
of fact, that the "inferior" pleasures do not actually 
produce as much happiness as the "superior", "nobler" 
pleasures, then they are making an empirical claim, which 
requires empirical proof. They need to produce some 
evidence or argument to substantiate their assertion; to 
show, for example, that watching "Rambo"-type films at the 
cinema as a matter of fact produces less happiness in the 
audience than seeing Shakespearean plays at the theatre. 
But Gray and Mill do not offer any evidence or argument to 
support such an assertion. Instead, they seem to fall 
back on the proposition that it is a question not of fact, 
but of meaning or definition: that the sensations
produced by employing the lower faculties are not really 
"happiness", but "content" - a "very different idea". 
They are saying, in short, that the word "happiness" (in 
contradistinction to the word "content") means the 
cultivation of nobleness of character. However, this 
essentially semantic proposition involves quite a shift
56
from the normal, commonly-understood definition of 
happiness. As a matter of ordinary language, it makes 
sense to say that people derive happiness from watching 
"Rambo"-type films at the cinema; otherwise they probably 
would not go. Yet this is a far cry from saying that 
doing so cultivates nobleness of character. Defining 
happiness as nobleness of character thus involves denying 
that certain forms of happiness are happiness - which is 
(to say the least) a contortion of language.
So, too, with the second point, the suggestion that 
happiness is that which a person desires or chooses77. 
Again, if this were an empirical claim - an assertion that 
if people attain what they desire or choose, this will as 
a matter of fact make them happy - it would require 
supporting evidence. But, again, no evidence is
forthcoming. Instead, it appears to be a linguistic 
rather than an empirical assertion, a statement about 
meaning rather than substance: that happiness can be
defined simply as anything that a person chooses or 
desires. That is to say: if someone wants something, and
obtains it, he is happy by definition, regardless of what 
it is that he actually obtains, or how he actually feels 
when he has obtained it. Isaiah Berlin puts the point 
succinctly:
In J.S. Mill's writings happiness comes to mean 
something very like "realization of one's wishes", 
whatever they may be. This stretches its meaning 
to the point of vacuity®8.
In both of these cases, a semantic game is being 
played. If Mill and Gray were making empirical statements 
about happiness, such statements would have to be verified 
empirically: evidence or argument would have to be
furnished to demonstrate that true happiness can in fact 
only be obtained by cultivating nobleness of character, or 
having one's choices realised. But no attempt is made to 
do this (as will be seen later in this chapter, in section
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3.3.2., Mill does attempt a "proof" of the principle of 
utility, and Gray attempts to refine it, but neither is 
remotely successful). It does not seem far-fetched to 
presume that the reason Gray and Mill do not try to prove 
these claims is that they cannot. As claims, as 
assertions of fact, they are unsustainable. So what has 
been done is to pretend that no proof is required, on the 
grounds that no contentions of fact are being made: only
definitions are being offered (and definitions need no 
proof). What Gray is saying, and what Mill seems to be 
saying, is that happiness means cultivating nobleness of 
character, and happiness means realising one's wishes. 
But of course these "definitions" are not what is meant in 
common usage by the word happiness. The meaning is no 
meaning; as Berlin says, it has been stretched to the 
point of vacuity.
The consequence of all this stretching of definitions 
is that the precise meaning of words like liberty and 
utility are removed, and the distinctions are blurred. 
This enables Gray to see them as overlapping concepts and 
to reconcile the paramountcy of liberty as an objective 
with the paramountcy of utility (and hence the notion of 
liberty as an intrinsic value with the idea of it as 
instrumental to attaining utility). But so what? Gray's 
reconciliation, the denial of incompatibility and 
inconsistency, rests on ultimately meaningless 
definitions. It is built on sand.
It would of course be unfair to blame all this on 
Gray. For, as the textual evidence has demonstrated, Mill 
himself seems to adopt the broad definitions of liberty 
(as autonomy) and utility ("in the largest sense"), such 
that the one is "constitutive" of the other. To that 
extent, Gray's interpretation, in his second pillar, is 
probably correct. But it is not very helpful. Because it
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involves redefining liberty and utility practically beyond 
recognition, it goes nowhere towards answering the central 
question of this chapters does Mill's very simple 
principle entail that liberty (in a sense that actually 
means something) is to be pursued for its own sake, or 
rather because it leads to utility (in a sense that also 
means something)? No clear or unambiguous answer can be 
found in Mill's writings.
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3. WHY DOES IT MATTER?
The project on which this thesis has embarked is to 
ascertain what kind of "free society" there would be if 
the very simple principle were applied in practice. Would 
it be liberal/laissez-faire* or socialistic? Would it, 
truly, be free?
The question of "why freedom?" - of whether Mill 
intends liberty to be upheld because it is intrinsically 
right, or because it is instrumental towards producing an 
ulterior end, and in particular utility - matters 
enormously for understanding the practical implications of 
the very simple principle. Three ways in which 
commentators have suggested that it could matter will be 
considered here.
The first is the argument that a belief in liberty is 
incompatible with the assertion of any other systems of 
belief or values such as utilitarianism - so that in a 
society where a value or end like "general happiness" is 
promoted, freedom cannot flourish. In the view of this 
thesis, the premise on which that argument is based - that 
a free society must be ethically neutral - is a false one, 
and the argument is unsound. Secondly, it is alleged 
that the utilitarianism in Mill derogates from the liberty 
because it entails "act-consequentialism"i in order to 
maximise happiness, some happiness or goodness must be 
"traded-off" against others to obtain an optimum balance, 
and this means "sacrificing" some people for the sake of 
others, an unacceptable infringement of people's 
liberties. This is the view taken by, for example, Robert 
Nozick89; but, in the view of this thesis, it likewise is 
an invalid objection to the notion of Mill's liberty as
* See the Note on Terminology at the beginning of this thesis.
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instrumental towards utility. Thirdly, there is the 
question of "rule-consequentialism" s the point that if 
liberty is made subject to another objective such as 
utility, then whenever the exercise of liberty would 
obstruct the attainment of that other objective, liberty 
is liable to be jettisoned. Liberty, if instrumental 
towards another objective, thus rests on the fragile 
foundation of contingency. This third point is, this 
thesis will argue, the real problem about liberty being 
merely instrumental - and, moreover, it is a very serious 
problem.
3.1. Liberty as ethically neutral
To begin with the first of these arguments: the
allegation that liberty is incompatible with other systems 
of belief or value, so that a free society cannot co-exist 
with the pursuit of an ultimate end, such as utility. 
Taken to its logical conclusion, this argument holds that 
a free society must be ethically neutral and, indeed, 
relativistic. Liberty, the proponents of this argument 
contend, depends on there being no absolute view of 
goodness or rightness or truth - because (they say), once 
a single truth or ultimate end is asserted, the right to 
have lots of different contending views of truth, or a 
variety of different ends and ambitions, is accordingly 
denied. Among the most vociferous spokesmen for this 
argument, at least in the context of Mill, is Isaiah 
Berlin.
Berlin is anxious to defend Mill's reputation as a 
champion of liberty. On account of this, he insists, 
Mill's assumptions must contradict90 the assumptions upon 
which utilitarianism is founded. In particular, they must 
reject the moral and scientific absoluteness of 
utilitarianism in favour of relativism. Thus Berlin 
claims that Mill worked from the premise
61
that human knowledge was in principle never 
complete...; that there was no single, universally 
visible, truth91.
Moreover, in Berlin's view, Mill rejects a teleological 
analysis of human development (for, if there is no single 
truth, there can be no single end and no single 
direction). Mill, he says,
assumes that finality is impossible, and implies 
that it is undesirable too90.
Berlin's portrayal of Mill in these colours is, quite 
simply, unsupportable by any analysis of what Mill 
actually writes. Indeed, Berlin comes close to
acknowledging this when he qualifies his assessment with 
the (somewhat devastating) caveats
. . .even if he [Mill] never, so far as I know, 
admits this explicitly92.
That is a masterpiece of understatement. The reality is 
that, in almost everything that Mill writes - in On
Liberty, in Utilitarianism and elsewhere - there is a 
passionate commitment to absolute truth, to finality of 
knowledge, to teleological human advancement. Mill's very 
argument in favour of allowing freedom of discussion is 
predicated on the idea that indeed there is a single
truth. The "peculiar evil", he argues in On Liberty, of 
people silencing the expression of an opinion is that
If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the 
opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if 
wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a
benefit, the clearer perception and livelier
impression of truth produced by its collision with 
error40.
In Utilitarianism Mill confidently asserts this 
progressive, teleological nature of human endeavour:
Yet no one whose opinion deserves a moment's
consideration can doubt that most of the great 
positive evils of the world are in themselves 
removable and will, if human affairs continue to
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improve, be in the end reduced within narrow 
limits92.
The two points are fused in the following passage from On 
Liberty where Mill demonstrates his belief not only in 
absolute truth and not only in human advancement, but in 
human advancement to the point (the finality) where a 
single absolute truth comes to prevail in society:
As mankind improve, the number of doctrines which 
are no longer disputed or doubted will be 
constantly on the increase; and the well-being of 
mankind may almost be measured by the number and 
gravity of the truths which have reached the point 
of being uncontested93.
The vision of a diminution in the "number of 
doctrines" might seem to sit uneasily with Mill's apparent 
espousal of the cause of diversity and variety of opinion. 
But this is to miss a distinction which Mill makes - and 
which Berlin fails to acknowledge - between the present 
and the teleological end which is yet to come. Thus Mill 
in On Liberty stresses that
diversity is not an evil but a good, until mankind 
are much more capable than at present of 
recognizing all sides of the truth***.
Moreover, this point is "applicable to men's modes of 
action not less than to their opinions"84. With regard 
both to freedom of speech and to freedom of action, 
variety and diversity are desirable only for the time 
being,
while mankind are imperfect84 
- which carries the unavoidable implication that Mill 
expects that ultimately mankind will be perfect. He does 
(pace Berlin). And the perfect state to which Mill refers 
is one where utilitarianism prevails and where happiness 
and the general good will be maximised by people acting in 
the interests of each other. In Utilitarianism he writes
* Emphasis added.
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that the maxim of love-thy-neighbour-as-thyself is the 
"ideal perfection"94 of utilitarian morality.
In similar vein, there is Mill's endorsement of the 
doctrine of Wilhelm von Humboldt, referred to earlier in 
this chapter, that
"the end of man, or that which is prescribed by the 
eternal and immutable dictates of reason... is the 
highest and most harmonious development of his 
powers to a complete and consistent whole"45.
It is all there: the absoluteness of truth ("eternal and
immutable"), the finality ("complete and consistent 
whole") and the teleological progression towards that 
finality ("development of his powers"). Here is to be 
found "the end of man" - "end" in the sense of an 
ultimate, absolute value, and "end" in the sense of the 
final point to which man is progressing through time. 
That end, both those ends, can be summed up as utility in 
the largest sense. This is Mill's ultimate value.
In the face of this, it is impossible to maintain the
view that Mill's vision is ethically neutral, relativistic 
or value-free*. Mill does believe in one single truth and 
in the likelihood and indeed desirability of that truth 
being universally accepted. As has been seen, his 
espousal of diversity of opinions and actions is only 
contingent: ultimately he looks forward to a day when
doctrines "are no longer disputed or doubted"93. Because 
of this at least one commentator has argued that Mill's 
commitment to liberty is only superficial and that Mill's 
vision is, in reality, a prescription for "moral 
totalitarianism"96.
* Indeed Berlin, ten years after having made his original claims in 
an essay entitled "John Stuart Mill and the ends of life", actually 
conceded the point. Writing an introduction to a new edition of his 
works in which the essay re-appeared, Berlin noted: "Mill does seem
to have convinced himself that there exists such a thing as 
attainable, communicable, objective truth in the field of value 
judgements"®3 .
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It must be said at once that, if Mill's commitment to 
utilitarianism means that the liberty he envisages is a 
sham, and that the very simple principle will lead to 
moral totalitarianism, then that is a very serious 
business indeed. If this is true, the question of "why 
freedom" matters very much. It matters enormously whether 
Mill intends liberty to be promoted as an intrinsic value 
(in which case, according to Berlin, his "free society" 
will be ethically neutral), or as merely instrumental to a 
utilitarian end (in which case, it is alleged, it will be 
totalitarian).
In fact, both the Berlin analysis and the "moral 
totalitarianism" argument rest on the same logical fallacy 
even though they reach diametrically opposite 
conclusions. The former view supposes that the very 
simple principle rules out any belief in absolute truth or 
values; and the latter view supposes that, because Mill 
clearly is committed to absolute truth and morality, it 
rules out genuine liberty. Both views pre suppose, 
wrongly, that morality is synonymous with legality. That 
is to say, both presuppose that a belief that certain
things are right (absolutely right, not just relatively)
is the same as a belief that those things must be
compelled or enforced by law. Conversely, they presuppose 
that because certain things are not prohibited by law, 
there is nothing wrong morally in doing them; in other 
words, that liberty is licence.
But legality is not morality, and liberty is not 
licence. Being allowed to do something does not make it 
right to do it. Equally, just because something is wrong 
does not mean that it should be forbidden. Indeed, it is 
the essence of a free society to recognise this
distinction. In a free society it is acceptable to 
persuade others of the rightness or wrongness of an 
opinion or action; it is acceptable to use argument,
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exhortation, explanation, the setting of examples - but 
not coercion. The freedom lies in allowing each 
individual the moral space to act as he chooses, rightly 
or wrongly (even after all the persuasion, exhortation and 
so on): in granting people the right to be wrong. An
inability to differentiate liberty from licence, 
persuasion from coercion, morality from legality, is 
characteristic of totalitarian societies; forcing people 
to do what is right really is moral totalitarianism. But 
Mill is not guilty of this inability. He recognises that 
the distinguishing mark of a free society is not to 
confuse morality with legality, or coercion with 
persuasion. Mill is not ethically neutral or
scientifically relativistic but he insists, in the 
paragraph where he spells out the very simple principle 
itself, that a man
cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear 
because it will be better for him to do so, because 
it will make him happier, because, in the opinions 
of others, to do so would be wise or even right. 
Those are good reasons for remonstrating with him, 
or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for
compelling him or visiting him with any evil in
case he do otherwise2.
Further on in On Liberty Mill expands on this point. 
Preventing people from interfering in each other's actions
- that is, recognising their independence and moral space
- does not, he says, entail moral neglect or "selfish
indifference which pretends that human beings have no 
business with each other's conduct in life". On the 
contrary, there should be "disinterested exertion to 
promote the good of others" - which, crucially, should use 
"other instruments to persuade people to their good than 
whips and scourges, either of the literal or metaphorical 
sort". Virtue should be inculcated by "conviction and 
persuasion" rather than by "compulsion". People, Mill 
concludes
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should be forever stimulating each other to 
increased exercise of their higher faculties and 
increased direction of their feelings and aims 
towards wise instead of foolish, elevating instead 
of degrading, objects and contemplations. But [no- 
one] ... is warranted in saying to another human 
creature of ripe years that he shall not do with 
his life for his own benefit what he chooses to do 
with it97.
It is interesting to note, parenthetically, that 
Berlin himself appreciates precisely this distinction when 
he pleads:
only tolerate; disapprove, think ill of, if need 
be mock or despise... We may argue, attack, 
reject, condemn with passion and hatred. But we 
must not suppress or stifle.9®
In other words, if we argue, attack, reject, condemn... 
we must assume that something is wrong in the first place. 
As we do so, we implicitly reject (as Berlin does so, he 
implicitly rejects) moral relativism. We accept (Berlin 
accepts) the compatibility of a commitment to absolute 
truth with a commitment to freedom**.
But more than being just compatible with a system of 
values, liberty is - and this is Mill's view - probably 
the best way to ascertain (in opinions) and attain (by 
actions) what is right and good. This works two ways. 
First, the restraint on freedom whereby the state uses its 
coercive power to regulate conduct and suppress immorality 
allows individuals to delegate moral responsibility to the
** Indeed, as Berlin’s words here virtually acknowledge, the kind of 
tolerance which a free society embodies and demands is pretty well 
meaningless unless it is combined with a system of values, with an 
objective conception of right and good. Roger Scruton expresses it 
succinctly when he defines toleration as
...patient forbearance towards that which is not approved. 
There is toleration only when there are also things that are 
disapproved; if men were perfect, tolerance would be neither 
necessary nor possible®®.
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authorities, such that their consciences and social norms 
become redundant and eventually, through lack of use, 
numbed. The result of this unfreedom is moral regression, 
for it enables people to blame "the government" or
"society" for all their wrongdoings* (and therefore to 
carry on those wrongdoings untroubled by the qualms of 
conscience), and also to take the view that it is all 
right to do anything that is not forbidden by law: telling 
lies, breaking promises, hurling abuse, displaying
contempt for the old and the weak and those who hold 
unfashionable opinions, and so on. Freedom, conversely, 
enables the development of personal moral responsibility 
and thus acts as a safeguard against such moral
regression. The second way that freedom enables
advancement towards truth and goodness is by acting as a 
corrective mechanism. As was seen earlier, this seems to 
be the main argument which Mill employs in favour of 
freedom in chapters 2 and 3 of On Liberty, saying that 
mankind's
errors are corrigible. He is capable of rectifying
his mistakes by discussion and experience30.
Only a free society gives him the opportunity to do so.
So it is that liberty is not only compatible with, 
but actually enhances the promotion of, values. The 
allegations of incompatibility - with the conclusions 
being drawn either that Mill's vision must be ethically
* Symptoms of this are to be found even in "welfarist" countries 
where it is felt that compassion is the responsibility of the state, 
and where the role of the state has been extended accordingly. The 
attitudes which this fosters include, typically, sociological 
"explanations" that place the blame for shoplifting, or for the 
deliberate running-up of debts, on the temptations provided by the 
"consumer society". Attitudes to the 1981 inner city riots in 
England are also instructive, such as the incredulity shown by two 
BBC commentators at Mrs Margaret Thatcher's reaction:
"After the appalling urban riots in Toxteth... when the frustrations 
of hundreds of unemployed, badly-housed no-hopers burst into horrific 
violence, Mrs Thatcher's reaction was, while startling, all of a 
piece. Recounted by someone who heard her say it, and not disputed 
by Lord Whitelaw, it was 'Oh, those poor shopkeepers’."100 [Emphasis 
added. ]
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neutral or that it must be morally totalitarian - simply 
cannot, therefore, be sustained. This is not why the 
intrinsicality/instrumentality question matters so much.
3.2. Liberty, utilitarianism and act-consequentialism
Nor does the importance of the intrinsicality/ 
instrumentality question rest on the fact that 
utilitarianism entails act-consequentialism. However, as 
has been mentioned (at the beginning of section 3.), 
Robert Nozick would disagree. Nozick thinks that the act- 
consequentialist nature of utilitarianism is a significant 
danger to liberty. His case is simple. Utilitarianism, 
he correctly points out, by requiring the maximisation of 
happiness, measures acts in terms of the totality of their 
consequences. Mill's definition of utility bears this 
out:
Utility... holds that actions are right in 
proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong 
as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness... 
All desirable things... are desirable either for 
the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as a means 
to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of 
pain28*.
Accordingly, when there are a number of alternative 
courses of action, the utilitarian will assess, so far as 
foreseeable, the total happiness produced in consequence 
of each of them (including the happiness inherent in the 
act itself: this is a matter not of means-versus-ends but
of aggregating means with ends), and will pronounce the 
one with the highest score to be the right course of 
action, which therefore ought to be adopted.
This means that it may happen that, for example, out 
of two available options, one entails a certain amount of
* Emphasis added.
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suffering but will eventually lead to an enormous amount 
of happiness ("jam tomorrow"), whereas the other entails 
no suffering but does not bring any happiness either (as 
is often the case with Inaction, which may be the only 
alternative to a certain course of action). If the net 
happiness (the happiness minus the suffering) in the first 
course of action equals a total of more than the net 
happiness in the second, the utilitarian will opt for the 
first - even though this entails some suffering and the 
second does not. This sort of "act-consequentialism" is 
what Nozick objects to about utilitarianism. It involves 
calculations in which a "moral balancing act" is attempted 
and, when utilitarianism becomes the rule in society, this 
involves "sacrificing" or "violating" people - and thus 
infringes their liberty, autonomy, sovereignty. Nozick 
puts his case thus:
Why may not one violate persons for the greater 
social good? Individually, we each sometimes 
choose to undergo some pain or sacrifice for a 
greater benefit: ... we go to the dentist to avoid 
more suffering later... But there is no social 
entity with a good that undergoes some sacrifice 
for its own good. There are only... different 
individual people... Using one of these people for 
the benefit of others, uses him and benefits the 
others. Nothing more... To use a person in this 
way does not sufficiently respect... the fact that 
he is a separate person... He does not get some 
overbalancing good from his sacrifice, and no one 
is entitled to force this upon him - least of all a 
state or government that claims his allegiance...89 
The implication is that, because utilitarianism enables 
some people to be sacrificed for others, a liberty which 
is expressed to be dependent on utility, must necessarily 
be a negation of liberty. A truly free society, Nozick 
believes, involves no such act-consequentialist violations 
at all. Instead it rests on
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a libertarian side constraint that prohibits 
aggression against another101*.
This is not the place to attempt a full critique of 
Nozick's deontological position or to try to justify act- 
consequentialism. The point which needs to be made at 
this stage is that the act-consequentialist nature of
utilitarianism is not the issue here: act-
consequentialism is not what makes the question of
instrumentality or intrinsicality so important for
understanding the nature of Mill's "free society".
A couple of examples will serve to illustrate this. 
They both come, perhaps unsurprisingly, from the time of 
the second world war, a period of the twentieth century 
when moral dilemmas facing the western world were possibly 
more acute than at any other. One is fictional, from the 
novel Sophie's Choice by William Styron. The heroine, 
Sophie, is a Polish woman with two young children. The 
central scene in the novel occurs where Sophie and the two 
children are in a Nazi extermination camp standing in the 
queue where those who are to live and those who are to die
are being selected. The camp doctor is making the
selection and approaches Sophies
The doctor said "You may keep one of your
children."
"Bitte?" said Sophie.
"You may keep one of your children," he repeated.
"The other one will have to go. Which one will you
keep?"
"You mean, I have to choose?"
"You're a Polack, not a Yid. That gives you a 
privilege - a choice."
* Emphasis added. The use of the term "libertarian" here is, 
strictly speaking, incorrect; Nozick means "liberal": see the Note
on Terminology at the beginning of this thesis.
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"Don't make me choose," she heard herself plead in 
a whisper, "I can't choose."
"Send them both over there, then," the doctor said 
to the aide, "nach links."
"MamaI" She heard Eva's thin but soaring cry at 
the instant that she thrust the child away from her 
and rose from the concrete with a clumsy stumbling 
motion. "Take the baby!" she called out. "Take my 
little girl."1° 2
This, then, is Sophie's choice, and it undoubtedly is 
an extremely difficult one (and one which, in the novel, 
is to haunt Sophie in later years). The significance of 
it in this context is that it is an act-consequentialist 
choice, involving a "moral balancing act" and the 
"sacrificing" of an individual human being. One option 
open to Sophie was to nominate one of her children for 
death, the consequence of which was that one survived. 
The only alternative was inaction or abstention - a 
refusal to nominate either - the consequence of which 
would have been that both were killed, neither survived. 
Act-consequentialism dictates choosing the option with the 
consequences which maximise goodness: that is, one child
surviving rather than none. A doctrine of side 
constraints, by contrast, would dictate that Sophie should 
absolutely refuse to nominate one of her children to die, 
that no balance and no sacrifice be made - in which case, 
of course, both children would have been killed.
The other example is factual. In 1943, as the 
Germans were attacking England with VI and V2 missiles:
The German missile attacks were directed against 
London; but, through miscalculation, many of these 
automated weapons exploded with comparatively small 
effect in the Home Counties. The military 
authorities [in Britain] favoured a calculated 
policy of planting false information on the enemy, 
designed to convince him that the metropolitan
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target was being successfully reached. The 
Cabinet, however, ordered the ending of this policy 
on the... ground that it involved... deciding who 
should and who should not be killed. [Duncan] 
Sandys [chairman of the Cabinet's defence 
committee] is alleged to have blandly ignored the 
instruction, thereby saving much devastation in 
London and contributing to the frustration of the 
enemy's strategic aim.3-03 
Sandys's choice, like Sophie's, is one which can only be 
justified on act-consequentialist grounds. It involved 
balancing the consequences of planting false information 
(deaths in the Home Counties) with the consequences of the 
alternative, inaction (far more deaths in London), and 
choosing the option with the less evil consequences. A 
policy of side constraints, by contrast, would have meant 
refusing to decide "who should and who should not be
killed", refusing to sacrifice the people of the Home 
Counties for the people of London. It would have meant, 
also, that there could have been no saving of the
devastation in London, no contribution to frustrating the 
Germans' strategic aim. Indeed, a true policy of side 
constraints would have meant not fighting Hitler at all: 
refusing to "sacrifice" lives in war regardless of the 
consequences of such inaction: refusing to "balance" some
killing in the short-term against the likelihood of mass 
murder and tyranny if the Germans were able to conquer 
without resistance. In short, the doctrine of side 
constraints commits those who hold it to an absolute
pacifist stance.
This is not the place to say whether such a stance is 
wrong or right, or indeed to say whether a morality of 
side constraints is, accordingly, wrong or right. What 
does need to be said and appreciated is that the 
abandonment of act-consequentialism in favour of side
constraints does in fact carry these implications, fairly 
radical implications. Nozick refers to "libertarian side
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constraints" and an individualist respect for "separate 
persons". But, as these examples show, individual life 
and liberty* are not necessarily best served by his 
doctrine: in Sophie's case, it would entail the killing
of one more child; in Sandys's dilemma, the deaths of 
thousands more people; in a pacifist stance, the triumph 
of Nazi tyranny.
There are some who would be willing to endorse side 
constraints with all these implications rather than 
maximising liberty. Indeed, in this respect, Nozick is 
impeccably consistent. His criticism is directed not 
solely towards utilitarianism, a form of act- 
consequentialism designed to maximise happiness, but also 
towards any act-consequentialist doctrine which was 
designed to maximise liberty and rights. His objection to 
the latter is that
this would still require us to violate someone's 
rights when doing so minimizes the total (weighted) 
amount of the violation of rights in society104.
This leads neatly to the main point being made about 
act-consequentialism and the intrinsicality or 
instrumentality of liberty. The purpose of the previous 
few paragraphs on act-consequentialism has not been to 
assess its merits or demerits, but to show that it is 
immaterial to the question of whether liberty should be 
viewed as an intrinsic value or as dependent on 
utilitarianism: it is a different issue altogether. For,
as has been shown (and as Nozick plainly acknowledges), 
there can be act-consequentialism in the pursuit of 
liberty for its own sake as much as in the pursuit of 
utilitarian happiness. It is quite possible to value 
liberty as an intrinsic good, independent of utility, and 
to want to maximise liberty by adopting act- 
consequentialism and rejecting side constraints. The act-
* As to the connection between protecting life and protecting 
liberty, see section 1.4.1. of chapter two of this thesis.
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consequentialist aspect of utilitarianism, therefore, is 
not what makes it so important for the maintenance of a 
free society that liberty should be independent of
utility.
3.3. Liberty, utilitarianism and rule-consequentialism
What matters about the intrinsicality/instrumentality 
question - the question "why freedom?" - is not act- 
consequentialism, but rule-consequentialism. This is the 
third of the three points raised in the introductory 
paragraph to this section; and it is the one which, in the 
view of this thesis, most pertinently answers the question 
of why does it matter.
3.3.1. The real problem with instrumental values:
contingency
As its name implies, the essence of rule-
consequentialism is that, instead of specific courses of 
action being assessed in terms of their consequences, 
entire general rules or principles are assessed in terms 
of their consequences. This is the point about liberty 
not being independent of utility. If liberty is to be 
promoted not in its own right, but because it is
instrumental to a utilitarian end, then the principle of 
liberty derives its value from its consequences: namely,
that it is able to advance utility. This is crucial to 
how secure will be the freedom of a society governed in 
accordance with Mill's principle. For if the very simple 
principle is assessed in terms of its utilitarian
consequences, then the focus of concern shifts away from 
liberty to another value altogether, utilitarianism; and 
liberty becomes subject to utility. Freedom is to be 
promoted so long as its consequences advance utility. 
This means that the prospects for freedom flourishing thus
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depend upon - are contingent upon - its propensity to 
advance utility. It follows that if, in any circumstance
or situation, freedom will not have the consequence of
advancing utility, there will no longer be any reason for 
having freedom, and it can (and should) then be
jettisoned. A "free society" which rests on such a
fragile principle of liberty cannot be assured of its 
freedom lasting for long.
There is also what might be termed a rhetorical 
problem here. Once the focus has shifted from liberty to 
utilitarianism, and liberty is justified in terms of 
utility, then liberty is implicitly devalued at the 
expense of utility. According to J.W.N. Watkins, this is 
the main problem with Mill's very simple principle:
He cannot argue for A [liberty] merely by affirming 
A ; he has to appeal to other principles, say B and 
C. ..; but if A is what he values most, he values B 
and C less highly: the superior principle is
justified by inferior principles, and these may not 
prove quite good enough to justify it 
effectively.105
Watkins here identifies a philosophical as well as a 
rhetorical issue. He writes that Mill cannot argue for A 
merely by affirming A (and hence has to justify it on the 
grounds of its propensity to do something else). But why? 
Why is it illegitimate merely to affirm A? Why is it 
illegitimate to say that A is right intrinsically, as an 
abstract right, a self-evident truth? Why must a rule 
(such as the liberty principle) be justified in terms of 
its consequences and of some other rule - with all the 
attendant problems of contingency, fragility and 
rhetorical limpness?
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3.3.2. The alleged problem with intrinsic values: "self-
evident " truths
It is at this point that the reasons for Mill's 
insistence that liberty is not to be regarded as 
"independent of utility" (an insistence which gives rise 
to the countless ambiguities in his work) begin to be 
apparent. Mill, it seems, felt he had to be a rule- 
consequentialist, and had to justify liberty in terms of 
something else, because he just could not accept the idea 
of any principle being self-evidently true. He appears to 
have believed that there must be some ulterior reason for 
everything. In this, he displays the spirit of
rationalistic scientific inquiry in which he was brought 
up.
The world in which Mill grew up, the world of his 
father and of Bentham, was one infused with the spirit of 
Enlightenment rationalism, applying a critical and 
sceptical eye to everything from physics and biology to 
religious belief and the question of whether to obey 
governments. The Benthamites maintained that dogmas and 
values ought not merely to be accepted as given; things 
were only true if they could be justified by reasons.
Nothing was intrinsically, self-evidently true. In his 
essay on Bentham, Mill identifies, and endorses, this
attitude s
An age of formalism in the Church and corruption in 
the State, when the most valuable part of the
meaning of traditional doctrines had faded from the 
minds even of those who retained from habit a
mechanical belief in them, was the time to raise up 
all kinds of sceptical philosophy... The father of 
English innovation, both in doctrines and in 
institutions, is Bentham: he is the great
subversive... the great critical thinker of his age 
and country106.
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But as traditional values regarding custom and divine 
right came to be replaced by Enlightenment ones, such as 
liberty and happiness, it began to be claimed that the 
Enlightenment values were also intrinsic, and did not need 
to be justified by reasons. Thus the famous lines from 
the American Declaration of Independence in 1776:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all 
men are created equal, that they are endowed by 
their Creator with certain unalienable [sic] 
rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the 
pursuit of Happiness3-07*.
If traditional values were not to be accepted as 
intrinsic and self-evident, still less were Enlightenment 
values (which could not even benefit from arguments that 
they were tried and tested over the centuries or that they 
were divinely ordained). The new values had a fortiori to 
be exposed to sceptical and critical scrutiny: to
reasons. Mill inherited this view from Bentham; and the 
consequence was that he could not accept the idea of a 
self-evident, abstract, intrinsic right to liberty that is 
independent of utility. In his writings he puts forward 
three main arguments for rejecting the concept of 
intrinsic, abstract values.
The first presages the Popperian concept of 
unfalsifiability. Writing in Utilitarianism about
various, conflicting, "notions of justice", Mill 
complains:
I cannot see how any... can be refuted3-08.
In other words, each of these "notions of justice" asserts 
its validity by virtue of its own presumed validity, 
internally and intrinsically. There is no attempt to 
justify any of them in terms of reasons ulterior to the 
notion which could be grasped by people who did not 
already believe in it. Therefore nobody can refute, or
* Emphasis added.
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argue against, the notion, because there are no common 
grounds or terms of discourse on which to base such an 
argument. Equally, however, nobody can prove the notion 
either: there are no grounds on which to base a
justification. So the various notions remain, internally 
self-justifying, externally unfalsifiable and irrefutable, 
but therefore unprovable - and all still contradicting 
each other without any prospect of the contradiction being 
resolved.
Secondly, Mill suggests that intrinsic or absolute 
values lack coherence, in that they often fail to take 
into consideration other values which, though equally 
valid and plausible, would undermine the validity of the 
first value. Thus - again in the context of competing 
notions of justice - Mill writes, of people who advocate 
these notions:
Each is triumphant so long as he is not compelled 
to take into consideration any other maxims of 
justice than the one he has selected; but as soon 
as their several maxims are brought face to face, 
each disputant seems to have exactly as much to say 
for himself as the others. No one of them can 
carry his own notion of justice without trampling 
upon another equally binding3-08.
Mill's first and second arguments, alleging the 
unfalsifiability and the incoherence of intrinsic, 
absolute values, are in truth rooted in the third. This 
third argument is, quite simply, that intrinsic values are 
to be rejected because they are impossible to prove. If 
the question is asked why one notion of justice is
preferred to the other, the answer can be no more than the 
bald assertion that it is to be preferred. No way of
falsifying, no account taken of conflicting maxims, no
reason or justification or proof. If the question is
asked, "why freedom?" and the answer is, "because it is 
intrinsically good", this begs the further question of why
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it is intrinsically good. To that question there can be 
no answer other than "because it is".
Mill, and Bentham before him, rejected such "reason­
less" answers as inadequate for a sceptical, critical, 
rational age. Thus Bentham accused the framers of the 
American Declaration of Independence - with its assertions 
of "self-evident" truths - of "bawling on paper"109. And 
Mill, in On Liberty itself, commenting on jurisprudential 
rules which claim to be "self-evident and self- 
justifying", dismisses them by arguing that
an opinion on a point of conduct, not supported by 
reasons, can only count as one person's 
preference110*.
To sum up the arguments about intrinsicality and 
rule-consequentialism so far: this thesis has argued
that, to justify a principle of liberty in terms of its 
consequences in being instrumental to utilitarianism, 
means that the principle is contingent, and hence fragile 
and insecure, and also that it is rhetorically more 
difficult to justify. Against this there is the 
Bentham/Mill argument that not to justify liberty in terms 
beyond itself, and merely to assert its intrinsic value, 
is just "bawling on paper". Therefore, Mill appears to 
conclude, liberty has to be regarded as dependent on 
utility, because otherwise there can be no reason, and no 
justification, for it.
In the view of this thesis, that (Benthamite/Millian) 
argument cannot be sustained. It may be true that the 
intrinsic value of liberty cannot be proven; but to 
justify liberty on the grounds of its propensity to 
promote utility merely produces the same difficulty at one 
remove. For why is it good to promote utility? What is
* Emphasis added.
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good about utility? The intrinsic value of utility is no 
more susceptible to proof than the intrinsic value of 
liberty.
Mill denies this, as indeed he must. Chapter 4 of 
Utilitarianism is entitled "Of What Sort of Proof the 
Principle of Utility Is Susceptible", and in it Mill 
attempts to formulate a proof of the validity of utility - 
that is, of the alleged connection between satisfying 
happiness, and rightness or virtue. His putative proof 
takes the form of an apparent syllogism. The first 
premise is:
The only proof capable of being given that an 
object is visible, is that people actually see 
it... In like manner, I apprehend, the sole 
evidence it is possible to produce that anything is 
desirable, is that people do actually desire it77*. 
This in itself is uncontentious. So likewise is the 
second premises that
Virtue, . . [is] a thing desirable in itself-77*.
From these two premises, the conclusion is inferred that 
virtue
is a thing that people do actually desire.
Thus is "proven" a linkage between what people actually 
desire (happiness) and virtue (rightness). Thus,
apparently, utility is "proven".
The "proof" is specious, for it blurs the all-too- 
real distinction between two quite separate definitions of 
the word upon which the whole syllogism turns: 
"desirable". In the first premise "desirable" is used in 
the sense of "capable of arousing desire". In the second 
it is used in its other sense, of morally desirable or 
good. Once this is appreciated, what remains is not the 
conclusion that happiness is virtue, but instead two 
separate statements: first, that something capable of
* Emphasis added.
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arousing desire is what people "do actually desire"; and, 
secondly, that "virtue" is good. Both are true, but they 
are also tautologies. They prove nothing. They certainly 
do not prove the validity of utilitarianism.
John Gray, in this as in other respects, springs to 
Mill's defence. He responds to the many critics of Mill's 
"proof" of utilitarianism thus:
Mill does not mean that "being desirable" is 
synonymous with "being desired"... His argument 
is, rather, that only things capable of being 
desired can be intrinsically desirable and, 
further, that the fact that something is desired is 
evidence that it is desirable.X1-2*
Unfortunately, Gray's formulation merely re-states the 
original argument (re-inviting the same criticisms). It 
does not advance the argument further, because it fails 
entirely to meet the point about the word "desirable" 
being used in two, quite different senses - first to mean 
"capable of arousing desire" and secondly to mean "morally 
desirable or good". Bearing this crucial distinction in 
mind it is worth re-examining Gray's words, substituting 
for the word "desirable" its first definition and then 
afterwards its second definition. In the first instance, 
this produces:
...His argument is, rather, that only things 
capable of being desired can be intrinsically 
[capable of arousing desire] and, further, that the 
fact that something is desired is evidence that it 
is [capable of arousing desire].
This is true, but it is a truism and says nothing at all. 
Then, adopting the second definition of "desirable", 
Gray's sentence reads:
...His argument is, rather, that only things 
capable of being desired can be intrinsically
* Emphasis added.
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[good] and, further, that the fact that something 
is desired is evidence that it is [good].
This, of course, is false.
So Mill, even when assisted by Gray's valiant 
efforts, does not succeed in proving the validity of 
utilitarianism. The utility principle cannot be proven. 
Because of this, it cannot be legitimate to criticise the 
concept of a liberty principle independent of utility for 
being unprovable. The intrinsic value of utility is just 
as unprovable as the intrinsic value of liberty. 
Consequently, the criticism that a liberty principle 
independent of utility is "not supported by reasons" is an 
illegitimate criticism. It certainly does not meet the 
criticism that a liberty principle which is dependent on 
utility is contingent, fragile and thus fails to provide a 
firm basis for the "free society" which Mill claims to 
seek.
3.3.3. The specific problems with liberty being 
contingent on utilitarianism:
3.3.3.A: Overriding individualism
The problem of the contingency and dependence of the 
liberty principle on utility is exacerbated by the actual 
content and nature of utilitarianism. It is not just that 
Mill makes liberty contingent on another principle*: the 
particular cause for concern is that Mill makes liberty 
contingent on utilitarianism, a principle which, in 
certain circumstances, is antithetical to liberty, and 
therefore potentially subversive of it.
* while at the same time (as has been seen) never wholly rejecting 
the idea of it as abstract right, so long as it is not "abstract 
right as a thing independent of utility"3-. Mill’s apparent belief 
that the two are reconcilable, and that one is "constitutive" of the 
other, is what causes fatal ambiguities in his argument.
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One aspect of this is the way that, in John Rawls's 
words,
utilitarianism does not take seriously the 
distinction between persons3-13.
What Rawls means is that, because the aim of 
utilitarianism is to promote happiness to the greatest 
extent, measured by aggregating the total of happiness 
throughout society, it attaches no great importance to the 
particular situation of each individual human being - 
other than as a component element in the collective social 
"sum". Mill in effect acknowledges this when he insists 
that the utilitarian standard
is not the agent's own happiness, but the greatest 
amount of happiness altogether114.
This point should not be confused with Nozick's criticism 
of act-consequentialism for "sacrificing" individual 
persons (which, as has been seen, can be applied as much 
to liberty as an intrinsic value as to liberty which is 
dependent on utility). Nozick's objection was to the very 
concept of a moral balancing act. The objection here has 
to do with the method by which the balances are calculated 
in utilitarianism.
Act-consequentialism, when attached to a commitment 
to liberty for its own sake, has the object of maximising 
liberty and, by necessary implication, life*; that is, it 
seeks to maximise what are commonly called fundamental 
individual rights. Unbound by side constraints, it may 
allow individual rights to be violated - but only to 
prevent them being violated more. By contrast,
utilitarianism seeks to maximise happiness of any and 
every kind, and it accords no especial priority to 
individual rights. Utilitarianism treats life and liberty 
just as forms of happiness (of a certain measurement or 
extent) to be aggregated in the balance with all other 
forms of happiness. The practical distinction between the
* life being an essential prerequisite of liberty: see chapter two,
section 1.5.1.A for a discussion of this question.
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two can be seen by returning to the example of Sophie's 
choice. Both the utilitarian, and the act-
consequentialist committed to liberty, would concur with 
Sophie's decision to sacrifice one of her children to 
prevent both being killed - the utilitarian because two 
lives rather than one means twice as much happiness, the 
act-consequentialist - for - liberty because it means 
twice as much freedom. Yet what would be the position if 
there were no threat of both children being killed, but it 
had been found that one of the children had a virus which 
would infect every other person on earth, giving each 
person a bad headache for a day but never troubling them 
again?* Suppose also that the total unhappiness caused by 
everyone on earth having a bad headache for a day 
outweighs the unhappiness caused by one child dying. In 
those circumstances, ought the child to be sacrificed? A 
commitment to liberty as paramount would forbid this, for 
to sacrifice the child does not maximise liberty or 
advance it in any way; accordingly a commitment to 
liberty, even an act-consequentialist commitment to 
liberty, will respect the individuality of the child. 
Utilitarianism, however, will require the very opposite. 
The individuality of the child does not matter for the 
utilitarian if it is outweighed by the happiness of 
everyone being spared a bad headache for a day. This is 
what is meant by utilitarianism not taking individuals 
("the distinction between persons") seriously enoughs 
where liberty is subject to utility, an individual's 
entitlement to life and liberty takes second place to the 
collective happiness.
* This infection would be such that its spread could not be prevented 
by any attempt to quarantine or isolate the child.
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3.3.3.B: Paternalism and the socialist state
But the more important problem for liberty in making 
the liberty principle subject to utilitarianism, is that 
utilitarianism in public policy can lead towards 
paternalism and even state socialism. At the beginning of 
this chapter, the polarity between individual freedom and 
government power was discussed, and it was seen how Mill 
recognises the need to limit the role of the state in 
order to protect the liberty of individuals. Indeed, as 
Mill writes in On Liberty, the very simple principle is 
designed to answer
the practical question where to place the limit - 
how to make the fitting adjustment between 
individual independence and social control13.
An increase in the role of the state - that is, in the 
range of its functions (see section 2.2.2. above) - must 
therefore be at the expense of liberty. It follows that, 
when the state assumes greater responsibilities for 
managing society, freedom is accordingly diminished. 
Paternalism in government means precisely this: the state
acting as paterfamilias to its citizen-children, caring 
for their welfare, acting for their own good, regarding an 
attitude of let-them-stand-on-their-own-two-feet
("laissez-faire") as unconscionable neglect. Socialism is 
a species of paternalism. It will not abandon its 
citizen-children to the mercy of market forces and 
laissez-faire. It sees it as the state's role to provide 
certain social goods and promote certain social 
objectives: universal welfare, equality, reward in
accordance with need, economic planning, environmental 
planning or any combination of these. So the socialist 
state is one which assumes greater responsibility and 
extends its role.
Mill's very simple principle suggests that liberty 
involves an unequivocal rejection of such paternalism. It 
is not the responsibility of the state or society, the
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principle avers, to look after individual citizens by 
interfering in the running of their lives - but only to 
prevent them from harming others. Individual citizens 
must, indeed, be left to stand on their own two feet. 
Unlike a father who protects his children from the 
consequences of their own follies and mistakes by limiting 
their freedoms (insisting that they do their school 
homework, eat their vegetables, observe bed-times, and so 
on), the state is not entitled to exercise analogous power 
over individual citizens. The individual's
own good, either physical or moral, is not a 
sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be 
compelled to do or forbear because it will be 
better for him to do so, because it will make him 
happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do 
so would be wise or even right2.
It is here that the difficulties of treating the 
principle as dependent on utility become most acute. For 
if Mill's principle is applied to solve "the practical 
question" of the extent of state power, what should the 
state do in circumstances where a majority of individuals, 
acting autonomously and without harming others, cause 
injury and unhappiness to themselves? In such
circumstances, the "very simple principle" would require 
non-interference. Since those individuals are harming no- 
one but themselves, none of them can "rightfully be 
compelled to do or forbear because... it will make him 
happier", so that the majority in society are left to 
cause unhappiness to themselves. However the point about 
a commitment to utilitarianism is that it entails exactly 
the opposite view. Utilitarianism does not hold, as Alan 
Ryan suggests, that "to see if an action is wrong we have 
to see whether it is an other-regarding action which tends 
to diminish other people's welfare"114*. Utilitarianism 
holds that actions are "wrong as they tend to produce the
* Understandably, on this view, Ryan regards the very simple 
principle as perfectly consistent with utilitarianism.
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reverse of happiness"28 - the individual's own happiness, 
as well as the happiness of others. Accordingly, where a 
majority of individuals cause injury and unhappiness to 
themselves, the utility principle requires that 
individuals must be "compelled to... forbear", even if 
they do not harm others s their action is increasing 
general unhappiness in society, and only a prohibition of 
that action would produce the "greatest happiness". The 
utilitarian, in short, would take a paternalist view of 
the state's role. This is true of utilitarianism in the 
original Benthamite sense of satisfaction and the absence 
of pain, which (assuming a causal link between smoking 
cigarettes and lung cancer) might require a ban on smoking 
if the majority were smokers. It is also true of "utility 
in the largest sense", used by Mill to mean "the general 
cultivation of nobleness of character", whereby if most 
people spent their evenings watching soap operas on 
television, these might be censored and people encouraged 
to take part in "improving" activities. (The telescreen 
in Orwell's 1984, exhorting the masses to Physical Jerks, 
comes to mind.)
It therefore matters very much to know whether Mill's 
conception of liberty is to be pursued for its own sake, 
or as subject to utilitarianism. It is crucial to 
understanding which of two radically different types of 
political order would subsist if the very simple principle 
were applied. And on this point Mill's ambiguity on the 
intrinsic/instrumental question is, to say the least, 
unfortunate.
That same ambiguity translates, not surprisingly, to 
Mill's attitude on the question of whether the polls would 
be a liberal/ "laissez-faire" society (non-paternalist), 
or a (paternalistic) socialist state. As was noted in 
section 1.3.3., Mill mentions socialism by name only once 
in On Liberty and then his attitude is one of antipathy48.
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Similarly, in a letter to his wife Harriet Taylor in 1855, 
Mill explained the need to write On Liberty as being that 
all the projects of social reformers these days are 
really liberticide2-2-5.
Again, in his articles on socialism published posthumously 
in the Fortnightly Review, Mill compares a society based 
on "private property" with a socialist state. "In order", 
he says, "to state this question in its simplest form", he 
equates the form of socialism which advocates equality of 
reward with what he calls "simple Communism"49. He 
concludes his comparison with a ringing endorsement of 
"private property" as more conducive to liberty than 
"Communism":
...in Communist associations private life would be 
brought in a most unexampled degree within the 
dominion of public authority, and there would be 
less scope for the development of individual 
character and individual preferences... Already in 
all societies the compression of individuality by 
the majority is a great and growing evil; it would 
probably be much greater under Communism...13-6
In the light of these remarks it is perhaps hard to 
understand how commentators can regard Mill as sympathetic 
to the idea of a socialist state. However, as was noted 
in the introduction, this is precisely the view of Geraint 
Williams. John Gray compares Mill's vision with what has 
been attempted in Titoist Yugoslavia. And C.L. Ten is 
quite explicit on the point, claiming that there is "no 
necessary connection" between Mill's views and
either a doctrine of economic laissez-faire* or a 
theory of the minimal function of the state. It is 
possible to combine Mill's liberty principle with, 
for example, a belief in socialism11,7.
* For her part, as has been seen, Gertrude Himmelfarb is convinced 
that "Mill, after all, was a laissez-fairist"118.
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In fact these interpretations of Mill are 
comprehensible, and even legitimate, precisely because of 
Mill's ambivalence on the subject. He is simply not clear 
about which is paramount: liberty, or utility;
individualism, or paternalism; a liberal state with a 
minimum range of functions, or a socialist state. The 
consequence is that, alongside his insistence that the 
individual's "own good... is not a sufficient warrant" for 
state interference, and that compulsion is not justified 
"because it will make [an individual] happier" - and 
alongside his condemnation of social engineering as 
"liberticide" - Mill appears at times to take a quite 
contrary view. Thus, in Utilitarianism, he seems to 
envisage the role of the state and society as including 
compulsion to make an individual happier:
laws and social arrangements should place the 
happiness, or (as speaking practically it may be 
called) the interest, of every individual, as 
nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of 
the whole39.
(Such talk of harmonising the interests of individuals 
with a collective interest is a far cry from Mill's 
passionate espousal of individualism and nonconformity3-7, 
and from his rejection of the equation of individual 
people with "the people" as a single entity8.)
Of course, Himmelfarb, with her notion of "two 
Mills", would probably claim that this is only to be 
expected from a passage in Utilitarianism, whereas On 
Liberty takes an altogether different approach. Alas, it 
does not. There are passages in On Liberty too where Mill 
appears to view compulsion by the state as desirable, not 
just to prevent harm to others, but to promote the common 
good. He writes:
There are also many positive acts for the benefit 
of others which [an individual] may rightfully be 
compelled to perform2"7.
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Mill then lists some of these. The first few, such as 
compulsion on an individual to give evidence in a court of 
justice or to "bear his fair share in the common defence", 
would be unexceptionable to the most ardent champion of a 
liberal system, whose paramount commitment to liberty 
implies a concern that the state should have only a 
minimalist role, intervening only to protect individual 
liberty. Courts of justice are needed to uphold the laws 
which protect an individual's freedom from the mugger, the 
thief, and so on. If they are to function effectively, 
people must be compelled to give evidence. Similarly a 
common defence is necessary to protect people's freedom 
from the threat of foreign attack or invasion.
But the later items in Mill's list suggest a wider - 
more paternalist, more socialist - role for the state. 
Mill declares that individuals may be compelled to 
"perform certain acts of individual beneficence" and he 
includes among these
interposing to protect the defenceless against ill- 
usage78 .
The possibilities for state interference (at the cost 
of individual liberty) which these words imply are almost 
limitless. In labour relations, the road is open for 
endless state regulations as to pay and conditions to 
prevent the employer "ill using" the "defenceless" 
workers; the freedom of a worker to accept a job with 
(say) low wages would be curtailed. So, too, with other 
commercial contracts. The obligation to protect a party 
with relatively weak bargaining power from being exploited 
by the other party implies state interference in freedom 
of contract. The consumer who makes a bad bargain may be 
protected from his mistake; the borrower who agrees to a 
high interest rate may be spared having to pay that 
interest rate - perhaps by making debts unenforceable, or 
setting statutory interest rates, or introducing credit 
controls. These are the characteristics of a socialist
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society; and they involve a rejection of the view that an 
individual's "own good, either physical or moral, is not a 
sufficient warrant" for interventionism. Moreover the 
notion of compelling people into acts of individual 
beneficence sits strangely with a commitment to liberty. 
It is, indeed, almost a contradiction in terms. For acts 
of individual benevolence are those which are done by 
choices freely, voluntarily, spontaneously. There is 
nothing benevolent or generous about giving under 
compulsion - giving because one has to, rather than 
because one wants to. Yet this confusion of benevolence 
with transferring wealth under compulsion (usually through 
the mechanism of taxation)* is what lies at the heart of 
the socialist ethic: the belief that poverty, misery,
unkindness and ill-usage are problems soluble by dirigiste 
interventionism. It implies a singular lack of faith in 
the way people would behave to each other if left to their
own devices - and, hence, a singular lack of faith in
freedom.
The examples quoted so far of "protecting the 
defenceless against ill-usage" have been extrapolations of 
Mill's reasoning, rather than examples chosen by Mill. 
But in chapter 5 of On Liberty, entitled "Applications", 
Mill gives his own example of the paternalistic 
possibilities opened up by his ambiguities. He writes 
that it would be perfectly consistent with the application 
of his principle
if either a public officer or anyone else [who] saw 
a person attempting to cross a bridge which had
been ascertained to be unsafe. . . [were to] seize
him and turn him back119.
The "bridge example" has been a source of much controversy 
among Mill scholars. Mill could have justified his 
commendation of such interventionism by the "public 
officer" with the argument that it is the state's role to
* and also with "treating people well" under compulsion, for example 
by statutory regulation of conditions at work.
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protect an individual's life and liberty, and where these 
are endangered the state must interfere. But Mill chooses 
a different argument which, it must be said, is among the 
sloppiest pieces of reasoning to be found in his works. 
He says that the individual should be prevented from 
trying to cross the bridge because
liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he 
does not desire to fall into the river3-19.
This, unmistakably, is paternalism*. It involves the 
public officer, on behalf of the state, deciding that what 
the individual expresses to be his desire (crossing the 
bridge) is not his real desire; the individual's "real" 
desire is what is good for him (not falling into the 
river), and if the outcome of acting on his expressed 
desire is not his real desire, then his expressed desire 
must be overridden. In the very simple principle Mill 
appears to say that liberty consists in allowing people to 
act on their expressed wishes regardless of whether it is 
for their own good, or will make them happier, or "in the 
opinions of others... would be wise or even right". In 
the bridge example, he says the exact opposite: liberty
consists in allowing the opinion of the public officer (or 
anyone else) as to the wisdom of the individual's chosen 
act to prevail.
Faced with this difficulty, Gray and C.L. Ten, both 
anxious to mount a defence of Mill, are forced to invent a 
distinction between what they call "weak" paternalism and 
"strong" paternalism. No matter that Mill never makes the 
distinction; it is worth considering on its own terms. 
"Strong" paternalism, they say, means interfering for the 
individual's own good, pure and simple. "Weak"
paternalism, on the other hand, permits such intervention 
only in certain circumstances - and this, they insist, is 
the only form of paternalism that Mill would countenance. 
Gray takes the circumstances for invoking weak paternalism
* or, to feminise the metaphor, the "nanny state".
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as being when an individual's expressed desire is "clearly 
not the result of considered rational deliberation"3-20. 
Ten adopts a slightly different criterion, saying that 
Mill would allow interventionism in circumstances where 
the individual does not understand the consequences of 
what he chooses to do.
The "strong"/"weak" distinction gives rise to more 
difficulties than it solves. For one thing, it totally 
removes the clarity and simplicity from the operation of 
Mill's "very simple" principle. Mill puts forward the 
principle as a convenient yardstick for answering "the 
practical question" of where to set the limit of social 
control encroaching on individual independence3-3. What 
Gray and Ten are saying is that this yardstick will not 
suffice, and it is necessary to consider further, 
supplementary, criteria about whether the individual 
understands what he is doing, or is "clearly" acting as a 
result of "considered rational deliberation". This 
introduces far greater complexity, uncertainty and, 
indeed, arbitrariness into the application of Mill's 
principle. Moreover, it is hard to believe that the state 
can possibly know what goes on in people's minds - whether 
they have made rational deliberations or understand what 
they are doing - and, even if it could, the arrogation by 
the state of the discretion to make such judgements 
involves an enormous extension of state power. The world 
of the "Thought Police" beckons.
Moreover, and linked to these difficulties, is the 
problem that not only is the line between "strong" and 
"weak" paternalism difficult to determines it may in fact 
be non-existent. When a person makes a mistake, or enters 
into a bad bargain, or over-borrows, then it follows 
virtually by definition that he did not understand the 
consequences of his choice: if he had understood that it
was a mistake or a bad bargain (or, if he had "clearly" 
made a rational choice), he almost certainly would not
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have done it. The mistake is the strongest evidence that 
the person did not understand what he was doing. 
Therefore, even applying so-called "weak" paternalism, the 
state would be entitled to interfere in an individual's 
actions virtually much every time that he might otherwise 
make a mistake. The scope for exercising free choice is 
accordingly diminished, and a state entitled to act in 
this way is indistinguishable from a paternalistic, 
socialistic, even totalitarian, state.
This is what the very simple principle is supposed to 
guard against. But this is also where the inconsistencies 
and contradictions in which that principle is couched, 
lead to. When Gray says that Mill's principle of liberty 
does not exclude the possibility of his favouring 
socialism121
it is impossible to disagree. Mill's principle does not 
exclude any possibility at all.
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3.4. Mill's gamble
Mill would not admit to any such inconsistencies. He 
does not acknowledge a contradiction between liberty as an 
intrinsic value, and liberty as valuable because it leads 
to utilitarianism. As has been seen, Gray interprets Mill
to regard liberty and utilitarianism as virtually
synonymous (see section 2.2.2. of this chapter), and in 
this Gray's analysis is very plausible. Certainly, as has 
also been seen, Mill believes that the maintenance of 
liberty is as a matter of fact the best way to attain 
utilitarian objectives, and that the two go hand in hand, 
so that the paramountcy of one is consistent with the 
paramountcy of the other. Free discussion (Mill asserts) 
is the most effective way to produce truth, and free 
competition in ways of life is the best way to attain a 
better way of life. Mill makes this empirical claim in 
various forms throughout On Libertyi-
Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other 
to live as seems good to themselves than by
compelling each to live as seems good to the 
rest.3-22*
Intolerance... induces men to disguise [their 
opinions ]. . . A state of things in which a large 
portion of the most active and inquiring intellects 
find it advisable to keep... their convictions
within their own breasts... cannot send forth the 
open, fearless characters and logical, consistent 
intellects who once adorned the thinking world.41**
Never when controversy avoided the subjects which 
are large and important enough to kindle enthusiasm
* Emphasis added.
** Emphasis added.
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was the mind of a people stirred up from its
foundations, and the impulse given which raised 
even persons of most ordinary intellect to 
something of the dignity of thinking beings.123*
...the only unfailing and permanent source of 
improvement is liberty...124
All of these quotations - variations on a theme - are 
assertions of empirical fact. They are not easily 
provable (if at all), and Mill does not even try to prove 
them. He simply assumes that they are true, that the
pursuit of liberty is factually consistent with the 
pursuit of utility, and that there is no contradiction 
between them. Of course, Mill must assume this, since his 
whole theory depends upon it.
But the implications of this unproven assumption are 
dangerous for Mill's theory, in two ways. The first is a 
logical difficulty. If liberty is justified because of 
its propensity to produce "utility in the largest sense", 
then if the premise is disproven (that liberty does 
produce such "utility"), liberty loses its justification. 
Secondly, and closely linked to the first point, is the 
factual difficulty. Mill says that liberty is to be 
pursued as the best way of attaining the utilitarian 
"goods" of truth, virtue, happiness, "nobleness of
character" and so on. Maybe it is. But maybe there is,
or will be, a situation when there is an alternative means 
of attaining these goods: a situation in which freedom
would derogate from their attainment, and the suspension 
of freedom would help. Mill's assumption implies that 
such a factual situation is impossible. But in the view 
of this thesis, it is at very least conceivable, and 
perhaps it is factually possible. In that case, Mill's
* Emphasis added.
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assumption perishes, and with it the basis of his argument 
for liberty.
Isaiah Berlin claims that historical fact disproves 
Mill's "at best empirical"125 assertion. Berlin himself 
makes the empirical assertion that
it is a commonplace that neither political equality 
nor efficient organization nor social justice is 
compatible with more than a modicum of individual 
liberty126
and he cites as an example of unfreedom's propensity to 
achieve utilitarian "goods" the alleged fact that goodness 
and truth have thrived in "severely disciplined
communities" such as the Scottish Calvinists125. Rather 
than enter into an historical dispute with Mill and 
Berlin, it might be better to give Mill the benefit of the 
(factual) doubt and concentrate on the question of whether 
a contradiction between liberty and utilitarianism is at 
least conceivable. For if it is, there is no need to
quibble about historical facts.
Alasdair MacIntyre has shown that it is conceivable. 
There are situations where the demands of liberty and of 
utility will not go hand-in-hand. MacIntyre accepts, 
first, that often they will coincide:
The concept of the public happiness has obviously 
legitimate application in a society where the 
consensus is that public happiness consists in more 
and better hospitals and schools.127 
But he warns against assuming that such a consensus, or 
one that is similarly benign, will necessarily prevail:
What application has [utilitarianism] in a society 
where the public happiness is found by the public 
itself to consist in the mass murder of Jews? If 
in a society of twelve people, ten are sadists who 
will get great pleasure from torturing the 
remaining two, does the principle of utility enjoin 
that the two should be tortured?127
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What hope for freedom then? Kenneth Minogue makes the 
same point thus:
. . .we might imagine a situation in which some 
expert, who knew perfectly well what we needed, 
might well dispose of our lives much more 
satisfactorily than we could do ourselves, since we 
often suffer disappointment because the obligations 
we contract provide us with less satisfaction than 
we expected3-2®.
In that case, too, liberty would have to be jettisoned to 
achieve happiness and better lives.
Mill's defenders would almost certainly object to 
this line of reasoning as being based on an unfair 
caricature of what Mill really believes about the 
relationship between liberty and utility. They would 
reject the idea that Mill sees liberty as a mechanistic 
means to a utilitarian end; and indeed there is reason to 
believe that Mill's very commitment to liberty arises from 
despair at the single-minded pursuit of a utilitarian end, 
for Mill writes that after his mental crisis
The end [realizing all one's objects in life] had 
ceased to charm, and how could there ever again be 
any interest in the means?3-29 
It is at this stage in his life that Mill begins to pursue 
utility "in the largest sense" and - as Gray and Geraint 
Williams insist - he sees liberty as "constitutive"81 of, 
rather than merely a means to, utility. In other words 
the larger kind of happiness is to be found in freedom, 
and the two therefore go hand-in-hand.
But the "constitutive" argument is of little 
assistance to Mill here. Again it rests on an unproven 
empirical assumption, that people do in fact derive 
"larger" happiness in a state of freedom, and that they 
always will, and necessarily must. Mill's principle of 
liberty is to be promoted as of right on the basis of this 
assumption. Yet it is at least conceivable that the
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assumption is wrong, in which case the basis for liberty 
disappears, and liberty itself may be overridden.
Gray himself acknowledges this problem, and admits
that
this moral right [to liberty] is a defeasible 
right130.
He expresses doubts about this which are similar to the 
points made by MacIntyre and Minogue:
What if (Gray asks) men do not converge on the 
higher pleasures: suppose, after due thought and
experiment, they come to prefer forms of life and 
activity in which autonomous choice is an 
insignificant ingredient - what then?131 
What, indeed?
Gray thus hits upon the main weakness in Mill's 
justification of liberty: Mill argues for liberty because
it is constitutive of utility; this rests on the factual 
assumption that liberty actually is constitutive of 
utility; and this in turn does not rest on any proof but 
instead (to quote Gray)
reposes on the wager that civilised men will in 
fact prefer the life of free men because it is in 
such a life that they will find their 
happiness132*.
A wager! A gamble! Mill's entire commitment to liberty 
rests on a gamble. This is the view expressed by Gray in 
his book Mill on liberty: a defence. And Gray believes 
that it is defensible because this wager is, in his words, 
a reasonable wager132.
Some might well challenge whether it actually is a 
"reasonable" wager. The anonymous author of an article in 
Fraser's Magazine in 1872 criticised Mill's assumptions, 
with the scathing declaration that to expect men to become
* Emphasis added.
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more vigorous (and hence attain happiness "in the largest 
sense")
by simply removing restrictions, seems to be as 
fallacious as the hope that a bush planted in an 
open field would naturally develop into a forest 
tree134.
But reasonable or not, a wager is hardly a firm basis for 
establishing a principle which is supposed to safeguard 
liberty. As was seen earlier, Mill rejects the notion of 
so-called "self-evident" truths because they are "not 
supported by reasons"110. Yet the same rigorous standards 
of proof cannot be applied to the assumption - the gamble 
- which is Mill's answer to the question "why freedom?".
The very simple principle is thus based on a gamble 
or wager. To repeat Gray's question: what if the gamble 
is wrong? "What then?"131 For those who care about the
safeguarding of liberty this is a very serious question, 
for if the principle is only contingent and can therefore 
be jettisoned, then it is not an effective guarantee of 
liberty. Mill offers no clear answer to the question 
"what then?". He himself presents the principle as being 
designed to solve "the practical question" of when 
interference in individual liberty is and is not 
justifiable; but its contingency means that it cannot 
properly do this:
the power of the doctrine to cope with practical 
dilemmas [may be] less than he hoped135.
These are Gray's words, in the conclusion to his 
"defence" of Mill. They are an understatement, and an 
eloquent one.
* * *
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CHAPTER TWO - PREVENTING HARM TO OTHERS
1. THE PROBLEM
The only purpose for which power can be 
rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilized community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm to others.
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty1.
Is compulsion ever justified? Mill had no doubt 
that it was. Since justice demands that all 
individuals be entitled to a minimum of freedom, 
all other individuals were of necessity to be 
restrained, if need be by force, from depriving 
anyone of it. Indeed the whole function of law 
was the prevention of just such collisions; the 
state was reduced to what Lassalle 
contemptuously described as the functions of a 
night-watchman or traffic policeman.
Isaiah Berlin, Two concepts of liberty2.
1.1. The night-watchman state?
According to Isaiah Berlin, then, Mill's principle of 
liberty entails the reduction of the state's role to that 
of "night-watchman*1.
In modern times one of the leading exponents of such 
a night-watchman state has been Robert Nozick. He 
describes it as
the night-watchman state of classical liberal 
theory, limited to the functions of protecting all 
its citizens against violence, theft, and fraud, 
and to the enforcement of contracts...3 
- and, also, as a "minimal state"4. In other words, the 
"night-watchman" state is one where the line between the 
sphere of individual activity and the sphere of 
governmental activity (the line which Mill's "very simple
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principle" was intended to mark out)* has been drawn such 
that government's range of functions is minimised, and the 
scope of individual freedoms is accordingly maximised. It 
is, as Nozick emphasises, the classical liberal state**.
So, if Berlin is right, the very simple principle set 
out in On Liberty would serve as the basis of a liberal, 
minimal state. It would not entitle a government to 
assume such a wide range of functions as are required in a 
socialist state. The functions of government, the state 
and its laws would be limited, as Berlin puts it, to 
restraining individuals from depriving other individuals 
of the liberty to which they are entitled. There is some 
evidence to support Berlin's contention that this is how 
Mill himself viewed the very simple principle. Thus, in 
his Autobiography, Mill writes that On Liberty was written 
as the latest contribution in a series of nineteenth- 
century writings reassessing the "doctrine of 
Individuality"
which, though bearing a superficial resemblance to 
some of the projects of Socialists, is diametrically 
opposite to them in principle, since it recognises no 
authority whatsoever in Society over the individual, 
except to enforce equal freedom of development of all 
individualities6.
There, one might suppose, the matter ends.
However, the difficulty with Berlin's "night-watchman 
state" interpretation is that it does not in fact accord 
with the actual wording of the very simple principle. In 
formulating the principle Mill does not say (pace Berlin) 
that the state may only restrict liberty so as to restrain 
individuals from depriving others of liberty. He does not 
(pace the Autobiography) say that the sole justification
* See above, chapter one, section 1.1.
** "Liberal" being used in the sense set out in the Note on 
Terminology at the beginning of this thesis.
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for state intervention is to "enforce equal freedom of 
development for all individualities". What the very 
simple principle does say is that the sole end and the 
only purpose for which interference in freedom is 
justified is
to prevent harm to others1.
That, it will be appreciated, is something quite 
different. Preventing harm to others is not the same as 
just preventing infringements of others' liberty. It can 
allow for a much wider range of functions to be accorded 
to the state. It does not necessarily ensure maximal 
liberty and minimal state interference. It does not 
guarantee a liberal society. It could be used to justify 
a socialist state.
Perhaps it will be thought that one is making a 
mountain out of a molehill in emphasising this 
distinction, and that it is ludicrous to exaggerate the 
importance of the exact form of words in the very simple 
principle, read in isolation and out of context. But the 
point is that it is not out of context. In addition to 
the very simple principle itself - which is of course the 
focal point of On Liberty - virtually every one of the 
many references in On Liberty to the boundary between 
individual freedom and state intervention conceives it in 
terms of harm-prevention rather than liberty-protection. 
This will be seen in more detail later in this chapter 
(see section 2.1.1.). Only once in On Liberty does Mill 
seem to imply that preventing infringements of others' 
liberty is the crucial thing7. Against that background it 
is impossible to sustain Berlin's analysis, or to agree 
that (even ignoring the uncertainties, discussed in 
chapter one, about liberty being contingent on utility) 
the very simple principle necessarily entails a liberal, 
minimal state.
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1.2. Utilitarianism revisited
Arguably Mill's emphasis on harm-prevention is 
traceable, once again, to his chronic inability to wrench 
himself away from his utilitarian roots (discussed at 
length in chapter one of this thesis). Moreover, once 
again, this inability on Mill's part may be what explains 
the failure of the very simple principle to meet its 
principal stated objective - its failure, that is, to 
provide a clear and unambiguous theoretical basis for 
securing a free society®.
Harm-prevention, after all, is the essence of 
utilitarianism. It is hard to contest John C. Rees's 
crisp assertion that
a major component... of Mill's conception of the 
proper limits to liberty derives from the need to 
prevent, or minimise, injury; and the notion of 
injury is supplied by the principle of utility9.
In Utilitarianism, for example, Mill asserts as a tenet of 
the utilitarian faith the proposition that "most of the 
great positive evils of the world are in themselves 
removable"10. The principle of utility, moreover, will 
provide the basis for removing those great positive evils 
and - the other side of the same coin - for promoting "the 
happiness of others"11. Mill repeats the concern with 
others' happiness (and, implicitly, with preventing 
others' unhappiness) when he stresses that the utilitarian 
moral standard "is not the agent's own happiness, but that 
of all concerned"12. Finally, in the same paragraph of 
Utilitarianism, Mill writes that utility would enjoin that 
"laws and social arrangements"13 should play their part in 
the attainment of this standard. From here it is but a 
short step to the very simple principle - "entitled to 
govern absolutely the dealings of society with the 
individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether 
the means used be physical force in the form of legal 
penalties or the moral coercion of public opinion"1 -
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which specifically entitles laws and social arrangements 
to provide for the prevention of harm.
It is necessary to be careful here, more careful 
perhaps than Rees has been. For the very simple principle 
does not entitle legal interference on any occasion when 
it is necessary to prevent harm - but only when it is 
necessary to prevent harm to others. Preventing harm to 
oneself is emphatically not the business of the state and 
its laws according to the very simple principle. At least 
by intention the very simple principle is extremely 
hostile to such paternalism*, and it insists that an 
individual's own well-being, either physical or moral, is 
an insufficient warrant for governmental interferences
He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear 
because it will be better for him to do so, because 
it will make him happier, because, in the opinions 
of others, to do so would be wise or even right1.
In this respect Mill's very simple principle differs 
fundamentally from utilitarian doctrine. The best way of 
appreciating this is to consider examples of where a 
majority of the population engage in activities which do 
themselves (but no one else) harm - for instance, spending 
more time suffering hangovers after drinking too much the 
previous night than going on energetic walks in the 
countryside. In such a case, a utilitarian concern with 
the greatest happiness of the greatest number, when given 
effect by "laws and social arrangements"13, necessarily 
entails coercive action to rectify the sorry state of 
affairs. By contrast, the very simple principle would not 
entitle the state to interfere with such purely "self- 
regarding" actions, as Mill calls them14 - for the simple
* By intention undeniably - but perhaps not in effect. The main 
charge which this thesis lays against the very simple principle is 
that, whatever its robust intentions, its ambiguity is such that it 
does allow for state paternalism. See chapter one (especially 
section 3.3.3.B), and see this chapter and the next.
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reason that this is not a matter of preventing harm to 
others**.
In short, a principle of preventing harm to others is 
not the same as utilitarianism. But the two doctrines 
share common roots, in the impulse to rid the world of its 
"great positive evils" - that is, to Prevent Harm. What 
they also have in common, in giving priority to harm 
prevention, is the capacity thereby to undermine liberty 
and to endanger the free society which the very simple 
principle was intended to uphold.
1.3. The threats to liberty
At the beginning of this chapter we saw how Berlin's 
concept of a state which only intervened to prevent 
infringements of liberty entails a minimal range of
governmental functions and the maximum scope for 
individual freedom. It entails a liberal society.
What is it about a state which is entitled to
intervene "to prevent harm to others" that endangers this 
maximal individual liberty? Three main factors will be 
considered here.
1.3.1. The first threat
The first factor is that a government which is
entitled to prevent people doing harm to each other enjoys 
far more discretion, and hence more power, than one
restricted to protecting people's liberties. "Harm" is 
not an objective term with a limited, specific definition. 
What constitutes "harm" will always be a controversial 
issue, involving subjective value judgements. When a 
trade union calls a strike, but some of its members
** With specific regard to drinking, this is borne out by Mill’s 
remarks on the subject in On L i b e r t y But see C.L. Ten’s doubts 
on this: section 2.4. of this chapter.
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continue to work and walk through the picket lines,
undoubtedly their action in crossing the picket lines 
damages the chances of the strike succeeding. It might 
appear to follow from this that the workers breaking the 
strike are harming the workers on strike and so, in order 
to prevent harm to others, they should be prohibited from 
crossing the picket lines and deprived of their freedom to 
go to work. Arguably, however, it might be against the 
long-term interests of all the workers, the strikers as 
well as the strikebreakers, for the strike to succeed - 
because, for instance, the success of the strike forces 
the management to increase wages, face higher costs,
become less competitive and less profitable, go out of
business and make the workers redundant. In that case, 
breaking the strike would not have harmed the workers, but 
rather the very opposite. The point here is not to say 
whether it would or would not harm the workers, but to 
show that it is all a matter of opinion. And a government 
charged with intervening to "prevent harm to others" is
not only entitled, but obliged, to take sides and permit 
or prohibit conduct on the basis of entirely subjective 
opinions. This of course makes for arbitrary government: 
ad hoc and unpredictable state interference. But more 
than that, because "harm" is a concept without a limited 
or specific definition, a principle of preventing harm to 
others can be extended to entitle governments to interfere 
in an ever-expanding range of activities. Both in its 
arbitrariness and in its unlimited scope for interference 
such a state is a permanent threat to liberty*.
* A state whose functions were limited, a la Berlin, to protecting 
individual freedom could not possibly have contemplated prohibiting 
workers from crossing the picket line. For although their 
strikebreaking might (or might not) have harmed the strikers, it 
certainly would not have infringed their liberty. On the contrary, 
such a state would have been obliged to protect the strikebreakers* 
freedom to go to their place of work.
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1.3.2. The second threat
The second threat to freedom in a liberty principle 
being subject to preventing harm to others is its 
asymmetry, an asymmetry whose bias is against freedom. To 
use the words of Berlin (cited in the epigraph to this 
chapter), Mill's liberty principle sees the law as a 
mechanism to avoid "collisions" between individuals in 
society2. I want to do something: you would rather I
refrained from doing it. Which of us should have his way? 
Should I be permitted to do what I want, or should I be 
prohibited from so doing? In the sort of liberty 
principle which entitles the state to prohibit actions 
only if they infringe the liberty of others, there is a 
conception that, as Berlin says, each individual is 
"entitled to a minimum of freedom"2. The presumption that 
I am free to do what I like is only rebutted if I start to 
encroach on your freedom to do what you like, and vice 
versa. Here lies the symmetry between our respective 
rights, or what Mill in his Autobiography calls "equal 
freedom of development for all individualities"6. Thus 
are our respective freedoms given the greatest scope that 
they can possibly have, stretching to the utmost point 
short of encroaching on each other's freedom. This, in 
short, is the maximisation of our freedoms.
But where - as in the "very simple principle" 
liberty may be limited in order to prevent harm to others, 
there is no such symmetry between our respective rights. 
There is a much lesser presumption in favour of my being 
free to do what I like. You can stop me doing what I want 
even if I do not for one moment encroach on your freedom 
to do what you want - on any occasion when what I want to 
do causes you harm. Many things, which do not encroach on 
others' freedom, nonetheless cause them harm. Mill writes 
in Utilitarianism about rules which forbid mankind
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to hurt one another (in which we must never forget 
to include wrongful interference with each other's 
freedom)15**.
In other words: harm is not coterminous with interference
with freedom; harm includes interference with freedom; 
harm is a broader concept than interference with freedom; 
and, therefore, the prevention of harm requires greater 
intervention than the prevention of interference with 
freedom. On the one hand there is my entitlement to
freedom. On the other hand there is your entitlement to 
limit my freedom, not only when it threatens your freedom 
(which would be symmetrical) but also in all the other 
cases in which "harm" - a broader concept - is done. The 
grounds for limiting freedom (infringement of freedom plus 
all the other things which "harm" includes) are broader, 
and outweigh, the grounds for allowing freedom. Here is 
the asymmetry. Thus does the very simple principle,
limiting liberty to prevent "harm to others", provide a 
broader range of justifications for interfering with 
freedom. Thus does it abandon the maximisation of
freedom.
This can be expressed in concrete terms by returning 
to the example of the strike and the strikebreakers. If 
the freedom to go to work is limited only by the 
imperative to prevent others' freedom being infringed, the 
presumption in favour of the freedom to go to work remains 
intact: no one could maintain that the pickets' or the
strikers' freedom was curtailed by the strikebreakers'
action. But if the wider concept of preventing harm to 
others is applied, then (at least arguably) it could be 
said that the strikers are harmed by the strikebreakers' 
action and, further, that this gives grounds for 
restricting the freedom to go to work. The presumption in 
favour of freedom has been rebutted.
** Emphasis added.
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In ordinary, everyday life, many things harm people 
without infringing their liberty. People may read (or 
merely see their friends read) books which are shockingly 
offensive, and they can be deeply and genuinely pained in 
consequence*. The price of washing machines may sharply 
rise, so that many people can no longer afford them; and 
the price of stocks and shares may fall, depleting the 
value of many people's investments. One may find that 
one's favourite local grocer has been put out of business 
because his prices have been undercut by a store in a 
neighbouring village (which of course harms the grocer at 
least as much as oneself). Or maybe one's morning walk is 
made pleasant every day by the smell of roses from a 
neighbour's front garden, and then one weekend the 
neighbour uproots the roses and replaces them with irises 
whose aroma one does not like at all.
Just because one may be harmed - genuinely harmed - 
in any or all of these ways, does it mean that the actions 
which cause the harm should be prohibited? Should books 
be banned?** Should manufacturers not be free to set the 
prices of their washing machines, and should shares not be 
bought and sold freely on the stock exchange? Should one 
store not be free to compete with, and undercut, another? 
Should a man not be free to decide what flowers he grows 
in his garden? Under a liberty principle qualified only 
by the need to prevent infringements of other people's 
liberty, it is inconceivable that any of these freedoms 
would be curtailed. Under the very simple principle, with 
its broader qualification of preventing harm to others, it 
is not inconceivable at all.
* See section 3.1.1. below.
** See section 3.1.1. below.
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1.3.3. The third threat
As these examples from ordinary everyday life 
illustrate, there are many ways in which it is daily 
possible to cause harm to others. This is a function of 
the interdependence of people in society. No man is an 
island entire of itself16; life, in almost every aspect, 
is social life, and each of us is bound up in a complex 
web of relationships with and commitments to parents, 
brothers and sisters, spouse, children, more distant 
relatives, friends, acquaintances, colleagues, employers, 
employees, customers, vendors, fellow motorists, fellow 
pedestrians, passers-by... Practically everything that 
one does has an impact on others. There are virtually no 
purely "self-regarding" actions, and if, under the very 
simple principle, "other-regarding" actions are to be 
amenable to external control and interference17, the scope 
for inviolable individual freedom will be negligible 
indeed, and in practice almost nil.
C.L. Ten cautions against viewing Mill's principle 
as being based upon such a simplistic distinction between 
self- and other-regarding conduct. He acknowledges the 
argument of "Mill's critics" that man lives in society and 
cannot be isolated from others and that, therefore, 
"except for actions which no one has ever thought of 
suppressing, all our actions will affect others in some 
way"18. But, Ten insists, the issue is not whether an 
action affects others, it is whether an action harms 
others s
I shall argue that Mill's defence of liberty does
not depend on there being two different areas of a
person's conduct which have very different effects. 
His case depends on distinguishing between
different reasons for interfering with the
individual's conduct in any area. Certain reasons 
are always ruled out as irrelevant, but there is
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one reason, the prevention of harm to others, which 
is always relevant19.
The "very simple principle" does, indeed, say that liberty 
may be interfered with only "to prevent harm to others", 
rather than "to prevent people's actions affecting 
others". To that extent Ten's argument is right, at least 
partially*. However, in terms of proving Ten's case that 
Mill was "a consistent liberal, deeply committed to the 
cause of freedom for everyone"21, this argument does not 
advance matters very far. For what the examples from 
ordinary everyday life (in section 1.3.2.) had in common 
was not just people affecting each other, but people 
harming each other, day after day, in a myriad of ways. 
There are thus, under Mill's principle, a myriad of 
justifications for limiting freedom. This constitutes the 
third threat to liberty posed by the words "to prevent 
harm to others".
The example cited of the neighbour who uproots his 
roses for irises is particularly instructive. The harm 
done to the passer-by who every morning looked forward to 
breathing the scent of roses lies in the fact that the 
passer-by prefers the smell of roses to that of irises. 
But the owner of the garden has a contrary preferences 
hence his supplanting of the irises for roses. It is in 
the nature of things that people's preferences, desires, 
ambitions are not all identical, but instead contradict 
each other. In an interdependent society, if practically 
every action affects someone else, it follows from the 
inherent conflict between people's different preferences 
that virtually every action will, inevitably, harm someone 
else. That being so, because the very simple principle 
renders the scope for freedom in society inversely 
proportional to the amount of harm done to others, a
* At one point, as will be seen (in section 2.1.1.C of this chapter), 
Mill talks of the "appropriate region” of human liberty as being that 
part of a person's life "which affects only himself"20.
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society which follows the principle can leave precious 
little scope for freedom.
1.4. Two caveats
Pausing for a moment in this indictment of Mill's 
doctrine of preventing harm to others, two caveats should 
perhaps be inserted here.
1.4.1. No threat to freedom of contract
The first caveat is that Mill expressly states that 
freedom will not be limited even where harm is caused to 
others if those others have consented to the harm being 
done. Society, he writes in On Liberty, may not intervene 
even in actions which affect or harm others if such 
actions are done "with their free, voluntary, and 
undeceived consent and participation"20. This is an 
affirmation on Mill's part of his commitment to the 
liberal doctrine of freedom of contract, the idea that in 
an interdependent society liberty depends on people being 
free not only to mind their own businesses but also to 
reach binding agreements with each other, provided that 
those agreements are freely and voluntarily entered into. 
In a liberal society, the state's role in upholding 
liberty involves according recognition, and giving legal 
effect to, such free contracts. This is what lies behind 
Nozick's inclusion of "the enforcement of contracts" among 
the functions of "the night-watchman state" of classical 
liberal theory (see above3). The proviso that the 
contract must be freely and voluntarily entered into 
involves the law of a liberal state in pronouncing 
contracts made under duress or coercion as void and 
unenforceable. It also means that, for the contract to be 
valid, the parties to it must have understood what they 
were doings not necessarily known what the consequences
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of what they were doing would be, or whether the contract 
would turn out to be a good or a bad bargain (after all, 
who can predict the future for certain?) - but known the 
meaning of the words which constituted their agreement.
No one must be duped into agreeing to something which they 
did not mean to agree tos such an "agreement" would not, 
truly, be voluntary. Hence, as Nozick puts it, one of the 
functions of a liberal state is to protects its citizens 
against fraud (see above3); hence too, the oft-repeated 
slogan that the liberal state is limited to the prevention 
of "force and fraud". The concern with preventing force 
and fraud is also what explains Mill's insistence that 
agreements must be "free, voluntary and undeceived"20. To 
be fair to Mill, the doctrine of freedom of contract 
(provided that the contract is free, voluntary and
undeceived) is consistent with his view of the state as 
being entitled to prevent harm to others, and consistent 
also with the very simple principle's anti-paternalistic 
statement that a person's "own good, either physical or 
moral, is not a sufficient warrant" for interference with 
liberty. If the state prohibits something done
unilaterally by A to B which harms B, it is merely 
restraining A from harming B. But if the state prohibits 
something done by A with B's consent, on the grounds that
such an act harms B, the state is restraining B from
agreeing to something which harms himself - which is a 
self-regarding action by B. In other words, since B 's own 
good does not warrant the state interfering in B's
freedom, the state is not entitled to prevent B from
entering into the agreement with A, notwithstanding that
it involves A harming B*.
* However, Mill makes clear in On Liberty that his commitment to the 
doctrine of freedom of contract is not unalloyed. He writes that it 
is "sometimes" a "sufficient reason" for releasing people from a 
contract that the contract "is injurious to themselves", even where 
the contract has been voluntarily entered into22. This question will 
be explored further in the conclusion to this thesis.
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1.4.2. Taste and "harm”
There is an obvious objection to citing the case of 
the roses and irises as an example of the way preventing 
"harm to others" severely limits freedom. To prefer the 
smell of roses to the smell of irises, it will be 
objected, is purely a matter of personal taste. There is 
nothing harmful about not having everything according to 
one's taste. Here is the second caveat.
This objection has its merits, but cannot greatly 
assist any defence of Mill's principle of preventing harm 
to others. The objection raises at least as many 
difficulties as it answers. For what, precisely, is wrong 
with the roses/irises example? That taste is purely a 
personal matter? But so are many, if not most, instances 
of physical pain. One person may be in severe pain whilst 
no-one else around him is. Moreover, it is a commonplace 
about pain that it is impossible to know how another 
person in pain actually feels. There is, therefore, 
nothing more "objective" about pain than about taste. 
Does it follow that physical pain should be excluded from 
the policy of preventing harm to others, so that the 
principle permits people to inflict pain on each other?
Or is the objection that the roses/irises example is 
trivial? Going without the smell of roses is not very 
great suffering, not a very important kind of harm. Well 
this is true - up to a point. Arguably, the pleasure 
obtained by the passer-by from smelling the roses every 
morning was a crucial element in his daily routine and a 
major (if semi-conscious) contribution to his cheerfulness 
for the rest of the day - every day. To deprive someone 
of something like that may not be an inconsiderable harm 
at all. Besides, making the state's right to intervene 
depend on a concept so uncertain as preventing "important" 
harm is - again - to introduce a dangerous degree of
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discretion and arbitrariness into the business of 
governing.
These difficulties, about whether Mill really intends 
to prevent only "objective" kinds of harm, or harms which 
are non-trivial, will be dealt with in more depth later in 
this chapter*. At this juncture suffice it to say that 
they greatly complicate the notion of preventing harm to 
others and make the principle much less useful at 
providing a clear-cut answer to what Mill calls "the 
practical question - how to make the fitting adjustment 
between individual independence and social control"23. In 
short, raising these difficulties robs the "very simple 
principle" of perhaps its major asset - its very 
simplicity.
1.5. The threats to liberty illustrated
The arguments advanced thus far about preventing harm 
to others can be summarised as follows. By delineating 
the bounds of individual liberty at the point where its 
exercise would cause harm to others, the very simple 
principle severely undermines freedom. Three main ways in 
which this happens have been identified. First, the 
question of whether or not an action causes harm is so 
closely linked to value-judgements that the state is given 
a wide discretion to argue that interference is justified 
in order to prevent an action which it considers harmful; 
there is almost no limit to what can be deemed harmful. 
Secondly, a principle of preventing harm to others is much 
broader than a principle of preventing infringements of 
others' liberty - in Mill's words, harm includes 
interference with freedom15 - so that this formula gives 
much more scope for state interference than the one which
* Section 2.1.2. (read with the rest of section 2.1.) on "objective" 
kinds of harm, and section 2.5. on "non-trivial" harm.
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Berlin attributes to Mill in the epigraph to this chapter. 
Moreover, because the grounds for state interference 
(preventing harm) are wider than the grounds for
individual independence (liberty: harm includes
interference with freedom), there is an asymmetry between 
the claims of the state and the claims of the individual 
which works to the latter's detriment. Thirdly, the 
interdependence of people in society, with their 
conflicting preferences and objectives, means that 
virtually any action will in some way cause harm to 
others, so that the scope for freedom under Mill's 
principle becomes so limited as to be virtually
negligible. Against this bleak picture, it is to be noted 
that Mill's principle respects the doctrine of freedom of 
contract, because the policy of harm-prevention does not 
extend to actions to which the "victim" has given his 
consent; and also that the principle perhaps respects a 
man's right to replace the roses in his garden with irises 
but only if modifications and complications are 
introduced into the principle.
1.5.1. Mill on smoking
A less controversial illustration than the roses-and- 
irises example is the question of cigarette smoking.
During the past few decades there has of course been a 
great deal of debate in most western countries about what 
role, if any, the state and its legislative machinery
should play in curbing smoking. It is seldom contended 
that the issues involved in this debate are purely matters 
of "personal taste", or that the harms allegedly caused by 
smoking are merely trivial. The smoking debate is, then, 
a suitable testing-ground to examine the practical impact 
of applying Mill's principle of coercion to prevent harm 
to others - by comparison with what Berlin takes to be 
Mill's principle, namely, coercion only to prevent anyone 
depriving anyone else of freedom. For convenience's sake, 
the former principle will be called the "Mill principle",
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and the latter will be called the "Berlin principle" (even 
though of course Berlin does not himself actually endorse 
the latter, minimal-state, principle; he merely believes 
that Mill does).
It will be appreciated that the debate about smoking 
envisages various ways by which the state can intervene in 
addition to absolute bans and prohibitions. For example 
the state can use taxpayers' money to finance advertising 
campaigns warning of the dangers which smoking poses to 
health. The state may also choose to impose extra taxes 
and duties on the sale of cigarettes in addition to the 
normal sales tax, singling out cigarettes among other 
goods because the extra duty will deter people from buying 
cigarettes rather than because it will raise more revenue 
(indeed, to the extent that it succeeds in deterring 
people from buying cigarettes, it can actually diminish 
revenue from both the extra cigarette duty and also the 
normal sales tax on the sale of cigarettes! ). In On 
Liberty, Mill himself expresses a view on such "deterrent 
taxation" which is equivocal and perhaps surprising. Mill 
acknowledges that "to tax stimulants [he is thinking of 
alcohol, but the point applies equally to cigarettes] for 
the sole purpose of making them more difficult to be 
obtained is a measure different only in degree from their 
entire prohibition", and - true to his anti-paternalist 
protestations - he declares that people's "choice of 
pleasures and their mode of expending their income... are 
their own concern and must rest with their own judgement". 
And yet, barely pausing for breath, he goes on to say:
It is the duty of the State... in the imposition of 
taxes... to select in preference those 
[commodities] of which it deems the use, beyond a 
very moderate quantity, to be positively injurious. 
Taxation, therefore, of stimulants up to the point 
which produces the largest amount of revenue... is 
not only admissible but to be approved of24.
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Questions of state involvement short of prohibition - 
through advertising and through deterrent taxation - thus 
complicate any discussion of the state's role in curbing 
cigarette smoking. In order to keep this illustration as 
clear and straightforward as possible, therefore, it will 
be confined to the simple issue of prohibition. How does 
the application of the "Mill principle" (compared with the 
"Berlin principle") resolve the central question of the 
extent to which people should be free to smoke, and the 
extent to which the state should ban them from doing so?
1.5.1.A: The right to smoke in public
In an essay written in 1966, J.W.N. Watkins - also 
attempting to apply Mill's principle to the smoking 
question - stated that he assumed there to be "a causal 
connection between smoking and lung cancer"25. Since 
1966, medical thinking has developed to the point where, 
for the purposes of this thesis, the same assumption can 
be made with considerable certainty: that smoking can
cause the smoker to contract lung cancer, and can thus 
endanger his life. But there has also been another 
medical development, with the emergence of the theory of 
"passive smoking": that is, the idea that non-smokers who
are in the vicinity of smokers involuntarily inhale 
cigarette fumes and are thus themselves exposed to the 
fatal risk of lung cancer. That is to say, that cigarette 
smoking endangers the lives of others. The passive 
smoking theory is by no means as uncontentious as the view 
that the smoker himself is at risk from lung cancer, and 
therefore it cannot be assumed to be true for the purpose 
of this thesis.
But if the passive smoking theory were true, what 
would be the implications of the "Mill principle" and the 
"Berlin principle"? About the Mill principle there can be 
no doubt: insofar as the passive smoking theory is true,
smoking in public causes harm to others; therefore, in
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order to prevent harm to others, smoking in public must be 
banned. But this is also the conclusion reached by 
applying the Berlin principle: if smoking in public
endangers the lives of others, then it must be prohibited 
in public. The Berlin principle restricts actions which 
infringe the liberty of others. Here the question is the 
lives of others. Life and liberty are obviously not the 
same thing, but it is impossible to have liberty without 
also having, as its essential prerequisite, life. The 
protection of others' liberties therefore necessarily and 
inescapably implies the protection of others' lives. 
This "prerequisite" argument of course has other, fairly 
significant, implications. If life must be protected by 
the state, then it is incumbent on the state to ensure 
that every citizen is provided with health care. The 
state must also ensure that everyone has food, clothing 
and shelter - truly the essentials of life. And, since 
basic education is a prerequisite of freedom in that a 
person cannot be considered free unless he is capable of 
meaningfully making his own choices (as Mill himself says, 
the concepts of individual liberty, independence and 
sovereignty "apply only to human beings in the maturity of 
their faculties"26), it must be the state's role to 
provide, or at least to ensure the provision of, education 
up to a certain standard*. To repeat: under the "Berlin
principle", the liberal principle of a minimum state 
limited to protecting freedom, the state must nevertheless 
ensure the provision of the prerequisites to liberty, 
including the protection of life and the provision of the 
basic welfare services of health, housing and education. 
This is not, however, to say that the Berlin principle 
entails the full-blown social-democratic welfare state or 
even socialism. It does not amount to redefining liberty
* In On Liberty, Mill states that it is "almost a self-evident axiom" 
in a free society that "the State should require and compel the 
education, up to a certain standard, of every human being who is born 
its citizen"27.
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as socialists do to mean "power" or "ability"** such that 
the state's role in protecting "liberty" is so wide as to 
encompass virtually anything. It does not mean, either, 
that every kind of harm can be subsumed under an expanded 
definition of "liberty", such that the supposedly 
minimalist "Berlin principle" of preventing infringements 
to others' liberty turns out to be little different from 
the "Mill principle" of preventing harm to others. The 
concept of infringements of liberty and its prerequisites 
is by no means unlimited or all-embracing. It does not 
encompass an unhappy marriage, or a leaking drainpipe, or 
an unpleasant smell (the irises, again). Those are harms, 
but they do not in any way infringe anyone's liberty. 
Without life or health or education, however, a person is 
not truly free. Where any of these are endangered - as 
with "passive smoking" - the state intervenes as much 
under the Berlin principle as under the Mill principle.
By contrast, even with a leaking drainpipe, an 
unhappy marriage or an unpleasant smell, a person can 
still be free. None of these things, undesirable and 
harmful though they may be, has any bearing at all on his 
liberty; protecting the prerequisites of liberty does not 
entail state intervention in people's lives to rectify 
these sorts of problem. And this point is crucial when 
considering the position when one does not assume the 
"passive smoking" theory to be true - which, given the 
current state of medical knowledge on the subject, must be 
the case at present. Applying the "Berlin principle", in 
the absence of any danger to health - that is to say, in 
the absence of any danger to a prerequisite of liberty, 
and hence to liberty - the state may not intervene. 
However unpleasant may be the smell and stuffiness one 
experiences in the vicinity of smokers, under the Berlin 
principle the state is not justified in stopping them from 
smoking in public places. Of course this does not prevent
** As to which, see chapter three of this thesis.
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private institutions from making sensible arrangements to 
minimise the unpleasantness, for example through the 
demarcation of areas for smokers and non-smokers in
restaurants or cinemas. But that is entirely a matter for
the restauranteur or cinema owner, and if they do not want 
to make such arrangements they do not have to. Under the 
Berlin principle the state is not entitled to take any
coercive measures in this matter, since there is no danger 
to anyone's liberty. It is otherwise with the Mill
principle. Under the Mill principle, the danger to 
others' liberty is not the crucial test; "harm to others" 
is. By the smells and stuffiness which they create, 
smokers undoubtedly do harm other people. The Mill 
principle of preventing harm to others would therefore 
entitle the state to prohibit smoking in public. Under 
present circumstances, when there is no conclusive 
evidence to prove the passive smoking theory, applying the 
Mill principle would thus entitle the state to remove 
people's freedom to smoke in public. On any measure that 
would be a substantial curtailment of individual liberty - 
but one which is implicit in the notion of preventing harm 
to others*.
The Berlin principle, then, would allow state 
interference only where there was a danger to others' 
liberty; in the case of smoking there could be 
intervention only to stop smoking in public and only if 
the truth of the passive smoking theory were established. 
Thus far the Berlin principle goes, and no further. The 
Mill principle, however, is not constrained in this way. 
As we have seen, the Mill principle would allow the state
* Although, of course, if the people harmed give their "free, 
voluntary and undeceived consent"20 (see section 1.3.1.), the Mill 
principle will not interfere with the freedom to smoke. Presumably 
such consent is tacitly given by people who sit in the "smoking room" 
of a Pall Mall club. But when someone gets on a crowded train and 
finds that he is in the smoking compartment, he cannot be said to 
have given his consent to his fellow passengers smoking. The Mill 
principle would entitle the state to prohibit any railway company 
from keeping smoking compartments on its trains.
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to ban smoking in public, whether or not the passive 
smoking theory is true. But even that is not the limit of 
its potential for interventionism; the Mill principle is 
capable of posing even bigger threats to individual 
liberty.
1.5.1.B : The right to smoke at home
What, for instance, of smoking, not in public, but in 
one's own home?
One of the most important defining characteristics of 
a free society lies in the demarcation of a clear boundary 
between the public domain on one side, and the private, 
independent world of home and family on the other. Very 
occasionally, it is necessary and desirable for the line 
to be breached, and for the law to invade the private 
world; in cases of child abuse, for example, the state 
must intervene in the family, in order to protect the 
child's liberty. But it is in the interests of liberty 
that such instances should be exceptional, and even then 
approached by the state with extreme caution. As a 
general rule, liberty is best served when the world of the 
family is left untouched by state intervention. For 
families are a focus of allegiance which rivals the state 
and undermines the state's chances of exercising monopoly 
power over individuals. The bonds of family loyalty, 
being more natural than any fealty and obedience which the 
state can command, are potentially stronger and more 
enduring. In addition, the family serves as a mutual 
protection society and, because of this, the individual 
does not stand alone before the state. In all these ways 
the family is an important and effective bulwark against 
threats to individual liberty posed by the state. The 
family is (as one writer has put it) "subversive" of the 
state's wilder pretensions28. Conversely, the success of 
a totalitarian state depends largely on weakening family 
ties as much as possible - a point effectively brought out
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by George Orwell in Nineteen eighty-four, where the state 
exercised control over adults by obtaining the unswerving 
loyalty of their children ("by means of such organizations 
as the Spies"), with the result that
It was almost normal for people over thirty to be 
frightened of their own children. And with good 
reason, for hardly a week passed in which The Times 
did not carry a paragraph describing how some 
eavesdropping little sneak - "child hero" was the 
phrase generally used - had overheard some 
compromising remark and denounced its parents to 
the Thought Police29.
In this context, the stance taken by Mill in On 
Liberty is not reassuring. Presumably inspired by the 
proto-feminism for which he has become so widely acclaimed 
in the late twentieth century, Mill sees the domain of the 
family as very much an area for state interference:
The despotic power of husbands over wives [he 
writes in On Liberty] needs not be enlarged upon 
here, because nothing more is needed for the 
complete removal of the evil than that wives should 
have the same rights and should receive the 
protection of the law in the same manner as all 
other persons30.
The sentiments seem innocuous enough, until we realise 
that Mill recognises nothing particularly special, private 
or inviolate about the family such as would mark it off 
from the public domain. Fellow members of one's family 
are, in Mill's vocabulary, "others" in much the same way 
that passers-by in the street are "others", and the 
state's role in curbing freedom to prevent "harm to 
others" necessarily involves the state in regulating 
relations within the family. Mill writes, in the same 
paragraph as his comment about the "despotic power" of 
husbands, that
the State, while it respects the liberty of each in 
what specially regards himself, is bound to
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maintain a vigilant control over his exercise of 
any power which it allows him to possess over 
others*. . .
He then immediately expresses regret that
this obligation [on the part of the State] is 
almost entirely disregarded in the case of family 
relations - a case, in its direct influence on 
human happiness, more important than all others put 
together30.
It is not difficult to imagine what this entails in 
terms of the case study which we have chosen to illustrate 
the practical effects of Mill's principle - that is, the 
question of cigarette smoking. On Mill's analysis, as set 
out above, smoking at home is not a private activity at 
all. It involves "others" - the members of one's own 
family. It is, in short, not " self-regarding"14, but 
"other-regarding". Moreover it harms those "others". If 
smoking in public is unpleasant to "others", smoking at 
home is hardly less so. On the contrary: they have to
endure the unpleasantness day after day at close quarters; 
have to live with the stale nicotine smell permanently 
hanging in the air, lingering on the carpets and curtains. 
(Mill is undeniably correct when he says that family 
relations have a "direct influence" on human happiness 
which is "more important than all others [all other 
relationships between individuals] put together"30.) And 
there can be little doubt that he regards these things as 
legitimate matters for state regulation. In an earlier 
passage of On Liberty he writes that "whenever there is a 
definite damage or a definite risk of damage, either to an 
individual or to the public, the case is taken out of the 
province of liberty and placed in that of morality or 
law". He cites a number of examples to demonstrate this 
point, one of which is "the frequent case of a man who 
causes grief to his family by addiction to bad habits".
* Emphasis added.
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Such a case, according to Mill, is emphatically not in 
"the province of liberty". But neither are cases where a 
man does not actually cause grief but merely cultivates
habits not in themselves vicious, if they are 
painful to those with whom he passes his life, or 
who from personal ties are dependent on him for 
their conduct31.
The inference to be drawn from this is really quite 
astonishing: the Mill principle - the "very simple
principle" of liberty - offers no guarantee even of a 
man's freedom to smoke cigarettes in his own home.
1.5.1.C: The right to smoke alone
It is, then, possible to imagine a state which, 
without in any way derogating from Mill's principle of 
liberty, denied its citizens the freedom to smoke either 
in public or even among their own families. In such a 
state, smokers would doubtless seek refuge in solitude. 
People would confine their smoking to moments when they 
were absolutely alone, with no chance of their fumes 
touching any other person: on a deserted beach, perhaps,
or a quiet country lane, or - more prosaically - on their 
own in the car, stuck in a traffic jam on the daily drive 
to and from work. It might be thought that at least this 
most private activity would surely be impregnable from 
interference by a state which faithfully applied the very 
simple principle.
But it would not be. Where interference is justified 
to prevent "harm to others", even the apparently personal 
realm of solitary smoking is vulnerable. For smoking 
alone can, in a wholly serious and non-trivial way, cause 
harm to others. As was mentioned in section 1.3.3. of 
this chapter, the harm which an individual can cause 
others derives not solely from physical proximity (smoking 
in the same room as others, for instance) but from the 
complex network of relationships and commitments which
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constitute modern life. This analysis of the right to 
smoke in the context of Mill's principle was predicated, 
it will be recalled, on the assumption that there is a 
causal link between smoking cigarettes and the smoker 
contracting lung cancer, an assumption which (unlike the 
"passive smoking" theory) is no longer medically 
controversial. That being so, smoking can cause the 
smoker to suffer long periods of illness, to spend time in 
hospital away from work, friends and family, and even of 
course to have his life cut short. This is obviously harm 
to himself. But because of the many relationships and 
commitments in which his life is bound up, it is also harm 
to others. The smoker's family will share his pain while 
he is ill, will miss him if he is hospitalised, and will 
undergo bereavement on his premature death. If he is the 
breadwinner, his loss of earnings during prolonged illness 
- not to mention his premature death - will be in addition 
financially damaging to them. His colleagues at work who 
depend on his contribution will, in a different way, 
suffer from his absence and of course all the more from 
his loss. To prevent these harms, there is a case, under 
the Mill principle, for banning even solitary smoking.
That case strengthens of course with the magnitude of 
the harm caused, and the numbers of "others" so harmed. 
If the smoker was a great entrepreneur, the whole economy 
will be harmed by his loss. Literature would suffer if he 
was a great playwright, technological advance if he was a 
great scientist. But what if he was a vagrant? Not only 
would his demise be less harmful to fewer others, but of 
course it might actually save a great deal of money, 
trouble and so on. Is a person's life worth less, and is 
there less need to prevent smoking-induced death, because 
less "harm to others" is caused? And if so, does this 
mean that the vagrant should be allowed to smoke when the 
entrepreneur, playwright and scientist are not? That is, 
should he, by virtue of his vagrancy, have greater rights 
to exercise individual liberty than they?
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By this stage one has entered the realms of an absurd 
and grotesque calculus which, one assumes, cannot have 
been what Mill intended in formulating the very simple 
principle. However it is implicit in the wording of the 
principle, in setting up the prevention of "harm to 
others" as the criterion by which to assess whether 
individual liberty may be interfered with. Whatever 
Mill's intentions, the way that they have been formulated 
in the principle generates ambiguities by which the most 
monstrous and illiberal notions can become legitimate 
considerations in drawing the line between "individual 
independence and social control" - the problem which the 
very simple principle was supposed to resolve23.
All this is - to reiterate - a function of the 
interdependence of people in society which makes a 
nonsense of the "harm to others" concept. It is not just, 
as C.L. Ten would contend, that the Mill principle has 
been sloppily misinterpreted as limiting liberty whenever 
it "affects" others*. The point about smoking alone is 
that, without in any way depriving other people of their 
freedom, it does not merely affect them, but actually 
harms them. The wording "harm to others" is the problem. 
The inherent ambiguity of those words, the almost 
unlimited scope there is for extending their ambit to 
cover such a wide variety of activities, is what gives the 
state a justification for encroaching on its citizens' 
lives even to the point of prohibiting them from smoking 
cigarettes alone**. The all-pervasive state, even the 
totalitarian state: these potentially are the
* See above, section 1.3.3.
** Alan Ryan puts the point nicely on the question of drink: "A man
who drinks so much that there is no money left for the housekeeping 
can be variously described. We may just say: 'He spends all his
money on drink* - describing the action in merely self-regarding 
terms... or we might say: 'He is neglecting his wife and children’,
and here we have an other-regarding action. "s:LA-.
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consequences of defining the state's functions in terms of 
preventing harm to others.
1.5.2. Other illustrations: "pursuing our own good in
our own way"
Smoking is in some ways a special case. It is easy 
to see why objections might be raised to the way that this 
thesis has dwelt so much on smoking as an illustration of 
what is wrong with the "preventing harm to others" 
principle. The principle of preventing harm to others is 
so restrictive of freedom in the case of smoking because 
smoking, by contrast to many other private activities, is 
particularly harmful to oneself. A great many of the 
types of "harm to others" which have been listed here, 
particularly in section 1.5.1.C - the family's
bereavement, depriving one's colleagues of one's 
contribution at work, the losses to the economy, 
literature and technological advance - are all direct 
consequences of the lung cancer caused to the smoker 
himselfs that is, of the harm to himself. It is just 
that smoking happens to cause lung cancer. Lots of other 
activities which people do by themselves are not "bad for 
them" in that way, and do not cause harm to themselves. 
Accordingly, all those consequent harms to others (the 
family's bereavement and so on) do not arise, and there is 
less reason to prohibit them. Thus, the objectors might 
conclude, the extensiveness of "harm to others" is more 
limited than the smoking example would suggest; and the 
very simple principle only encroaches so pervasively on 
people's private activities when they are harmful to 
themselves.
This objection is a good deal less helpful to Mill's 
case than it might at first seem. To accept the force of 
the objection is to acknowledge as relevant a point which 
Mill, in the paragraph where the very simple principle is 
set out, expressly repudiates. It ought not to be a
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justification for interfering in private smoking, as 
opposed to other forms of private activity, that smoking, 
unlike those other activities, is bad for the agent 
himself. To accept this consideration as relevant, and to 
countenance interference on these grounds, makes a 
nonsense of Mill's anti-paternalistic protestations that 
the agent's "own good, either physical or moral, is not a 
sufficient warrant" for interference and that he "cannot 
rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will 
be better for him to do so"1. It is no defence of the 
very simple principle to say that it comes down hardest on 
people's actions when they cause harm to themselves. That 
only serves to blur the very distinction, between "self- 
regarding" and other-regarding, between harm to oneself 
and "harm to others", which is the essence of Mill's 
attempt to draw the line dividing individual independence 
from social control.
Besides, the objection ignores a very great number of 
everyday ordinary actions which are good rather than bad 
for the agent, which in any free society would be regarded 
as perfectly lawful, but which - applying the Mill 
principle - could be prohibited on the grounds that they 
cause harm to others. Some of these were mentioned in 
section 1.3.2. The point about the stock exchange example 
cited there is that an individual may derive considerable 
profit and advantage to himself by selling a substantial 
block of his own shares in a company, but insofar as that 
sale causes the price of that company's shares to fall, 
his personal action will have caused losses and 
disadvantage to the other people who hold these shares32. 
A family may enjoy a particular picnic spot in the country 
because it is unspoilt: there is simply no-one else
around. They return there for lunch every year on 
midsummer's day. Then one midsummer's day it so happens 
that an hour before the family arrive at their favourite 
spot, three other families travelling on holiday together 
discover the same spot, admire it for the same reasons and
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themselves decide to settle down for a picnic there. By 
the time the first family arrive it is no longer an 
unspoilt spot "away from it all". The three families had 
exactly the same - legitimate - motive as the first one in 
setting up their picnics they wanted to enjoy themselves 
in a peaceful, quiet, ordinary way. But in doing so they 
ruined the first family's days they caused harm to 
others. Transpose this metaphor to the Costa del Sol or 
Majorca or the Greek islands, and you have (writ large) 
what thousands of holidaymakers have done to each other on 
the originally unspoilt beaches there.
Here, again, can be seen the effect of the 
interdependence of people in society. Mill writes in On 
Liberty that "the only freedom which deserves the name is 
that of pursuing our own good in our own way"33. This is 
precisely what the person who sells his shares, or the 
three families who settle down at the picnic spot, or the 
countless families who fly off to the Costa del Sol, are 
doing. They are not infringing anyone else's liberty. 
That being so, under the "Berlin principle" there would be 
no question of interfering with their freedom to sell 
shares, settle down at a picnic spot, go on holiday where 
they choose. But the Mill principle is different. It 
guarantees freedom only where its exercise does not cause 
"harm to others". But in an interdependent society, 
people's private desires and ambitions inevitably 
conflicti the desire of one shareholder to profit from 
the sale of his shares conflicts with the desire of others 
to preserve the value of theirs, the desire of one 
holidaymaker to have an unspoilt beach conflicts with the 
desire of others to go there too, and so on. In every 
sphere of activity where they do so conflict - and they 
are many, if not infinite - the action of any one man 
will, with equal inevitability, cause harm to others. In 
consequence the range of activities in respect of which
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interference is authorised under the Mill principle is 
very large, and the range of activities in respect of 
which freedom is guaranteed by the Mill principle 
correspondingly small.
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1.6. How Mill responds to the problem
Mill's defenders have an answer to the criticism, 
voiced in this thesis and many times before, that by 
virtue of society's interdependence there is almost no 
limit to the range of activities which cause harm to 
others. Wearily, these defenders point out that Mill 
himself recognises the interdependence problem in On 
Liberty and takes account of its therefore, they 
continue, Mill's principle is considerably more 
sophisticated and refined than those who crudely denigrate 
it give him credit for34*.
It is undeniably true that Mill recognises the point. 
In chapter 4 of On Liberty, echoing Donne's observation 
that No man is an island, Mill writes (albeit less 
poetically)
No person is an entirely isolated being; it is 
impossible for a person to do anything seriously or 
permanently hurtful to himself without mischief 
reaching at least to his near connections, and 
often far beyond them35.
Earlier, in chapter 1, he likewise acknowledges that, with 
regard to an individual's actions,
whatever affects himself may affect others through 
himself20.
However it is less clear that Mill, having 
appreciated the problem, deals with it effectively. He 
obviously thinks that there should be exceptions to the 
sanctioning of intervention to prevent "harm to others", 
but the scope of such exceptions is left unclear. There 
are, Mill writes, a number of instances in which "to 
extend the bounds of what may be called moral police"
* C.L. Ten even goes as far as to claim that "Mill readily and 
explicitly admits that self-regarding conduct affects others, and 
this admission is fatal to the traditional interpretation"2*.
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would have the effect of encroaching on "the most 
unquestionably legitimate liberty of the individual"36. 
Such cases, he implies, arise even when all that is being 
done by the "moral police" is applying his own principle 
of preventing harm to others. Thus he acknowledges that 
in a society with a Muslim majority the eating of pork by 
non-Muslims among the general public will cause great harm 
to the general public there:
The practice is really revolting to such a 
public37.
Notwithstanding this harm done to others - intense and 
extensive harm - Mill believes that to prevent the harm 
being done to others would be an interference with the 
"most unquestionably legitimate" sphere of individual 
liberty: therefore in this instance he opposes
interference "to prevent harm to others". This is at once 
an admission that the application of the Mill principle of 
preventing harm to others potentially undermines the most 
basic human freedoms (and is thus not the guarantee of 
liberty it is supposed to be), and also an explicit 
statement that there must be exceptions to the application 
of the principle. A more modern example cited by Ten 
makes the same point:
if a fanatical Nazi desires that all Jews be put to 
the gas chamber, and his desire is not realised, 
then he has been harmed38.
Most people, including Mill if he had lived to see 
Nazism and its works, would take the view that - as with 
the harm felt by the Muslims when people eat pork - for 
the state to prevent the harm felt by the fanatical Nazi 
in this case (by sending all Jews to the gas chamber) 
would encroach on "the most unquestionably legitimate 
liberty of the individual". After all, if a principle of 
liberty is such that, if applied, it does not stand in the 
way of a Nazi state, then it really cannot be said to be 
much use at all to the cause of liberty. But again the 
problem is that, even as Mill and his defenders would
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baulk at "preventing harm" to the fanatical Nazi by
sending Jews to the gas chamber, they are admitting that 
exceptions must be made to the very simple principle of
preventing harm to others - and, by implication, that to
apply the principle as it is formulated consistently (that 
is, without exceptions) truly would not be a guarantee 
against Nazism, and is thus pretty well useless in 
upholding liberty.
That Mill allows for exceptions to the principle 
obviously exonerates him from the charge that his
intentions are in any way inimical to "the most 
unquestionably legitimate liberty of the individual"s he 
clearly would have been anxious to ensure that the very 
simple principle would not allow for a Nazi state. But 
this is where the difficulties begin. For if there are to 
be exceptions, on what grounds should they be made? The 
state should not interfere to prevent the harm to the 
Muslim majority or the Nazi fanatic. What kinds of harm, 
then, should not be a cause for interference, and what 
kinds should?
In the same paragraph of On Liberty where Mill 
acknowledges that, among an individual's actions, 
"whatever affects himself may affect others", he also 
suggests that the criterion for deciding whether an action 
is self-regarding and thus inviolable by the state or 
other-regarding and thus a ground for intervention, is to 
look at the action's effects (and hence the harm it 
causes) insofar as they operate
directly and in the first instance20.
In other words, if the action is "directly and in the 
first instance" harmful only to the individual himself, 
while any harm caused to others is only indirect and 
incidental, liberty should be respected and the state 
should not intervene. It follows that the state should 
intervene only in cases where the harm done to others is 
direct and in the first instance.
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The first thing to note about this refinement of the 
principle is, of course, that it clouds the simplicity and 
consistency which is one of the main advantages which Mill 
claims for the principles "one very simple principle". 
It in effect creates an exception to an exception - the 
principle accords individuals the right to liberty, except 
when exercising the liberty would cause harm to others, 
except that such harm to others may be discounted when it 
is not "direct and in the first instance". In doing so it 
allows yet more scope for ambiguities in a principle 
already amply riddled with ambiguity.
But, worse than that, the "direct and in the first 
instance" refinement does not work. That is to say it 
does not meet the objections enumerated so far in this 
chapter that allowing interference to prevent harm to 
others undermines the liberty which Mill's principle is 
supposed to protect. Even if interference is to be 
allowed only where the harm is direct and in the first 
instance, application of the principle would still 
legitimise assaults on many basic human freedoms. As has 
been pointed out, to a devout Calvinist or a principled 
vegetarian
the very presence in his community of a Catholic or 
a meat-eater [respectively] may cause him fully as 
much pain as a blow to the face or the theft of his 
purse39.
The harm to the Calvinist or the vegetarian is, then, 
direct and in the first instance. On Mill's doctrine of 
allowing interference to prevent harm (which is direct and 
in the first instance) to others, this would mean that the 
principle would not guarantee the liberty of worship of 
the Catholic, or the right of the meat-eater to eat any 
meat at all (that is, he could face even greater 
restrictions than under the Muslim state which denied him 
the right to eat pork!).
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Surely this is not what Mill means by his very simple 
principle? But if not, then his principle is
insufficiently clear to achieve its ends. Insofar as it 
is not profoundly illiberal, it is hopelessly 
inconsistent.
This was the charge, it will be recalled, which was 
laid at Mill's door in chapter one of this thesis - and of 
course by many earlier critics of On Liberty - in the 
matter of whether or not the principle is supposed to be 
contingent on achieving utilitarian ends. Then of course 
there were defenders of Mill - notably Gray - who claimed 
that, on the contrary, the principle is "consistent almost 
to a fault"40. On this issue, of "preventing harm to 
others", Mill again has his defenders. These defenders 
claim that the word "harm" has been misinterpreted by 
Mill's critics and that, if "harm" is understood properly 
in the context of On Liberty, the doctrine of harm- 
prevention loses its potentially illiberal implications. 
Foremost among the defenders on this point is J.C. Rees, 
who protests (in similar vein to Gray) that if the word 
"harm" in On Liberty is properly interpreted, it will 
"yield a single consistent principle"41.
The case for the defence will now be examined.
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2. TRYING TO DEFINE "HARM”
2.1. Harming others means "violating their interests"
Probably the most widely-canvassed "interpretation" 
of the term harm in On Liberty is that it means "violation 
of another person's interests". This, it is argued, 
carries the implication that Mill's principle justifying 
interference applies to a "more limited range"42 of 
conduct than the traditional interpretation would suggest.
The point about violating others' "interests" is that 
it involves something more specific than merely harming 
others (in the sense in which "harm" has so far been used 
in this chapter). In particular it excludes situations 
where all that has happened is that someone else's 
sensibilities have been offended - situations such as that 
where the Muslim is offended by the presence in his midst 
of the pork-eater, the vegetarian by the presence of the 
meat-eater, the Calvinist by the presence of the 
Catholic, the fanatical Nazi by the presence (or even 
survival) of the Jews. As Rees puts it:
I could be very seriously affected by the action of 
another person merely because I had an 
extraordinarily sensitive nature, and no claim to 
have others respect these tender spots would be 
recognised as an interest43.
The consequence of defining "harm" like this is that (at 
least some of) the most obnoxious effects of a policy of 
preventing harm to others would be avoided. To a far 
greater extent than under the traditional interpretation 
of harm, the application of the very simple principle 
would respect the "most unquestionably legitimate" of 
human liberties - the freedom of worship of the Catholic, 
the Jews' right to live, and so on. In the words of 
Raymond Plant, contemplating cases where a work of 
literature causes offence,
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Unless we have a tolerably clear distinction 
between harming interests and offending 
sensibilities we are on a very slippery slope. 
Offended sensibility is an inherently subjective 
matter and if [it is] considered the basis of legal 
coercion or moral disapproval, then this is a 
licence for people with strong beliefs of any sort 
to claim that their sensibilities have been 
offended by a work of art. This then would involve 
a prima facie case for limiting freedom of 
speech...44.
Granted, then, that interpreting harm to mean 
violation of interests would remove some of the worst 
defects of the very simple principle on the traditional 
interpretation, the question which arises next is whether 
there is any justification for interpreting the principle 
in this way. Does a proper reading of the very simple 
principle, in the context of On Liberty, really yield the 
"interests" interpretation, with its more liberal
implications ?
Mill's defenders are convinced that it does. Once 
again Gray joins the fray. His view is that Mill's
concern is for the protection of people's "vital
interests"45, and he cites as an example an extract from 
Mill's essay on Auguste Comte and positivism:
It is incumbent on everyone to restrain the pursuit 
of his personal objects within the limits
consistent with the essential interests of 
others46.
But in the vanguard of the argument that harming others 
means violating their interests, is Rees. According to 
Geraint Williams, it is "difficult to overestimate the 
influence on later Mill study" of Rees's interpretation42. 
In a 1960 article originally entitled A re-reading of Mill 
on liberty (and since republished in a volume edited by 
Williams), Rees expressed his view thus:
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My case... is that we ought not to gloss over the 
different modes of expression, that there is an 
important difference between just "affecting 
others" and "affecting the interests of others", 
and that there are passages in the essay [On 
Liberty] which lend support to the view that Mill 
was thinking of "interests" and not merely 
"effects"47.
And he suggested an alternative formula to the wording of 
the very simple principle:
The revised version would read something like this: 
"Social control of individual actions ought to be 
exercised only in cases where the interests of 
others are threatened or actually affected"48.
2.1.1. The textual evidence
2.1.1.A: "Interests" in the text
Perhaps the most obvious, yet nonetheless important, 
objection to Rees's 1960 "revised version" is precisely 
that it is a revised version. It is not what Mill 
actually says. Mill's words in the very simple principle 
are that the only purpose for which interference may be 
exercised is "to prevent harm to others"1. Nowhere in the 
entire paragraph of On Liberty in which the very simple 
principle appears is the word "interests" so much as 
mentioned. This is something which ought at least to give 
some pause for thought.
Nonetheless, elsewhere in On Liberty the word 
"interests" is mentioned. In the 1960 article Rees 
claimed that "the word appears at least fifteen times in 
the course of the essay" and, moreover, "some of the 
passages where it is used are of the greatest importance 
in assessing Mill's intentions"4®. In addition, he said, 
criticism of the very simple principle as illiberal
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because of the breadth of the words "harm to others" is 
based on:
the supposition that Mill's principle depends for 
its validity on there being some actions, including 
some important ones, which are free from social 
consequences, i.e. they affect no one but the agent 
himself. I shall argue that this assumption on the 
part of the critics is false and that it derives 
from a failure to observe the form of words which 
Mill often employs in the text50*.
Rees's honesty and integrity in confining his claim 
to the assertion that Mill "often" uses the term 
"interests" is not merely rhetorically limp, but it 
undermines his whole case. For the point is that, apart 
from the central passage of On Liberty where the very 
simple principle is spelled out - and where the form of 
words used is "harm to others" - Mill expresses the 
delineation of the frontier between the realm of liberty 
and the realm of interference in various different ways. 
They all mean roughly similar things, and doubtless they 
are intended by Mill to mean precisely the same as the 
formulation in the very simple principle itself. But the 
exact words used differ greatly, and their usage is almost 
random, to the point of carelessness. Even if Mill did 
"often" write the word "interests" in On Liberty, perhaps 
indeed fifteen times, it would be mistaken to attach too 
much significance to this because he also used lots of 
other expressions to convey the same idea - expressions 
which do not in the same way imply a clear distinction 
between harming interests and offending sensibilities.
* Emphasis added.
2.1.1.B s "Concerns" in the text
One such expression is "concerns". A number of times 
in On Liberty Mill expresses the difference between the 
realm of liberty and the realm of interference in terms of 
whether someone's action "concerns” only himself (in which 
case he should be left free) or "concerns" others as well 
(in which case his actions are subject to legitimate 
intervention). Now of course many many things done by a 
person can easily be said to concern other people without 
actually violating their interests. For example in the 
sentence "the Professor's work concerns Australian society 
and the aborigines; questions concerning Red Indians 
should be addressed elsewhere", there is absolutely no 
inference to be drawn that the Professor's work violates 
(or even affects) the interests of Australian aborigines. 
"Concerns" here merely means "relates to" or "is connected 
with". It is a much less specific expression than 
"violates the interests of", and can be applied much more 
widely. When Mill writes about an action which 
"concerns" others being subject to intervention, this 
therefore leaves a much narrower range of actions in the 
realm of liberty to be protected by the very simple 
principle. With the use of the word "concerns", the 
principle is just as illiberal as if it had been expressed 
to apply to all actions which "affect" others; and Rees's 
rescue operation fails.
Rees has protested against this inference being drawn 
from Mill's use of the words "concern" and "concerns". 
While admitting that "concerns" can sometimes mean no more 
than "relates to" or "affects", he points out that it also 
has another meaning which is stronger, narrower in scope 
and not so very different from the concept of interests. 
When an interfering and meddlesome neighbour starts 
inquiring about the personal affairs of the family next 
door - for example, asking which church Sunday school they 
are sending their children to - a common response would
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be: "That's none of your business. That's our concern."
In other words, regardless of the fact that the meddlesome 
neighbour might be a committed Calvinist and would be 
offended and upset to hear that the children next door are 
being brought up as "papists", the issue of the children's 
religious education is the concern of - the interest of - 
only the family itself. (Therefore, if Mill is using 
"concerns" in this sense, offended sensibilities could not 
be a ground for interfering with the family's freedom to 
choose.) By contrast, the question of whether traffic 
lights are to be placed at the end of their street is of 
"common concern" to both the family and the neighbour, and 
to everyone else in the street, because it does not 
merely affect them but affects their interests. (Again, 
if Mill is using "concerns" in this sense, a decision 
about the traffic lights, unlike the question of 
children's upbringing, would be a matter outside the 
private realm of individual independence and one which 
would legitimately be subject to social control.) In 
short, there is a sense in which "concerns" can be used 
which means rather more than "affects". To quote Rees:
though the word "concerns" has sometimes no more 
force than "has reference to" or "affects", with no 
implication that interests are being referred to, 
it can also mean "is of importance to" and could in 
some contexts carry with it the suggestion that 
interests are involved51*.
Rees's contention is that, this being so, Mill's use of 
the word "concerns", when defining the frontiers of 
individual freedom in On Liberty, does not necessarily 
invalidate the argument that the very simple principle 
only sanctions interference to prevent violation of other 
people's interests.
* Emphasis added.
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Once again, Rees's honesty in not exaggerating his 
claims ("can also mean"; "could in some contexts carry 
with it the suggestion that...") lets him down. It is 
rhetorically weak and, more importantly, it alerts Rees's 
readers to a certain lack of confidence in what is being
argued. To some extent Rees is correct. In some
contexts, as he says, Mill's use of "concerns" does seem
to imply the involvement of interests rather than mere
effects. Thus, for instance, Mill writes about the
"fanatical moral intolerance of the Puritans" who, prior 
to the English Restoration of 1660, attempted to meddle in 
the private lives of individuals to ensure conformity to 
strict ethical norms. No doubt the Puritans were affected 
(concerned) by the way various individual were conducting 
their own lives, but the Puritans' interests were not
being affected (and it was thus not their concern):
If there be among those whom it is attempted to 
coerce into prudence or temperance any of the 
material of which vigorous and independent 
characters are made, they will infallibly rebel
against the yoke. No such person will ever feel 
that others have a right to control him in his 
concerns, such as they have to prevent him from
injuring them in theirs52*.
Perhaps, too, Rees's interpretation of "concerns" as 
related to interests holds good for the opening paragraph 
of chapter 3 of On Liberty, where Mill maintains that "the 
liberty of the individual must be thus far limited" - to 
the extent that
he refrains from molesting others in what concerns 
them, and merely acts according to his own 
inclination and judgement in things which concern 
himself53**.
But in other contexts in Mill's essay, the Rees 
interpretation stumbles, and it would go beyond the bounds
* Emphasis added.
** Emphasis added.
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of plausibility to imagine that when Mill uses "concerns" 
in these passages he means anything so specific as 
"affects the interests of". In chapter 3 of On Liberty 
Mill links the idea of a person's action which "concerns" 
others directly with the central problem of 
interdependence in society -
The distinction here pointed out between the part 
of a person's life which concerns only himself and 
that which concerns others, many people will refuse 
to admit. How (it may be asked) can any part of 
the conduct of a member of society be a matter of 
indifference to the other members? No person is an 
entirely isolated being...35*.
Mill's reference here to his critics' point about social 
interdependence (which is of course the main point being 
made by this chapter of this thesis) can only make any 
sense if "concerns" in this context means merely "relates 
to" or "affects". If Rees were right (that is, if 
"concerns" here could be taken to mean "affects the 
interests of") then it would be nonsensical to raise the 
issue of no person being an entirely isolated being: even
where members of society are interdependent rather than 
isolated there are many parts of each one's conduct which 
do not violate the interests of others**. Consequently 
Rees's interpretation of the word "concerns" cannot 
possibly apply to Mill's usage of it in this passage.
The same is true of Mill's use of "concerns" in 
chapter 1 of On Liberty, the chapter where the very simple 
principle is first spelled out. He writes of
that part of the conduct of an individual which 
concerns other people20*** 
but in the same paragraph, and in the same context and 
sense, he writes also about
* Emphasis added.
** This of course is the very basis of Rees's defence.
*** Emphasis added.
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all that portion of a person's life which affects 
only himself* 
and about the very simple principle requiring
liberty of tastes and pursuits... without
impediment from our fellow creatures, so long as
what we do does not harm them*.
In other words, Mill is using "concerns" to mean "affects" 
(not "violates the interests of"), and is using both words 
as practically synonymous with each other and with the 
concept of "harming others". Rees's idea that Mill is 
really talking about "interests" rather lacks credence 
here.
2.1.1.C: Terminological randomness in the text
As is shown by the passages quoted above, Mill in On 
Liberty sometimes uses "concerns" to refer to interests, 
but sometimes merely to effects; moreover he uses the 
words "concern", "affect" and "harm" virtually
interchangeably. Consistency of language is hard to
detect here - certainly not consistency in the use of the 
concept of "violating others' interests" - and it is 
impossible to draw any other conclusion than the point 
made above: Mill's use of language to define the boundary
of individual liberty is imprecise and ill-considered, to 
the point of randomness.
To do Rees justice, he is conscious of this criticism 
of Mill, and he writes of the objection made by critics 
that
we are not justified in attempting to produce a 
coherent theory when, from the variety of the terms 
used in the relevant passages, there is clearly not 
one there to extract51.
But Rees rejects the criticism. He persists in his view 
that a "coherent theory" of Mill - what he elsewhere calls 
a "single consistent principle"41 - can be discerned in 
the text. That coherent theory is, he insists, that
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Mill's principle allows for intervention only to prevent 
the violation of others' interests. Having taken note of 
the objection about "the variety of terms used in the 
relevant passages", Rees continues,
My answer to this objection... is that...41 
- and it is here that he makes his point that the word 
concerns "could in some contexts carry with it the 
suggestion that interests are involved".
But even if Rees were right about the word "concerns" 
(and, as shown in section 2.1.1.B, with regard to some 
passages he is clearly wrong), this is not the whole 
problem. The "variety of the terms used" in On Liberty to 
define the individual independence/social control 
delineation is very wide indeed. Many other expressions 
are used, and their usage is characterised by neither 
consistency nor coherence. Sometimes it does indeed seem 
as if the boundary depends merely on whether others are 
affected, sometimes on the way in which they are affected 
(that is, whether harmfully or not), sometimes on what is 
affected (their interests or just their tastes and 
sensibilities), and sometimes on a combination of these.
A selection of quotations from On Liberty will bear 
witness to this. Where Mill is delineating the realm of 
individual freedom which the very simple principle is 
intended to protect, in some places he does seem to 
suggest that the criterion is the individual's own 
interests. In chapter 4 of On Liberty, for instance, he 
writes that individual freedom must be unimpeded wherever 
a person's conduct affects the interests of no 
person besides himself
because
he is the person most interested in his own well­
being54 .
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Similarly, in chapter 5, Mill states that "the individual 
is not accountable to society for his actions" in so far 
as these concern
the interests of no person but himself54.
However, in many other passages of On Liberty Mill 
defines the realm of individual freedom merely in terms of 
whether an action affects or regards only himself. In the 
paragraph where the very simple principle is introduced, 
Mill says that a person's independence is absolute "in the 
part [of his conduct] which merely concerns himself"26. 
Further on in the same chapter Mill says that this applies 
in the portion of his conduct "which affects only 
himself"20. Later, in chapter 4, Mill defines this area 
of individual liberty as "what only regards himself"56, 
and as the "self-regarding class" of conduct57, "self- 
regarding conduct"58 (twice on the same page), "individual 
conduct"59 and "private life".
In chapter 5, the realm of freedom is defined mainly 
in terms of concerns, although in which sense of the word 
(interests or merely effects) it is not made clear. The 
expressions used include "things wherein the individual is 
alone concerned"60, "all that concerns only the agents 
themselves"22, "his own concerns"30, and "things which 
concern only himself"61.
When it comes to Mill's definitions of the scope of 
intervention permitted by the very simple principle, the 
position becomes even more confused. There are a number 
of passages which suggest that liberty becomes subject to 
intervention when there is merely an effect on others. In 
addition to the two uses of the phrase "concerns others" 
which seem to bear this interpretation (see section
2.1.1.B)22, there are in chapter 1 the expressions "things 
which regard the external conduct of the individual"63 and 
conduct which "affects others"20.
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Yet Mill also writes about the state's role as 
limited to preventing conduct which affects others (not 
necessarily others' interests) in a prejudicial or harmful 
way. At the head of this list of quotations is obviously 
the phrase used in the very simple principle itself - to 
prevent "harm to others"1. But other examples of phrases 
in On Liberty where Mill defines the conduct to be 
prevented by intervention as any type of harmful action 
(regardless of whether interests are harmed), include: 
"conduct... calculated to produce evil to someone else"1; 
"an act hurtful to others"63; "injury"63; "doing evil to 
others"63; "harm"20; "acts... which without justifiable 
cause do harm to others"53; making oneself "a nuisance to 
other people"53; "injury or molestation"64; "acts 
injurious to others"65; "the evil consequences of [an 
individual's] acts... on others"66; "a definite damage or 
definite risk of damage either to an individual or to the 
public"6”7; and "doing wrong to others"52.
Then there are a number of instances in On Liberty 
where the conduct to be prevented by intervention is 
stated to be that which affects, or prejudicially affects, 
the interests of others. These are the questions which 
(if selected to the exclusion of those cited in the 
previous two paragraphs) would support Rees's defence of 
Mill. They include: "those actions of each which concern
the interest of other people"63; "injuring the interests 
of one another"64; "conduct [which] affects prejudicially 
the interests of others"64; conduct and character which 
"affect the interest of others"65' "such actions as are 
prejudicial to the interests of others"55; and "damage, 
or probability of damage, to the interests of others"Ss. 
In addition there are at least a couple of usages of the 
word concerns which, as stated in section 2.1.1.B, it is 
probably correct of Rees to regard as meaning "affects the 
interest of"6 8.
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The picture is further confused by Mill's use of a 
number of expressions which cannot be classified with 
confidence in any of the categories of conduct so far 
listed: affecting others, or harming others, or
affecting/harming others' interests. Thus Mill variously 
defines the scope of interference as being to prevent: 
"an offence against the rights of others"66; the 
violation of "a distinct and assignable obligation to any 
other person or persons"57; and, even, attempts to 
deprive others of their freedom or impede their efforts to 
obtain it7. And as well as expressing the justification 
for intervention in terms of the negative things it is 
supposed to prevent, Mill also writes (creating yet more 
ambiguity) of the positive things which intervention 
should promote under the very simple principle: for
example, "self-protection"x, "the security of others"26, 
justice "for the sake of others"69. Is it possible to say 
with any certainty whether promoting these positive goods 
involves only preventing violations of others' interests 
(and hence a reasonably limited role for intervention, as 
Rees suggests) or preventing any kind of harm to others 
(and hence a virtually unlimited role for intervention)?
Rees's defence of Mill - that really the very simple 
principle would entitle state intervention only to prevent 
violations of others' interests, and that the critics are 
therefore wrong to see it as enabling potentially 
unlimited interventions by the state - depends for its 
plausibility on the support of textual evidence. That 
evidence simply is not there. The critics are, in fact, 
right, and it is Rees who is wrong. A thorough reading 
of the text of On Liberty does not yield up a "single 
consistent principle". Instead of one coherent definition 
of the boundary between the realms of individual liberty 
and state intervention, there is indeed, as the above 
selection of quotations all too amply illustrates, a 
"variety of... terms used in the relevant passages". It 
is a potpourri of different expressions with different
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meanings, and the consequence is that Mill's principle 
suffers from the same defect as it was accused of in 
chapter one of this thesis. Far from being a coherent or 
"very simple" principle, it is chronically ambiguous.
For all Rees's protestations, there are places in the 
text where it really seems that Mill has been almost 
reckless in choosing his words, not even making an attempt 
at consistency. At the start of chapter 4 of On Liberty, 
Mill makes a distinction between, on the one hand, 
violating the rights of others, and, on the other, merely 
being "hurtful" to them; the latter type of action, he 
states, is not a ground for state intervention:
The acts of an individual may be hurtful to others 
or wanting in due consideration for their welfare, 
without going to the length of violating any of 
their constituted rights. The offender may then be 
justly punished by opinion, though not by law64*. 
But this fine semantic distinction is set at nought when 
the reader turns back to chapter 1 to discover Mill 
stating, no less equivocally,
If anyone does any act hurtful to others, there is 
a prima facie case for punishing him by law. ..63**.
The point about Mill's use of the word "interests", 
Rees explains in his 1960 article, is that it implies 
something specific. Interests are not, he writes, "tender 
spirits" or "an extraordinary sensitive nature"43. 
Equally, they "are not just arbitrary wishes, fleeting 
fancies, or capricious demands"70. Offending someone's 
sensibilities, or failing to satisfy someone's likes or 
dislikes, is therefore not the same as violating his 
interests (and hence will not in itself justify state 
intervention). However, the trouble with this analysis is 
that Mill himself is not quite so precise about the
* Emphasis added.
** Emphasis added.
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meaning of "interests". In chapter 2 of Utilitarianism he 
uses the word much more loosely when he writes about
the happiness, or (as speaking practically it may 
be called) the interest, of every individual13.
And in his Thoughts on parliamentary reform, Mill writes 
that
everybody has as many different interests as he has 
feelings; likings or dislikings, either of a 
selfish or a better kind-71 
- a description of "interests" which has been aptly 
summarised by one commentator as meanings "a person had 
an interest in x when he wanted x". The fanatical Nazi 
wants to send all Jews to the gas chamber, the devout 
Calvinist wanted an end to Catholic practice, the 
vegetarian wants meat-eating to stop. If the failure to 
satisfy these wants constitutes a violation of interests, 
Rees's re-phrasing of the very simple principle in terms 
of preventing interest-violation does not render it any 
more liberal. But it is Mill's use of words - its 
randomness, inconsistency and ambiguity - which is to 
blame.
2.1.2. Trying to define "interests"
But even if Mill's own words had not been so 
unhelpful to the Rees case - even if, that is, the textual 
evidence showed consistent use by Mill of the term "harm" 
to mean "violation of interests" - it is by no means clear 
that the Rees argument would be of much help in mounting a 
defence of Mill. Rees, having insisted that some of the 
passages where the word "interests" is used in On Liberty 
"are of the greatest importance in assessing Mill's 
intentions"4®, seems unclear as to why. After working 
flat out to prove (unsuccessfully, in the view of this 
thesis) that "harm to others" means something very 
specific - violating interests - Rees does not explain 
satisfactorily what, precisely, "interests" means. The
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result is that even if Rees' s interpretation of Mill' s 
text were correct, it would not remove the ambiguities.
At several points in his 1960 article, Rees appears 
to suggest that "interests" is closely related to the idea 
of human "rights" - something to which human beings are 
entitled by virtue of their humanity, as of right. Thus 
Rees distinguishes "interests" from "effects" by noting 
that
"effects" is a concept applicable to plants and 
animals as well as to human beings, but no one 
talks about the interests of plants43, 
and then goes on, albeit somewhat tentatively, to 
associate the concept of "interests" with that of rights;
Certainly Mill is not saying that rights and 
interests are the same thing, synonymous terms (and 
of course they are not), but he does seem to imply 
that they are very closely related to each other. 
It would be consistent with what he says here to 
suppose that when a person can be said to have 
interests he is thereby possessed of a right49. 
There is undoubtedly textual support in On Liberty for the 
view that Mill regards "interests" and "rights" as closely 
related, or at least that he uses both terms almost 
interchangeably as the criterion for the boundary between 
individual liberty and state intervention (which is 
perhaps not surprising, in view of the wide range of terms 
which he uses almost interchangeably for this purpose; 
see section 2.1.l.C above). Thus Mill states that the 
very simple principle permits interference where there is 
"an offence against the rights of others"66 and "to 
prevent the stronger specimens of human nature from 
encroaching on the rights of others"69. In the third 
paragraph of chapter 4, the chapter which purports to 
define "the limits to the authority of society over the 
individual", Mill writes of the indispensability of each 
individual in society
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not injuring the interests of one another, or 
rather certain interests which, either by express 
legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to 
be considered as rights64.
The trouble with defining interests in terms of 
rights is that it leaves the essential question (what 
justifies state intervention restraining individual 
liberty?) unanswered. For "rights” is a contentless word. 
A right is simply an entitlement - but to what? In the 
liberal view, people have a right to freedom. A socialist 
might say that people have rights to (are entitled to) 
welfare, or perhaps equality. Unless the term "rights” 
has a specifically liberal content, the idea of a state 
limited to doing no more than protecting others' rights 
could be a socialist state72. But Rees, in his 1960 
article, seems to repudiate a specifically liberal content 
for Mill's conception of "rights" and to reject a 
definition of interests in terms of the right to freedom*. 
He does not, however, suggest what else the content of the 
"rights" to be protected by the state might be. So Rees's 
attempt to define interests as rights fails to remove the 
ambiguities, and fails to take the argument further. In 
Utilitarianism Mill offers his own definition of a 
"right"s
* As was pointed out earlier, Rees emphasises that interests are "not 
just arbitrary wishes, fleeting fancies, or capricious demands”, and 
thereby implies that they are something more substantial, such as 
welfare. But the point about freedom is that it does entail
respecting each person's arbitrary wishes, fleeting fancies or
capricious demands no less than his desire for welfare (although only
in respect of his own life - not his arbitrary wishes or demands for 
the lives of others, which would of course entail meeting the demands 
of the fanatical Nazi in respect of Jews and so on: see section
2.1.1.C above). Freedom is not an entitlement to a specific "good" 
such as welfare, but consists rather in a person's entitlement to 
realise for himself, insofar as he is so capable, whatever desire he 
may have, regardless of how substantial or fleeting, serious or
capricious, that desire might be. In limiting "interests" to the 
realisation of something substantial, and not "just" capricious 
demands, Rees is dissociating it from the concept of freedom. By 
1980, however, it appears that Rees may have changed his mind on 
this: see section 2.3. below.
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When we call anything a person's right, we mean 
that he has a valid claim on society to protect him 
in the possession of it... To have a right, then, 
is, I conceive, to have something which society 
ought to defend me in the possession of73.
If this passage is combined with Rees's interpretation of 
Mill, the exegesis becomes simply circular; When should 
the state intervene to protect people? When they would 
otherwise be harmed. What does being harmed mean? 
Violating interests. What does interests mean? Rights. 
Rights to what? Rights to being protected by the state. 
It is a tautologous argument, and it just begs the 
original question.
Rees, then, does not specify or define what exactly 
is the content of the "right"/interest to be protected 
under the very simple principle. But he does at least 
seem to recognise, in the 1960 article, that some form of 
definition is necessary. Unfortunately, though, his 
comments in this respect are contradictory, and serve to 
emphasise the ambiguities of Mill's principle more than to 
elucidate it. Thus in one passage in his article Rees 
insists that
there is an objective element about [the concept of 
an "interest"]70 
and that it is this "objective element" which "precludes 
any fanciful demand from being an interest"70. In other 
words, the right which the state is to protect has an 
objective content. Since Rees does not appear to think 
that this right is merely the right to make free choices, 
it follows that he believes that the very simple principle 
exists to protect people's right to do certain, 
objectively-determined, specific things. This of course 
lays Mill's principle open again to the charge of "moral 
totalitarianism"74*: a "Berlin principle" of preventing
infringements of others' liberty involves the state in
* See also section 3.1. of chapter one of this thesis.
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protecting people's right to do as they choose, but 
precludes the state from interfering in or directing the 
choices they actually make - whereas the Mill principle of 
preventing harm to others, defined as protecting people's 
objectively-defined "interests", requires the state to 
accord greater rights to those who choose to act in one 
way than to those who choose to act in another. In short 
Rees's "objective interests" interpretation fails to 
refute the allegation that the Mill principle, formulated 
in terms of preventing harm to others rather than 
preventing infringements of others' liberty, is subversive 
of freedom.
Moreover, if the "interests" to be protected are 
objective, how is their objective content to be 
ascertained? Rees recognises this problem when he notes 
that the "objective interests" interpretation means that
the principle... must necessarily harbour value- 
ingredients which will inevitably render its use a 
controversial question75*.
This, of course, is quite an indictment of the Mill 
principle. It is supposed to be a "very simple 
principle"1, to "govern absolutely the dealings of society 
with the individual"1 and thereby to answer "the practical 
question where to place the limit... between individual 
independence and social control"23. If its use becomes "a 
controversial question" the principle therefore cannot 
serve its purpose.
Perhaps because of the implications of an "objective" 
definition of interests - endless controversy resolvable 
only by moral totalitarianism - Rees elsewhere in his 1960 
article seems to conceive the idea of interests in terms 
which are almost the very opposite of objective. 
Interests, he writes,
* Emphasis added.
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depend for their existence on social recognition 
and are closely connected with prevailing standards 
about the sort of behaviour a man can legitimately 
expect from others43.
This is a relativistic approach to the problem of defining 
interests: far from being specific or objective, the
content of interests is variable according to time, place 
and the popularity or fashionableness of beliefs 
("prevailing standards"). The implications of this for 
the capacity of the very simple principle to protect 
liberty are, if anything, more devastating than in the 
case of the "objective" approach. It is hard to disagree 
with Gray when he notes that, if Rees is right on this 
point, the principle "cannot perform the critical 
functions Mill intended for it"76. Those "critical 
functions" were that the principle should stand as a 
bastion of freedom, unmovable in the face of "prevailing 
standards", rather than reflecting and embodying those 
standards. In the opening paragraphs of On Liberty Mill 
warns that democratisation of government does not 
necessarily protect individual liberty, and that there is 
a danger that the "tyranny of the magistrate" will be 
replaced by the "tyranny of the majority". That being so, 
he continues,
there needs protection also against the tyranny of 
the prevailing opinion and feeling,... the tendency 
of society to impose... its own ideas and practices 
as rules of conduct23.
The very simple principle is proposed to fulfil that need. 
If, as Rees suggests, the principle is defined in terms of 
prevailing standards, then it clearly fails to do so. It 
becomes, instead, an instrument of the majority tyranny it 
is supposed to keep at bay.
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2.1.3. The problem remains
Probably the most depressing aspect of Rees's 1960 
interpretation of harm to others is that - even if the 
textual evidence were there, and even if Rees could have 
formulated a definition of interests by which the very 
simple principle did not entail either moral 
totalitarianism or the tyranny of the majority - the 
problem Rees was endeavouring to solve would still in 
large part remain. That problem, it will be recalled, is 
that enabling the state to intervene to "prevent harm to 
others" allows for state intervention and the curtailment 
of individual liberty in an almost limitless range of 
human activity, simply because the number of actions which 
cause harm to others of one form or another is virtually 
limitless. Preventing harm to others implies
encroachments on "the most unquestionably legitimate 
liberty of the individual"36. Rees's contention was that 
a "revised version"48 of the principle (based, he claimed, 
on what Mill really meant), entitling intervention only to 
prevent violation of others' interests, would limit the 
scope for state intervention and prevent encroachments on 
the "most unquestionably legitimate" liberties. Rees was 
arguing that the violation of someone's interests, however 
hard to define, is a far more specific phenomenon than 
mere harm to others, and therefore one which arises in far 
more limited circumstances.
The trouble is that the same interdependence in 
society which means that so many "unquestionably 
legitimate" private acts which have harmful effects on 
others, also means that a large number of "unquestionably 
legitimate" private acts can violate others' interests as 
well. As Mill himself acknowledges in On Liberty,
the mischief which a person does to himself may 
seriously affect, both through their sympathies and
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their interests r those nearly connected with him 
and, in a minor degree, society at large5*7*.
One example of this is where an individual allows his 
house to "run to seed": the consequence may well be that
his next-door neighbour, seeking to sell his own house, 
finds it more difficult to do so. That is to say, the 
neighbour's financial interest is seriously and adversely 
affected by the perfectly private and unquestionably 
legitimate behaviour of the first person. The Mill 
principle, as modified by Rees, would entitle the state to 
intervene in the way the first person keeps his house.
The violation of others' interests does not only 
arise out of self-regarding "mischief". There are other 
self-regarding acts which are not only legitimate but 
commendable, yet which nonetheless can seriously and 
adversely affect the interests of others. Anti-smoking 
campaigns, if successful, result in tobacco companies 
sustaining financial losses (and perhaps even having to 
make their employees redundant)*75. Robert Nozick cites 
the case of Toscanini who at one time conducted an 
orchestra called Symphony of the Air. That orchestra 
depended, in order to survive financially, on Toscanini 
being conductor: it was he who gave the orchestra its
reputation and attracted the audiences. If Toscanini had 
retired, the other members of the orchestra would have 
lost their jobs and in all probability would not have been 
able to find alternative employment that was equally 
lucrative*78.
Rees, although he never properly defines interests, 
illustrates the distinction between interests and mere 
effects thus:
How one is affected by a theatrical performance 
depends on one's tastes, but the interests of a 
businessman would be affected by a tax on business
* Emphasis added.
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property no matter what his tastes or 
susceptibilities43.
By analogy, the actions which cause the tobacco company's 
financial losses, the home-owner's selling difficulties, 
and the orchestra members' redundancies, are all 
undeniably violations of their respective interests. If 
the Mill principle, and even Rees's "revised version" of 
it, were applied, the state would be entitled to prevent 
these violations. It would be entitled not only to 
suppress the "mischief" of letting one's house run to 
seed, but also to prohibit anti-smoking campaigns, and to 
remove Toscanini's right to retire. The "most
unquestionably legitimate" liberties would be curbed. And 
the problem would remain.
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2.2. Harming others means "violating their security"
In 1980, twenty years after writing his original
article, Rees turned again to the problem of how to
interpret "harm to others". Lecturing at the Royal 
Institute of Philosophy, he conceded that he had been 
wrong to assert, in the article, that harm to others 
relates to the violation of "interests" where interests 
are defined in terms of "prevailing standards". This 
interpretation, he said, was
relativistic... Mill is clearly not limiting the 
application of his remarks to Britain in the
nineteenth century79.
That being so, the principle can still perform what Gray 
calls "the critical functions Mill intended for it"76*, 
and "harm to others" does mean something definite and
specific.
But what does it mean? The Rees of 1980 is as 
anxious as the Rees of 1960 to reformulate the very simple 
principle so that the prevention of harm to others cannot 
be interpreted as entitling widespread state interference. 
But by 1980 there is less emphasis on the word 
"interests", and there are not one but two "revised 
versions".
The first is based on a particular reading of a 
passage in chapter 3 of On Liberty where Mill says that 
the rationale for the state restraining individual liberty 
is the need for people
to be held to rigid rules of justice for the sake 
of others69.
"Harm to others", Rees infers, is a violation of the rigid 
rules of justice80. This view is partially substantiated 
by a passage in chapter 5 of Utilitarianism - the chapter
* See above, section 2.1.2. of this chapter.
171
dealing with the connection between justice and utility - 
where the issues of "just and unjust" are stated to have 
an "obvious connection with hurt or injury". Moreover, 
with regard to the injustice of breaking promises, Mill 
writes s
Few hurts which human beings can sustain are 
greater. . . than when that on which they habitually 
and with full assurance relied, fails them in their 
hour of need81**.
But justice in itself, like "rights", is a contentless 
term, unless it is more fully defined. In chapter 5 of 
Utilitarianism, Mill puts forward a definition. He 
states, first, that
Justice implies something which it is not only 
right to do, and wrong not to do, but which some 
individual person can claim from us as his moral 
right. No one has a moral right to our generosity 
or beneficence...82.
What people do have a moral right to, however, is
security, to every one's feelings the most vital of 
interests. Nearly all other earthly benefits are 
needed by one person, not needed by another; and 
many of them can, if necessary, be cheerfully 
foregone, or replaced by something else; but 
security no human being can possibly do without83. 
The conclusion which Rees in 1980 draws from this is that 
the "rigid rules of justice" require that each person be 
accorded a moral right to security: the restraint of
individual liberty to hold people "to rigid rules of 
justice for the sake of others"69 therefore implies 
intervention to prevent the violation of others' security.
The violation of people's "security" - that which, 
according to Mill, "no human being can possibly do 
without"83 - is of course a very specific type of harm. A 
state which limits itself to protecting its citizens'
** Emphasis added.
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security would have a far smaller range of functions than 
one which was entitled to intervene to prevent almost 
every type of harm. If the very simple principle really 
means to limit the state's functions thus, then there is 
indeed little risk that it could be interpreted to justify 
an over-extended socialist-type state.
However, Rees's interpretation of harm as security- 
violation, ingenious though it may be, suffers from one 
major defects the textual evidence supporting it is, to 
say the least, thin. Rees in 1960 claims to have counted 
the word "interests" at least fifteen times in the course 
of On Liberty4,9*; and even that could hardly be regarded 
as impressive evidence when there are so many alternative 
formulations used by Mill such as "harm", "concerns" and 
so on. In the case of the word "security", Rees in 1980 
does not even bother to say how many times he counted it 
in On Liberty. It is true that Mill writes, just one 
paragraph after setting out the very simple principle, 
that compulsion is "no longer admissible" as a means to 
people's own good and is
justifiable only for the security of others26. 
Perhaps the word appears elsewhere in the text as well. 
But it is impossible to read Mill's essay in its entirety 
and feel that it is suffused with the principle of 
protecting people's security. The concept simply does not 
predominate in the text. It is swamped by other words and 
concepts which have a less specific meaning and which 
suggest a wider range of reasons for intervention 
preventing harm, protecting people's interests, taking 
care of actions which concern others. That is to say, it 
is swamped by the randomness with which Mill scatters 
concepts throughout On Liberty.
* See above, section 2.1.1.A of this chapter.
173
2,3. Harming others means "violating their freedom"
The second "revised version" which Rees in 1980 
proposes, or at least alludes to, is that harming others 
means violating their freedom. Freedom, he seems to 
suggest, is the content of the "rights" and "interests" 
which Mill's principle - as interpreted by himself in 1960 
- is intended to protect. (This of course differs 
radically from the view actually taken by Rees in 1960: 
see section 2.1.2. of this chapter.) The Rees of 1980 
cites with approval H.L.A. Hart's argument that
if there are any moral rights at all, it follows 
that there is at least one natural right, namely, 
the equal right of all men to be free84.
And he refers to a passage from Utilitarianism in which, 
he claims, Mill says that "an essential interest is 
damaged when there is wrongful interference in a person's 
freedom"83.
If this second "revised version" is correct, the 
implications are enormous. If the "harm" to be prevented 
is the violation of others' freedom, then the very simple 
principle means that interference is only justified to 
protect people's liberty. That implies a state whose 
functions are limited to preventing interference with 
liberty: the specifically liberal, non-socialist state of
the Berlin principle. On this interpretation the Mill 
principle is the Berlin principle, and the formulation 
"harm to others" poses no threat to liberty.
But, as with Rees's other interpretations, the 
textual evidence is not plentiful. His quotation from 
Utilitarianism is a misquotation. The way that Rees has 
it - "an Essential interest is damaged where there is 
wrongful interference in a person's freedom" - gives the 
impression that Mill is equating freedom with a person's 
essential interest. But what Mill actually says (in 
chapter 5 of Utilitarianism) is that a person's essential
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interest is in not being harmed, and that wrongful 
interference in freedom is just one of the types of action 
which constitute harm. Thus he writes of the "moral 
rules" which
forbid mankind to hurt one another (in which we 
must never forget to include wrongful interference 
with each other's freedom)15* 
and notes that
the moralities which protect every individual from 
being harmed by others, either directly or by being 
hindered in his freedom of action, are. . . those 
which he has the strongest interest in publishing 
and enforcing by word and deed15**.
In short, a state entitled to prevent harm to others will, 
indeed, protect wrongful interference in people's freedoms 
- but it will intervene to prevent a whole range of other 
types of harm as well. Such a state will not be limited 
to the purely liberal functions suggested by the Berlin 
principles the type of state sanctioned by the Mill 
principle will have these functions, and many more 
besides.
Already in 1832 Mill had stated his antipathy to a 
state limited to the liberal functions of simply 
protecting individual liberty. For the reasons explained 
in section 1.4.1. of this chapter, the limited functions 
of the liberal state are sometimes characterised as the 
prevention of "force or fraud". But in 1832, in an 
article in The Examiner, Mill had advocated a much more 
active interventionist role for the state. Discussing the 
issue of whether legal limits should be imposed on the 
number of hours to be worked in factories by women and 
children, Mill specifically rejected arguments drawn from 
the non-interference philosophy, and resting on the 
maxim that government ought not to prohibit
* Emphasis added.
** Emphasis added.
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individuals, not under the influence of force or 
fraud, from binding themselves by any engagement 
which they may think free to contract86.
Is there any evidence that by the time he comes to 
write On Liberty, and formulates the very simple 
principle, Mill has changed his mind? Mill words the 
principle itself - it cannot be repeated often enough - in 
terms of preventing harm to others. He does not write of
preventing force or fraud; indeed, he does not use this
formulation anywhere in On Liberty. However, he does seem 
to suggest at one point in On Liberty that intervention is 
warranted only to prevent violations of others' liberty. 
He writes, in the introductory chapter, that
The only freedom which deserves the name is that of 
pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we 
do not attempt to deprive others of theirs [this 
can only mean their freedom, not their good]...7. 
But this, like the quotation about "security", is just
another example of the terminological randomness of On
Liberty, in which words like "freedom" and "security" 
jostle with "interests", "concerns", "rights", "harm" and 
so on in Mill's casual re-phrasings of his principle. It 
is a symptom of that randomness and of the ambiguity which 
inevitably results. Rees's various interpretations fail 
in their professed intent - "to yield a single consistent 
principle"43- - and they fail to remove the possibility 
that the Mill principle as formulated could be used to 
justify an interventionist or socialist state whose role 
in society would leave little scope for individual 
freedom. For all Rees's efforts, the threat to liberty 
remains.
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2.4. Harming others means "threatening social cohesion”
C.L. Ten, like Rees, believes that Mill's harm- 
prevention principle is consistent. Moreover, in Ten's 
view,
it is as a consistent liberal, deeply committed to 
the cause of individual freedom for everyone, that 
Mill should be remembered21.
Like Rees, too, Ten is concerned that misunderstanding of 
the "harm to others" formulation has been the cause of 
much ill-considered criticism of Mill; and, like Rees, 
Ten seems to think it necessary to re-formulate it in 
order that it should be better understood.
But Ten's reformulation differs considerably from 
Rees's. It is yet another revised version (and the 
proffering by Mill's defenders of so many versions seems 
to emphasise the principle's ambiguities far more than its 
alleged consistency). Ten, posing the question of what 
Mill means by "harm to others", cites two passages, from 
Utilitarianism and On Liberty respectively, which appear 
to link it with a concern for the cohesion and unity of 
society. In the first passage, in chapter 5 of 
Utilitarianism, Mill writes that
a human being is capable of apprehending a 
community of interest between himself and the human 
society of which he forms a part, such that any 
conduct which threatens the security of society 
generally, is threatening to his own87*.
The second passage is from chapter 4 of On Liberty:
Though society is not founded on a contract... the 
fact of living in society renders it indispensable 
that each should be bound to observe a certain 
course of conduct towards the rest64.
* Emphasis added.
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Ten's conclusion is that "a central part of Mill's concept 
of harm is tied to the infringement of those rules which 
are necessary for the continued survival of society****.
The extraordinary aspect of this interpretation is 
that, although in one respect it narrows the concept of 
"harm” by confining it only to those kind of acts which 
threaten the continued survival of society, in another 
respect it broadens it by enabling it to include a great 
many activities which are usually regarded as private and 
self-regarding - and hence beyond the scope of the state's 
functions. Under Ten's interpretation the state could 
intervene with these private, self-regarding acts as well. 
It is not insignificant that, as noted in section 1.3.3. 
of this chapter, Ten rejects the idea of "there being two 
different areas of a person's conduct", self-regarding and 
other-regarding***; on Ten's interpretation both areas of 
conduct are open to intrusion by the state, with 
profoundly illiberal implications.
For it is not just other-regarding actions which 
endanger "the continued survival of society". This is a 
point upon which Lord Devlin insisted in his celebrated 
polemic The enforcement of morals*9. Attacking what he 
took to be Mill's position - that self-regarding, private 
conduct should be beyond the reach of the state - Devlin 
argued that it is absurd to say that if a man gets drunk 
every night in the privacy of his own home that is no 
business of the law, for what sort of society would there 
be if half the population got drunk every night? Thus, 
Devlin maintained, "society cannot live without morals"90 
and "an established morality is as necessary as good 
government to the welfare of society"91. He concluded 
that it was the duty of the state, through its laws, to
** Emphasis added.
*** in spite of the fact that Mill several times makes the 
distinction, actually using the term "self-regarding"1* .
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enforce morality, including purely private conducts "the 
suppression of vice is as much the law's business as the 
suppression of subversive activities".
The traditional response to Devlin has been to draw a 
clear distinction between liberty and licences of course 
private morals are important, and just because people 
should be free to get drunk does not mean that they ought
to do so, or that it is right or acceptable to do so.
Conversely, because an action is wrong, this does not mean 
that that action should be prohibited, since it is the 
essence of government in a free society that - unlike 
totalitarian regimes - it permits actions which it 
disapproves of or considers wrong. H.L.A. Hart, in his 
equally celebrated reply to Devlin, makes this point 
succinctly. There is, Hart writes, a very important 
distinction
between the use of coercion to enforce morality and 
other methods... to preserve it, such as argument, 
advice and exhortation... It is a disastrous
misunderstanding of morality to think that where we 
cannot use coercion in its support we must be
silent and indifferent92.
And this seems to be what Mill means when he writes, 
immediately after setting out the very simple principle, 
that although an individual "cannot rightfully be 
compelled to do or forbear" on the grounds that "to do so 
would be wise or even right", these are nonetheless good 
reasons for
remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or 
persuading him, or entreating him, but not for 
compelling him or visiting him with any evil in 
case he do otherwise1.
But when Ten defends Mill against Devlin, it is on 
entirely different - indeed incompatible - grounds. Ten 
refers to Devlin's point about half the population getting
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drunk in the privacy of their own homes every night, and 
declares that
Devlin has obviously misunderstood Mill... [in 
believing] that Mill's liberalism commits him to 
invoking "a principle that exempts all private 
immorality always from the operation of the law"93. 
Ten's defence of Mill against Devlin is that Mill does not 
believe that private immorality should be always exempted 
from the operation of the law. Ten thinks that there is 
no distinction to be drawn in Mill's principle between 
self-regarding and other-regarding actions. Just as 
Devlin believes that "society cannot live without
morals"90 and that this therefore requires the enforcement 
of morals, so Ten understands Mill's principle to be that 
the state may interfere in any conduct where this is
"necessary for the continued survival of society"®8 - and
does not demur from Devlin's assertion that this includes
private conduct such as getting drunk in one's own home. 
Devlin's view is that an individual should not have 
absolute liberty in self-regarding conduct. Ten
apparently agrees with him - and believes that Mill does 
too!
Whatever one may make of Ten's interpretation, it 
most certainly is not consistent with Mill's assertion, in 
the paragraph of the very simple principle, that an
individual's
own good, either physical or moral, is not a
sufficient warrantx* 
for interfering in his liberty. More to the point, it 
suggests that, in sanctioning state interference in such 
purely private matters as how much alcohol an individual
should drink in his own home, the application of Mill's
principle could have extremely illiberal results involving 
encroachments on "the most unquestionably legitimate 
liberty of the individual"36. Ten seeks to portray Mill
* Emphasis added.
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as a "consistent liberal", but his Interpretation suggests 
that he is neither. Of course, Ten's interpretation may 
be wrong**. But the very fact that he and Professor Hart, 
both defending Mill, are capable of reaching such 
diametrically opposed views - as to whether the very 
simple principle would sanction interference in private 
morality - is eloquent testimony to the principle's 
chronic ambiguity.
** On the question of alcohol Ten’s interpretation almost certainly 
is wrong, to judge from Mill’s specific remarks on drunkenness in On 
Liberty1AA-.
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2.5. Several principles
Even if their attempts to redefine '‘harm to others" 
are not wholly successful, Rees and Ten are responsible 
for one very important and valuable contribution to the 
debate on this subject. Both are at pains to highlight 
something which earlier critics, in their haste to point 
out the illiberal implications of the "harm to others" 
formulation, all too often overlooked. For although it is 
true that the interdependence of individuals in society 
means that a vast number of actions may cause harm to
others - and possibly almost every action does so - Mill 
never says in On Liberty that all such actions
automatically require state intervention. He says merely 
that these are the only types of action in respect of
which state intervention may even be contemplated. Where 
there is no harm to others the state is absolutely
forbidden by the principle to intervene; where there is 
harm to others, this absolute prohibition is removed, but 
it does not follow that the state should or will 
intervene. Both Rees and Ten express this in the same 
way. Rees writes that
Mill says that only harmful conduct should be 
subjected to social control, be made subject to 
punishment. He stipulates a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for restricting liberty80. 
Likewise Ten:
"harm to others" is a "necessary" not "sufficient" 
condition for intervention9**.
In other words, applying the principle need not have the 
illiberal implications which some have suggested, because 
the amount of state interference will not necessarily be 
commensurate with the amount of activity in society 
causing harm to others: as Ten puts it, "prohibition is
an issue only after it has been shown that an action is 
harmful"95**.
* Ten's emphasis.
** Ten’s emphasis.
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This implies a two-stage test. First, does an action 
cause harm to others? If not, there may be no
interference. If so, a second question arises: is state
intervention justified? Only if both questions are
answered in the affirmative may the state intervene.
Textual evidence from On Liberty wholly supports the 
Rees/Ten case in this regard. In chapter 1, just a couple 
of paragraphs after introducing the very simple principle, 
Mill explains:
the subjection of individual spontaneity to 
external control [is authorised] only in respect of 
those actions which concern the interests of other 
people. If anyone does an act hurtful to others, 
there is a prima facie case for punishing him by 
law63+.
In chapter 4 he writes:
As soon as any part of a person's conduct affects 
prejudicially the interests of others, society has 
jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the 
general welfare will or will not be promoted by 
interfering with it becomes open to discussion***. 
And finally, at the beginning of chapter 5:
It must by no means be supposed that because 
damage, or probability of damage, to the interests 
of others, can alone justify the interference of 
society, that therefore it always does justify such 
interference55.**
+ Emphasis added.
* Emphasis added.
** [AUTHOR’S NOTE: Reflecting on this passage since I first wrote
it, I am now less sure that I accept the view of Rees and Ten that
Mill only posits "harm to others" as "a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for restricting liberty". The wording of the 
very simple principle itself seems to suggest otherwise. Mill writes 
that
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is
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The trouble with this two-stage test is that, once 
again, it complicates what was supposed to be a simple, 
clear, unambiguous, practical principle. It converts "one 
very simple principle"1 - the "single truth" of which Mill 
intended On Liberty to be "a philosophic text-book"96 - 
into two. Mill is quite candid about this by the time he 
reaches the final chapter of On Liberty. He writes of
the two maxims which together form the entire 
doctrine of this essay80 
and he specifies them thus:
The maxims are, first, that the individual is not 
accountable to society for his actions in so far as 
these concern the interests of no person but 
himself... Secondly, that for such actions as are 
prejudicial to the interests of others, the 
individual is accountable and may be subjected 
either to social or to legal punishment if society 
is of opinion that the one or the other is 
requisite for its protection80*.
Some commentators96A have attempted to minimise the 
significance of Mill's statement that On Liberty's 
doctrine comprises "two maxims", arguing that the two 
maxims are merely a verbal reformulation of the same one 
very simple principle. Whether this is true or not
to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or 
moral, is not a sufficient warrant3-.
Mill here is defining the proper grounds for interference in 
individual liberty, and is specifically contrasting other-regarding 
conduct ("harm to others") with self-regarding conduct ("his own 
good"). The latter, he states, is not "a sufficient warrant" for 
intervention. This carries the unavoidable implication that, by 
contradistinction, the former - preventing harm to others - is "a
sufficient warrant" for intervention. Not just a necessary, but a
sufficient, warrant. Of course this is inconsistent with the other 
extracts from On Liberty, cited above, which support the "necessary 
but not sufficient" interpretation. But the inconsistency is Mill's 
rather than mine, and is one more example of the ambiguities which
riddle On Liberty. - MPG]
* Emphasis added.
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depends on what exactly they mean. If they are saying 
that the "two maxims" are really only one idea divided 
into two sentences - in other words, that the duality is 
merely a matter of syntax rather than substance - then 
this is patently false. The two maxims, as has been seen, 
represent two quite discrete ideas: first, that there
should never be interference where there is no harm to 
others and, secondly, that where there is harm to others 
there should not be interference unless "society is of 
opinion that [interference] ... is requisite for its
protection", However, if the commentators mean that there 
are indeed two discrete ideas, but that those ideas were 
already implicit in the very simple principle, they may 
well be right. But if they are, it was not "one very 
simple principle" at all, but two.
For Mill to have two principles of liberty instead of 
one is perhaps, as Lady Bracknell might have said, a 
misfortune. Yet - and here one begins to detect the signs 
of carelessness in Mill's analysis - a thorough reading of 
On Liberty reveals even more principles superimposed on 
the "two maxims". For instance Mill makes a distinction 
between the principle of freedom of expression and the 
principle of freedom of action. "No one", he writes at 
the beginning of chapter 3, "pretends that actions should 
be as free as opinions"53. This is explained more fully 
elsewhere in his essay. Defining "the appropriate region 
of human liberty", Mill writes that it comprises
first, the inward domain of consciousness, 
demanding liberty of conscience in the most 
comprehensive sense, liberty of thought and 
feeling, absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment 
on all subjects, practical or speculative, 
scientific, moral or theological. The liberty of 
expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall 
under a different principle, since it belongs to 
that part of the conduct of an individual which 
concerns other people, but, being almost of as much
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importance as the liberty of thought itself and 
resting in great part on the same reasons, is 
practically inseparable from it20.
Freedom of thought and freedom of expression, then, being 
"practically inseparable", the one does not fall under "a 
different principle" from the other. The apparent 
implication of this is that freedom of action, by 
contrast, does fall under a different principle, a second 
principle:
Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes 
and pursuits, of framing the plan of life to suit 
our own character, of doing as we like, subject to 
such consequences as may follow, without impediment 
from our fellow creatures, so long as what we do 
does not harm them, even though they should think 
our conduct foolish, perverse or wrong20.
It was necessary to reproduce these quotations in full so 
as to bring out precisely what is the difference between 
the first principle and the second, between Mill's 
principle of liberty of expression and his principle of 
liberty of action. Freedom of opinion and expression, it 
will be noted, are "absolute". No qualification or 
exception is set out. It is only freedom of action, by 
contrast, which is stated to be subject to the proviso "so 
long as what we do does not h a m  them".
To add to the complexity, Mill sets up yet another 
dichotomy - between the type of h a m  to others which is a 
sin of commission, and the type which is only a sin of 
omission. If an individual hams another by committing an 
assault on him, Mill's principle makes clear that the 
state is entitled to intervene, and that laws backed by 
penal sanction may compel him to desist. But what if the 
individual, passing down the street, sees an assault being 
attempted by someone else? If he just passes by, omitting 
to help the victim, the victim will be harmed, and so his 
omission is a f o m  of "ham to others". Mill recognises 
this when he notes that
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A person may cause evil to others not only by his 
actions but by his inaction, and in either case he 
is justly accountable to them for his injury63.
But that does not settle the matter. Mill makes clear 
that the same principle does not apply equally to "either 
case". In the latter case, harm to others by inaction, 
Mill says that there must be "a much more cautious 
exercise of compulsion"63 than in the former. In other 
words a different, more cautious, principle of 
intervention applies for harms of omission than for harms 
of commission. Yet, compounding the confusion and 
ambiguity, Mill is extremely vague about what that more 
cautious principle is. Intervention is permitted in cases 
of active, "committed" harm to others. But Mill does not 
specify in which cases of passive, "omitted" harm to 
others intervention is permitted. Ten explains helpfully 
that
the harm prevented is always grave®7.
"Grave harm" is hardly a very definite concept on which to 
base a "very simple principle" - but Mill is even less 
specific. He merely informs the reader that to make an 
individual answerable for "not preventing evil" is 
comparatively speaking, the exception63 
and depends on
the special expediencies of the case63.
But such a resort to expediency, and to deciding on a 
case-by-case basis whether the state should interfere, is 
exactly what the principle was supposed not to do. On the 
contrary, it was supposed to replace the pragmatic 
practice of assessing each case on its merits. In the 
paragraph immediately before spelling out the very simple 
principle, Mill bemoans the lack of any rule or principle 
to which people
consistently adhere, as to what things are fit to 
be done by a government 
leading them to
range themselves on one or the other side in any 
particular case1.
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Yet by the time he comes to deal with harms of omission, 
Mill's own attempt at a principle of liberty has succumbed 
to the same kind of arbitrariness and uncertainty.
Uncertainty piles on uncertainty, and ambiguity on 
ambiguity. There is in fact another modification of the 
very simple principle in On Liberty, another pair of 
maxims into which it subdivides. For the test of whether 
interference is prohibited is apparently not, as first 
seemed, based on the simple criterion of whether the 
action to be prevented causes harm to others (or even 
violation of their interests or their security). After 
determining whether an action harms others, a further test 
has to be applied: if it does harm others, does it
primarily affect others, in which case intervention is 
permitted; or does it primarily affect the agent, with 
the harm to others being merely ancillary and secondary, 
in which case intervention remains prohibited? This 
complication is alluded to in Mill's reference to harming 
others "directly and in the first instance"20 (as to 
which, see section 1.6. of this chapter), and it recurs at 
the beginning of chapter 4 of On Liberty:
What, then, is the rightful limit to the
sovereignty of the individual over himself?
How much of human life should be assigned to
individuality, and how much to society? Each will 
receive its proper share if each has that which 
more particularly concerns it. To individuality 
should belong that part of life in which it is
chiefly the individual that is interested; to 
society, that part which chiefly interests 
society64*.
In each case, then, one is supposed to decide not just 
whether the action causes harm to others, but how much, 
and whether that harm to others is the more important 
consequence of the action or merely a secondary by-
* Emphasis added.
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product. No clue is suggested by Mill as to how this 
calculation is to be made: no simple criterion or
principle "entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of 
society with the individual”. Even Rees, among Mill's 
staunchest defenders in the matter of harm to others, 
appears to despair at this point. He concedes that
it requires little imagination to foresee the 
immense complications that would be bound to arise 
in the application of such a formula98.
Although he attempts to construct a "revised version” of 
the very simple principle which, he believes, explains and 
clarifies it48**, Rees's honesty compels him to observe 
forlornly in a footnote that in doing so
I am leaving out the complications concerned with 
"primarily”, "chiefly" and "directly"48.
There are, then, many principles of liberty, not "one 
very simple principle", which Mill presents to the readers 
of On Liberty. Whether or not the state should intervene 
depends not only on the existence of harm to others, but 
on whether intervention is "requisite"80 if there is harm 
to others, on whether freedom of expression or freedom of 
action is at stake, on whether the harm done would be by 
commission or omission, and on whether it would primarily 
or only secondarily affect others. It takes a great deal 
of ambiguity indeed for even Rees to find that applying 
the very simple principle can create "immense 
complications".
** See section 2.1. of this chapter.
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2.6. No principle
It is the contention of this thesis that the 
existence of so much ambiguity about when the state may or 
may not restrict an individual's freedom makes the 
principle a quite ineffectual safeguard of liberty. 
Having several principles, embodying "immense 
complications", means that the clear guidance which the 
principle was supposed to provide is lost, and any 
benefits accruing to the cause of liberty are lost with 
it.
To this, Mill's defenders believe they have an 
effective riposte. They return to the question of the 
two-stage test: if no harm to others, no intervention;
if harm to others, a prima facie case subject to a number 
of complicating factors. Even where, like Rees, they 
concede that the second limb can pose difficulties and
ambiguities, the first limb is clear and unequivocal. 
Whatever uncertainty about state intervention there may be 
where there is harm to others, there is a clear and 
inviolable sphere of liberty where there is no harm to 
others. Mill may not have precisely defined the 
sufficient conditions for intervention but, his defenders 
insist, he left no doubt about the necessary condition. 
As Gray puts it:
In laying down as a necessary condition of
justified restriction of liberty that it apply only 
to actions which harm others... Mill's Principle 
sought to guarantee a sphere of self-regarding 
action entirely immune from social control".
This, Mill's defenders believe, is the crucial point, and 
the real guarantee of liberty. Rees is particularly
explicit:
From Mill' s point of view the important thing was 
to check the growing tendency to interfere in cases 
where intervention should be totally banned, and 
for this purpose what had to be done was to
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demarcate the area of non-intervention from that in 
which a prima facie right to control could only be 
overridden by an appeal to the "general welfare". 
We have seen that with all its indefiniteness
Mill's principle is emphatic on one point, namely 
that when the interests of others have not been 
affected society should not intervene100*.
Rees thus abandons the defence of the second limb of the 
two-stage test, and retreats to the first limb. His 
entire defence rests on the first limb alone: the
inviolable sphere of liberty and non-intervention that 
applies to conduct which causes no harm to others.
The weakness of this defence is apparent from a brief 
recapitulation of the arguments advanced in this chapter 
so far. People in society are interdependent, and what 
any individual says or does almost invariably affects
others. This is true even of actions done at home or 
entirely alone: smoking cigarettes at home can make life
unpleasant for the rest of the family, while the 
impairment to an individual's health from even solitary 
smoking affects those who depend on him to be healthy, 
such as colleagues, employers, customers, friends and so 
on. Moreover, given that people's preferences are so
varied, it is virtually inevitable that the desire of one 
person to do something will conflict with the wishes of 
others, and thus harm them. This may happen in relatively 
trivial ways, such as when different families compete to 
enjoy the same "peaceful" and "unspoilt" picnic spot on 
midsummer's day (although for the families it is not 
necessarily so trivial); or it may harm others 
financially, as in the example of the dumping of a large 
block of shares on the stock market, profiting the vendor 
but causing losses to others who hold shares in the same 
company. Various attempts to narrow the range of 
activities falling within the "harm to others" definition,
* Emphasis added.
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by redefining it as violation of others' interests or 
security or freedom, are simply not supported by textual 
evidence in On Liberty or in Mill's other works: the most
that can be said is that Mill is ambiguous and 
inconsistent in his terminology. Moreover even if there 
were grounds for accepting the redefinitions they would 
not make much difference, since it is by no means clear 
what is meant by "interests" and, in any case, a perfectly 
legitimate action such as Toscanini resigning as conductor 
can still affect the interests of others. In short: 
there are very few actions indeed which can definitely be 
said to cause no harm to others. That being so, there are 
very few actions which unambiguously fall within the 
inviolable sphere of liberty which Mill's principle 
delineates.
The vast majority of human actions, if not all, 
therefore pass through the first stage of the two-stage 
test, and fall to be considered under the second stage. 
For most of human activity, the necessary condition for 
state intervention under the very simple principle is 
satisfied. Most human activity, accordingly, is not 
immune from social control under Mill's principle, and is 
afforded no inviolable sphere of liberty by the principle. 
Of course this does not mean that the state will intervene 
in this vast majority of cases. That depends on whether 
the sufficient conditions for intervention in any 
particular act are satisfied. But when it comes to 
defining the sufficient conditions for intervention - the 
second limb of the two-stage test, applicable to most 
human activity - Mill's principle is hopelessly confused. 
Rees, as has been seen100, gives up trying to defend Mill 
on this point. Mill himself says that it is "open to
discussion"64. There is some reference in On Liberty to 
the second limb being a matter of ascertaining "the 
general welfare", which carries with it the suggestion 
that utilitarianism rather than individual liberty might 
be the criterion for deciding whether the state should
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intervene in the vast majority of cases; but this is not 
explored further. Ten's admission is more telling with 
regard to Mill's comment that the second limb is "open to 
discussion". Mill, he writes,
thereby lost the opportunity for formulating more 
precise general principles for justifying actual 
intervention101.
That is to say, Mill left the second limb - the question, 
if there is harm to others, should the state intervene? - 
to ad hoc decisions, to pragmatism and expediency rather 
than principle. For the vast majority of human actions, 
on the question of whether the state should restrain the 
individual's freedom, the "very simple principle" offers 
no principle at all.
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3. WHY DOES IT MATTER?
3.1. A principle of serious and practical moment
Mill's principle, as has been stated often enough in 
this thesis, was not intended merely to be an exercise in 
philosophical speculation. It was supposed to be applied 
in practice to determine when individual liberty should 
and should not be restrained. The formula "to prevent 
harm to others” was to answer
the practical question where to place the limit - how 
to make the fitting adjustment between individual 
independence and social control23.
Mill insists on this point again and again throughout On 
Liberty. In chapter 4 he declares that
the principle I maintain is of serious and practical 
moment36.
It is designed to solve real problems, not "imaginary 
evils”36, since
there are, in our own day, gross usurpations upon the 
liberty of private life actually practised, and still 
greater ones threatened with some expectation of 
success59.
Yet in the midst of all this gloom about the threats 
to liberty, Mill evinces a somewhat more sanguine 
disposition on one points the existence of freedom of 
expression in the England of his day. Introducing chapter 
2 of On Liberty, regarding "the liberty of thought and 
discussion", he writes that
speaking generally, it is not, in constitutional 
countries, to be apprehended that the government... 
will often attempt to control the expression of 
opinion, except when in doing so it makes itself the 
organ of the general intolerance of the public3-02.
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In more recent times Gertrude Himmelfarb has likewise 
opined both on the practical relevance of Mill's principle 
and on the state of free expression in England. Although 
the times have changed, she sees little reason to differ 
from Mill's assessment. On the question of the 
principle's applicability in practice, she writes that On 
Liberty has become
the gospel of our own time even more than of Mill's 
day3-03.
Indeed in her optimism she surpasses Mill. "The essential 
doctrine of On Liberty", she writes,
has become so much a part of our intellectual 
heritage that we are no longer aware of its 
assumptions, we no longer regard it as 
problematic3-03.
3.1.1. The Satanic Verses
In the spring of 1989 the opportunity arose to test 
both these points. As if from nowhere, the issue of 
freedom of expression in England suddenly became a matter 
of heated and (literally) violent controversy. A serious 
and respected British author, Mr Salman Rushdie, had 
written a novel called The Satanic Verses which had just 
been published. The novel was widely felt, particularly 
by Muslims, to impugn and even to mock some of the central 
tenets of Islam. Initially there were demands for 
publication of the novel in Britain to cease, and copies 
of the book were publicly burned in one or two English 
cities. Then, in February, the Muslim leader of Iran, 
Ayatollah Khomeini, called on British Muslims to kill Mr 
Rushdie for having written his novel. The danger to Mr 
Rushdie's life was felt to be sufficiently great for him 
to go into hiding.
In the lively debate which ensued in England - via 
newspaper columns, literary and political journals, radio 
and television - there was much to depress defenders of
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Mill's principle of liberty. First and foremost was the 
fact that, more than a century after Mill had written that 
the "liberty of publishing and expressing opinions" must 
be "absolute"20, the issue should be a matter of debate at 
all. Secondly, it was notable how little mention was made 
in public debate of either Mill or his principle, even 
though they might be thought to have a direct practical 
relevance to the issue*. And thirdly, there was the fact 
that, on this starkest of questions relating to liberty - 
whether or not Mr Rushdie should be permitted freely to 
publish - anyone seeking to apply the very simple 
principle in practice would not have found that it offered 
a wholly unambiguous answer.
For there is no doubt that publishing The Satanic 
Verses could be said to have caused "harm to others". It 
was common ground among contributors on all sides of the 
debate that the publication of Mr Rushdie's book had 
caused considerable pain and anguish to many Muslim 
believers. Mill's very simple principle permits the 
curtailment of liberty in order to prevent harm to others; 
on one interpretation, this means that the principle would 
not serve as a bar against attempts to curb Mr Rushdie's 
freedom of expression on the grounds of the pain and 
anguish it had caused. In other words, the principle 
would be on the side of those attempting to silence Mr 
Rushdie, of the book-burners and of those who issued death 
threats - and directly opposed to the idea that a man is
* A striking illustration of this was provided by the publication, in 
summer 1989, of a book called The Rushdie File. This was a 
collection of articles, speeches and other public comments on the 
Rushdie affair, which claimed to provide "documentation from all 
sides of the controversy". Although it was some 200 pages long, 
there was only one reference in the index to "Mill, John Stewart" 
(sic) and that related to the following extract from a statement made 
by Leon Wieseltier at a public meeting:
"In the past we read More and Milton and Galileo and Spinoza 
and Locke and Voltaire and Jefferson and Mill and Mann and 
Tucholsky and Koestler a little smugly, because they won"3-0*.
In this context Himmelfarb’s assertion that On Liberty is "the gospel 
of our own time” seems somewhat hollow.
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entitled in his own country to express himself in whatever 
way he chooses. As such the principle can scarcely be 
regarded as an effectual safeguard of free speech; it is 
hardly a principle of liberty at all. Of course, however, 
that interpretation of the principle may not be correct. 
As we have seen, the expression "harm to others" is so 
riddled with ambiguity that it is not at all certain 
whether it includes the undoubted distress suffered in 
this case. The principle is thus open to alternative 
interpretations; and on the crucial question of whether 
The Satanic Verses should have been published or banned - 
a question "of serious and practical moment" - the very 
simple principle is quite incapable of providing a clear, 
practical answer.
This can be seen, by way of example, in public 
comments on the Rushdie affair made by three prominent 
individuals at the time. One was a Member of Parliament, 
and the other two were professors of politics at British 
universities. In attempting to weigh Mr Rushdie's freedom 
to publish against the pain and offence to Muslims which 
this caused, the three were unable to derive much 
assistance at all from Mill's principle. Far from the 
principle being the integral "part of our intellectual 
heritage"103 which Himmelfarb suggests it to be, only one 
of the three even so much as mentioned Mill44. Among the 
three there was absolutely no consensus about how to 
balance the conflicting rights of Mr Rushdie and the 
offended Muslims. One, the Member of Parliament, Mr Keith 
Vaz, was of the view that
It would be appropriate for it [the book] to be 
withdrawn105
- while the two professors, Raymond Plant of Southampton 
University and Bhikhu Parekh of Hull University, argued 
that Mr Rushdie should be free to publish.
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Moreover, even between the two professors there was 
no agreement on the grounds for taking the views they did. 
Professor Plant wrote that he opposed the banning of the 
book
as a liberal and a Christian44.
Professor Parekh, by contrast, was rather scornful both of 
liberalism and of any liberty principle:
liberals rightly remembered the principle of 
liberty but forgot the equally important principles 
of fairness, compassion and humanity106 
- and his argument against a ban was based on reasons of 
pragmatic expediency rather than of principle. His 
reasons were, first, that
Once a literary work is published it is permanently 
in the public realm. No expedients can prevent its 
circulation or diminish its impact106.
And secondly:
Anyway, the law is too blunt an instrument to deal 
with creative literature, and bans and censorship 
have always done more harm than good106.
Professor Parekh's opposition to a ban, in short, was not 
motivated by any principled commitment to freedom such as 
might be derived from the sentiments in On Liberty or its 
"intellectual heritage"*.
* Later Professor Parekh was to write that the Rushdie affair was a 
lesson that the traditional liberal defence of every individual being 
entitled to free speech is "too elitist and paternalist to carry 
conviction in a democratic society". Freedom of expression, he said, 
is not "necessarily" good for society as a whole, and one should 
"look at the question of free speech from the standpoint of the 
community... and show if, how and why it is in its interest to allow 
maximum freedom ... to its iconoclastic individuals nio®‘A‘. These 
sentiments, from someone opposed to a ban on The Satanic Verses, are 
in stark contrast to the precepts of On Liberty. Mill's demand that 
individual freedom should enjoy "protection ... against the tyranny 
of the prevailing opinion and feeling"23, and his conception of "the 
peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion", which 
silencing is "as noxious, or more noxious, when exerted in accordance 
with public opinion that when in opposition to it"lt>6B.
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Professor Parekh's opinion was not even influenced by 
the question of the nature of the "harm to others" caused 
by The Satanic Verses. His pragmatic argument against 
prohibition was made in spite of his being convinced that 
the harm caused was very grave indeed, that "some of the 
passages in The Satanic Verses demean Muslims in their own 
and others' eyes" and that those passages "perpetuate 
prejudices about them and give grounds for a few more into 
the bargain"106. However, the disagreement between Mr 
Vaz, the MP, who supported a ban, and Professor Plant, who 
opposed a ban, was essentially a difference of opinion as 
to whether the offence caused to Muslims did in fact 
constitute a grave enough "harm" to justify curbing Mr 
Rushdie's free speech. Mr Vaz believed that it did:
It cannot be right that people should be able to 
publish views that offend and seriously affect the 
religious beliefs of the communityxos**.
Professor Plant believed that it did not: at the end of a
somewhat long and tortuous piece of reasoning in which he 
first argued that "offended sensibility is an inherently 
subjective matter", then conceded that sometimes offended 
sensibility could nevertheless justify a curb on free 
expression ("if advertising hoardings depicted a religion 
in a way which its adherents regarded as offensive there 
would be a case [for prohibition] since the presumed 
offence would be public and unavoidable"), Professor Plant 
finally came down in favour of the statement that
we should resist the view that indirect knowledge 
of something - such as other people reading a book 
one would find offensive - is an argument for 
seeking to proscribe it44***.
Does "seriously affecting" beliefs constitute 
sufficient harm to justify a ban? If so, does it have to 
be "direct" offence, or will "indirect" offence suffice?
** Emphasis added.
*** Emphasis added.
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These questions are not merely theoretical, but serious 
and practical: a novelist's basic freedom to publish his
own work in his own country in 1989 apparently depended on 
the answers to them. But Mill's ambiguity on precisely 
these questions, revolving around the central issue of 
what constitutes "harm to others", means that his very 
simple principle cannot provide the guidance necessary to 
resolve the disagreement between Mr Vaz and Professor 
Plant. In section 1.3.2. of this chapter, it will be 
recalled, the question was posed whether, if people read 
or hear about books which are shockingly offensive to 
them, those books should be banned. In 1989 it was made 
clear that Mill's principle can provide no answer.
3.1.2. Religion and sex
As it happens, it is possible to divine with some 
certainty what Mill' s position would have been in the 
Rushdie affair. As was noted in section 1.6. of this 
chapter, Mill in On Liberty specifically considers the 
case of the effect caused to religious Muslims (or 
"Mussulmans") by the eating of pork in their midst. There 
are, he writes in chapter 4, few acts regarded "with more 
unaffected disgust than Mussulmans regard this particular 
mode of satisfying hunger":
It is in the first place, an offence against their 
religion... The practice is really revolting to 
[them]3-07.
Notwithstanding the grave offence to their religion thus 
caused, Mill states that Muslims would have "no business 
to interfere"107 in anyone's freedom to eat pork, even in 
a society where they formed the majority. By the same 
token, it may be inferred, as a minority Muslims would 
have no business to interfere in any freedom of expression 
which was "an offence against their religion" or "really 
revolting" to them.
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But this inference is not derived from Mill's 
principle; the inference can only be drawn because of the 
coincidence that On Liberty fortuitously contains a 
practical example which is closely analogous to the 
Rushdie affairs both cases happen to deal with the 
particular question of whether causing religious offence 
to Muslims constitutes "harm to others". There is nothing 
about the way the principle itself is formulated and 
expounded which enables equally clear inferences to be 
drawn in other contexts where there is no exactly parallel 
illustration in On Liberty. And Mill's inconsistency in 
expressing the principle - at one moment using the 
criterion of conduct which "affects prejudicially the 
interests of others"64, and at another conduct which 
merely "affects others"20; at one moment stating that 
"any act hurtful to others" is prima facie punishable by 
law63, and at another that an act "hurtful to others" 
which does not violate their constituted rights may be 
"justly punished by opinion, though not by law"64* 
renders futile any attempt to infer generally applicable 
maxims from isolated passages in the text of On Liberty.
This matters a great deal. In recent decades western 
society, and particularly British society, has on several 
occasions been confronted with dilemmas in which its 
traditional behavioural norms have been rudely challenged 
and there has been uncertainty as to whether to grant 
freedom of expression to the challengers. These
challenges have generally come in the form of works of art 
and literature (of varying quality) which have shattered 
fundamental social taboos, chiefly religious and sexual 
taboos. An instance of a religious taboo being challenged 
was Martin Scorsese's film The Last Temptation of Christ; 
when first screened, in 1988, its depiction of Jesus 
Christ in lascivious reverie on the Cross provoked - 
throughout the western world - loud and violent
* See the textual analysis in section 2.1.1.C of this chapter passim.
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denunciations and demands for it to be banned forthwith, a 
controversy uncannily resembling (albeit in milder form) 
the Rushdie affair which was to erupt less than a year 
later. So, too, with the storm over the first publication 
in England of Lady Chatterley's Lover (in 1960) - and the 
many controversies about various forms of pornography 
which over the years have offended the sensibilities both 
of traditional defenders of "Victorian values" and of. 
modern feminists who object to the degradation of women 
which (they say) pornography entails. Sometimes it has 
proved possible for a publication to break religious and 
sexual taboos in one go: thus in 1980 the magazine Gay
News printed a poem which portrayed Christ committing 
homosexual necrophilia (publication was held to be 
unlawful by the English courts). In each of these cases 
the dilemma over whether to permit publication has been: 
does the possible danger to the social fabric arising out 
of a permissive approach to religious and sexual questions 
justify the imposition of constraints on people's liberty? 
And in each case controversy has raged because there has 
been no clear or unambiguous principle of liberty to 
resolve the dilemmas. Mill's "very simple principle" will 
not do - simply because it is unclear whether the possible 
danger to the social fabric in each case does or does not 
constitute "harm to others". Consequently, the "very 
simple principle" has not, contrary to Mill's claims for 
it, proved to be "of serious and practical moment"36. On 
these "social" questions it has failed to serve its 
purpose.
This is strikingly demonstrated in the deliberations 
of the Wolfenden committee in England in 1957. The 
committee was appointed by the British Government to 
examine the delicate relationship between state 
interference and individual liberty in sexual matters - 
and in particular the extent to which the criminal law 
should prohibit prostitution and homosexuality. Here 
again, Mill's principle of liberty, designed to solve "the
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practical question - how to make the fitting adjustment 
between individual independence and social control"23, 
ought to have been able to provide clear guidance on these 
issues. In fact, the Wolfenden committee did make use of 
Mill's principle, and the committee's report specifically 
referred to it and endorsed it. But, once again, the 
ambiguity of the principle - the lack of clarity as to 
when freedoms should be curtailed, as to what is meant by 
"harm to others" - meant that the guidance was anything 
but clear. The report spelled oiit the theoretical basis 
for its practical recommendations in a paragraph which, by 
all accounts108, was meant to be a re-statement of Mill's 
principle. But this "re-statement" described the law's 
functions as not merely
to provide sufficient safeguards against 
exploitation or corruption of others 
but also
to preserve public order and decency, to protect 
the citizen from what is offensive or 
injurious...109.
It is a confusing picture. It is hard to know what 
conclusions could be drawn from it in deciding whether to 
ban Lady Chatterley's Lover, The Last Temptation of Christ 
or The Satanic Verses, all of which were "offensive" to 
many people, and regarded by many people as a violation of 
"decency". Moreover, the committee's "re-statement" of 
Mill's principle cannot easily be reconciled with much of 
what Mill actually says in On Liberty. He observes in
chapter 4 that liberty requires that marriage by 
Protestant clergy be tolerated, even in the Roman Catholic 
countries of southern Europe where Protestantism itself is 
considered
offensive in the highest degree37 
and where the very notion of a married clergy is thought 
by the general public to be
unchaste, indecent, gross, disgusting110.
203
That the Wolfenden committee, attempting to re-state 
Mill's principle, should believe that offensiveness and 
indecency are legitimate grounds for the state restricting 
individual liberty, when Mill specifically insists that 
they are not, says everything that needs to be said about 
the sort of practical guidance that Mill's principle was 
able to provide.
3.2. Socialism and harm-prevention
But the ambiguity of Mill's "harm to others" 
criterion also matters in terms of what has been the 
central question of politics, in England and throughout 
the world, virtually since the time On Liberty was 
written. That question is, essentially, whether society 
should function along liberal free-market lines, with 
minimal state interference in people's freedom to run 
their own lives, earn, invest and spend their own money, 
and make agreements as they please - or whether, as 
socialists advocate, the state should adopt a more 
interventionist role for the good of the people, even at 
the cost of curtailing some of their individual liberties. 
Mill's principle ought to be able, indeed purports to be 
able, to delineate the scope and limits of the state's 
functions, and therefore to answer this central political 
question. But it is not able to do so. The line is 
stated to be drawn at the point where freedom of action 
would cause harm to others. But because "harm to others" 
is such a fluid, indefinite concept it becomes impossible 
to draw the line - and therefore impossible to know how 
much scope for individual freedom there can be where 
Mill's principle is applied in practice. At the beginning 
of this thesis it was asked: is the principle a
prescription for liberalism and laissez-faire, for 
socialism, or for what? The ambiguity of the expression 
"harm to others", like the ambiguity (discussed in chapter
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one) about whether the principle is subject to 
utilitarianism, makes it impossible to tell the answer.
This is not the case with what was called earlier in 
this chapter the "Berlin principle"* - that is, the 
principle that the state may only restrain individual 
liberty to prevent infringements of liberty. A person's 
liberty to walk in the street must not be infringed. 
Therefore the state must use the criminal law, the police, 
the courts and a range of penal sanctions and deterrents 
to protect that liberty from thieves, muggers, murderers. 
The state must also have armed forces to protect its 
citizens' liberty from foreign attack. For the reasons 
set out in section 1.5.1.A of this chapter**, protecting 
liberty necessarily also entails providing the 
prerequisites of being free - health, education, shelter 
and clothing - and, under the Berlin principle, the state 
must ensure that these are provided. Of course there may 
still be disputes about what will be the precise levels of 
provision (about what standard of housing, for example, 
the state should provide), but the Berlin principle does 
nonetheless serve as a ceiling on the functions which the 
state may assume. Under the Berlin principle the state is 
entitled (and obliged) to ensure, so far as is possible, 
that its citizens have everything necessary to be free to 
do the things they want. It is not, however, obliged (or 
entitled) to ensure that they are able to do the things 
they want (unless "freedom" is re-defined in a socialist 
way, to mean "ability" or "power": as to which, see
chapter three of this thesis, passim). This is the 
ceiling or limit of the state's functions under the Berlin 
principle. That is to say, it is not the state's role to 
enable people to be as rich as their neighbours - by 
"redistributive" taxation aimed at promoting equality. It
* So named, it will be recalled, not because Isaiah Berlin actually 
advocates this principle himself, but because he believes 
(mistakenly) that Mill does.
** and in section 1.2.1. of chapter three.
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is not the state's role, either, to invest people's money 
for them - through nationalisation - or to manage their 
businesses or to provide them with employment. Neither is 
it the state's role to decide on people's behalf what 
agreements they should or should not make - through 
economic regulation and dirigisme. It is up to people 
themselves to do these things. In short, the application 
of the Berlin principle does not, and cannot, entail a 
socialist state.
It was argued in chapter one* that socialism is a 
species of paternalism. Like a father to his children, 
the socialist state assumes responsibility for the welfare 
of its citizens, and takes control of a large proportion 
of the running of their lives. On the face of it, the 
Mill principle of intervention only to prevent "harm to 
others" could never be used to justify such a state. 
After all, the distinction made between actions that harm 
others, over which the state does have jurisdiction64, and 
self-regarding actions, over which it does not, carries 
strongly anti-paternalistic implications: matters which
regard oneself are one's own business. And, indeed, Mill 
appears to have believed that his principle most decidedly 
is not a prescription for socialism. In his
Autobiography, as already mentioned, he describes the very 
simple principle as "diametrically opposed"6 to socialist 
doctrine; and in the only reference to socialism in On 
Liberty he expresses the view that "a considerable 
diffusion of Socialist opinions"3-3-3- would be thoroughly 
detrimental to the cause of liberty which he espouses.
The problem is, as has been expounded in this 
chapter, that the distinction between "harm to others" and 
"self-regarding actions" is by no means sufficiently 
clear-cut to preclude the application of Mill's principle 
entailing paternalism or socialism. Society is so
* See section 3.3.3.B.
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interdependent, and "harm" such an indefinite word, that 
many of the "most unquestionably legitimate"36 exercises 
of liberty may be characterised as causing harm to others 
and hence proper subjects for paternalistic or 
socialistic state intervention. In this way, the very 
simple principle is ambiguous enough to justify much of 
the philosophy and practice of state socialism.
Thus for example it is a characteristic of a free- 
market liberal society that people compete against each 
other. In doing so, those who succeed might be said to 
cause harm to those who do not, with the implication that 
free competition causes "harm to others", entitling the 
state to curtail it. Two types of "harm to others" may be 
identified here. First is the way that those who succeed 
are likely to - and very often do - inspire resentment and 
envy among the less successful. If commentators such as 
Rees and Professor Plant are to be believed, this kind of 
"harm" can be ignored, since the Mill principle is only 
concerned with preventing violations of others' interests 
and pays no regard to offended sensibility*. However 
there is a second type of harm to others arising out of 
free competition which cannot so easily be discounted, 
since it involves not merely offended sensibility and 
resentment but real loss - real harm to others' interests. 
Through the (often random) operation of market forces in a 
free economy, competition between people can mean that 
some people can sustain actual loss as a result of the 
success of others. Nozick offers a very commonplace 
example of this whereby there might be two cinemas in a 
town, and because people choose to see the film being 
shown in one rather than the film being shown in the 
other, the former cinema-owner profits at the expense of 
the latter. The exercise by the former cinema-owner of 
his freedom to compete against the latter is a direct 
cause of the latter's failure to attract audiences, and
★ See section 2.1. of this chapter.
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hence of his failure to make profits (or even of his 
sustaining losses). But, as Nozick asks,
if I go to one movie theater [sic] rather than to 
another adjacent to it, need I justify my different 
treatment of the two theater owners?1X2 
Should the cinema-goers not be free to see whichever film 
they prefer? Should the cinema-owners not be free to show 
whichever film they choose? Or should the state intervene 
- by benign, paternalistic planning - to redress the 
inequality between the two cinema-owners (an inequality
which can plausibly be characterised as arbitrary, unfair 
or unjust)? Applying the Berlin principle of intervention 
only when the freedom of others is infringed, there can be 
no doubt. Neither the exercise of the cinema-goer's 
freedom to see his preferred film, nor the exercise of the 
cinema-owner's freedom to screen his preferred film,
infringes anybody else's freedom. Accordingly, under the 
Berlin principle, these "unquestionably legitimate" 
liberties are unqualified and uncurtailed. Under the Mill 
principle, however, the position is rather more equivocal. 
It is true that Mill says, in chapter 5 of On Liberty:
Whoever succeeds in an overcrowded profession or in 
a competitive examination, whoever is preferred to 
another in any contest for an object which both 
desire, reaps benefit from the loss of others, from 
their wasted exertion and their disappointment. 
But it is, by common admission, better for the
general interest of mankind that persons should
pursue their objects undeterred by this sort of 
consequence. In other words, society admits no 
right, either legal or moral, in the disappointed 
competitors to immunity from this kind of 
suffering. . .x:L3.
But this is not a conclusion which flows from the "one 
very simple principle" itself. It is another maxim 
altogether, a comment thrown in by Mill about the 
utilitarian benefits of competition ("better for the 
general interest of mankind"113). Applying the principle
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itself cannot yield such a certain answers on the 
contrary, the competitive success of one cinema-owner 
harms the other, and indeed harms his interests. Thus the 
principle itself furnishes no grounds on which to stop the 
state intervening to prevent such harm, and no effective 
guarantee of the freedom of cinema-owner or cinema-goer. 
Mill's justification of the freedom to compete on other 
grounds - such as utilitarianism, and also public opinion 
("it is, by common admission, better"3-3-3) - is an implicit 
acknowledgement of the inadequacy of the very simple 
principle at upholding that freedom.
Another way in which free-market liberalism might be 
said to cause harm to others, and hence to justify 
socialistic state intervention under the Mill principle, 
is through the price mechanism: the freedom to agree
prices and wages. It is important to be precise about 
this. Himmelfarb appears to believe that the very simple 
principle's distinction between self-regarding and other- 
regarding actions is useless to prevent paternalism in 
this context, since an employee's acceptance of a certain 
wage need not be regarded as a self-regarding action 
immune from state intervention: Mill's principle (she
writes) can be used to justify the argument that
social intervention is required because the 
individual is not in control of his situation and 
therefore may be injured by the actions of another: 
... an employer who offers less than a prescribed 
wage3-3-4.
Himmelfarb is almost certainly wrong here; and, however 
ambiguous Mill's principle may be, it is not capable of 
yielding the interventionist interpretation which she is 
outlining. As noted above (in section 1.4.1. of this 
chapter), Mill does specifically exclude from the realm of 
intervention harms caused to others "with their free, 
voluntary, and undeceived consent"20. That is to say, if 
a party to a contract consents to its terms - if an 
employee consents to a wage prescribed by his employer, or
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if a purchaser consents to a price set by the vendor - 
Mill's principle will not allow the state to intervene. 
So the Himmelfarb argument cannot be thrown at Mill. On 
the other hand, the free operation of the price mechanism 
can cause harm not only to the parties to a contract who 
consent to certain prices, but also to third parties whose 
agreement or consent is not obtained. . . and, in this 
respect, Mill's principle is rather more ambiguous. Two 
examples of this have already been cited in this chapter.
If a person sells a substantial block of a company's
shares, the price of shares in that company is likely to 
fall, so that the wealth of other people who continue to 
hold those shares will accordingly be depleted*. If a 
person lets his home "run to seed", the consequence may 
well be that the attractiveness of his next-door
neighbour's house - and hence its price, and hence the 
value of that neighbour's assets - will suffer**. In both 
cases, harm has been caused to other people, third 
parties, who never gave their consent or agreement to the 
price movements. The price mechanism causes losses to the 
remaining shareholders and to the next-door neighbour. 
Does this mean that freedoms should accordingly be
curtailed - that people should not be free to sell their 
shares as they please, or that people should not be free 
to maintain (or not maintain) their own houses as they 
like? Applying the Berlin principle, the question does 
not even arise. To find the value of one's shares or of 
one's house falling is not an infringement of one's 
liberty, so that under the Berlin principle there are no 
grounds for interfering in the actions which caused such 
price falls: no grounds, that is, for restraining
people's freedom to buy and sell shares and to keep their 
houses in whatever way they choose. But the Mill 
principle, which justifies interference when harm to 
others is caused, would be different: to find the value
of one's shares or of one's house falling is harm, and
* See section 1.5.2. of this chapter.
** See section 2.1.3. of this chapter.
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indeed it is harm to one's interests. This would not of 
course be sufficient grounds for intervention under the 
Mill principle (see sections 2.5. and 2.6.); but it means 
that the principle offers no grounds to protect people's 
freedom to buy and sell shares, or to decide how to 
maintain their own houses, from socialistic state 
interference. If a socialist state wanted to eliminate 
those freedoms, or to regulate or totally suppress the 
operation of the price mechanism, the very simple 
principle - which makes liberty subject to preventing harm 
to others - would offer a theoretical justification for 
doing so.
Finally, and underlying all this, is the fact of 
inequality: the uneven spread (or, as socialists like to
say, "distribution") of wealth in a market economy. 
Socialists believe that it is the function of the state 
not merely to guarantee people's liberty, or even to 
guarantee such prerequisites of liberty as health, 
shelter, clothing and education, but to "redress" 
inequality and to "redistribute" wealth. As has been 
seen, inequality of wealth is produced by the exercise of 
various freedoms - the freedom to go to one cinema rather 
than another, the freedom to buy and sell shares, the 
freedom to bequeath money, the freedom to pay whatever 
salary an employee agrees to accept and to earn whatever 
income an employer agrees to pay. It is implicit in the 
socialist objective of "redressing" inequality by state 
action that the state is entitled both to interfere in and 
curtail such freedoms, and also to "remedy" their effects 
(by, for example, redistributive taxation,
nationalisation, expropriation, confiscation and other 
compulsory transfers of wealth). The Berlin principle, of 
course, would have none of this. It sanctions state 
intervention to protect liberty (and, by implication, its 
prerequisites) but nothing more. The Mill principle, 
however, is less clear-cut. As noted above* Mill seems in
* Section 2.5. of this chapter.
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On Liberty to consider sins of omission, as well as sins 
of commission, to be - in certain circumstances - "harm to 
others":
There are... many positive acts for the benefit of 
others which... [an individual] may rightfully be 
compelled to perform... A person may cause evil to 
others not only by his actions but by his inaction, 
and in either case he is justly accountable to them 
for the injury. The latter case, it is true, 
requires a much more cautious exercise of 
compulsion than the former. To make anyone 
answerable for doing evil to others is the rule; 
to make him answerable for not preventing evil is, 
comparatively speaking, the exception63.
In chapter 5 of Utilitarianism, Mill expands on this 
conception of "harm", and gives some idea as to what sort 
of sins of omission he has in mind. While the worst types 
of injustice are acts of wrongful aggression or wrongful 
exercise of power over someone (he writes), the next are 
those which consist in
wrongfully withholding from him something which is 
his due63-.
Both cases involve "inflicting on him a positive hurt"**, 
either in the form of direct suffering, or of
the privation of some good which he had reasonable 
ground, either of a physical or of a social kind, 
for counting upon83-.
So on this definition, privation can be as much a 
"positive hurt" as direct suffering is: "harm",
therefore, can include not only theft of what a person 
has, but the privation of what others have. And one is 
entitled not to be so deprived if one has "reasonable 
ground, either of a physical or of a social kind", for 
counting upon having what others have. By now the very 
simple principle has dissolved, and the argument has moved 
onto very uncertain terrain. For who is to say that it is
** Emphasis added.
212
unreasonable for someone to expect a certain standard of 
living, or even to be no poorer than his neighbours? That 
being so, Mill supplies the grounds for contending that 
the privation of such a standard of living, or of such 
financial equality with one's neighbours, is a "positive 
hurt" and a "harm" - so that it becomes easy to argue 
that, in adopting whatever socialistic measures are 
necessary to remove such privation, the state is merely 
applying the very simple principle of preventing harm to 
others. Such is the almost infinite flexibility of Mill's 
principle. Such are the implications for freedom of the 
principle's ambiguities.
These, then, are the practical consequences of 
attempting to apply Mill's principle. It professes to be 
anti-paternalistic, declaring that a person "cannot 
rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will 
be better for him to do so”1. Furthermore, the principle 
insists that
the only part of the conduct of anyone for which he 
is amenable to society is that which concerns 
others. In the part which merely concerns himself, 
his independence is, of right, absolute. Over 
himself, over his own body and mind, the individual 
is sovereign26.
However, as has been seen, the interdependence of people 
in society, and the elasticity of the concept ("harm to 
others") which makes a person amenable to society, renders 
this grand declaration almost meaningless. So many of an 
individual's actions which concern himself also concern, 
and harm, others. There is little, if anything, which 
"merely" concerns himself - and therefore little over 
which, under Mill's principle, the individual will 
certainly be sovereign. For the remainder, there is 
plenty of scope for paternalistic intervention. "Harm to
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others" is an ambiguous, and therefore a potentially 
overwhelming, qualification of liberty.
Mill's professions of anti-paternalism are matched by 
his claims regarding the relationship of the very simple 
principle with socialism. The two doctrines, he writes, 
are "diametrically opposite"6 to each other. Yet the same 
ambiguities in the principle which give considerable scope 
for paternalism could also be used, as we have seen, to 
justify the most thoroughgoing socialist state. The 
practical application of the principle, by virtue of its 
intrinsic ambiguity, is thus an extremely hazardous 
enterprise: there is no knowing what it can entail. A
free market society or a socialist state? It is anybody's 
guesss*.
Faced with these criticisms, Mill's scholarly 
defenders adopt the curious posture of arguing that Mill's 
claims for the principle are more modest than in fact they 
are. R.J. Halliday, for instance, points out that
The one single, absolute and "very simple" 
principle turns out to be rather more complex than 
some commentators have imagined3-17.
(It might be felt that the reference to "some 
commentators" is a little unfair, in view of the fact that 
it is Mill himself who claims that his principle is "one 
very simple principle... entitled to govern absolutely".) 
In similar vein, Rees offers the "defence" of Mill that
it would be uncharitable to reject Mill's principle 
out of hand merely because it fails to provide an 
automatic and definite solution in an extensive 
range of cases. . . For how many of the actions we 
constantly wield in everyday life provide us with 
quick and certain answers?100
* See, as evidence of this, Gray’s view that Mill’s principle 
"contains no commitment to any principle of laissez-faire"113, by 
contrast with Halliday* s comment that Mill had a "pragmatic 
commitment to laissez-faire"11®. There are many similar examples.
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And, as has been mentioned, Ten insouciantly acknowledges 
that Mill "lost the opportunity" to formulate "more 
precise general principles for justifying actual 
intervention01 - but does not seem to think that this 
significantly reduces the value of the principle Mill did 
formulate!
Reading these defences one could be forgiven for 
forgetting that Mill's principle is not supposed to be 
"complex" (pace Halliday), that it is supposed to "provide 
an automatic and definite solution in an extensive range
of cases" (pace Rees), and that it is supposed, also, to
provide "precise general principles for justifying actual 
intervention" (pace Ten). So it is worth recalling one of 
the opening paragraphs of On Liberty, in which Mill 
complains:
There is, in fact, no recognized principle by which 
the propriety or impropriety of government 
interference is customarily tested. People decide 
according to their own personal preferences... And 
men range themselves on one or other side in any
particular case... very rarely on account of any
opinion to which they constantly adhere, as to what 
things are fit to be done by a government. And it 
seems to me that in consequence of this absence of 
rule or principle... the interference of government 
is, with about equal frequency, improperly invoked 
and improperly condemned118.
There the paragraph ends. The next paragraph begins with 
the words: "The object of this essay is to assert one
very simple principle"1.
The "defences" of Mill offered by Halliday, Rees and 
Ten are thus in effect admissions that Mill has failed in 
the very object of his essay. It is supposed, in Mill's 
own words, to provide an answer to a "practical 
question"23 about delineating the proper limits of 
individual liberty. Yet it fails to deliver. Mill's
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answer to the practical question is to set forth a 
resounding trumpet call, a very simple principle, a neat 
formula. "Harm To Others" is where the line should be 
drawn. But - as even Mill's defenders admit - the 
trumpet, when played, sounds an uncertain note.
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CHAPTER THREE - THE REAL MEANING OF "LIBERTY**
The only freedom which deserves the name is that of 
pursuing our own good in our own way...
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty*.
It is only too easy to pass from defining liberty as 
the absence of restraint to defining it as the
"absence of obstacles to the realisation of our
desires",... the physical "ability to do what I
want", the power to satisfy our wishes, or the
extent of the choice of alternatives open to us. . . 
Only since this confusion was deliberately fostered 
as part of the socialist argument has it become 
dangerous. Once this identification of freedom with 
power is admitted, there is... no end to the tricks 
by which people can be exhorted in the name of 
liberty to give up their liberty.
F.A. von Hayek, The constitution of liberty2.
It is nonsense to assert... that freedom is simply 
the absence of restraint, and protection from the 
coercion of the state. That is only the beginning 
of liberty. Real freedom requires possession of the 
economic power that enables the choices that a free 
society provides to be made in practice, not just in 
theory. Once freedom is defined as the real ability 
(rather than the notional opportunity) to make 
choices, it becomes a socialist issue... Socialism 
is about liberty.
Roy Hattersley MP, deputy leader of the Labour 
party,
The real meaning of liberty3.
1. WHY DOES IT MATTER?
In spite of all its contradictions and ambiguities, 
one thing at least is certain about Mill's very simple 
principles the principle is - to use Mr Hattersley's 
expression - "about liberty". The essay in which it 
appears is unambiguously titled On Liberty. The essay's 
first sentence declares: "The subject of this essay is...
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civil or social liberty"4. After summarising in general
terms the sort of activities which would be permitted
under the principle, Mill states in his introductory
chapter:
No society in which these liberties are not, on the 
whole, respected is free; and none is completely 
free in which they do not exist absolute and
unqualified5.
But "free" in what sense? What kind of "liberty" is 
Mill speaking of? In the context of the very simple 
principle, what (borrowing Mr Hattersley's words again) is 
the real meaning of liberty?
As the quotations in the epigraph show, freedom means 
different things to different people. What for Mr 
Hattersley is "real freedom", is regarded by F.A. von 
Hayek as a "dangerous confusion". Safeguarding the 
freedom favoured by Mr Hattersley entails socialism; 
safeguarding the freedom favoured by Hayek implies its 
very opposite.
From this it will be apparent that the difference 
between the two definitions of liberty, and the question 
of which one Mill means when he uses the word, is 
absolutely crucial to resolving the central issue of this 
thesis, posed in the introductions is the very simple 
principle a prescription for liberalism and "laissez- 
faire"*, or for socialism, or for what?
The purpose of chapter three of this thesis, 
therefore, is to examine what exactly Mill means by 
liberty and freedom - whether, as it were, he is using 
Hayek's definition or Hattersley's. But before proceeding 
to a textual analysis, it is probably helpful first to set 
the question in context and to consider its significance.
* as to which, see the Note on Terminology at the beginning of this 
thesis.
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Accordingly, reversing the order of previous chapters, 
this chapter will begin by asking: why does it matter?
1.1. Freedom and free will
Even before that, however, we can fairly simply 
dispose of one red herring. It has been suggested6 that 
it is relevant to On Liberty to consider the metaphysical 
question of whether human beings have free will or are 
subject to determinism. In fact, it is irrelevant, and 
Mill could not make this plainer. There is no denying 
that Mill's writings include reflections on the free will 
issue, most notably in chapter 26 of his Examination of 
Sir William Hamilton's philosophy. But he emphasises the 
disjuncture between freedom in its political sense and 
free will. In Examination Mill expresses considerable 
sympathy for determinism, or "the doctrine of necessity", 
and opposition to the doctrine of free will 
notwithstanding his commitment to political liberty. He 
insists that determinism is merely a description of what 
makes people think and act and desire. It is "a truth of 
experience"7. It has nothing to do with what social or 
political arrangements ought to be in place. Moreover the 
operation of "necessity" in no way signifies compulsion8. 
The two are entirely separate issues. And to dispel any 
doubts, Mill dispenses with the question in the very first 
words of On Liberty, writing:
The subject of this essay is not the so-called 
liberty of the will, so unfortunately opposed to 
the misnamed* doctrine of philosophical necessity; 
but civil, or social liberty: the nature and
limits of the power which can be legitimately 
exercised by society over the individual8.
* "misnamed", because it can be taken to imply compulsion®.
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1.2. "Negative" and "positive" liberty
But within the framework of "civil, or social 
liberty" there remain various different concepts of 
liberty. Mr Hattersley's (socialist) concept, and Hayek's 
(anti-socialist) concept, have already been mentioned and, 
given the subject of this thesis, they will obviously be 
central to the analysis which follows. However it is 
impossible to go further without referring to another 
classifications Isaiah Berlin's celebrated "two concepts 
of liberty", "negative" freedom and "positive" freedom. 
The terms have already been used in this thesis - in 
section 2.2.2. of chapter one - and no modern examination 
of the meaning of liberty can sensibly ignore them. Their 
chief value lies in the fact that, since Berlin's 1958 
essay9, they have been adopted by numerous commentators as 
a major tool of theoretical analysis**.
But this is a tool which must be handled with some 
caution, since the definitions of the two concepts are not 
as clear or precise as they might be. At one point in his 
essay Two concepts of liberty, Berlin defines "negative" 
liberty as "not being interfered with by others"15, and 
contrasts this with "positive" liberty which (he says) 
derives from "the wish on the part of the individual to be 
his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on 
myself, not on external forces of whatever kind"16. Yet 
it is hard to see what, logically, is the difference 
between the two when expressed this ways to the extent 
that others do not interfere with what I do and the 
decisions I take, so accordingly my life and decisions 
depend on myself. Berlin readily acknowledges that:
The freedom which consists in being one's own 
master, and the freedom which consists in not being
** Examples include: Noel Annan10, John Gray11, Roger Scruton12,
Joseph Raz13 and David Miller1*. The terminology, however, is older, 
and was used as early as 1891 by T.H. Green in his essay Liberal 
legislation and freedom of contract3-**.
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prevented from choosing as I do by other men, may, 
on the face of it, seem concepts at no great 
logical distance from each other - no more than 
negative and positive ways of saying the same 
thing3-6.
Interestingly, although he implies that the allegation of 
"not much difference between the two" is superficial and 
misleading ("may, on the face of it, seem..."), Berlin 
does not actually attempt to refute it. Instead he merely 
observes that "the 'positive' and 'negative' notions of 
freedom historically developed in divergent directions not 
always by logically reputable steps, until, in the end, 
they came into direct conflict with each other"3-7*. That 
may be so; but it does not follow that the pair of 
definitions he offers are logically opposite, or even very 
different.
All of this gives us a clue about the best way to 
utilise Berlin's analytical tool. He does not provide a 
precise definitional formula by which one kind of freedom, 
"negative" liberty, can be distinguished from another, 
"positive" liberty. But in his article he does offer many 
interesting insights about the uses of the word "liberty", 
and he makes us conscious that the term is used to mean 
very different things**. Not just two different things, 
but several; for under the blanket label "positive" 
liberty, Berlin identifies a number of distinct concepts 
of liberty, all of them different from each other, and 
different from the concept he calls "negative" liberty. 
In short, Berlin's achievement is not to have defined two 
concepts of liberty, but to have defined several.
* Emphasis added.
** to the extent that one must beware when one sees the word 
"liberty" that it is not just "a specious disguise for brutal 
tyranny"3-®.
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The following paragraphs will consider some of those 
concepts - first, the concept which Berlin calls negative 
liberty; and then three concepts which, though distinct, 
he subsumes under the heading "positive" liberty: namely, 
democracy, "self-realisation" and "ability".
1.2.1. "Negative" liberty
"Negative" liberty, Berlin explains, is "simply the 
area within which a man can act unobstructed by others"18. 
This, it can readily be seen, approximates to the non­
socialist conception of liberty which both Hayek and Mr 
Hattersley describe (in the epigraph to this chapter) as 
"the absence of restraint". There is nothing particularly 
new about this definition of liberty. In the mid­
seventeenth century, Hobbes wrote:
by liberty is understood, according to the proper 
signification of the word, the absence of external 
impediments19;
and Berlin is more than happy to acknowledge that "this is 
what the classical English political philosophers meant 
when they used this word"15. Consequently, it is perhaps 
preferable to call this concept "classical liberty" (not 
least because of the potentially pejorative connotations 
of the word "negative").
What rights are implied by the classical/negative 
conception of liberty? Joel Feinberg's definition of 
liberty as
not the absence of just any kind of constraint or 
any kind of constraint that can prevent me from 
doing something, but rather the absence of 
constraints.. . imposed by enforced rules or 
commands20*
* Feinberg’s emphasis.
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is actually too narrow, in that it excludes from its ambit 
the absence of constraints or impediments which are not 
implied by rules or commands: in other words, it includes
the right not to be constrained or interfered with by the 
state and its laws, rules and regulations; but excludes 
the right not to be constrained or interfered with by 
one's fellow citizens, be they muggers or hijackers or 
rapists. Feinberg maintains that rights not to be 
interfered with by one's fellow citizens are something 
altogether different from liberty:
No one [he writes] has a duty of noninterference
derived simply from another's being at liberty21.
Rights of noninterference from fellow citizens he calls 
"claim-rights", and he argues that an individual may have 
claim-rights to noninterference from fellow citizens in 
certain specific circumstances, but that such rights are 
wholly unrelated to the individual's right to liberty. By
way of illustration, Feinberg cites two cases of
individual liberty: first, a person's liberty to keep one
hundred dollars in his pocket; and, secondly, a person's 
liberty to pick up one hundred dollars from the street. 
In the first case, the person's liberty to keep one 
hundred dollars in his pocket is accompanied by an 
obligation on others not to interfere by taking the money. 
That, says Feinberg, is a claim-right held by the 
individual. However, in the second case - a person's 
liberty to pick up one hundred dollars from the street - 
there is no accompanying obligation on others not to 
interfere by taking the money. Accordingly, Feinberg 
concludes, the individual in the second case has no claim- 
right to noninterference - thus demonstrating (to 
Feinberg's satisfaction) the disjuncture between liberty 
and rights to noninterference from fellow citizens22.
The flaw in the illustration is that Feinberg is not 
comparing like with like. In the second case (of the 
individual's liberty to pick one hundred dollars from the 
street) the claim-right which is properly analogous to the
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claim-right in the first case is not an obligation on 
others not to pick up money themselves, but rather an 
obligation not to restrain the individual from bending 
down to pick up the money himself. That claim-right is 
coextensive with the initial liberty to pick the money up 
- insofar as the individual really is entitled to pick the 
money up, so likewise other people are obliged not to 
restrain him from exercising that entitlement - and is 
derived precisely from the liberty. Contrary to
Feinberg's view, therefore, for every act which a person 
is at liberty to do, he has a corresponding right not to 
be restrained, either by the state or by his fellow 
citizens. (The alleged claim-right in Feinberg's second 
case was non-existent only because it was not a 
corresponding right: the right to pick up one hundred
dollars in the street corresponds with a right not to be 
restrained from doing so, not a right to prevent others 
doing so. ) Commonsense ought to yield the same
conclusion. If a person cannot walk in the street without 
interference from muggers, kidnappers and so on, he cannot 
sensibly be said to be at liberty. The infringement of 
his liberty is equivalent to that endured by any citizen 
of a police state who cannot walk in the street without 
risking arbitrary arrest or police beating. For this 
reason, a state which respects the rights of its 
individual citizens to enjoy classical or negative liberty 
will not merely accept limits on government interfering in 
their lives - but will also protect them from interference 
from their fellow citizens, with laws against assault, 
theft, rape, murder and so on, backed by the state's 
resources of police, courts and prisons.
From this it is possible to derive a tentative 
definition of classical/negative liberty. It consists in 
not being subject to external interference, whether from 
the state or from fellow citizens*. I am free to the
* or, indeed, from foreign conquerors.
232
extent that I am entitled to take my own decisions, rather 
than having them taken for me by other people.
If the classical/negative concept of liberty is not 
so narrow as to exclude the right to noninterference from 
fellow citizens (pace Feinberg), neither is it so wide as 
to include the "right" to a secure job or the "right" to 
recreational facilities. Secure employment and the 
availability of recreational facilities are often regarded 
as rights by those who conceive liberty in terms of 
ability (as we will see in section 3.1.). Yet although 
not having a job - and not having (say) a local swimming 
pool - may be unfortunate or unpleasant, it does not 
prevent the individual from taking his own decisions. 
Undeniably it is good to have low unemployment, and good 
to have swimming baths up and down the land; but people 
can still sensibly be said to be free without them.
On the other hand, an individual cannot sensibly be 
said to be free unless he has the essential prerequisites 
to liberty outlined in section 1.5.1.A of chapter two of 
this thesis. He Is prevented from taking his own 
decisions if he is not alive and well. That requires 
adequate health care, shelter and sustenance by way of 
food, clothing and so on. Moreover, he is not in a 
position to take decisions in any meaningful sense unless 
he has had the benefit of at least a basic education. 
Consequently, a state committed to safeguarding 
negative/classical liberty will be responsible (no less 
than a state committed to "ability") for ensuring that its 
citizens enjoy those "welfare" provisions - health care, 
shelter, sustenance, a basic education - which are 
prerequisites to liberty. Classical liberty does not 
imply the right to a secure job or to recreational 
facilities, but it does imply the right to the 
prerequisites of liberty, as well as to noninterference 
from either the state or one's fellow citizens.
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[AUTHOR’S NOTE: From comments I have received on this section of the
argument, it is clear that readers, particularly non-socialist 
readers, will have grave doubts about the way I have aggregated 
various welfare entitlements with the entitlements which normally go 
under the umbrella of classical/negative liberty: freedom of
expression, freedom of association and freedom to trade. The concern 
is that I have thus blurred the distinction which chapter three is 
supposed to be arguing for - that between negative and positive 
liberty, or (as I prefer to call it) between classical liberty and 
ability. Correspondingly, it is thought, once a state charged with 
the responsibility of protecting the individual freedom of its 
citizens is deemed to have certain duties to provide for their 
welfare, we are on a "slippery slope" to social-democracy and 
socialism. I have, it is suggested to me, "sold the pass" to the 
socialist argument. Having conceded that much responsibility to the 
state, I have deprived myself of the grounds for resisting further 
accretions to the functions of the state.
My answer is that the concept of "prerequisites" to 
classical/negative liberty offers a distinction of principle between, 
on the one hand, the state being responsible for ensuring that its 
citizens have adequate health care, shelter, etc, and, on the other 
hand, the state taking on "socialist" responsibilities such as 
reducing inequalities, ensuring full employment, elevating the 
consciousness of the people, or whatever (all of which require a far 
greater role for the state in society, and correspondingly far more 
scope for intruding on the liberty of individuals). Not only that; 
but, I would contend, any coherent view that the state should ensure 
its citizens’ (classical/negative) liberty commits one to the 
proposition that it should also ensure that the prerequisites are 
also provided.
The point - which I have tried to sketch out in section 1.5.1.A 
of chapter two as well as here - is this. It is impossible to be 
free (in the classical sense) without being alive: conceptually
impossible and physically impossible. It is impossible to be alive 
without sustenance. Although the conditions for sustenance will vary 
from society to society, for various contingent reasons 
(geographical, historical, technological), in all societies with 
which we are concerned they can broadly be defined as comprising 
adequate health care, shelter, food, drink and clothing. Ergo: it is 
impossible to be free in the classical sense without having adequate 
health care, shelter, food, drink and clothing: at least, enough of
those things as ensures sustenance. A state responsible for 
protecting the liberty of its citizens, in the classical sense, must 
therefore be responsible for ensuring that they all have these 
things.
Perhaps more controversial, but (I think) equally true, is the 
proposition that it is impossible to be free (in the classical sense) 
without the benefit of a basic education. At least, not free in any 
meaningful sense. Classical liberty, as we have seen in this 
section, involves being free to take one’s own decisions, rather than 
having them taken for one by other people. But it is impossible to 
speak meaningfully of being free to take one’s own decisions if one 
is simply incapable of taking one’s own decisions. What does it mean
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to say that a five-month-old baby is entitled to freedom of movement? 
Or that an eight-year-old is entitled to freedom to trade? Or that 
the insane are entitled to political freedom of expression? These 
classical freedoms are meaningless .- conceptual and physical 
impossibilities - without a basic education. Presumably this is why, 
in m o d e m  western societies, persons under certain defined ages 
(14,16,18,21) are not accorded the freedom (say) to buy alcohol, to 
vote, to consent to sexual intercourse, or to spend their time as 
they choose (in England people up to 16 years of age must by law 
attend schools) - and why, correspondingly, they are not held legally 
responsible for their actions (people whose actions cannot 
meaningfully be described as free, accordingly cannot meaningfully be 
described as responsible for those actions). Likewise the insane - 
or whatever euphemism is currently used - are denied many basic 
freedoms and legal responsibilities in most western societies. This 
is presumably also the background to Mill’s contention, in the
opening paragraphs of On Liberty, that the principle of liberty "is 
meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their
faculties"3®. There is obviously an element of arbitrary line-
drawing in all of this. At what particular age does a person became 
mature in his faculties? Many 17-year-olds (who in England are 
disenfranchised from voting) are better capable of exercising mature 
judgements in a general election than many 37-year-olds (who are
entitled to vote). How does one define insanity? But the law has to 
draw a line somewhere and, however arbitrary, it does not detract 
from the basic principle: it is impossible to speak meaningfully of
people as free (in the classical sense) unless they are possessed of 
certain educational capabilities - the "maturity of their faculties".
Again, the conditions for a basic education vary from society 
to society according to contingent factors. In close-knit primitive 
societies, families and tribal elders may be able to provide basic 
education. But in modern western societies - where there is division 
of labour, parents go out to work, and the knowledge necessary to 
equip people to take decisions is relatively specialised and 
technical - schooling is required. If classical liberty is 
impossible without a basic education, a state committed to ensuring 
the classical liberty of its citizens must also, in modern western 
societies, ensure the provision of schooling to all its children. 
Mill asks rhetorically, in chapter 5 of On Liberty: "Is it not almost 
a self-evident axiom that the State should require and compel the 
education, up to a certain level, of every human being who is born 
its citizen?".
In summary: it is impossible to have (classical/negative)
liberty without sustenance and without a basic education. These are 
the prerequisites of (classical) liberty. A state responsible for 
ensuring the (classical) liberty of its citizens must also assume 
responsibility for providing them with sustenance - adequate health 
care, shelter, food, clothing - and a basic education.
Of course there are grey areas here. There is room for 
legitimate argument about precisely what standard of shelter or what 
level of "basic" education - as well as about how they are to be 
provided in the manner which is both most effective and most 
consistent with liberty (for instance, through direct provision by 
the state or through "voucher schemes").
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But there is no slippery slope to socialism. There is a hard 
difference of principle between those state welfare provisions (no 
matter how generous) which are prerequisites of classical liberty, 
and those which are not. It is not impossible to be free if one does 
not have a job (so long as one’s sustenance is otherwise assured, 
where necessary by state social security). It is not impossible to 
be free if one’s standard of living is one-tenth, or even one- 
hundredth, of the Duke of Westminster’s (so long as one’s sustenance 
is assured). Therefore, the responsibilities accorded the state in 
order to protect its citizens* classical liberty and the 
prerequisites to such liberty, do not require government subsidies to 
inefficient or failing industries in order to avoid redundancies and 
unemployment, for example, or government policies which redistribute 
wealth so as to reduce inequality. The pass has not, I believe, been 
sold. - MPG]
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1.2.2. "Positive" liberty: democracy
According to Berlin, there is "no necessary 
connection" between individual liberty and democratic 
rules
The answer to the question "Who governs me?" is 
logically distinct from the question "How far does 
government interfere with me?" It is in this 
difference that the great contrast between the two 
concepts of negative and positive liberty, in the 
end, consists23.
Here, then, is an example (just one example) of what 
Berlin means by positive liberty. Positive liberty, in 
this sense, is the claim that liberty is achieved when the 
government is elected by the people, or at least the 
majority or largest portion of the people. This, Berlin 
believes, is a confused and mistaken view of liberty, 
since the "source" of government control is by no means 
the same as its extent. Thus, it is "perfectly 
conceivable" that a liberal-minded despot might allow his 
subjects a large measure of freedom24. On the other hand, 
where a government interferes excessively in the liberties 
of the people, denying them the right to take their own 
decisions in large areas of their lives, it is no comfort 
to know that the government was democratically elected 
(the case of Hitler in Germany is instructive): why
should a man deeply care whether "he is crushed by a 
popular government or by a monarch"25?
But, as Berlin points out25, this is not a confusion 
of which Mill is ever guilty. Whatever other ambiguities 
there may be in Mill's conception of liberty, however much 
he might flirt with other elements of what Berlin calls 
"positive liberty", on this point he could not be clearer. 
Democracy, according to Mill, is emphatically not the same 
as liberty; indeed, the very simple principle is needed 
to protect people from the illusion that it might be. In
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the opening chapter of On Liberty, Mill chronicles how, 
over the centuries, people had believed that they only 
needed to control the government to avoid being crushed by 
it. But then, with the advent of the United States of 
America, the opportunity arose to test this belief, and it 
was found wanting: "a democratic republic came to occupy
a large portion of the earth's surface... and elective and 
responsible government became subject to the observations 
and criticisms which wait upon a great existing fact”26. 
It became clear that "the 'people' who exercise the power 
are not always the same people with those over whom it is 
exercised... [but rather] the majority, or those who 
succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority; the 
people, consequently, may desire to oppress a part of 
their number"*. Mill considers that:
The limitation. . . of the power of government over 
individuals loses none of its importance when the 
holders of power are regularly accountable to the 
community, that is, to the strongest party 
therein.26
Democracy could, unless constrained, become "the tyranny 
of the majority" which, in Mill's view, is "among the 
evils against which society needs to be on its guard". 
The liberty prescribed by the very simple principle is not 
part of such evil, but the remedy to it. In this sense at 
least, Mill's liberty is most certainly not positive 
liberty.
1.2.3. "Positive" liberty: self-realisation and ability
1.2.3.A: Autonomy and the good life
The term "autonomy", as used by John Gray, has 
already been mentioned in this thesis, in section 2.2.2. 
of chapter one. It is a concept of freedom, but a freedom
* Mill's emphasis.
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very different from classical or negative liberty. The 
concept of classical liberty requires only that people 
should not be interfered with and should be left free to 
take whatever decisions they like. The content or quality 
of those decisions, what motivates them and what their 
consequences will be, is immaterial to the advocate of 
"negative" liberty. (Which is not to say that the 
content, reasons and consequences of people's choices do 
not matter; only that they have no bearing on the rights 
involved. The point made by those who support negative 
liberty is that, even if an individual exercises his 
freedom in ways which are wrong or wrongheaded, however 
undesirable this may be, he should nonetheless be entitled 
to do so. See the distinction drawn between liberty and 
licence in section 3.1. of chapter one.)
By contrast, the quality, reasons and consequences of 
decisions are highly relevant to the concept of liberty 
embodied in the term "autonomy". It is not enough just to 
make any old choice; rationality enters the equation. 
This is a liberty which is not "empty" or "neutral" or 
"negative"; it is "positive".
Both Gray and the late S.I. Benn write of "autonomy" 
as the higher of two steps "up" from negative liberty. 
The first step they call "autarchy". Autarchy, according 
to Gray, involves not just having classical liberty, but 
being capable of rational self-direction as well27. In 
Benn's view autarchy is the characteristic of a person 
whose conduct is effectively governed by a set of reasons
rather than merely impulse or post-hoc 
rationalisation28. Autonomy is the second step up, and 
involves rather more than autarchy. In Benn's
terminology, a person is autonomous if he reflects on his 
beliefs and, where he discovers inconsistency, decides 
which beliefs are the less defensible and ought therefore 
to be abandoned28. To Gray, similarly,
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an autonomous agent will possess all the defining 
features of an autarchic agents but, in
addition... an autonomous agent must also have 
distanced himself in some measure from the 
conventions of his social environment and from the 
influence of the persons surrounding him. His 
actions express principles and policies which he 
has himself ratified by a process of critical 
reflection29.
An autonomous agent, moreover, is "one who, in Rousseau's 
expression, acts in obedience to a law he has prescribed 
for himself"30. Joseph Raz echoes Gray on this, saying 
that "one is autonomous if one determines the course of 
one's life by oneself"31.
It is evident that the concepts of autarchy and 
autonomy are of a piece with the aspect of positive 
liberty which Berlin calls "self-realisation". The quest 
for "self-realisation", according to Berlin, derives from 
the "desire to be self-directed - directed by one's vtrue' 
self"32. It embodies the rationalistic notion that "to 
understand the world is to be freed":
What you know, that of which you understand the 
necessity - the rational necessity - you cannot, 
while remaining rational, want to be otherwise32.
The reason that the promoters of the concept of 
autonomy attach such importance to the quality of 
decision-making is, of course, the hope that beneficial 
consequences will ensue; that decision-making of good 
quality will produce what Raz calls "the good life"33. 
This kind of "freedom" is valued for its capacity to 
deliver a certain quality of life. As Raz puts it, with 
admirable candours "our concern for autonomy is a concern 
to enable people to have a good life"34.
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1.2.3.B: The rights of autonomous people
Classical or negative liberty, it will be recalled, 
entails the right to take one's own decisions without 
interference from either the state or one's fellow 
citizens (or, indeed, from foreign powers, against which 
governments must defend their subjects), and implies the 
prerequisites to the exercise of that right in the form of 
health, sustenance and education. When we come to look at 
the rights entailed in the "positive" concept of autonomy, 
it becomes clear that this is a concept with implications 
which are inimical to liberty, and possibly authoritarian 
and even totalitarian.
Two major implications which flow from the idea of 
liberty as autonomy are, first, that only certain people - 
autonomous people - are entitled to exercise choices; 
and, secondly, that choices are only valuable if they are 
"autonomous" choices: that is, if they produce "the good 
life". These two propositions will now be examined in 
turn.
First, the proposition that, implicit in the notion 
of autonomy, is the idea that only some people may 
exercise free choices. It is plain from the definitions 
of autonomy offered by Benn, Gray and Raz that not 
everyone in society is, or even can be, an autonomous 
person. As Gray says, autonomous agency should be 
regarded as "something which must be achieved... rather 
than as a natural human endowment or original 
inheritance"29. It is not, then, a human right, which 
people have by virtue of their very existence as human 
beings. Unlike classical liberty, it is not the 
birthright of every Englishman. It is something which has 
to be "achieved"; and that means that some people have 
it, while others do not. As Gray admits:
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the moral right to autonomy is possessed, not by 
all men, but by those possessing in some minimal 
degree the capacities of an autonomous agent35. 
Freedom as autonomy thus means freedom granted to some 
people but denied to others. A principle of liberty 
founded on the notion of autonomy could therefore be used 
to justify the kind of authoritarian state depicted by 
Berlin as flowing from rationalistic positive liberty: a
society "obedient to the directives of an elite of 
Platonic guardians"3 6.
Attempts have been made to show that Mill's principle 
of liberty is just such a principle: one which, in this
way, excludes certain people from the right to exercise 
free choices. John Skorupski, for example, writes that 
under Mill's principle "none but a person of confirmed 
rationality is completely free"37. But the textual 
evidence for this is slender. Gray cites Mill's 
"exclusion of children, the mentally unbalanced and 
backward peoples from the sphere of application of the 
Principle of Liberty" and says that this suggests strongly 
that Mill regarded the autarchic status as a necessary 
condition of the application of the principle38*. If "the 
autarchic status" is taken to mean (adopting Benn's 
definition) that which appertains to people whose conduct 
is governed by reason rather than impulse28, then clearly 
it excludes a considerable number of people. Yet Mill 
makes plain that he means the very simple principle to 
apply fairly universally. In the passage to which Gray 
refers, Mill writes that the principle
is meant to apply only to human beings in the 
maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking 
of children or of young persons below the age which 
the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. 
Those who are still in a state to require being 
taken care of by others must be protected against
* Emphasis added.
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their own actions. .. For the same reason we may 
leave out of consideration those backward states of 
society in which the race itself may be considered 
as in its nonage... Despotism is a legitimate mode 
of government in dealing with barbarians39.
What he is saying is little more than the situation which 
exists in England today. Minors and the insane do not 
enjoy full civil rights (to vote, or to drive motor cars, 
for example), and full legal responsibilities do not 
attach to them. But this does not mean that liberty can 
sensibly be regarded as selective in present-day England, 
still less that the country is obedient to "an elite of 
Platonic guardians". (Mill's reference to "barbarians" is 
of course somewhat more embarrassing to modern readers.) 
Although Mill limits the liberty principle's applicability 
to the point where "mankind have attained the capacity of 
being guided to their own improvement by conviction or 
persuasion"39, he considers that this point has "long 
since [been] reached in all nations with whom we need here 
concern ourselves"39, and adds later that "there is on the 
whole a preponderance among mankind of rational opinions 
and rational conduct"40. Therefore, while it may be true 
that the concept of liberty as autarchy or (even more so) 
autonomy allows freedom to be denied to some people, it is 
false to claim that Mill's principle envisages this kind 
of discrimination.
The second implication of liberty as autonomy is, as 
noted above, the proposition that a choice only has value 
where it is an autonomous choice, that is to say, where it 
will produce "the good life". From this it follows that 
those choices which do produce the good life have value, 
and the freedom to exercise them should be protected. But 
those choices which do not lead to the good life - because 
they are bad, or irrational, or merely trivial - are 
regarded as having no value; and a liberty principle
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based on the concept of autonomy will not respect the 
right to make such choices.
In this vein, Gray writes that "there is something at 
least problematic about counting as a freedom an 
opportunity to act which no reasonable man would ever 
take"43-. Raz writes that "autonomy... supplies no reason 
to provide, nor any reason to protect, worthless let alone 
bad options"42 and, defending this kind of positive 
liberty, he blithely insists that
denying someone a certain choice of ice-cream is 
generally admitted to be insignificant to the 
degree of autonomy enjoyed by that person43.
In much the same way, H.J. McCloskey argues that
the value of self-determination depends on how it 
is used; when used to seek good ends... it is 
right to foster it; when used to produce evil 
ends, no good is lost if coercion is used to 
prevent them44 
and affirms his view that there is
no special value in the liberty enjoyed by the 
aimless, shiftless drifter... the situation would 
be better for [his] actions not being freely 
chosen44*.
The notion of liberty which aims at producing a 
"better. . . situation" or "the good life" - whether it be 
called autonomy or self-realisation or positive liberty - 
is thus one which allows people freedom to do some things, 
but not others. People are free to do what is 
"reasonable" or leads to "good ends". However, they are 
not free to pursue "bad options", or "evil ends", or 
"worthless" purposes. A liberty principle based on 
autonomy/self-realisation would not allow freedom to the
* Emphasis added.
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"aimless, shiftless drifter"; it would not even safeguard 
people's right to decide their favourite ice-cream.
But, of course, freedom to choose what is good rather 
than what is bad, to choose one way but not the other, is 
a contradiction in terms. It is the very antithesis of 
what freedom really means, a recipe for monstrous 
intolerance and enforced conformity. Moreover, it raises 
the problem of who decides what is a "bad option" or a 
"worthless" choice or an "insignificant" decision. In the 
nature of things, opinions will differ on all these 
questions. Someone must be the arbiters presumably the 
state. Here, again, is a role for an "elite of Platonic 
guardians".
To his credit Raz is sensitive to these criticisms of 
autonomy and the "good life". He acknowledges that it may 
all sound "paternalistic". It "conjures images of the 
state playing Big Brother, forcing or manipulating people 
to do what it considers good for them against their will". 
But, Raz adds:
Nothing could be further from the truth34.
Unfortunately the arguments which Raz uses to support
this bold denial are less than wholly convincing.
Essentially there are two arguments. One is his 
insistence that the state will not need to play a Big 
Brother role because what it believes will have no bearing 
on whether or not people are to be allowed to make a
choice. The fact that the state considers something to be 
valuable is irrelevant, Raz says. "Only its being
valuable or valueless is a reason"34. But this argument 
is unsatisfactory, because it does not explain how people 
are supposed to know whether something is, as a matter of 
objective fact, valuable or valueless. As noted above, 
such things are usually a matter of disagreement between 
people. Someone - whether the state or someone else - 
still has to decide. And we are back with Big Brother.
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Raz's other argument is that, far from requiring enforced 
conformity,
autonomy means that a good life is a life which is 
a free creation. Value-pluralism means that there 
will be a multiplicity of valuable options to 
choose from34.
But this also fails to meet the objections. Again freedom 
is limited. An individual is not free to choose whatever 
he likes, only what is "valuable”. And again there is the 
problem of who determines what is valuable. If not Big 
Brother, who?
Benn, in his posthumously published work "A theory of 
freedom"45, is rather less certain than Raz. He also 
finds "negative" liberty inadequate, but he is prepared to 
concede that traditional "positive" views of freedom based 
on rationalism often result in policy proposals "which, in 
the extreme, may be totalitarian in character"46. He 
therefore seeks to develop a theory of positive freedom 
which does not have these consequences - a sort of "middle 
way" under which it would be possible to be discriminating 
about the aims and beliefs of agents without requiring 
that everyone should follow the same, universally valid, 
set of prescriptions. Benn's middle way turns out to be 
freedom as consistency: it does not matter what beliefs a
person holds, so long as he holds them consistently as 
part of a coherent set of beliefs which are his own28. 
This is Benn's account of what freedom consists in, and it 
supposedly avoids the totalitarian implications of the 
traditional "positive liberty" view. But a state 
protecting freedom on Benn's terms, although tolerant of 
different views, would not be required to permit all views 
to flourish: it would not necessarily entitle an
individual to hold (or express? or act on?) views which he 
did not hold consistently with his other views. In such a 
society, there would be limited freedom only. More than 
that, Benn's account of freedom raises the practical 
problem of how anyone can tell whether the opinion
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expressed by an individual is consistent or inconsistent 
with the rest of his views. Are individuals to be 
interrogated about their views? Or will someone deem 
whether an individual's opinion is consistent or 
inconsistent with the rest of his views? How else could 
his mind be read? Once again, the spectre of Big Brother 
looms, and Benn's compromise turns out to be scarcely less 
totalitarian than the "full-blooded" positive liberty 
which he repudiates. What his theory seems to show, 
contrary to what he intended, is that there is in fact no 
middle way, and that it is impossible to depart from 
classical liberty and go off in the direction of autonomy 
without seriously undermining freedom.
It follows from the notion of autonomy as a concern 
to enable people "to have a good life"34 (as Raz puts it) 
that autonomy requires people to have more and more things 
available to them. Providing someone with rights of 
autonomy thus involves creating "an adequate range of 
options for him to choose from", according to Raz. If 
liberty is defined as autonomy, one arrives at Gray's 
conclusion that
a freedom-promoting policy is one which expands the 
options open to man47.
This necessarily requires providing access to material 
resources, or wealth: the option of (say) visiting
Australia is not open to me unless I can afford to buy the 
ticket. Accordingly, the concept of liberty as autonomy 
includes certain rights of access to material resources. 
In Raz's words:
autonomy is possible only if various collective 
goods are available48.
This, it will be appreciated, involves rather more 
than the classical idea of liberty as being entitled to 
take one's decisions without interference from the state 
or from fellow citizens. It involves actually being able
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and empowered to have what one wants; not merely that no-
one stops me from deciding to do something, but that I can
actually do it. As Skorupski says, autonomy
embraces the capacity and the freedom to make one's 
decisions37* 
and, in Raz's words,
one's positive freedom is enhanced by whatever 
enhances one's ability to lead an autonomous 
life13.
This, then, is the "positive" concept of freedom as 
ability, or power, or capacity.
It is not a new concept. As early as 1881, T.H.
Green was writing of "what I call freedom in the positive 
sense"48A. He insisted that "when we speak of freedom... 
we do not mean merely freedom from restraint or
compulsion... We mean a positive power or capacity"48®.
The two major implications of liberty-as-autonomy 
considered above - first, that only certain people 
(autonomous people) are entitled to exercise choices; 
and, secondly, that choices are only valuable if they are 
autonomous choices - apply equally to the concept of 
liberty as ability and access to material resources.
Under the classical conception of liberty people are 
generally entitled to access to material resources not by 
automatic right, but only through having received a gift 
or by way of contract. Typical examples of contracts 
include: I work for you, if you pay me money; or I pay
you money, if you sell me a car. And, as discussed in 
section 1.4.2. of chapter two of this thesis, classical 
liberty respects people's freedom to enter binding 
contracts with each other on whatever terms they choose, 
provided that the contract is not induced by force or 
fraud.
* Emphasis added.
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The exponents of the "positive"/autonomous view of 
liberty as ability take a different view. They believe 
that not everybody should be free to enter binding 
contracts, but only people with the requisite level of 
autonomy or ability; where that requisite level is 
absent, the state is entitled to interfere, rewriting or 
undoing or by-passing the contract and thus overriding the 
freely-expressed wishes of the parties. This is partly 
because ability implies that certain goods should be 
available to people by right, and not by contract. But it 
is also because a party with relatively little wealth is 
in a weak bargaining position when he enters a contract 
with someone much richer, so that the terms which result 
are "unconscionably" biased in favour of the party with 
greater wealth and bargaining power. If ability and 
access to material resources are a form of freedom, then 
their absence is correspondingly a form of subjection to 
coercion - so that, applying the "force or fraud" 
exception to freedom of contract, the weaker party is said 
to have agreed to the terms under duress or "force" or 
coercion, permitting the contract to be overridden. On 
this argument, the less wealthy party is not in control of 
his situation49 - he is not "free" in the autonomous sense 
of the word49A - and therefore his right to agree 
contracts need not be respected. The argument is often 
applied to employment contracts where the employee, in a 
weaker bargaining position than the employer, agrees to 
accept less than a prescribed wage49, or to contracts for 
the sale of anything from washing machines to package 
holidays where the seller is an enormous company with the 
bargaining power to "impose" standard-form terms and 
conditions on the relatively weak consumer, terms which 
are said to be unconscionable**. Feinberg believes that
** The concept of "unconscionable" bargains is in fact known to 
English contract law. In a 1974 case, a standard-form contract 
between a young song-writer and a music publishing company was held 
by the House of Lords to be so biased in favour of the music company 
(which had drafted it) that its terms were held void and 
unenforceable. Lord Diplock explained this judgment by stating that
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the justice of the argument is effectively demonstrated by 
J.G. Murphy's famous water well examples
Suppose I own the only water well within a two 
hundred mile radius of desert. A man, nearly dead 
from thirst, drags himself to my well and begs for
water. Realising (a) that the well is lawfully
owned by me and that I am entitled to all its
water, and (b) that the thirsty man's predicament 
is no fault of mine... I say " I will sell you a 
glass of water only if you sign over to me all your 
worldly possessions"50.
To Feinberg the injustice of the state upholding such a 
contract (the glass of water in return for all the thirsty 
man's worldly possessions), rather than overriding it, 
shows that "usurious agreements are indeed coercive* in 
the manner of all 'unconscionable contracts'; ... their 
coercive character reduces the voluntariness of the
consent of the weaker party whose position is very much 
like that imposed by the well owner on the man dying of 
thirst in Murphy's example"S1.
the court will intervene to protect those "whose power is weak 
against being forced by those whose bargaining power is stronger to 
enter into bargains which are unconscionable" (emphases added: 
Schroeder v Macaulay [1974] 3 All ER 616 at 623). A  year later the 
Court of Appeal refused to enforce another, not dissimilar, contract 
between song-writers and a music publishing company, Lord Denning 
holding that "there was such inequality of bargaining power that the 
agreement should not be enforced" (Clifford Davis v WEA [1975] 1 All 
ER 237 at 240).
However, the predominant strain in English law is that of classical 
freedom of contract: not intervening to override the expressed wishes 
of the parties. Although there are now statutory and common law 
grounds for overriding certain contractual clauses which exclude or 
limit the liability of companies in standard-form contracts etc, the 
text-books emphasise that, even in this context, "Inequality of 
bargaining power... in itself is not a ground for invalidating such a 
clause at common law" (Chitty on contracts (26th edition); Sweet & 
Maxwell (London 1989); paragraph 941).
* Feinberg’s emphasis.
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But it is not at all clear that this follows, or that 
Feinberg has drawn the right conclusion from the water 
well example. Certainly the well owner's behaviour is 
repellent and outrageous, displaying a degree of meanness 
and unkindness which is (almost) beyond belief. But does 
that mean that the state should intervene? When was it 
ever the business of the law to make people generous or 
kind? However objectionable the well owner's behaviour, 
the distinction between liberty and licence spelled out in 
section 3.1. of chapter one - a distinction essential to a 
truly free society - needs to be borne in mind here.
Nevertheless, to most people, there remains something 
unconscionable and repellent even about permitting the 
well owner to enforce the contract, quite apart from the 
mere disapproval that attaches to his behaviour. For the 
fact is that the thirsty man only agreed to the terms 
because otherwise the well owner would have denied him 
sustenance and let him die. But that is precisely why the 
water well example cannot properly be used as an analogy 
for other cases of contracts entered into by parties with 
unequal bargaining power, such as those between large 
employer and individual employee, or between major company 
and individual consumer. Obtaining the thirsty man's 
signature as the price of not letting him die is 
equivalent to obtaining it at gunpoint, and most theories 
of classical liberty would recognise that as being a 
contract made under duress or force, and hence as 
unenforceable. As already discussed (see section 1.2.1. 
of this chapter) it is consistent with a classical view of 
liberty to regard sustenance as a prerequisite of liberty, 
and thus something which people have by right, without 
conceding that people have rights to material resources 
generally (as the advocates of liberty-as-ability 
maintain). The water well example is an instance of a man 
entering a contract under duress, and not freely; but the 
unfreedom lies in the lack of sustenance rather in the 
lack of ability. It does not follow that an employee is
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similarly unfree or coerced when he contracts with his 
employer, or that a consumer signs the company's standard- 
form terms under duress.
When it comes to contracts where there is no threat 
to life, and no water well example-type duress, but where 
the parties have unequal wealth and bargaining power -
employment contracts, consumer contracts - there are good 
reasons for not allowing the law to intervene and override 
the agreement between the parties. Like other kinds of 
state interference, striking down such "unconscionable 
contracts" induces a lack of personal responsibility and 
encourages recklessness and ignorance. It is true, for 
example, that many consumers sign contracts without 
reading them properly, or are too easily persuaded by 
advertising, and often end up with bad bargains as a
result. But so long as no force or fraud (such as
dishonest advertising) is involved, that is no ground for 
saving them from their bad bargain, and so protecting them 
from the consequences of their actions. For if someone is 
so protected, what incentive is there to act more 
responsibly on future occasions, to be a more
discriminating consumer, to read things before signing 
them? Moreover, to strike down contracts entered into by 
parties with unequal bargaining power is an affront to the 
basic liberties of both parties. If a man is unemployed 
and is offered a job at a low wage by a business unwilling 
to spend more on labour, why should he not be free to
accept? It may be that his earnings would be barely more 
than he receives in unemployment benefit for doing 
nothing, but he might nevertheless prefer to keep himself 
occupied and to enjoy the dignity of labour. There is a 
choice to be made: what right has the state to decide for 
him? It is true that, being unemployed, he lacks the 
ability to extract a better bargain, but that should not 
imply that he be denied the freedom to contract. Yet just 
such an implication arises from a policy based on the 
positive conception of liberty as ability.
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The second implication of liberty-as-ability is, as 
with autonomy generally, the proposition that the only 
worthwhile choices are those which are autonomous and lead 
to a good life. A free choice, on this conception, has no 
value unless it is accompanied by access to material
resources, and people are only "free" to the extent that 
they have such access, can afford to do things and hence 
are "able" to do them. It will be apparent that a state 
committed to this kind of "liberty" will not leave people 
to themselves quite as much as a state safeguarding the 
classical/"negative" conception of liberty. It will have 
a more "positive", active role. Raz writes:
The principle of autonomy, as I shall call the
principle requiring people to secure the conditions 
of autonomy for all people, yields duties which go 
far beyond the negative duties of non­
interference33 .
Accordingly:
a government whose responsibility is to promote the 
autonomy of its citizens is entitled to 
redistribute resources, to provide public goods and 
to engage in the provision of other services on a 
compulsory basis52.
The socialistic connotations of this are evident. 
This kind of "positive" conception of liberty as
autonomy/access to resources/ability is what Mr Hattersley 
means when he denies that freedom is "simply" protection 
from the coercion of the state and says (in the epigraph 
to this chapter) that "real freedom" requires "possession 
of the economic power" which enables choices to be made in 
practice3. It is also what Hayek regards as a "dangerous 
confusion" embodied in "the socialist argument": the
identification of liberty with "the physical 'ability to 
do what I want', the power to satisfy our wishes, or the 
extent of the choice of alternatives open to us"2.
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Is Mill's very simple principle a prescription for 
liberalism and "laissez-faire", or for socialism? It is 
to answer this question, and to discover how effective a 
safeguard of liberty the principle is, that this chapter 
seeks to understand the sense in which Mill uses the terra 
"liberty". Crucial to that understanding, it will be 
apparent, is an examination of the implications of the 
concept of liberty central to the socialist arguments 
freedom as ability and power.
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1.3. Ability
What socialists mean by freedom is ability, or power. 
The welfare state, Alan Ryan writes, is tied to
"enabling goods", those goods which allow their 
possessors to choose for themselves what life plans 
to try to implement 
and therefore property in the welfare state must
give individuals access to the life of their 
society, which is a matter of increasing freedom of 
choice53*.
H.J. McCloskey writes similarly of
the argument for socialism from liberty. . . that 
the shortcomings and inequalities of capitalist 
systems are impediments or obstacles to freedom, 
and that socialism, by providing employment, 
reasonable minimum wages, and amenities such as 
health services, may foster and enlarge liberty54. 
And, within the realms of British domestic politics, Roy 
Hattersley as deputy leader of the Labour party told an 
interviewer in 1989** that freedom means
the ability to do those things which a free society 
says you can do in theory... It's that sort of 
freedom we're going to provide... [Mrs Thatcher] 
may have made this country more free, more 
libertarian for the people at the top of the income 
scale who can do more with their money. . . [but] 
she's depressed the amount of choice, the amount of 
ability to do what they want to do further down the
* Emphasis added.
** The interviewer was Mr Brian Walden, and the interview was 
broadcast on The Walden Programme on 22nd October 1989, by London 
Weekend Television. The author is grateful to London Weekend 
Television for providing the transcript of the interview, from which 
this and other quotations are taken.
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income scale... If you're a pensioner living on 
£46 a week you can choose virtually nothing155.
In the following paragraphs, three points will be 
made about "ability". First: that, contrary to Mr
Hattersley's description of ability as a "sort of
freedom", classical liberty and ability are not simply two 
aspects or variants of the same phenomenon. Ability is a 
different phenomenon altogether. Secondly: that classical 
or "negative" liberty is something of intrinsic value. 
Whereas advocates of "positive" liberty, and of socialism, 
often claim that freedom without ability is worthless, it 
will be argued that freedom has great value in itself, and 
is therefore worth protecting and promoting. The third 
point will be that this valuable phenomenon - freedom in 
itself, "negative" liberty - must necessarily be
sacrificed if governments attempt to promote and enhance 
ability. The pursuit of ability can only be conducted at 
the expense of liberty.
1.2.1. A different phenomenon altogether
To be free to do something is not the same as to be 
able to do it. To be unable to do something is not the
same as to lack the freedom to do it. In expounding his
distinction between positive and negative liberty, Berlin 
provides a few neat illustrations of this:
If I say that I am unable to jump more than ten 
feet in the air, or cannot read because I am blind, 
or cannot understand the darker pages of Hegel, it 
would be eccentric to say that I am to that degree 
enslaved or coerced18.
And again:
If I stumble and fall, and so find my freedom of 
movement frustrated, I cannot, surely, be said to 
have suffered any loss of basic human rights56.
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Berlin is not the first to have made the point. 
Hobbes writes in Leviathan that when men
are imprisoned, or restrained, with walls or 
chains... we use to say, they are not at liberty to 
move in such manner as without those external
impediments they would. But when the impediment of 
motion is in the constitution of the thing itself, 
we use not to say it wants the liberty, but the
power to move, as when a stone lies still, or a man
is fastened to his bed by sickness5*7*.
In similar vein, Feinberg has pointed out that the fact 
that he is unable to speak Russian, high-jump seven feet, 
write an original work in nuclear physics or give birth to 
a baby cannot sensibly be said to indicate that his 
liberty is thereby infringed22; and Nozick has noted that 
if a man chooses to walk somewhere, the fact that he might 
prefer to fly there like a bird but is unable to do so 
does not make his choice to walk any less voluntary or 
free50**. Conversely, Hayek has argued with the
implication of the socialist/"ability" concept of liberty 
- that the degree of one's freedom is determined by the
* Hobbes's emphasis.
** These points might be thought uncontroversial, but, remarkably, 
one proponent of the socialist conception of freedom has recently 
argued - in an article in The American Political Science Quarterly - 
that such physical and mental human inabilities are the same as a 
lack of freedom. The writer, Larry M. Preston, declares that someone 
untrained in music is, accordingly, "not free to play a piano 
composition even if a piano and sheets of music are present ,S8A .
The peculiar wickedness about using the word "free" in this way is 
that it renders nonsensical any objection to true infringements of 
liberty. Under communist rule in Czechoslovakia, no plays by Vaclav 
Havel were published, because the authorities banned them. At the 
same time, in England, no plays of mine were published, because I am 
untrained and unskilled as a playwright. Adopting Preston’s 
terminology, both Havel and I were therefore "not free" to publish 
plays. Does this means that the two situations are alike? Is the 
censorship of Havel’s plays morally comparable to my inability to 
write plays? If both are deprivations of freedom, why should we 
condemn the former any more than the latter? Thus, by a linguistic 
sleight of hand, we no longer have the vocabulary with which to 
protest when freedom really is infringed. Perhaps this is congenial 
to socialists.
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extent of one's wealth - by observing that "the courtier 
living in the lap of luxury at the beck and call of his 
prince may be much less free than a poor peasant or 
artisan"5®. This last illustration points to the 
essentially materialistic nature of the "ability" 
conception of freedom; it echoes the familiar objection of 
people in the former socialist states of eastern Europe, 
whose governments during the 1970s and 1980s offered them 
consumer goods as a substitute for freedom (of speech, of 
the press, of literature, and so on), that their mouths 
were being stuffed up with salami.
Another example from pre-1989 eastern Europe serves 
to clarify the distinction. In section 1.2.3.B of this 
chapter it was noted that the option of visiting Australia 
is not open to me unless I can afford to buy the 
ticket***, a truism if ever there was one. If I cannot 
afford to buy the ticket, I am unable to go. That would 
be the case regardless of whether I happened to live in 
England, or in East Germany while the Berlin Wall was
still up. In neither case would I be able to visit
Australia. But it is absurd to conclude from this that
whether I lived in England or behind the Berlin Wall makes
no difference to my freedom to go to Australia. Living in 
England, all I need to do is acquire the means to go. It 
all depends on me and on what becomes of me; nobody is 
stopping me going. Because of that, irrespective of my 
ability to go at any one time or another, I am always free 
to go. Behind the Berlin Wall, by contrast, it would not 
depend on me; no matter what I did, no matter what 
happened to me, I would still be prevented from going. I 
would face two, quite distinct, obstacles to goings not 
only the inability to go, but, in addition, a denial of my 
freedom to go. For an inhabitant of East Germany with the 
ambition to visit Australia, but without the means (in 
terms of material resources) to realise his ambition, the
*** or someone buys it for me, which is effectively the same thing.
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significance of the Berlin Wall coining down in 1989 would 
not have been that he suddenly became able to realise his 
ambition, but that he suddenly became free to do so. 
Being able to go is a different phenomenon altogether.
1.3.2. The value of classical liberty
What is the good of being free to go to Australia if 
one cannot afford to go, if one is unable to go? Wherein 
lies the value of classical liberty? This question has 
been posed already in this thesis, in chapter one, where 
reference was made in passing to the view that "liberty 
only has any point when people have access to the material 
resources which enable them to use freedom". It was 
suggested that this view is typical of a socialist 
attitude to freedom, which finds expression in questions 
such as: "what is the point of having freedom of choice
in education, with the ('negative') liberty of not being 
compelled to educate one's children in the state sector, 
if one cannot afford to pay the fees of an independent 
school?", or: "what is the point of being free to
negotiate the terms of one's employment, if one is so poor 
that one is desperate for work and thus in a weak
bargaining position to obtain good pay and conditions from 
the employer?"*. On this view liberty is only valuable if 
it is accompanied by ability; liberty without ability, 
liberty in itself - "negative" or classical liberty - is 
virtually worthless.
It is an attitude neatly encapsulated in a scene in
Piers Paul Read's novel A Season in the West. The hero of
the novel, Birek, is a dissident from another pre-1989 
socialist state, Czechoslovakia, who comes to England to 
seek political asylum. Shortly after arriving he is
* Chapter one, section 2.2.2.
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invited to a party where he meets Ben, an English 
intellectual socialist. Ben angrily tries to tell Birek
"what it's really like in this country... what our 
so-called freedom really means to people who can't 
get a job, or, if they can, don't earn enough to 
pay for a roof over their heads."
"I am sure there are such people," said Birek with 
a patient smile. "I am sure there are great 
inequalities, and much suffering, but isn't that 
the price of freedom?"
"Those who have the freedom don't pay the price." 
"But surely," said Birek, "the freedom, even of the 
few, releases an energy and an inventiveness which 
leads in turn to a prosperity which benefits even 
the poorest citizen?"
"Tell that to your unemployed steel worker!"
"He may not perceive it," said Birek, "because no 
one, hit by a misfortune, can see beyond it. But, 
I should have thought, his conditions here, as an 
unemployed steel worker, are even on a material 
level superior to an employed steel worker in a 
socialist state; and spiritually the two have no 
comparison because in his leisure - in what he 
reads in the newspapers, or watches on television - 
he is the beneficiary of all the ferment which 
arises in a free society."
"The Sun," sneered Ben, "and Blankety Blank?"60*
If Ben's comments seem a little exaggerated, the 
exercise by Piers Paul Read of excessive literary licence, 
it is perhaps worth turning to the words of a real English 
socialist and quoting again from Mr Hattersley's 1989 
interview55:
* Lest this should ever be read by anyone who needs it, perhaps it is 
worth repeating the explanation which the party's hostess proffers to 
a bewildered Birek. The Sun, she tells him, is "a newspaper - rather 
a vulgar newspaper. And Blankety-Blank is a silly television game”.
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. . . freedom is meaningless without the capacity to 
put that freedom into operation... Mrs Thatcher 
will say that this is a free country because you're 
able to buy aspects of health, you're able to buy a 
place in hospital, you're able to buy health for 
yourself and your family. Now, that may be one 
aspect of freedom but it's not an aspect of freedom 
that means very much to the people who can't 
actually afford a hospital.bed.
And again, later in the interview:
The great principle of socialism has always been 
freedom and the great understanding of the 
principle of freedom is that it is meaningless 
unless you can exercise those rights and that 
requires more equality**.
This is, in effect, the same point as H.J. 
McCloskey's claim, cited earlier, that "the value of self- 
determination depends on how it is used" and there is "no 
special value in the liberty enjoyed by the aimless, 
shiftless drifter"44. Liberty which leads to "the good 
life", which can be "put into operation", is worthwhile. 
But liberty on its own, for its own sake - the liberty of 
Ben's "unemployed steel worker" or McCloskey's "aimless, 
shiftless drifter" - has no value. As we have already 
observed, this is a highly materialistic view of freedom 
which places the greatest emphasis on what freedom brings, 
rather than on the thing itself: does it bring a good
life? does it (in Ben's words) get people a job or a roof 
over their heads? It is an attitude which says: The
freedom to buy health care for your family only matters if 
you can actually afford to "exercise those rights". The 
freedom to go to Australia only matters if you can
** In the same interview Mr Hattersley also proffers the view that he 
is "on the side of the philosopher John Rawls and I think all modern 
political philosophy now". He then comments helpfully: "Take it from 
me Mr Baker's [then chairman of the Conservative party] strong suit 
is not political philosophy, Mrs Thatcher is not one of nature's 
conceptual thinkers. " .
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actually afford to go to Australia. Only the material 
outcome matters.
What is being ignored in the "ability'1 conception of 
freedom is a spiritual dimension. Interestingly it is 
Mill, in book II of his Principles of Political Economy, 
who (albeit in a different context) provides one of the 
best illustrations of this. He writes:
Many a person remains in the same town, street or 
house from January to December, without a wish or a 
thought tending towards removal, who, if confined 
to that same place by the mandate of authority, 
would find the imprisonment absolutely 
intolerable61.
Either way, of course, the material outcome would be the 
same: whether freely and voluntarily, or by "mandate of
authority", such a person would remain in the same house 
"from January to December". There is no difference in 
material terms: freedom would not bring, or lead to,
anything different from compulsion. And yet a person 
would find the lack of freedom "intolerable", regardless 
of the identity of material outcome. Insofar as people do 
have the sense that being compelled not to move house for 
a year is something "absolutely intolerable", even where 
they would freely choose the same outcome, it is because 
they value something in freedom other than its outcome or 
how it is "put into operation" (to use Mr Hatters ley's 
words). They value liberty in its classical or negative 
meaning: the sense of being in control of one's own
destiny, rather than subject to the dictates of others. 
Maybe I will stay here from January to December, but that 
is my choice, and I could not bear having any other person 
(the state or my fellow citizens) interfering and taking 
the decision for me.
Whether the "mandate of authority" represented by the 
Berlin Wall is there or not, the material outcome is the 
same: if I do not have the money I am unable to visit
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Australia. But the two situations are nonetheless vastly 
different. If the Berlin Wall is there, and I am
forbidden (that is, denied the freedom) to go to 
Australia, then whatever I do can never change anything. 
I am an irrelevance. It is not up to me; it is the 
state's decision. On the other hand, without the Berlin 
Wall, without the prohibition on going, I am free to shape 
my own destiny and to direct my personal efforts to 
realising my ambition: by working harder, by saving up, by 
being inventive and resourceful (in, say, finding the
cheapest way to travel). Of course it will not
necessarily be entirely up to me. Luck may play a part
(for instance, if I win free tickets in a competition or, 
conversely, if the value of my savings plummets in a stock 
market "crash"). In the end, I may never realise my 
ambition. But in that case, although ultimately unable to 
go, I will still have had the hope and the potential. It
is that hope and that potential, rather than being "at the
beck and call" of others and having one's future 
predetermined by somebody else, which - even in the 
absence of ability - gives classical/"negative" liberty 
its value. It endows people with human dignity; without 
it their lives would be "absolutely intolerable".
Contrary to the socialist view that conceives liberty 
in terms of ability, the material outcome is not 
everything. Being fed salami in abundance does not
compensate for not being free to criticise. Piers Paul
Read's character Ben measures freedom in terms of people 
having "a roof over their heads", but as council tenants 
know all too well, it also matters whether one can make 
one's own decisions about what to do with one's house: 
whether one is free to decorate it as one pleases, whether 
one is free to dispose of it and acquire something else in 
the neighbourhood*. People attach value to being entitled
* In council estates where some people have exercised the "right to 
buy” it is possible to find people living next door to each other in 
identical flats, where one (the owner) enjoys these freedoms while 
the other (the council tenant) does not. There is no difference
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to take their own decisions; without that entitlement, 
regardless of what material goods they might be provided, 
their lives lack an essential component of what it is to 
be fully human. Here lies the meaning and the worth of 
the classical conception of liberty, liberty in itself and 
independent of "ability”, and here is the reason for 
safeguarding it.
1.3.3. Ability at the expense of liberty
Liberty in its classical sense is endangered by 
policies which involve the state in promoting and 
expanding ability. If a government embarks on this 
course, it compromises its responsibility to safeguard 
liberty.
As was seen earlier, the case for governmental 
promotion of ability - and, indeed, what Hayek calls "the 
socialist argument" - is often advocated by the 
identification of ability with freedom. H.J. McCloskey's 
writings are a prime example of this. Using the language 
of ("positive") liberty, McCloskey writes that the state
can do much to enlarge an individual's effective 
enjoyment of his liberty62** 
and on this basis he argues for an active welfare state 
(which he calls a "liberal welfare state") in which the 
government has responsibilities which go beyond the 
protection of liberty in its classical/negative sense. 
Yet the arguments he uses do not really make out the case. 
He argues for state involvement in health care so as to 
secure "the good of health to many who would lack it" and 
for government relief of unemployment on the grounds that, 
without adequate means, the unemployed may suffer
between the rooves over their heads; the difference lies in the fact 
that one can take decisions for himself while the other’s decisions 
are taken for him.
** Emphasis added.
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malnutrition and disease62. These points seem reasonable 
but, as has already been discussed*, they are not in 
themselves grounds for the state to exceed its classical 
liberty responsibilities: having health care and
sustenance are essential prerequisites of liberty in the 
"negative" as well as the "positive" sense, and it is 
perfectly consistent for a state committed to protecting 
its citizens' classical/negative liberty to try and ensure 
that their "good health" is secured and that they are
spared malnutrition and disease (although it may 
legitimately be asked whether, in providing for its
citizens' health, the state is necessarily obliged to use 
the medium of a nationalised health service).
McCloskey's points become less reasonable, however, 
as he argues that the state's responsibilities, above and 
beyond this, include ensuring that people have the
standard of living that enables them to do certain things 
that are not essential prerequisites of classical liberty. 
He considers the case of a man who, "because of his
poverty", is unable to "be active in his chosen career as 
a builder" or to "marry the woman he loves"62. The state, 
he says, should supply the money to relieve the poverty 
which engenders these inabilities; otherwise (and here 
McCloskey's attempt to identify ability with liberty is at 
its most conspicuous) the man's poverty will make him "a 
slave" by comparison with "the well-paid worker in the 
modern liberal welfare state"62.
But why should the state do any such thing? The 
question may seem heartless**, for it is undoubtedly nice 
and good when men can pursue their chosen careers and 
marry the women they love. Yet it is absurd to imagine 
that people should be entitled to these things by right in
* See section 1.2.1. of this chapter, and section 1.5.1.A of chapter 
two.
** If so, McCloskey is to be congratulated for choosing his examples 
well.
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the same way that they are entitled to the classical 
liberties of taking their own decisions without 
interference from others (and to the essential 
prerequisites of those liberties) - or that the state is
correspondingly obliged to provide them. A few analogies
make the absurdity all too clear. Is the state also 
obliged to enable me to pursue my chosen career - as a 
film star? (If not, why not?) What if the man is unable 
to marry the woman he loves not because of his poverty, 
but because she does not love him, or because she is 
married to someone else? Does he still have a right to 
marry her? (Again, why not?) The absurdities would not 
matter so much in themselves - were it not for the fact 
that, as will be explained below, these pseudo-rights can 
only be accommodated at the price of infringing real 
rights to liberty in its classical sense.
In his 1989 interview (already extensively quoted), 
Mr Hatters ley also advances the case for ability by 
couching it in the language of freedom. He offers a 
graphic example when he recalls that
when one of the defendants in the Guinness trial or
the pre-trial came out of court, newspapers said to 
him "Do you enjoy being a millionaire?", and not 
surprisingly he said that he did... and then... 
they said "Why do you enjoy being a millionaire?", 
and he said "Because it makes me free, I've got so 
much money that nobody can tell me what to do".55* 
The inference which is supposed to be drawn from this is 
that wealth or access to material resources is what makes 
people free, so that a government concerned with the 
freedom of its subjects ought correspondingly to give them 
greater access to material resources which, wherever there 
are people who do not enjoy such access, requires the 
state to engage in the "redistribution of wealth". Or, as
* Emphasis added.
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Mr Hattersley puts it in the interview: "If we can spread
it about a bit, there'll be more people who can't be 
pushed around"55.
The argument is beguiling, but it is fallacious. For 
it is only true that millionaires "can't be pushed around" 
in societies where they have liberty in its classical or 
negative sense. It is this, rather than their wealth, 
which makes them free. So long as people with money are 
entitled to take their own decisions about how to use that 
money without interference from the state or their fellow 
citizens - the definition of classical liberty - they 
will, indeed, be free and nobody can tell them what to do. 
But in, for example, a socialist command economy, when the 
state interferes with people's use of their money, 
millionaires are pushed around and told what to do, and 
being wealthy clearly does not entail being free. The 
defendant in the Guinness trial enjoyed freedom for the 
simple reason that he lived in a society which respected 
the "negative" liberty to take his own decisions with his 
money: in other words, a free market society based on
classical principles of economic liberty, rather than on 
the promotion of ability. By contrast, in a society where 
the state was committed to ability and to the policy of 
"spreading it about a bit", that freedom would be eroded.
Partly this is because the impulse to spread it about 
a bit, to enhance people's ability and their material 
well-being through state action, is in essence a desire to 
promote "the good life". The implications of this were 
considered earlier*. Where the government's job is to 
promote the good life, actions and choices and decisions 
taken by people which fail to advance the achievement of 
the good life, or which retard it, are inimical to the 
objectives of policy. For this reason, the freedom to 
exercise such choices and to take such decisions is
* See above, section 1.2.3.B of this chapter.
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accorded no value. This is the basis for Raz's view of 
"autonomous"/"positive" liberty as supplying no reasons to 
protect "bad options"42 and for McCloskey's belief that 
"the value of self-determination depends on how it is 
used; when used to seek good ends... it is right to foster 
it; when used to pursue evil ends, no good is lost if 
coercion is used to prevent them"44*. But, as already 
noted, being free only to make good rather than bad 
choices, to choose one way rather than another, is not 
freedom at all but its very antithesis. The point is well 
put by Mill in On Liberty when he describes as 
characteristic of freedom the idea that "diversity [is] 
not an evil, but a good, until mankind are much more 
capable than at present of recognising all sides of the 
truth"63, and that a person's "own mode of laying out his 
existence is the best, not because it is the best in 
itself, but because it is his own mode"64**.
The socialist objective of promoting the good life 
through greater access to material resources represents a 
rejection of this conception that a person's choice is 
valuable "not because it is best in itself, but because it 
is his own mode". The crucial criterion of policy becomes 
instead McCloskey's concern for whether "good is lost": 
choices are valuable if, and to the extent that, they 
promote the good life. The outcome is all-important - 
rather than the processes by which it is achieved; what 
matters is that people should be provided with material 
resources, rather than that they should determine their 
lives for themselves. The spiritual dimension of being in 
control of one's life - Mill's criterion of whether "it is 
his own mode" - is of, at most, secondary concern. Under
* See also T.H. Green’s view that "when we speak of freedom... we do 
not mean merely freedom to do as we like irrespectively of what it is
that we like... We mean a positive power or capacity of doing or 
enjoying something worth doing or enjoying”4SB.
** Emphasis added.
268
socialism, ability and access to material resources are 
paramount; freedom is disposable.
In addition, there is the simple fact that, in order 
to achieve "the good life" and ensure that more people 
have access to material resources, governments committed 
to promoting ability must take a more active dirigiste 
role in the way material resources are allocated, 
infringing people's entitlement to take economic decisions 
on their own and without interference. In this way, 
through greater state economic intervention, the socialist 
pursuit of ability diminishes classical liberty.
There are many people who would readily accept that 
those pre-1989 totalitarian states which called themselves 
"socialist", such as East Germany or Czechoslovakia, did, 
indeed, violate people's liberty, but that this was only 
insofar as they censored the press, jailed dissidents, 
restricted travel and so on. Such people would regard as 
irrelevant to the issue the fact that those states 
interfered in economic life through (for example)
nationalised industries, restrictions on private
enterprise and centrally-determined wages. Similarly, 
they would see no connection between, on the one hand, the 
denial of liberty implied in press censorship and, on the 
other, the kinds of state economic interventionism (in the 
form of nationalised industries, restrictions on private 
enterprise, incomes policies and minimum wages) advocated 
not only in eastern European socialist states but also by 
western "democratic socialist" and social-democratic 
parties. In short, they would see nothing inimical to 
liberty in socialism per se; only in the specific
circumstances of eastern Europe's "Soviet" or "Stalinist"* 
regimes.
* or "state capitalist"
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The argument which will be put forward here is that 
it is false, or at least exaggerated, to draw such a
distinction between state interference in, say, press 
activity and state interference in economic freedom; it 
will be contended that the latter ought just as much to be 
considered a restriction of liberty as the former. This, 
then, is an endorsement of the view that, to quote 
Margaret Thatcher in the very month when she first became 
Britain's prime minister:
There can be no liberty unless there is economic 
liberty65
and that it is intrinsic to socialist policies, by virtue 
of their sanctioning state interference in the economy,
that they should in fundamental ways violate people's 
freedom. That is to say: policies which seek to enhance 
ability - by trying to ensure that more people are able to 
use material resources (whether the precise goal be 
equality or "social justice" or any other so-called 
"redistribution of wealth") - are inevitably conducted at 
the expense of liberty.*
To support this argument, four examples of policy
involving state economic interference, all of which are 
typically advocated by western socialists and social-
* None of this should be taken to suggest that socialism does not 
also threaten political freedoms (the free press and so on). The 
Marxist theories of "false consciousness" and historical
inevitability have a propensity to breed intolerance of "dissident" 
opinions: why should respect be given to the expression of views 
which are merely the product of class interest and which detract from 
the onward march of progress? Moreover, the concentration of 
economic power into the hands of the very person who wields political 
power (namely, the state) serves to give government a "hands-on-the- 
purse-strings" power to coerce subjects into conformity; the 
temptation to abuse such power will, in the nature of things, always 
be hard to resist. Thus the experience of socialist states in 
eastern Europe, the USSR, China, south-east Asia, Africa and central 
America has been that political liberties were violated no less than 
economic liberties. Likewise western "democratic socialist" parties 
have often been attracted by the devices of totalitarian control - in 
England, for instance: the trade union closed shop; the confusion
of party with state by left-wing local authorities which have used 
public authority and public funds to promote partisan political 
causes; etc.
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democrats, will be considered:- (i) taxation;
(ii) minimum wages; (iii) nationalisation; and
(iv) restrictions on, or the abolition of, private health 
care and education.
Taxation: It is a truism to observe that money is
not everything, that it cannot guarantee happiness, and so 
on. But (as the advocates of positive liberty are the 
first to point out) money does enable people to do various 
things: to go to Australia, to decorate their homes, to 
provide for their children, to give to charity. When 
people spend their money, they are making decisions and 
exercising choices between these various options: if
someone has, say, £1000 and spends it all on a holiday to 
Australia so that he is left with no money to redecorate 
his home, he has in effect taken a decision to visit 
Australia rather than to redecorate his home. Someone 
else in his position might have preferred to redecorate 
his home and, if so, would have spent his money on that. 
Someone else might have decided that he would rather 
provide for the future, and in that case would have put 
the money into savings. Each of these spending choices is 
a decision about what the person in question wants to do 
with his life, and to the (limited, but obviously not 
insignificant) extent that money is important to a 
person's life, the right to spend it is the way by which 
each individual determines his own life and his destiny.
Taxation is nothing more or less than the state 
taking people's money and spending it for them - which is 
to say removing from them the right to make those 
decisions and appropriating that right for itself. If the 
£1000 is levied from each person in taxation, it may well 
be spent on something for their benefit. (On the other 
hand, it might not.) But, whether it is or not, they will 
not have chosen it: the state will have chosen it on their 
behalf, regardless of whether they would rather the money 
had gone on a visit to Australia, or an encyclopaedia for
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their children, or a gift to charity. Taxation, then, is 
the state saying to the individual: although that Is your
money, you cannot decide what to do with it, we shall 
decide for you. The higher the level of taxation, the 
greater the control of people's decisions lies with the 
state, and the less the individual is in charge of his own 
destiny. The less, that is to say, he is free.
This is not a new point. It has been made many times 
before, often with greater force. More than a century ago 
Herbert Spencer wrote that levying taxation is tantamount 
to the state declaring: "Hitherto you have been free to
spend this portion of your earnings in any way which 
pleased you; hereafter you shall not be free to spend it, 
but we will spend it for the general benefit"66. And, to 
the extent that an individual's money is derived from his 
wages, it is impossible to disagree with Nozick's view 
that taxation is "on a par with forced labour; . . . taxing 
the earnings of n hours labour is... like forcing the 
person to work n hours for another's purpose"6,7.
But, as Nozick observes67, however obvious this point 
is to some people, to others it remains virtually 
incomprehensible. The incomprehension finds expression in 
arguments that, surely, taxation is necessary - to provide 
for an army and a police force, for old age pensions, and 
so on - and therefore one cannot possibly have a political 
system without taxation. Such arguments miss the point. 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to deny the 
proposition that one cannot have a functioning political 
system without taxation; on the contrary, this thesis 
would argue that taxation is sometimes justified, in just 
the same way as other restraints on liberty are sometimes 
justified (laws prohibiting people from planting bombs in 
the street, for example). The point is merely that,
justified or not, taxation quite simply is a restraint on 
liberty, and should be so regarded.
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Minimum wagesi Much as taxation involves the state 
deciding for people how to spend their money, so likewise 
legal minimum wages are, in effect, the state making 
people's contracts for them - whether they like it or not. 
It may be that I have no job, but someone offers me work 
at a certain wage. Although the wage is low, I agree to 
accept it, either because it will make me better off than 
I am at the moment, or because I want to spend my day 
usefully, or for whatever reason. The employer agrees to 
take me at that wage, I agree to work at that wage. But 
if there is a legal minimum wage, and what he has offered 
is below that minimum, then the fact that we both want to 
proceed is irrelevant. The state, imposing the minimum 
wage, says no: you are not free to enter into contracts 
howsoever you choose, we decide what you may agree to. 
Thus both his freedom and mine are curtailed.
Nationalised industries: Instead of using my money
to go on holiday or to redecorate my house, I may decide 
to save or invest it. That being so, I could decide to 
put the money under my pillow, or in a bank, or in 
industry (in the form of shares) - or any combination of 
these, as I see fit. Because of my assessment of their 
likely relative profitability, or for whatever other 
reason, I may decide to put some of my money in steel 
making, rather more in the telephone company, and none at 
all in coal-mining. Yet when the state "nationalises" 
industry, it takes these choices out of my hands. It 
says, in effect: we shall decide for you where to invest
your money; we shall put this amount into coal-mining, 
regardless of whether you wanted to or not, or of what you 
might have wanted to do with the money. The state tells 
me: the choice is ours, not yours.
Restricting private health care and education: It is
the policy of many western socialist and social-democratic 
parties that people should be free to buy videocasettes 
for their children, but not to buy them schooling; and
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that people should be permitted to spend their money on 
alcohol and cigarettes, but not on health care. Of all 
the four examples, this is perhaps the most perverse - and 
the most offensive - limitation on liberty. For here the 
state is saying to peoples you may spend your money on 
ice cream and holidays and fashionable clothes, and 
exercise choices between these things, but when it comes 
to two of the most important things on which you might 
want to spend your money, you cannot; THOSE decisions we 
shall take for you.
In all four cases, people's liberty to take 
fundamental decisions affecting their lives is being 
denied. These are, of course, all economic decisions, and 
it may perhaps be objected that this emphasis on economic 
liberty is excessively materialistic - precisely the 
accusation which was levelled earlier at the socialist 
advocates of "ability"*. In response to that objection, 
two points need to be made. First, whereas the proponents 
of "ability" demand that people should have certain 
material things, the proponents of classical economic 
liberty, by contrast, demand only that people should be 
free to decide what to do with such material things as 
they may or may not haves in other words, it is not having 
the material thing which is crucial, but having the 
freedom. Secondly, the case for economic liberty is 
emphatically not that the only type of liberty should be 
economic liberty. It is not contended that freedom to 
spend money is the sole, or even the most important, 
liberty. Neither is it being denied that people should be 
free in other, non-material, aspects of their lives, 
enjoying (for example) freedom of expression and freedom 
of association. What is being contended, what this thesis 
is arguing, is that freedom should also apply to how 
people spend their money. It is an assertion that liberty 
is indivisible. Without exception, and to the greatest
* See above, section 1.3.2. of this chapter.
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extent possible (that is, subject to not violating other 
people's liberties**), people should be entitled to take 
their own decisions, without interference from the state 
or their fellow citizens: they should be free to do as
they please with themselves and what they have.
But there is a further objection which could be made, 
the argument which has been presented here - that policies 
aimed at promoting ability undermine liberty because they 
involve interference with people's economic decision­
making - embodies a (so far) unspoken political 
assumption. It has been argued that taxation violates 
people's freedom by restricting their entitlement to 
decide how to spend their own money. But, it might be 
objected, by what right is it "their" money in the first 
place? It has been asserted that people should be free to 
do as they please with what they have. But why should 
they "have" things? In short, the implicit assumption in 
all this is that private property is justified: the
argument presupposes that people are entitled to "have" 
material things (money, houses, cars, clothes), to call 
material things "theirs"69. That assumption is thus 
crucial to the claim that economic liberty is an essential 
component of liberty generally. The basis for saying that 
the social and economic order which is variously described 
as "economic liberalism" or "capitalism"*** is necessary 
for the protection of liberty - and that socialism (by 
contrast) represents a major threat to liberty - is, then, 
the idea of a right to private property. It is that idea, 
therefore, which now needs to be examined.
** See chapter two of this thesis, passim,
*** or, in more recent times, "Thatcherism".
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1.4. Property
1.4.1. The problem
Property is the name for just one type of 
relationship between people and material things. There is 
nothing inevitable about it - about people having material 
things, owning them, regarding them as theirs - and it is 
perfectly conceivable that there should be societies which 
do not recognise the legitimacy of this particular 
relationship and instead, for example, accord people 
common rights of access to and usage of material things. 
Indeed in most (if not all) societies, the air people 
breathe is held in common, with common rights of user; it 
belongs to no one. Under the laws of England the right of 
property is even today limited in respect of certain lands 
designated as "common lands", meaning that, although the 
soil is technically owned, non-owners are fully entitled 
to take or use what it produces. Nobody owns the right to 
the produce; it is held in common*70.
However in England, and in the other western liberal 
societies of the world, most material things are owned as 
property: houses, jewellery, cars and petrol, for example, 
together with the money which is used as a common currency 
to denote the value of those things and as a medium of 
exchange between any one of them and any other thing held 
as property.
What, then, does it mean to have property in a thing? 
In book II of his Principles of Political Economy, Mill 
offers as good a working definition as any. "The 
institution of property", he writes, "consists in the 
recognition, in each person, of a right to the exclusive 
disposal" of certain things'73-. This contains the two 
essential components of the right to property: the right
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is one of disposal and, secondly, it is an exclusive 
right. Property implies a right to dispose of a material 
thing as one chooses, both in the sense of alienating, or 
of ridding oneself of, it however one pleases - by gift or 
bequest, or in exchange for something else (money, goods 
or services) which the recipient gives in return - and 
also in the sense of using it however one pleases. The 
owner of something is entitled to do what he likes with 
it, subject of course to the constraints which operate on 
every other rights that is to say, the right to use 
something so long as doing so does not (for example) cause 
"harm to others", or infringe the liberties of others*. 
In Nozick's graphic phrase: "My property rights in my
knife allow me to leave it where I will, but not in your 
chest"72. The second element is that this right to 
dispose of the thing (in both senses) is held exclusively 
by the owner, which is to say that nobody else may dispose 
of it or use it without his consent. Locke identifies 
exclusivity as essential to property when he writes, in 
the Two treatises of civil governments
For truly I have no property in that which another 
can by right take from me, when he pleases, against 
my consent73.
The right to property is thus an extraordinarily 
strong right. It gives its holder total and sole mastery 
over physical matter which is not part of him almost as 
though it were part of him. Yet it is an entitlement 
which has been considered fundamental by those who have 
sought to determine what are the rights to which people 
are entitled. Article II of the French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of Citizens of 1791 lists the "natural 
and imprescriptable rights of man" as being "liberty, 
property, security and resistance of oppression"74. This 
of course raises the question of why people should be 
entitled to such a strong and apparently fundamental
* What were called, in chapter two of this thesis, the "Mill 
principle" and the "Berlin principle" respectively.
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right. The question is posed not least by those who are 
most sceptical about the alleged virtues of economic 
liberty. Thus Tom Settle asks:
What is the problem about the grounds of rightness 
of property? In short, this: there do not seem to
be any such grounds, and yet if there are [sic] 
none, there is no escape from force as the arbiter 
[of who should use or have what]-75.
Rather more cautiously, Ryan observes:
Anyone's property limits the freedom** of everyone 
else to acquire and use what he feels like 
acquiring and using. It is an institution which 
therefore requires justification-76.
Considering the importance of the question, and - as 
has been seen - how fundamental it is not only to 
understanding what is meant by "freedom"*** but also to 
assessing the merits of rival political and economic 
arrangements (socialism and communism versus free-market 
liberalism), it is remarkable how few political thinkers 
have been willing to confront it. There has been 
considerable reticence about attempting to justify the 
right to property, as opposed to holding things in common 
in the absence of ownership****. A number of political 
thinkers have made efforts to define property (Mill, as 
noted above-71, and Kant-7-7) and others have described 
benefits which accrue from the institution of property
** He means the ability
*** i.e. does it embrace economic liberty and is it therefore 
undermined by policies which promote ability?
**** Everything said here about holding things in common applies a 
fortiori to "state ownership" - that is, the existence of property, 
but property vested not in individual people but in the state. 
Marxist-Leninist theory, of course, envisages state ownership (by 
nationalisation etc) of the means of production, distribution and 
exchange as a necessary precursor (while people are still 
psychologically attached to the notion of property) to the abolition 
of property altogether and the holding of things in common. Both 
holding in common and state ownership involve a denial of private 
property: that is, of a person’s right to own things himself.
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(for instance, Hegel78 and Bentham79). From Hume, there 
is an argument for property based on alleged 
considerations of expediency, but it does not serve as a 
justification. Hume argues that, in the context of a 
universal and insatiable "avidity" on the part of people 
to acquire material goods80, the only way to avoid rival, 
greedy claims on the same (limited) resources degenerating 
into civil conflict and the destruction of society, is to 
establish a convention81 by which it is agreed who is 
entitled to use which resources. The institution of 
property, Hume contends, fulfils this function and is thus 
the "most natural expedient"82 for maintaining society83. 
As an institution it can guarantee social peace because, 
by contrast with common ownership, it is - according to 
Hume - in everyone's interests to acknowledge each other's 
property rights:
I observe, that it will be for my interest to leave 
another in the possession of his goods, provided he 
will act in the same manner with regard to me84*. 
The obvious flaw in this line of reasoning is that a poor 
man, enviously eyeing the possessions of his rich 
neighbour, will not necessarily observe there to be such a 
mutual interest between them: it will not be as much to
the poor man's benefit as to the rich man's to respect 
property rights and to leave the allocation of material 
resources undisturbed and in the same hands. Property 
rights, then, are not quite the expedient that Hume makes 
them out to be; and, to repeat Settle's point75, in the 
absence of some actual justification for people keeping 
what they have, there is nothing to stop brute force being 
the ultimate determinant.
Possibly the most celebrated attempt at a 
justification of property is Locke's "appropriation 
theory", set out in chapter 5 of his second treatise. 
This takes as its premise the notion that "the work of a
* Hume’s emphasis.
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man's body is truly his" and goes on to assert that 
"whatever he mixes that work with, becomes his"85. Thus, 
although material goods were originally held in common, 
people can appropriate goods from the common stock by 
mixing their labour with them. When a man starts to eat 
an apple from a tree owned by no-one, the apple becomes 
his in the act of eating. When a man cultivates a piece 
of land which is owned by no-one, the land becomes his 
through the mixing of his labour with it86. By these acts 
of original acquisition, Locke maintains, material goods 
legitimately and justifiably passed from being held in 
common to being owned by people. Subsequent ownership is 
justified to the extent that the original owners give 
their consent to the transfers through bequest, gift or 
contractual exchange. Locke is conscious that there are 
limits to this: if one man were to use the profits from
the land he owns to buy up everyone else's land, there 
would be the unsatisfactory (and hard to justify) 
consequence that no-one else had access to the food needed 
to sustain them. So Locke makes the right of property 
(through original "mixing" of labour plus transfer by 
owner's consent) subject to a "sufficiency rule", that the 
appropriator is only entitled to own goods if "enough and 
as good" is left for others86.
The objections to Locke's argument are virtually as 
familiar as the theory itself, and effectively succeed in 
wrecking it. It is not clear, first of all, what is the 
extent of the ownership acquired when labour is mixed with 
goods. When the first man starts to eat an apple from a 
tree, does he thereby acquire just the apple, or the whole 
tree, or all the land on which the tree stands? If a 
private astronaut clears a place on Mars, has he mixed his 
labour with (so that he comes to own) the whole planet, 
the whole uninhabited universe, or just a particular 
plot?87. Secondly, it is not explained by Locke why 
mixing one's labour with (say) a piece of land 
automatically implies that one acquires the land in which
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one's labour is mixed, rather than simply having lost 
one's labour to the land. Nozick puts this point nicely: 
"If I own a can of tomato juice and spill it in the sea... 
do I thereby come to own the sea, or have I foolishly 
dissipated my tomato juice?"88 Finally, and most 
crucially, Locke fails to give a satisfactory account of 
why it follows from the fact of a man owning his labour 
that he is entitled to own the land on which he labours: 
is it not more justifiable to assert that he owns the 
value added to the land by the labour (that is, at most, 
the crop, but not the land itself)?
Even Nozick, one of the most ardent champions of
property rights (and economic liberty) in recent times, 
while skilfully exposing the failings in Locke's theory89, 
fails to proffer an alternative justification. He does 
not even try. He criticises socialist policies of
"redistributing" wealth on the grounds that they violate 
people's entitlement to keep what they own. Nozick 
insists that a person is entitled to own a thing if it has 
been legitimately transferred to him - that is, with the
consent of the previous owner (bequest, gift or
contractual exchange) - and, accordingly, the state is not 
entitled to take it from him. But this fails to answer 
the question of by what right the previous owner held the 
goods. By what right was it originally acquired from the 
common stock? On these fundamentals, Nozick is strangely 
silent:
To turn these general outlines into a specific 
theory we would have to specify the details of each 
of the... principles of justice in holdings: the
principle of acquisition of holdings, the principle 
of transfer of holdings... I shall not attempt 
that task here. (Locke's principle of justice in 
acquisition is discussed below.)90*
* Emphasis added.
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But - to repeat - the right to economic liberty, in 
contradistinction to socialistic economic interventionism, 
cannot be justified unless the right to property is 
justified.
1.4.2. The absence of property is unjustifiable
This thesis has no pretensions to improve on the work 
of Nozick, let alone of Hume and Locke. The problems 
which they encounter in trying to justify property seem to 
the present author unanswerable; certainly this thesis can 
do no better than they in answering them. But in the 
paragraphs which follow an attempt will be made to sustain 
the case that the right to property ought to be respected 
- for the simple reason that its absence carries necessary 
implications which are morally indefensible.
Two such implications of the absence of property will 
be discussed. First, it will be argued that, if there are 
no property rights, people who work will be in the 
position of slaves. And, secondly, it will be shown how, 
where there is no property, natural human sentiments are 
inevitably denied and overridden, so that the absence of 
property is a form of inhumanity.
1.4.2.A: The absence of property is slavery
Introducing his book on "property and political 
theory", Alan Ryan muses that "although liberty may 
sustain private property, the converse seems less 
plausible""76. What will be argued here is not only that 
it is plausible that property sustains liberty, but also 
that the absence of property entails wholesale 
enslavement.
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At the beginning of section 1.4.1., the point was 
made that, whereas the air people breathe is held in 
common and is not owned by anyone, other material goods - 
such as petrol - are the subject of property rights. I am 
entitled to use as much air as I like at any time, and so 
can everyone else. However, I am only entitled to use 
petrol if I own some, which I can do by having it 
transferred to me with the consent of another person who 
currently owns it: in practice that usually means going
to a petrol station and buying it (that is, entering into 
a contract with a petrol station by which it consents to 
transfer petrol to me provided that I pay a sum of money 
in return).
It should be apparent that what distinguishes a 
commodity such as air from a commodity such as petrol is 
that it is freely and effortlessly available. Access to 
air requires no payment, because there is no difficulty in 
obtaining it. Access to petrol, by contrast, involves an 
enormous amount of effort and labour: someone (or several
people) must first discover the oil, someone else (or 
several other people) must extract it, someone else (or 
several other people) must refine it. The finished 
product needs to be distributed by still more people, and 
marketed by still more people - until it is ready to be 
sold to me at the pumps. Hume expresses the point well in 
his analysis of property:
When there is such a plenty of any thing as 
satisfies all the desires of men... the distinction 
of property is entirely lost, and every thing 
remains in common. This we may observe with regard 
to air and water*, though the most valuable of all 
external objects83.
* It is interesting to note how Hume categorises water alongside air 
as a material resource which is freely and effortlessly available, 
and therefore not something which should be the subject of property 
rights, buying, selling and so on. In the sense that water falls 
from the sky as rain, he is of course right. But in modern Britain 
most people are not prepared to drink rainwater, and only want to 
acquire water after it has been worked on - collected, purified and
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The point about material resources such as petrol, 
then, is that nobody wants them without labour; labour is 
what turns (say) the undiscovered oil into something 
valuable. With the exception of air, the same is true of 
virtually every material thing, from diamonds to toilet 
paper. This does not, as Ryan seems to think92, imply the 
validity of the "revolutionary"92/Marxist labour theory of 
value. The point is not that the value of something
(petrol, a diamond, a toilet roll) lies in the worth of
the labour put in it; after all, how can one possibly
assess the value of some labour over others?** Rather, as 
classical economists have always maintained, the value of 
a thing lies in what people are prepared to pay for it. 
The point is simply that, by contrast with air, people
will not be prepared to pay for most goods unless labour 
has gone into producing them.
The finished product - petrol, for instance - is thus 
in most cases the fruit of a person's, or many people's, 
labour. If there is no property, but instead common
ownership of goods, this means that the products of
people's labour are held in common; the fruit of a
person's labour does not belong to him, but to everyone.
If I work all day, five days a week, my reward at the end 
will not be mine, to do with as I please, but will be 
owned by everyone in common. My labour will not be mine,
piped. Because that involves labour, there is property in the 
finished product, and people have to pay to be supplied with water 
from the tap (or in bottles). This was as true when the water
industry was nationalised as it is since going into private
ownership; yet a failure to appreciate this seems to have muddled a 
great deal of debate at the time of privatisation. Thus Neil 
Kinnock, the Labour leader, told his party's conference at the time 
of privatisation in 1989 that "Tories are the kind of people who
start off promising you the earth and end up selling you water"®1 .
** a difficulty which, sadly, never seems to daunt proponents of
"comparability", "wages boards" and the other paraphernalia of 
arrogant economic planning.
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but everyone's. (Where, instead of common ownership, 
there is state ownership, it will belong to the state.)
In the absence of private property, each person (or 
the state) has a claim to the activities and the products 
of other people93. It follows that all those things in an 
individual which are productive and which constitute his 
labour - his personality, qualities and abilities, his 
mind and his body - are not his to dispose of, but, 
rather, are at the disposal of the community: they become, 
as Nozick puts it, "a collective asset”94. The individual 
thus does not belong to himself, but to others. He is 
enslaved***.
Respect for property rights rests on the opposite 
view: that a person does belong to himself, and has a
right to "dispose of himself" as he pleases - to decide 
what will become of himself and what he will do - so that, 
in consequence, he has a right to reap the benefits of 
what he does72. My person (my mind and my body) are mine 
to dispose of. If for the next hour I decide to devote 
myself to playing sport, or reading, or sleeping, I may 
reap the benefit of any of those uses of my mind and body. 
Of course I may choose to bestow all or part of the 
benefit of my activities on others - as when I read aloud, 
or play sport before a crowd of spectators, or make love 
to someone. But in each case the choice is mine; the 
benefit of my activities is mine to keep or to give away 
or to share as I please; I am mine to dispose of. By the 
same token, if I choose instead to spend the next hour 
working - engaging my mind and body in labour - I am no 
less entitled to reap or to dispose of the benefit of that 
labour as I choose. The petrol at the pumps is the fruit
*** Herbert Spencer is succinct on this point. On the basis that 
socialism idealises either the holding of goods in common, or their 
appropriation by the state through taxation (for the putative benefit 
of the community), he makes the bold claim: "All socialism involves
slavery"®3 . To the extent that socialism involves the abridgement of 
property rights, Spencer's claim seems incontestable.
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of people's labour; it ought not therefore to be a 
collective asset. It belongs to the vendor, he has 
property rights over it, and he can dispose of it as he 
chooses. If the vendor wants to charge motorists money 
for using it, that is his right; by contrast with the air 
they breathe, they are not entitled to use as much as they 
like at any time at will. It is not theirs for the 
taking. Insofar as individuals are entitled to the fruits 
of their labour, the petrol - being the fruit of labour - 
ought to be subject to property rights, and not held in 
common.
Of course, in the real economy, things are a little 
more complex, but the principles are the same. A potter 
might take a lump of clay from the ground, turn it, let it 
dry in the sun - and when he claims the right to dispose 
of the finished vase (to keep it, to give it away or to 
sell it), it is indisputably his labour which has produced 
it. In the case of petrol sold to motorists at the pumps, 
however, the position is obviously different. The vendor 
has not produced the petrol himself. In all likelihood, 
he will have paid a distributor who paid a refiner who 
paid an extractor of oil. And at each stage, the person
will probably not have put in the labour himself*; the
refiner whom the distributor pays will not have done the 
work of refining himself, but will have employed other 
people (possibly hundreds or thousands) to do so, and will 
have paid them for their labour. It might be thought that 
this is where the theory of property rights as enshrining
people's entitlement to the fruits of their labour breaks
down. Thus Marxists contend that, in a system of private 
property, the workers employed do not reap the benefit of 
their labour; it is "alienated” to their capitalist 
employer, who himself profits from the fruit of the 
workers' labour when he sells the product of that labour 
(the refined oil to the distributor) and pays only a small
* "The person", of course, may not be a "he" or even a "she" but a 
company - a group of people deemed by the law to be a person.
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portion of that profit in wages to the workers, pocketing 
the remainder for himself. But the "alienated labour" 
argument, although superficially attractive, rests on 
fallacious assumptions. It presupposes that the workers 
are entitled to all the value added to the raw material at 
the production stage - the difference in value between the 
unrefined oil and the refined oil - because their labour 
is what has "produced" the difference and is therefore 
"worth" the value added. In reality, of course, other 
factors will also have been essential contributories to 
the difference between the raw material and the products 
not only machinery belonging to the employer but also risk 
(for the worker, failure of the business will at most mean 
redundancy; it could ruin the employer). It can never be 
possible to quantify the proportions in which these 
various factors make up the value added in the production 
process. The "alienated labour" argument presupposes, 
moreover, that a person's labour can be assigned a 
specific objective value which he "ought" to receive. 
But, as noted above, there is no meaningful way of 
assessing the value of labour or anything else other than 
what people are prepared to pay for it. The potter is
entitled to as much for his vases as anyone is willing to 
pay for them; the petrol vendor is entitled to as much for 
his product as anyone is willing to pay for it; and, in 
exactly the same way, the employee is entitled to as much 
for his labour as employers are willing to pay. If he
receives that much, he is reaping the benefit of his
labour; neither more, nor less. It may well be that as a 
self-employed person or an employer he would earn more 
from producing the same thing; but, not incurring the 
risks involved in being self-employed or an employer, he
is earning as much as his labour is worth as an employee. 
On a principle of private property, a person's labour is 
his, to use for himself or to sell, perhaps to an
employer. Workers being paid the market rate reflects 
their right to sell their services to an employer (or not 
to do so), and thus enshrines the freedom to "dispose of"
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themselves as they please (a person belonging to himself/ 
not to others) - in a way that common holding never can.
On the other side of the equation/ it is the same. 
The purchaser who pays for petrol is entitled to property 
rights over it: he has exclusive rights to dispose of it 
as he pleases. He obtains it in a free and voluntary 
exchange by which he hands over to the vendor "his" money: 
money over which he had property rights, having perhaps 
earned it from selling something he had produced or from 
selling his services to an employer. If he did not enjoy 
property rights over that money - the exclusive right to 
dispose of it as he chose (for example/ by buying petrol) 
- this would be depriving him of property rights in the 
productive efforts or services or labour of his mind or 
body. It would be saying that his person was not his, but 
belonged to others. The absence of property rights would, 
again, be tantamount to enslavement. Contrary to Ryan's 
protestations'76, therefore, private property does indeed 
sustain liberty.
1.4.2.B: The absence of property is inhumanity
It hardly needs saying that, whereas (for the reasons 
just put forward) abolishing private property inevitably 
entails depriving individuals of the fruits of their own 
labour, not all the private property held by each 
individual is the fruit of his own labour. Private 
property cannot be justified entirely in terms of a 
person's rights over his labour - for the simple reason 
that labour does not account for all holdings of private 
property.
Earlier in section 1.4.1, private property was 
defined as the right to exclusive disposal of a material 
object, including the right to alienate the object from 
oneself. This obviously carries the implication that an
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owner can voluntarily transfer ownership of a thing to 
someone else, so that the latter person becomes its owner. 
The doctrine of private property thus recognises a 
person's right to own a thing if it has been transferred 
to him by, or with the consent of, its previous owner. 
Without such consent there is no legitimate passing of 
ownership, so that (for instance) a thief is not 
recognised as enjoying property rights over the goods he 
has stolen. (On the contrary, he has violated the 
property rights - the rights of exclusive disposal - of 
the legitimate owner.) But people can legitimately 
acquire property rights other than through the fruits of 
their labour, including by way of gift or inheritance (as 
well, of course, as voluntary exchange).
To return to the example of the purchaser of petrol. 
It was argued above that he is entitled to property rights 
over the petrol he has bought, to treat it as "his", and 
to the exclusive right to dispose of it as he pleases*, 
because he freely and voluntarily exchanged it with "his" 
money. It was suggested that he might have earned the 
money from selling something he had produced, or from 
working for an employer. In that case, his property in 
the money, and hence in the petrol, would be justified by 
reference to his being entitled to the fruit of his 
labour. But, of course, he might have obtained the money 
in other ways which the doctrine of private property 
regards as legitimate - but which cannot be said to be the
fruit of his labour. He might have been given it. He
might have won it in a competition or in gambling. He
might have speculated successfully on the stock market.
He might have inherited it. He might, in short, own it by 
luck rather than labour.
* subject, as noted in section 1.4.2.A, to the constraints which 
operate on every other right: "My property rights in my knife allow 
me to leave it where I will, but not in your chest"72. The petrol
owner is not entitled to douse the petrol over his neighbour's 
children.
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So, likewise, in the case of the refiner who is paid 
for selling refined oil to the distributor. As has been 
seen, in all probability, he will not actually have done 
the refining himself, but will have employed other people 
to do the dirty work and, although he will have paid them 
wages for their labour, he obtains a much higher sum for 
the finished product and he thus profits from their 
labour. Even if, as was argued earlier, the workers 
cannot justifiably expect to earn more for being employed 
(that is, where they earn as much as anyone is prepared to 
pay for employing them), it may well be that the employer 
does much better financially from the arrangement than his 
employees - such that, given the opportunity, many would 
want to change places with him. Why, then, do they not 
become employers, like him? Why is he able to be the 
employer, and to derive (in all probability) more profit 
from the arrangement than they, while they are not? 
Usually the answer is simply that he starts off with more 
than they do. He has the refinery - the land, plant and 
equipment - and he has the money to pay lots of people's 
wages, to advertise and so on. In short, he has the 
capital, and because he has the capital he receives more 
money than they do as a result of their labour. This, of 
course, is the well-known Marxist distinction between 
"capital" and "labour", whereby those with capital are 
able to "exploit" the labour of others.
Hence, under a system of private property, the 
refiner's profits are largely the result not of his 
labour, but of his capital. It may be in fact that his 
capital is the fruit of his labours the barrow boy made 
good and other, less dramatic, cases of self-made wealth. 
But, as a matter of observable reality, it is at least as 
likely that he obtained it by lucks inheritance, for 
example. To many people this aspect of private property 
seems unfair, unjust - and hence unjustifiable.
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It is hard to see how there is anything "fair" about 
some people being richer than others by sheer luck. But 
what will be argued here is that private property 
ownership, even to the extent that it derives from 
elements other than the owner's labour, is nonetheless 
justified - because, were private property to be shorn of 
these elements, society would need to operate in a way not 
consonant with what is generally considered as morally 
acceptable. It would be inhumane, and intolerable.
The first, and most obvious, unfairness about 
property holdings is that, as the most rudimentary grasp 
of history makes clear, the initial allocations of 
property ownership - the point of departure for subsequent 
purchases and sales and other transfers of wealth, and 
from which the current pattern of ownership is ultimately 
derived - do not appear to have been made on any just, or 
morally justifiable, basis. This point is made with 
particular force by Mill in Principles of Political 
Economy,
The social arrangements of modern Europe commenced 
from a distribution of property which was the 
result, not of just partition or acquisition by 
industry, but of conquest and violence.®6 
And it is surely such considerations - the appalling 
thought that the rich in society may owe their privileged 
position to pillage and murder by their forbears (truly 
living on immoral earnings) and that the poor are the 
continuing victims of monstrous crimes as yet unexpiated - 
which lie behind the obsession of Locke and others with 
the original appropriation of property. Even Nozick, one 
of the staunchest modern defenders of the institution of 
private property, gives thought to what steps, if any, 
should now be taken to "rectify" past injustices in the 
acquisition of holdings, and admits himself defeated by 
the problem97.
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Undeniably there is a problem here. But whether the 
probable arbitrariness and unfairness of original 
allocations of property are such as to render the current 
situation unjustifiable, or (which is the same thing*) are 
such as to justify "rectification", depends on how a 
number of factors are assessed. For there can be little 
doubt that if such a rectification were to be attempted - 
for instance by a single redistribution of capital from 
the "beneficiaries" of the original injustice to its 
"victims" - even on the (improbable) assumption that such 
a thing were practically feasible, the costs to society 
would be immense. It would be an administrative 
nightmare; it would entail immeasurable economic
disruption and detriment; and it would involve enormous 
social upheaval, with deprivation and pain being 
unexpectedly inflicted on individuals who themselves bear 
no personal moral guilt. Maybe these are costs worth 
paying, and are outweighed by the greater moral outrage of 
leaving things as they are. In determining this, the 
degree of injustice involved in leaving things as they 
are, it is necessary to enquire how much the current 
holdings of wealth reflect the original unjust 
allocations, bearing in mind the manifold increase in 
overall wealth since then: the extent to which, for
example, the current distribution of wealth in England can 
plausibly be accounted for in terms of the forcible 
allocation between Normans and Saxons that occurred in the 
aftermath of 1066. It is only insofar as such connections 
can plausibly be made that the original distribution of 
property has any moral significance**.
* assuming that some form of private property is justified for the 
reasons set out in section 1.4.2.A.
** And, as Norman Barry has pointed out, this makes it impossible to 
know what actually would be a fair "rectification". For if there is 
an obligation to reimburse the successors of the original "victim", 
should they be entitled only to the value of the original property 
holding when it was unjustly acquired, or also to the value added by 
the successors of the original acquiror? On the one hand, the 
acquiror’s successors are entitled to the fruits of their labour on 
the holding. But, on the other hand, the victim’s successors "might 
well claim that the original unjust acquisition denied them the right
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But leaving aside the original unfair distribution, 
private property legitimises other apparently unfair 
transfers of property which continue to be carried on to 
this day. One of these is that people acquire property 
not through their own labour or by dint of their own 
efforts, but by the sheer good fortune of being given it. 
This is obviously the case when people inherit wealth, and 
it is also the case when - with equal unfairness - they 
receive gifts inter vivos. (There is no morally relevant 
difference between the two.) But would eliminating this 
unfairness make society better? Is it better to accept 
the unfairness - or to remove it such that no-one gives 
anything to, or receives anything from, anyone else, and 
that people keep for themselves everything they earn? For 
the implication of objecting to "unearned"/"given” 
property amounts, purely and simply, to this: the
"problem" identified is in fact altruism, and the only way 
to "cure" it is to repress the human impulse for 
generosity and to maintain rigid self-sufficiency. The 
case against inheritance and gifts is an exaltation of 
selfishness. It is "individualism with a vengeance"98*, 
and it is morally repugnant.
Finally, there is a category of property ownership 
which, despite being acquired by voluntary exchange 
(contract) rather than by gift or bequest, is nonetheless 
often felt to be unfair. It can be said about many people 
who own property that, even though they were not simply 
given it, they are still lucky to have it, and do not 
necessarily "deserve" it by virtue of effort or merit. It 
is frequently suggested, for instance, that pop stars or 
sportsmen do not deserve to earn as much as they do (and
to develop the land", so that they are in fact entitled to at least 
some of the value added®
* which is ironic, since it is most often socialists who profess 
themselves repelled by "excessive individualism".
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certainly do not deserve to earn more than, say, nurses). 
They are lucky to be so well-off.
It is in the nature of luck that it operates 
unfairly: luck is, almost by definition, the opposite of
fairness. But this does not necessarily make it 
unjustifiable that property rights should attach to the 
fruits of luck, or that people should only own what they 
deserve. Pop stars and sportsmen may not deserve their 
wealth but, as Nozick points out, they earn so much as a 
result of people's free choices. Nozick cites the case of 
a basketball player who contracts to play for a team on 
condition that, in each home game for a season, twenty- 
five cents for each ticket sold goes to him. (The team 
members agree to this because the player is such a star 
attraction that he will pull in more crowds and increase 
their income.) When the season . starts, the team raises 
the price of its tickets by twenty-five cents, so that the 
public are in effect paying a "levy" to see the star 
player. (The public are willing to pay the higher price 
because they are so keen to watch him play. ) Nozick 
writes:
Let us suppose that in one season one million 
persons attend his home games, and [the player] 
winds up with $250,000, a much larger sum than the 
average income and larger even than anyone else 
has. Is he entitled to this income? Is this... 
unjust? If so, why?"
Brian Barry takes great exception to what he calls 
this "now notorious argument of Robert Nozick [that] if a 
large number of people voluntarily pay.. . to watch some 
star performer, they can obviously have no valid objection 
to whatever distribution arises from it":
You might as well say that every time we turn on a 
light we consent to nuclear reactors and acid rain, 
or that by not between us putting some arbitrary 
amount of money per year into a public call box
294
somewhere on the Yorkshire moors, we consent to its 
being carted away100.
But this is to miss the point. Nozick's example, drawing 
attention to the fact that the basketball star's wealth 
derives from people's free choices, has significance not 
because it suggests that people consented to his 
"undeserved" wealth and hence legitimised it, but because 
it highlights a contradiction between, on the one hand, 
the demands of "fairness" and, on the other, the harmless 
and legitimate exercise of freedom (to pay twenty-five 
cents of one's own money to go to a basketball match). 
Nozick's point is that, if the "unfairness" of the 
basketball player acquiring so much wealth so easily were 
to be removed, it could only be at the expense of freedom.
A more sustained criticism of Nozick's basketball 
player example is made by Robert Young, in a 1988 article 
in the journal Political Studies. Young claims that the 
liberty-based arguments used to justify the unfair 
transfer of wealth from the one million spectators to the 
star player are "unconvincing"10OA. However, Young makes 
no attempt to refute the proposition that the spectators' 
liberty would be infringed if they were prevented from 
going to the player's matches; instead he asserts that 
their liberties are infringed to a greater extent by the 
inequalities resulting from their going to his matches. 
"Serious inequalities", Young writes, "can and do 
undermine the effectiveness of the civil and political 
liberties of individuals"100-^. Winding up with $250,000, 
the star player would command "a large financial resource 
which would enable him to exercise power over the lives of 
fellow citizens", putting him in a position where "he can 
interfere with the autonomy of his fellow citizens"100®.
What kind of "interference" is Young speaking of 
here? It turns out that his case depends on using the 
word "liberty" to mean power or ability (a confusion which 
he tries to mask by the terminological fudge word
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"autonomy"). Clearly, the transfer of $250,000 from 
spectators to player means that they will have less power 
than he to do certain things (although they presumably 
always had less power than he to play basketball, and some 
of them may have more power than he in other respects - 
for instance, to seduce members of the opposite sex, or to 
persuade in argument). But this does not mean that their 
liberties are thereby interfered with: as was shown
earlier in this chapter, power and ability are not the 
same as liberty. In a state which respects and enforces 
classical liberty (including property rights and freedom 
to contract), the player will not be allowed to infringe 
his fellow citizens' liberty: he cannot coerce them to
attend his matches, ha cannot imprison them, he cannot 
kidnap them or steal from them. No matter how much wealth 
or power is transferred to the player, nobody's liberties 
are infringed. The only infringement of liberty would be 
if they were prevented from attending his matches and 
voluntarily paying what he asks for, or if he were 
prevented from accepting.
To reiterate: however "unfair" it might be for the
basketball player to obtain property without deserving it, 
the "fair" distribution of holdings could only be achieved 
by infringing freedom. Removing the unfairness from 
property is not justifiable - indeed, is unjustifiable - 
simply because it requires the abridgement of freedom. It 
may be unfair and undeserved, but the basketball star in 
Nozick's example is wealthy because people have chosen to 
go to his matches. They want to do so. It would perhaps 
be fairer, and he would have less undeserved wealth, if a 
large proportion of those people did not go to his 
matches. But if they want to, why should they not go? It 
may be unfair if a beautiful woman whom I want to marry 
rejects me in favour of another man - even if it is on 
account of his better looks and keener intelligence; after 
all, he did not earn his good looks and fine mind. But
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what relevance has fairness to her entitlement to make the 
choice?101
It is normal, natural, human to want to make choices 
which discriminate between people, advantaging some and 
disadvantaging others, even where that discrimination is 
unfair. It would be inhuman to deny people the right to 
do so: to deny the beautiful woman the right to marry
whom she wants, to deny the basketball player's fans the 
right to spend their twenty-five cents each to see him. 
In another of Nozick's illustrations, already cited in 
chapter two of this thesis*, filmgoers in a town are faced 
with a choice between two cinemas next to each other102. 
If they choose to go to one rather than the other, its 
owner will take more money than the owner of the other. 
This inequality may be unfair, unearned, undeserved: maybe 
the fact that one film would prove more popular than the 
other could not have been predicted. But it does not 
follow that the unfairness should be rectified, that half 
the cinema-goers should be forced, against their will, to 
go to the second cinema. Applying that policy
consistently, and ensuring that property is never unfairly 
or undeservedly acquired, would have the result that the 
state continually interfered in people's lives103 and
determined their choices. It might remove the unfairness, 
but it is morally unacceptable.
Contemplating these examples, the objection might be 
made that there is another solution to the "unfairness" 
problem which has so far been overlooked, and that freedom 
need not be curtailed in the way described. Stopping 
people attending the basketball star's matches or forcing 
them to go to the second cinema are, of course, not the 
only ways to remove the unfairnesses of wealth
distribution which result from those people's free 
choices. An alternative solution would be to
* Section 3.2. of chapter two.
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"redistribute" the income after it has been acquired, for 
example by means of taxation - so that, in the case of the 
cinema owners, the unfairness is removed and they receive 
the same. But the same as what? Just the same as each 
other, or the same as everyone else - basketball players, 
nurses, refinery workers, window cleaners, pornographic 
video stars? At this point the difficulty with the 
alternative solution should become apparent: as noted
already, there is no objective standard for assessing the 
value of labour, and how much a person deserves. So, how 
does one decide who receives what?
If the decision is left to the market, such that each 
person receives for his services what other people are 
willing to pay for those services, the result may be that 
star basketball players become fabulously and undeservedly 
rich. Therefore, if unfairness is to be avoided, the 
decision must not be left to the market: that is, it must
not be for ordinary people to decide. Instead, the 
decision must be taken centrally, and the state must be 
given the power to decide what each person should receive. 
This of course involves according to the state enormous 
power over people's lives and, in the absence of objective 
standards, the exercise of that power must necessarily be 
arbitrary. It is unavoidable that the people who exercise 
most influence over the state - the vested interests with 
most "industrial muscle" or, in a democracy, the most 
sophisticated public relations - will be those best able 
to manipulate the state's enormous arbitrary power so that 
they receive the most. The "alternative solution" to 
unfairly acquired property turns out, then, to be no 
different: more power to the state, less freedom to
people. The cure is worse than the disease.
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1.5. Basic propositions
From the foregoing discussion of property rights, 
economic liberty, ability and autonomy, a number of basic 
propositions emerge. They are as follows.
In order that people's labour should not be 
enslaved104, and in the interests of humanity 
(allowing people to be as generous and giving as they 
please, allowing people to make the choices they want 
rather than the choices which "fairness” 
dictates)105, people are entitled to private property 
rights.
An entitlement to property rights entails an 
entitlement to exercise control and sovereignty over 
the things one has106. A state which takes people's 
economic decisions for them - which prescribes how 
they must spend their money and arrogates to itself 
the right to allocate their wealth as it sees fit - 
thus assumes control over what they are entitled to 
control. It violates their sovereignty. It 
diminishes their freedom.
Policies which involve government in promoting 
"ability" have precisely this effect. Ensuring that 
people have access to material resources such as will 
enhance their ability requires the state to take on 
the role of allocating material resources and 
interfering in how people spend their money - through 
taxation, nationalisation, the setting of minimum 
wages. Such policies, albeit that they infringe 
people's liberties107, are necessitated by a 
commitment to the "positive" ideal of autonomy, since 
that ideal implies increased availability of options, 
hence of ability, hence of material resources108.
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The pursuit of the "positive" conception of freedom- 
as-autonomy therefore unavoidably undermines people's 
sovereignty and diminishes their liberty. 
(Interestingly, even Gray, despite championing the 
cause of autonomy, appears willing to accept this: 
the promotion of autonomy, he writes, sometimes 
"encompasses adoption of policies that are illiberal 
in that they curb personal sovereignty"109.)
It is in the light of these propositions that Mill's 
conception of liberty, embodied in the very simple 
principle, should now be considered.
2. WHAT MILL SAYS
In the epigraph to this chapter, two mutually 
incompatible uses of the term "liberty" were presented. 
One* - which has been called here the "classical" 
conception - involves a person being free to do what he 
pleases with himself and with what he has**. It assumes 
private property rights, the absence of which amounts to 
enslavement and inhumanity. Accordingly, it embraces 
economic liberty and implies that policies which entail 
the state taking people's economic decisions for them, 
such as taxation, infringe people's liberty (albeit 
sometimes justifiably, like any other constraint on
liberty).
The other conception*** is socialistic in its 
implications. It involves the promotion of "ability". If 
it is pursued, that can only be at the expense of liberty 
in its classical sense.
Mill's very simple principle is intended to promote 
and safeguard liberty. But which conception of liberty 
does he mean? The one which involves ability and
autonomy? Or the one which is based on a presumption of
private property? The one which treats taxation as a
violation of liberty, or the one which considers that
* Hayek’s.
** It is not implicit in this that a person should necessarily be 
free to do whatever he pleases with himself and with what he has. 
This is merely a definition of what is meant by the term "liberty"; 
it is not normative. Thus, many people who use the term in its 
classical sense would contend that people should not be free to do 
what they please when doing so would either harm others or violate 
the liberty of others - in other words, that people's "liberty" (in 
the classical sense) should be subject to limitations.
*** Roy Hattersley*s.
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taxation enhances liberty (by spreading access to material 
resources more widely)?
Mill's words in the epigraph provide little by way of 
clarification. To say that "the only freedom which 
deserves the name" is that of "pursuing our own good in 
our own way"3- does not give much of a clue. Or, rather, 
it is the most revealing clue to Mill's conception of 
liberty. For, once again, textual analysis of what Mill 
says reveals only ambiguity and ambivalence. It is 
impossible to know what kind of liberty is enshrined in 
the very simple principle - and whether its implications 
are free-market/liberal or socialistic - because, on this 
crucial point, Mill simply is not clear.
2.1. Mill and autonomy
This lack of clarity is all too apparent in the 
enormously varied - and contradictory - impressions which 
Mill's critics have of what he means by liberty. To 
Berlin, Mill's is a rigorously "negative" conception of 
liberty, a belief in "the rigid limitation of the right to 
coerce" such that men are "left free from interference by 
other men within a certain minimum area of their lives, 
which he regards as - or wishes to make - inviolable"3-3-0. 
To Noel Annan, also, On Liberty is an exposition of "the 
idea of negative liberty"3-3-3-*. But to Neil Thornton, on 
the other hand, it demonstrates "Mill's recognition that 
it is impossible to formulate a defensible 'negative' 
liberalism taking non-interference as the highest value... 
What Mill is demanding freedom for, is individuality and 
self-development"1X2**.
* Annan's emphasis.
** Thornton's emphasis.
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Alongside Thornton - and in sharp contrast to Berlin 
and Annan - Ryan and Raz regard Mill's conception of 
liberty as essentially "positive". From Ryan there is a 
portrayal of Mill as holding a thoroughgoing socialistic 
conception of freedom-as-ability:
Mill thinks that the "freedom" offered to those 
without resources is illusory, and that only a
public and effective concern for freedom and 
diversity could really be relied on to secure 
them113
- words not dissimilar from Mr Hattersley's remark that 
"the great understanding of the principle of freedom is 
that it is meaningless unless you can exercise those
rights and that requires more equality"55. For his part, 
Raz interprets Mill's principle of liberty
not as a restraint on the pursuit of moral goals by 
the state, but as indicating the right way in which 
the state could promote the well-being of people114 
and he regards Mill's principle as linked to "the
principle of autonomy"115 (Raz's advocacy of "the 
principle of autonomy" is discussed in section 1.2.3.B of 
this chapter).
This last view - placing Mill in the ranks of those 
who conceive liberty as autonomy - is shared by John Gray. 
He writes:
Nor can J.S. Mill finally be characterised 
unequivocally as a negative libertarian. For,
despite the classical-liberal subject matter of On 
Liberty in the grounds and limits of political 
obligation, the conception of freedom at work there 
is one. . . of which it is the notion of a free or 
autonomous man... which is essentially 
constitutive4*7.
Elsewhere Gray writes that the argument of On Liberty is 
one
in which a strongly "positive" conception of 
freedom as autonomy figures centrally116.
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As was seen earlier in this chapter*, the right to
autonomy, as used by Gray, is something which, first of 
all, is "possessed not by all men, but by those possessing 
in some minimal degree the capacities of an autonomous
agent"35 and, secondly, implies not just the absence of
restraint but an expansion of "the options open to man"4,7. 
Gray sees Mill's concept of autonomy as designating
the capacities and opportunities involved in self- 
critical and imaginative choice-making35 
and a society of autonomous agents as one whose members
had developed these capacities up to at least a 
minimum level117.
To his credit, Gray recognises that there is a 
problem in attributing this particular conception of
freedom to Mill. He admits that
except in a letter to a correspondent, Mill never 
uses the term "autonomy" in the context of the 
argument of On Liberty3-18 
and he acknowledges the need to find textual evidence in 
Mill's writing to support his claim119. "Much of the 
clearest evidence," Gray says, "occurs in the famous third 
chapter of On Liberty"119 - the one entitled "Of
individuality, as one of the elements of well-being" - and 
he cites two passages from that chapter to support his 
argument. First s
The human faculties of perception, judgement, 
discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even 
moral preference are exercised only in making a 
choice. He who does anything because it is the 
custom makes no choice120.
And, secondly, a couple of paragraphs further in On 
Liberty.
A person whose desires and impulses are his own - 
are the expression of his own nature, as it has 
been developed and modified by his own culture - is
* Section 1.2.3.B.
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said to have a character. One whose desires and 
impulses are not his own has no character, no more 
than a steam engine has character3-23-.
In these two passages quoted by Gray, Mill does 
indeed seem to be exercised by a concern for what Gray 
calls the capacities of an autonomous agent - "the 
capacities and opportunities involved in self-critical and 
imaginative choice-making"35 - with his emphasis on 
"perception, judgement, discriminative feeling, mental 
activity"3-20 and, indeed, "character"3-23-. As noted in 
chapter one of this thesis (section 2.2.2.) Gray's claims 
that Mill's idea of liberty has many of the 
characteristics of autonomy are plausible. The alleged 
concern with the capacities of an autonomous agent appears 
at the very beginning of On Liberty, where Mill declares 
that the very simple principle is intended to limit not 
only "physical force in the form of legal penalties" but 
also "the moral coercion of public opinion"3-22: people's 
decisions being taken not simply in the absence of 
restrictions by the state, but with an independence of 
mind. Moreover, the stress laid upon expanding "the 
options open to man"47 and enabling people "to have a good 
life"34 which is implicit in the concept of autonomy, also 
finds expression in Mill's frequent identification, in On 
Liberty, of freedom with well-being. Thus, in chapter 2 
of On Liberty, Mill writes of
the necessity to the mental well-being of mankind 
(on which all other well-being depends) of freedom 
of opinion3-23 
and in chapter 3 he claims that
If it were felt that the free development of 
individuality is one of the leading essentials of 
well-being; that it is not only a co-ordinate 
element with all that is designated by the terms 
civilization, instruction, education, culture, but 
is itself a necessary part and condition of all
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those things, there would be no danger that liberty 
should be undervalued3-24.
Yet - and this point was also made in chapter one of 
this thesis - the apparent presence of "autonomy"-type 
notions in Mill's conception of liberty is highly 
ambiguous. It is not possible to conclude that "a 
strongly 'positive' conception of freedom"3-3-6 is central 
to On Liberty. Indeed, it is quite unclear the extent to 
which Mill's conception of liberty in the very simple 
principle is either "positive" or, on the other hand, 
"negative"/classical. At times Mill's concerns do seem to 
be primarily the "negative" ones of preventing external 
interference. The wording of the very simple principle 
itself is highly suggestive of this, depicting the 
impediments to "liberty of action" in terms of 
"compulsion", "physical force", "legal penalties", "moral 
coercion" and so on (rather than, for example, the non­
availability of options)3-22. The same view is expressed 
more forcibly in book II of Mill's Principles of Political 
Economy where he describes it as "the perfection of social 
arrangements and of practical morality" to secure to 
individuals "complete independence and freedom of action, 
subject to no restriction" save the prevention of harm to 
others3-25. By complete contrast, however, just a page 
further on in Principles Mill appears to reject this kind 
of "negative"/classical liberty as valueless unless 
accompanied by ability (the Hattersley view that "freedom 
is meaningless without the capacity to put that freedom 
into operation"55), writing that
the generality of labourers in this and most other 
countries have as little choice of occupation or 
freedom of locomotion, are practically as dependent 
on fixed rules and on the will of others, as they 
could be in any system short of actual slavery3-26*.
* Mill adds that, in comparison with this, "the restraints of 
Communism would be freedom".
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Elsewhere Mill seems to go even further, equating freedom 
with ability, when he writes that a day labourer has
many of the anxieties which have not an 
invigorating effect on the mind, and none of those
which have. The position of the peasant proprietor
is the reverse... he is a free human being12*7.
Mill's confusion on all this is epitomised by the 
notorious "bridge example" in On Liberty - already 
discussed in this thesis** - where Mill writes that it 
would be consistent with the very simple principle
if either a public officer or anyone else [who] saw 
a person attempting to cross a bridge which had 
been ascertained to be unsafe. .. [were to] seize 
him and turn him back128.
Is this not a violation of the pedestrian's liberty, 
imposed for his own good, and hence contrary to the anti­
paternalist stipulations of the very simple principle? 
No, Mill says, this does not involve "any real 
infringement of his [the pedestrian's] liberty"128. What 
is interesting here is not Mill's conclusion, but the 
reasoning which leads him there. Mill does not argue that 
the state has a duty to protect people's lives, since life 
is an essential prerequisite of (classical/negative)
liberty. Instead, he concentrates on the definition of
liberty:
liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he 
[the pedestrian] does not desire to fall in the 
river128.
It is as ill thought-out a definition of liberty as 
can be imagined, allowing for almost unlimited 
paternalistic intervention in people's decision-making 
(such that the scope for taking decisions oneself without 
interference - classical liberty - would be negligible)
** Section 3.3.3.B of chapter one.
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without in any way departing from the terms of the very 
simple principle. Rejecting this allegation, Gray 
explains the "bridge example" as demonstrating Mill's 
commitment to just "a weak form of paternalism"129, which 
treats decisions as invalid (and therefore not fully 
voluntary or free) if they are "clearly not the result of 
considered rational deliberation"129. Ten likewise 
regards Mill as committed to "weak paternalism"130 which, 
he says, allows for state intervention in an individual's 
decision "only when there is a defect in his decision"131 
or his "decisions are impaired"130, in contradistinction 
to "strong paternalism" which sanctions interventionism 
"even when [the individual's] decision is fully voluntary 
or totally unimpaired"131.
The totalitarian dangers implicit in limiting 
people's liberty to take decisions which are "irrational", 
"defective" or "impaired" ought to be obvious. By what 
criteria does one judge whether someone's choices (or 
votes) are defective? How can one tell whether someone's 
views are rationally reached? Who decides? The concept 
of "false consciousness", used by Marxists to deprive 
their opponents' views of legitimacy (and therefore to 
remove the value of the freedom to express them or realise 
them) provides a prime example of this kind of thing*.
But such dangers are unavoidable, given the reasoning 
employed by Mill in his statement that "liberty consists 
in doing what one desires, and [the pedestrian] does not 
desire to fall in the river"128, so that the public 
officer is accordingly entitled to prevent the pedestrian 
crossing the bridge. The pedestrian's decision is deemed 
involuntary, just as if it had been made under force or as 
a result of fraud**, and therefore no liberty is lost by
* See also the traditional Soviet practice of consigning political 
dissidents to psychiatric hospitals, presumably to instil "reason" in 
them.
** See section 1.2.3.B of this chapter, and section 1.4.1. of chapter 
two for the rationale behind the "force or fraud" exception.
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the interference in that decision. It is the same 
reasoning as that of Feinberg when he says (as quoted 
above, in section 1.2.3.B) that "usurious agreements are 
indeed coercive in the manner of all 'unconscionable' 
contracts,... their coercive character reduces the 
voluntariness of the consent of the weaker party"51. And 
it is the same reasoning which Himmelfarb notes in the 
oft-used argument that liberty requires "legislation and 
government intervention to promote economic security, or 
material welfare, or racial equality... because the 
individual is not in control of his situation"49.
The fallacy in this reasoning is that it fails to 
recognise the crucial distinction between the decision and 
its consequences. When someone agrees to do something 
under duress of force - at gunpoint, for example - his 
decision is truly involuntary, because at that moment he 
does not want to do the thing itselfs he does it only 
because he is being compelled to do it. But when the 
pedestrian in Mill's bridge example starts to cross the 
bridge (before being deprived of the freedom to do so), he 
does want to do the thing itself. He desires to cross the 
bridge, and if, as Mill says, "liberty consists in doing 
what one desires", refusing to let him cross the bridge IS 
- pace Mill - an infringement of his liberty. Mill points 
out that the pedestrian does not desire to fall into the 
river, but that is the consequence, not the thing itself. 
Many choices and decisions which people take have 
consequences which they do not desire. It is often the 
case that people who move home to a different town find 
themselves unhappier there than they were in their old 
town. Or that people who buy things discover later on 
that their purchase was a waste of money. Or that people 
who marry find that their marriage is not all they had 
hoped. Obviously in these instances, the people involved 
do not desire misery or to obtain a bad bargain or to have 
an unhappy marriage. But none of this means that their 
decisions and choices - to move home, to buy things, to
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marry - are in any sense involuntary; still less that 
some public officer should interfere with their freedom to 
make those decisions and choices; still less that, if 
ever their freedom to do so were interfered with by the 
state it would make sense to say that this did not involve 
"any real infringement of [their] liberty"128.
Yet this is precisely the logic employed by Mill in 
the bridge example, when he defines liberty so as to 
exclude the freedom to take decisions whose consequences 
one does not desire. A state which respected that kind of 
liberty would not respect the freedom to make a bad 
bargain, to enter an unhappy marriage, to do anything that 
would make the agent worse-off or unhappy. It is hard to 
conceive of a more repressive society.
None of this is meant to suggest that Mill intends 
such a situation. After all, it runs directly counter to 
Mill's claim, in the paragraph of the very simple
principle itself, that an individual's "own good, either
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant"122 for 
interfering in his freedom and that an individual
cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear 
because it will make him happier, because, in the 
opinion of others, to do so would be wise or even 
right122.
But this is exactly the problem. The contradictions in On 
Liberty are what make it so difficult to know what would 
be the practical outcome of applying the very simple
principle - a very free society or a very repressive one, 
a liberal society or a socialist one. The point about the 
bridge example is not that it necessarily shows Mill's
concept of liberty to be totalitarian, but that his 
imprecision in defining liberty - indeed, his almost 
cavalier attitude to it - makes his principle such an 
ambiguous, and unreliable, safeguard of it.
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2.2. Mill and property
The significance of the concept of property rights in 
defining liberty was considered in section 1.4. of this 
chapter. It was argued that classical/"negative" liberty 
(the entitlement to do what one likes with oneself and 
with what one has) requires respect for property rights; 
whereas the "positive" pursuit of "autonomy", 
necessitating the enlargement of options and "ability", 
entails the infringement of property rights as material 
resources are allocated by the state to broaden access to 
material resources. Further, it was contended that 
respect for property rights is justified, on the grounds 
that their infringement puts men's labour at the disposal 
of others (which, to the extent that this happens, is 
tantamount to enslavement) and violates the realisation of 
human, and humane, impulses (generosity, and freedoms such 
as the freedom to see one's preferred sports star in 
action).
Mill's attitude to property rights is thus a crucial 
indicator of his conception of liberty. The first thing 
to note about this attitude is that Mill is not opposed to 
the continued existence of private property, at least for 
the time being. In his writings on socialism, published 
posthumously by the Fortnightly Review in 1879, Mill sees 
the "principle of individual property" surviving "for a 
long period to come"132 and he argues that the alternative 
to private property proposed by socialists requires such a 
transformation in human nature that it "is not available 
as a present resource"133. The state which today adopts 
the very simple principle as its guiding light must, Mill 
is saying, respect property rights as well.
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But Mill's is, at best, an ambiguous commitment to 
property rights. It is neither absolute nor unequivocal, 
and is far from being the firm commitment on which, as 
argued above, a classical conception of liberty rests. It 
is both limited in its scope, and contingent on 
circumstance.
2.2.1. Limited property rights
The case for private property as put forward in this 
thesis was based partly on the idea that people are 
entitled to the fruit of their labour. But that was only 
part of the argument. Much of the property people hold, 
it was pointed out, is not the fruit of their labour - it 
may be gifts from family and friends, it may be 
inheritance, it may be what they were lucky enough to 
receive because of the popularity of the service they 
provide (a cinema-owner who puts on a great box office 
success). If private property is limited to the fruits of 
labour, its extent is much reduced - and the causes of 
"unearned" property, in the form of human generosity and 
the exercise of free choice, are repressed.
Mill's adherence to property rights is limited in 
this way. In book II of his Principles of Political 
Economy, Mill states the "essential principle" of property 
to be:
to assure to all persons what they have produced by
their labour and accumulated by their abstinence134 
and in the same work he insists that "the only unequivocal 
property... anyone could claim was in what he had made by 
his own efforts"X3S. Mill's refusal to give any greater, 
or more unequivocal, status to property rights appears to 
lie in his unease at the way property was originally 
appropriated: the suggestion, already quoted, that it was 
"the result, not of just partition or acquisition by 
industry, but of conquest or violence"96.
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The implications of this are spelled out by Mill. He 
is strongly critical of unearned property which, as he 
puts it in a Vindication of the French revolution of 
February 1848, permits some people to
be born to the enjoyment of all the external 
advantages which life can give, without earning 
them by merit or acquiring them by any exertion of 
their own136.
And, in Principles, he calls for restrictions on 
inheritance s
If it be said, as it may with truth, that those who 
have inherited the savings of others have an 
advantage which they have in no way deserved, over 
the industrious whose predecessors have not left 
them anything; I not only admit, but strenuously 
contend, that this unearned advantage should be 
curtailed137.
Such a curtailment on the right to bequeath property must, 
by the same logic, apply to the right to give property 
inter vivos - leaving a "right of property" which only 
recognises as legitimate each person keeping what he has 
earned for himself: in Nozick's words, "individualism with 
a vengeance!"98. More than that, the limitation of 
legitimate property rights to what is "deserved" and 
"earned" raises questions about the distribution of 
property - does a property tycoon "deserve” to have more 
than a doctor? - which could allow for a lot more 
dirigiste interference in property ownership than is 
apparent from Mill's stated rejection of the socialist 
alternative to private property133.
Mill's justification of property solely in terms of 
labour leads him to postulate a further limitation on 
property rights: they should not extend (or at least not 
completely) to land. "No man made the land," Mill argues 
in Principles, and therefore
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when the ''sacredness of property" is talked of, it 
should always be remembered that such sacredness 
does not belong in the same degree to landed 
property... Landed property is felt... to be a 
different thing from other property3-38.
The point here is that, since "the essential principle" of 
property is to assure to people the product of their 
labour134, that principle
cannot apply to what is not the produce of labour, 
the raw material of the earth134.
Accordingly, Mill says, any justification for giving 
people property rights over land must lie elsewhere - if 
they improve the land, with benefits for the economy - and 
this makes Mill doubt whether property over land should be 
recognised under English law:
Landed property in England is... very far from 
completely fulfilling the conditions which render 
its existence economically justifiable140.
Mill's reasoning here gives rise to two observations. 
First, it is hard to follow the logic of his singling out 
land as "a different thing from other property"138 on the 
grounds that it is the "raw material of the earth"134 and 
"no man made the land"138. For land is not the only "raw 
material of the earth". So, too, are oil, gold, coal. 
Indeed, as noted earlier, the very meaning of property is 
that it endows people with rights (of exclusive disposal) 
over material resources - which, by definition, are part 
of the earth and not of themselves. Of course, whereas 
"no man made the land", people "make" petrol in the sense 
of extracting oil, refining it, and so on. They "make" 
gold rings in the sense of mining the gold, melting it 
down, crafting the ring. But the property right which a 
person has in a tankful of petrol or in a gold ring does 
not just extend to the value added by such labour. The 
value of petrol sold at a garage or a gold ring sold at a 
jeweller's is not just its labour value (to repeat a 
question asked several times before: how can one possibly
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assess the value of people's labour?), but rather the
amount that people are prepared to pay for it. And that,
of course, is determined not only by the labour put into
"making" the finished product, but by the commodity
itself. Petrol is more in demand from motorists than 
nettle-juice - and gold rings are more in demand than tin 
rings - and this would remain the case even if exactly the 
same labour went into changing the raw material into the 
finished product. It follows that there is value in the 
commodity element of petrol and gold rings - the oil and 
the gold respectively. If people are entitled to full 
ownership of a tankful of petrol or a gold ring, this
gives them property rights in raw material commodities 
over and above their property rights in the fruits of
labour (that is, in the full value of a gold ring less the 
full value of a tin ring which required the equivalent 
labour to produce) - that is to say, property rights in 
things which "no man made". But Mill does not question 
such property rights; illogically, he specifically 
distinguishes land from "other property". Of course, it 
may be the case (though Mill does not say this) that 
property rights in raw material commodities such as oil 
and gold, as well as in land, require special
justification. Why should a man own an oilfield or a 
goldmine? Perhaps he inherited it, or was given it (the 
result of altruism or free choice again). Perhaps he 
bought it with money which he earned from his labour 
(and/or which he inherited or was given). This still 
leaves the vexed Lockean problem of what justifies the
original owner appropriating it from the earth ah Initio; 
however, as argued in section 1.4.2.B above, that question 
only has moral significance insofar as, given the manifold 
increases in wealth over the centuries since then, the 
original allocation of property holdings can plausibly be 
said to have a bearing on the current state of affairs*.
* As it was put earlier: to what extent can the present distribution
of wealth in England plausibly be attributed to the division of 
property between Normans and Saxons following the conquest of 1066?
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The second observation to be made about Mill's
attitude to property rights in land is that he is not
absolutely opposed to them. His opposition to landed 
property in England rests only on his view that it does 
not fulfil the conditions which render its existence 
"economically justifiable"140. If, however, the land were 
being "improved" that would be a different matter. Mill 
argues that idle landlords should be bought out by
compulsory purchase, and their land then resold, or 
leased, to tenants who would thereby have an incentive to 
improve their property141. In the hands of "improving" 
tenants, therefore, property rights are justifiable in
Mill's eyes. This, then, is a contingent right to 
property - contingent on whether it brings economic 
improvement. As Mill says in Principles, ownership of 
land is
wholly a question of general expediency. When 
private property in land is not expedient, it is 
unjust138.
Curiously, it appears that even Mill's justification 
of non-landed property - that it assures to all persons 
what they have produced by their labour134 - might 
likewise be based not on the idea of a man's right to the 
fruit of his labour, but (as in the case of land) on 
expedential considerations. This view has been fairly 
persuasively argued by F.R. Berger, who quotes a passage 
from Principles where Mill describes an individual's 
labour as at least partly the result of an investment 
which society has put into him, through education, 
training and the inculcation of appropriate mental and 
physical qualities:
this labour and outlay must be regarded as part of 
the advance by which society effects its productive 
operations, and for which it is indemnified by the 
produce142.
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The inference which Berger draws from this is that, in 
Mill's eyes, an individual's labour is not fully "his", 
but is to some extent the product of society. It follows 
that the fruits of his labour cannot be said to be "his" 
either, and he is not entitled to property. If society 
rewards him with property to incentivise him, that is one 
thing; but if society deprives him of property by taxing 
him (or, presumably, lays claim to his labour by enslaving 
him*), he has no grounds for complaining that his rights 
are being violated or that something is being taken from 
him to which he has "clear and exclusive title by virtue 
of its being the reward for an exclusively individual 
effort"142. What the individual keeps as property is not 
a moral entitlement, but something which society has 
conferred on him as a matter of expediency, which is 
contingent on it bringing the benefits sought (higher 
productivity as a result of incentivisation), and which is 
violable.**
2.2.2. Contingent property rights
Whether Berger's interpretation of that particular 
passage in Principles is correct or not, there seems 
little doubt from a reading of other passages of Mill's 
that he sees property (property of any sort, including the 
fruit of one's labour) less as an absolute right or 
entitlement, and more as a matter of expediency. It is 
justifiable so long as it brings ulterior benefits, and is 
contingent on its capacity to bring such benefits.
* [AUTHOR’S NOTE: This is my comment, not Berger’s. - MPG]
** See also 0. Kurer’s comment that, for Mill, "property is one of 
the central institutions which is evaluated in terms of its social 
benefits and social costs". (0. Kurer; "John Stuart Mill on 
government intervention"; History of Political Thought (London 
1989); volume X; page 473.)
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Mill does not appear to accept that the proposition 
that property rights are necessary for liberty (the 
proposition made in this thesis, and elsewhere, that in 
the absence of property a person's labour is a collective 
asset94, meaning that he is at the disposal of others and 
not himself, and hence unfree). As Ryan notes143, when 
Mill defends property (as in his rejection of the
socialist alternative "for a long, period to come"132), it 
is not as a corollary to his very simple principle of 
liberty "entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of 
society with the individual"122. Indeed, in Principles 
Mill actually depicts property as potentially inimical to 
liberty, writing that the property of the owners of 
capital gives them power over people who have to sell
their labour, and asking whether this is not in fact a 
threat to, rather than a safeguard of, freedom144*.
On what grounds, then, does Mill base his
justification of property? He says that "individual 
property has presumably a long term before it"132 and
insists that a new basis of society, involving 
alternatives to private property, is "not available as a 
present resource"133. In Principles, as already noted, 
Mill claims that the justification for property ownership 
lies in its being "deserved", and he argues that only 
"unearned" property should be curtailed137. Gray sees the 
concept of desert as crucial to Mill's view of
property145. But this is a very flimsy basis for 
rejecting alternatives to private property. It has
already been seen how difficult, if not impossible, it is 
to assess desert; and, more importantly in terms of how 
free society would be if Mill's principle were applied, it 
has been shown how illiberal a state which attempted to 
allot private property according to desert would be
(section 1.4.2.B above). Moreover, as a matter of
* Mill here appears to be using freedom in the sense of "power" or 
"ability" rather than in its classical sense. It is not the only 
time he does so, but he is not consistent in doing so. See section 
2.1. above.
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observable fact, it is the case that much of property 
ownership is based on factors other than deserti 
inheritance, luck, earning more than one "deserves” 
(because the service one provides happens to be in high 
demand). Mill himself considered that in his own time 
property ownership bore little relationship to desert; and 
he pointed out that, although property is supposed to be 
"the means by which labour and frugality are insured their 
reward"146,
an immense proportion of the industrious classes 
[are]... at some period or other of their lives... 
dependent, at least temporarily, on legal or 
voluntary charity147.
Take away the property acquired other than through 
"desert", ensure that the industrious are given the 
"reward" they deserve - and you make property rights very 
frail indeed. There are plenty of grounds here for 
violating property rights; few grounds for respecting 
them.
Elsewhere in Mill's writing, however, an altogether 
different justification for property is offered - a 
consideration wholly unrelated to. (and inconsistent with) 
Mill's concern for "desert". It is the same consideration 
on which, as shown in chapter one of this thesis, a large 
part** of his argument for liberty itself appears to rests 
namely, utilitarianism and the promotion of the general 
welfare. Private property is preferable to socialism or 
communism, Mill writes, because of the incentive it 
provides to produce more, and thus economically benefit 
society as a whole: where the means of production are in 
private hands, the owners reap the whole profit of 
productive success or suffer the whole detriment of 
failure, giving them a
strong personal motive to do their very best and 
utmost for the efficiency... of the operations148.
** although quite how much is unclear.
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In the absence of private property. Mill says, this spur 
to productivity "would not exist"3-48. That is to say, 
property rights have the expedential advantage that they 
promote the wealth of society, and on this ground Mill 
favours their continuing existence.
But it is, in Mill's words, a "provisional 
existence"3-32. It is contingent on its ability to carry 
on promoting the wealth and welfare of society; there is 
no commitment in principle to property rights. Mill is 
quite candid about this, stating that in deciding between 
private property and collective property, regard must be 
had to the "requisites of production"
and the question is, which of these 
arrangements is most conducive to human 
happiness3-49.
The point about a contingent right is that it is 
transient. It depends on circumstances, and if
circumstances change, the right vanishes. In chapter one 
of this thesis we saw how Mill's ambiguity as to whether 
the very simple principle is contingent on its propensity 
to promote utilitarianism posed a similar problem. It was 
argued that, if the prospects for freedom flourishing 
depend upon its propensity to advance utilitarian goals, 
in any circumstance or situation where freedom does not 
have the consequence of advancing those goals there will 
no longer be any reason for having freedom, and it can 
(and should) be jettisoned. A "free society" which rests 
on such a fragile principle of liberty, it was said, 
cannot be assured of its freedom lasting for long*.
As with freedom, so with property rights. Mill's 
utilitarian concerns once again render his other 
commitments ambiguous and uncertain. He is in favour of 
keeping private property for the moment. But he does not
* Section 3.3.1. of chapter one.
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rule out its eventual abolition, at a time when "self- 
interest is... replaced by conscience" as a "spur" to
harmonious productive effort3-50. Whatever produces the 
goods is thus acceptable to Mills if private property
does, so be it; if common ownership does, so be it.
Mill's writing offers no assurance of property rights 
enduring, and hence no safeguard to the liberty which is 
based on property rights.
2.3. Mill and taxation
Classical liberty, incorporating recognition of
property rights, means the entitlement of people to do as 
they like with themselves and with what they have without 
interference from the state or from anyone else (be they 
fellow citizens or foreign invaders). It follows that, as 
already noted, in the classical conception, taxation is an 
infringement of liberty (which, like other limitations of 
liberty, may or may not be justifiable): it involves the 
state interfering in the individual's freedom to do what 
he likes with what he has, by taking some of what he has - 
the taxed amount - and disposing of that amount as it (the 
state) pleases. If a person's income is taxed at, say, 
33 per cent, this means that, in any calendar year that he 
works, it is only from May onwards that his labour is his 
to dispose of; for the first four months, he is at the 
service of the state, and the fruits of his labour are the 
state's to dispose of. It is this which prompts Nozick to 
describe taxation of earnings graphically (but not 
inaccurately) as "on a par with forced labour"67.
By contrast, the project of promoting "ability" 
actually looks to taxation as an ally, a means by which 
the expansion of opportunities can be advanced. 
Socialists, who tend to conceive freedom in terms of 
ability, generally have no objection to taxation in 
principle; on the contrary, it is through taxation that
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their various plans for redistributing wealth can often 
best be realised. If liberty is defined as "ability", 
taxation ceases to pose a problems even as it encroaches 
on liberty, it can confidently be said to enhance it.
Where does Mill stand on this issue? The answer, as 
usual, is ambiguous. In purely pragmatic, utilitarian 
terms, he fully understands and sympathises with those who 
object to high taxation because of its disincentive effect 
on production. Thus, in Principles of Political Economy 
Mill expresses hostility to progressive income tax on the 
grounds that, by "relieving the prodigal of the expenses 
of the prudent", it imposes "a penalty on people for 
having worked hard and saved more than their 
neighbours"153-. He evinces a similar concern for 
incentives in his posthumously-published chapters on 
socialism, writing that in a more egalitarian society the 
"strong personal motive [of individuals] to do their very 
best and utmost for the efficiency and economy of the 
[productive] operations, would not exist"148.
But these are purely contingent arguments against 
high taxation, dependent on present circumstance and 
subject to revision should circumstances change (thus, 
while Mill thinks that "personal interest will for a long 
time be a more effective stimulus to the most vigorous and 
careful conduct of the industrial business of society than 
motives of a higher character", he does not believe that 
it will always necessarily be so, and he considers that, 
after years of moral education and improvement, people 
might one day be persuaded to work hard and produce more 
without personal financial incentives150*). They are not, 
therefore, permanent grounds for resisting high taxation. 
They are not an objection in principle, and hence offer no 
reason, at a future date in different circumstances, for
* Emphasis added.
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restraining the state from undermining people's (economic) 
liberty through high taxation.
Taxation infringes a person's liberty to do what he 
likes with what he has and, if that is the kind of liberty 
which Mill's very simple principle is meant to protect, 
the very simple principle must be understood as limiting 
the state's entitlement to impose taxes on people. This 
was certainly the understanding of Mill's contemporary 
James Fitzjames Stephen, who wrote that
paying a single shilling of public money to a 
single school in which any opinion is taught of 
which any single taxpayer disapproves... cannot be 
justified without infringing the principle of 
liberty as stated by Mr Mill152.
Support for this interpretation appears in chapter 5 of On 
Liberty where Mill explicitly makes the connection between 
liberty and low taxation when he declares that people's
choice of pleasure and their mode of expending 
their income... are their own concern and must rest 
with their own judgement113 
(although he qualifies this by saying that it is subject 
to first "satisfying their legal and moral obligations to 
the State" - which of course begs the question of what 
those obligations should be). And when, in Principles, 
Mill speaks of the necessity of assuring to all persons 
"what they have produced by their labour and accumulated 
by their abstinence"134 - this, he says, is the "essential 
principle of private property" - the implication is that
taxation, which runs counter to that end, is in principle
objectionable.
On the other hand, quite different signals,
inconsistent with these principled grounds for opposing 
high taxation, are given out elsewhere in Mill's writing. 
It has been argued strongly both by A.L. Harris154 and by 
Gray (among others) that Mill's very simple principle
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offers no reason for opposing high taxation, or indeed any 
of the other dirigiste forms of economic intervention 
favoured by socialists; on their interpretation, Mill's 
principle of liberty is quite irrelevant to the issue, 
since the liberty it is intended to protect does not
include the economic liberty to dispose of what one has as 
one pleases without government interference. In support 
of this ("Harris/Gray") argument, two passages from Mill's 
works are most often quoted. The first appears in the 
final pages of On Liberty where Mill lists a number of 
pragmatic "objections to government interference"155 in
the economy - namely, that many things are "likely to be 
better done by individuals than by the government"155, 
that leaving things to individuals is "a mode of
strengthening their active faculties... and giving them a 
familiar knowledge of the subjects with which they are
thus left to deal"155, and that "every function 
superadded to those already exercised by the government" 
constitutes "the great evil of adding unnecessarily to its 
power"156 - but appears to regard these points as 
separate from the concerns of the very simple principle. 
He writes that, although they are "closely connected with 
the subject of this essay", they "do not, in strictness, 
belong to it"155. They are cases in which
the reasons against interference do not turn upon 
the principle of liberty155.
And the reason for this is that
the question is not about restraining the action of 
individuals, but about helping them155.
This reason, distinguishing between government 
interference which "restrains" individuals and that which 
"helps" them, is the essence of the second main passage 
cited in support of the Harris/Gray argument. This is the 
distinction between "authoritative" and "non- 
authoritative" interference, set out in book V of 
Principles. "Authoritative" interference by the
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government, Mill writes, occurs when the state accords 
itself the right to
interdict all persons from doing certain things; or 
from doing them without its authorisation; or [to] 
prescribe to them certain things to be done157.
Mill contrasts that kind of intervention with "another 
kind which is not authoritative"
when a government, instead of issuing a command and 
enforcing it by penalties, adopts the course... of 
giving advice and promulgating information; or 
when, leaving individuals free to use their own 
means of pursuing any object of general interest, 
the government, not meddling with them, but not 
trusting the object solely to their care, 
establishes side by side with their arrangements, 
an agency of its own for a like purpose157.
By way of example, Mill says that "there might be a 
national bank, or a government manufactory [non- 
authoritative, "helping", interference] without any 
monopoly against private banks or manufactories [which 
would be authoritative, "restraining" interference]" or 
that "there may be public hospitals [non-authoritative/ 
helping], without any restriction upon private medical or 
surgical practice [authoritative/restraining]"157.
Mill makes clear his preference for the non- 
authoritative/ helping type of interventionism over the 
authoritative/ restraining type, and insists, in the same 
passage in Principles, that the non-authoritative/helping 
type need not be limited by a principle of liberty in the 
way that the authoritative/ restraining type is;
It is evident, even at first sight, that the 
authoritative form of government intervention has a 
much more limited sphere of legitimate action than 
the other158.
So it is more "legitimate" for the state to intervene in 
such a way as "helps" people. How much more legitimate 
Mill does not say. But it seems that the principle of
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liberty which limits interference does not limit these 
forms of interference in the same way. It allows for 
public hospitals, nationalised banks and "manufactories" - 
and, Gray believes, the state's assumption of "a share of 
responsibility for poor relief, colonisation, scientific 
research and the financing of education, among other 
things"159. Mill here is according at least some form of 
legitimacy to various measures of socialist or dirigiste 
economic interventionism; and he does so notwithstanding 
that nationalisation requires coercion in that the state 
compels people to invest their money according to its 
wishes, and publicly-financed services require higher 
taxation and hence less freedom for people to spend their 
money as they please.
But on what grounds? Support for state interference 
to "help" people is of course consistent with the 
"ability" view of freedom, which sees the expansion of 
opportunities by the state as an enhancement of liberty. 
As has been seen (in section 2.1. above), Mill is unclear 
whether he conceives liberty in its "negative"/classical 
sense or in its "positive" sense of autonomy and ability. 
As Raz notes, on the latter definition of liberty, it is 
"no objection" to a programme of heavy government 
subsidisation "to point out that the funds necessary for 
all these policies are raised by compulsory taxation... 
Tax is raised to provide adequate opportunities and is 
justified by the principle of autonomy... The principle 
merely restricts the use of coercion"52. It is possible, 
then, that Mill - like Raz - regards taxation not as a 
form of coercion or compulsion or a limitation of liberty, 
but as liberty-enhancing. That would be consistent with 
his ambiguous view of property rights (described in 
section 2.2. above). But it is inconsistent with his 
observation in book V of Principles that
There is,... in almost all forms of government, one 
thing which is compulsory; the provision of the 
pecuniary means. These are derived from taxation;
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or, if existing in the form of an endowment derived 
from public property, they are still the cause of 
as much compulsory taxation as the sale or the 
annual proceeds of the property would enable to be 
dispensed with. And the objection necessarily* 
attaching to compulsory contributions, is almost 
always greatly aggravated by the expensive 
precautions and onerous restrictions, which are 
indispensable to prevent evasion of a compulsory 
tax160.
If taxation is a form of compulsion, why then is it not 
limited in the same way as any other infringement of 
liberty by the very simple principle, "entitled to govern 
absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in 
the way of compulsion and control"122? Mill is completely 
unclear on this.
Rather more seriously, if Mill does regard socialist 
interventionism as outside the ambit of the very simple 
principle, under what principle is it to be regulated? 
Are there any reasons for limiting state interference in 
people's economic liberties, any objections in principle 
to the growth of state socialism? According to R.J. 
Halliday,
Mill preferred to avoid final principles and single 
ends161
- and Gray quotes Mill as saying in Principles that the 
range of necessary government functions cannot be 
identified
by any universal rule, save the simple and vague 
one, that it should never be admitted save when the 
case of expediency is strong159.
Here, then, is the abandonment of principle in favour of 
expediency and, more to the point, the abandonment of the 
purpose of the very simple principle as expressed at the 
beginning of On Liberty: to meet the need for some
* Emphasis added.
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"recognized principle by which the propriety or 
impropriety of government interference is customarily 
tested"112.
As it turns out, the very simple principle is too 
riddled with ambiguities to fulfil this requirement.
Contrary to the explicit intention of On Liberty,
expediency - rather than an "opinion to which [people] 
consistently adhere, as to what things are fit to be done 
by a government"122 - triumphs in the end. On the crucial 
issue of what kind of "liberty" the principle is supposed
to safeguard, Mill is painfully equivocal. Is he using
liberty in Hayek's sense of the word, or Mr Hatters ley's? 
Does his concept of freedom embrace economic liberty, or 
does it involve the expansion of economic opportunities? 
Does it require property rights to be protected? Does it 
entail high or low taxation, socialism or free-market 
liberalism? What degree of state interventionism is 
compatible with it? These are fundamental questions, on 
which the practical applicability of the very simple 
principle depends. But they are questions to which, 
despite Mill's claims for the principle, no clear answers 
are forthcoming.
* * *
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CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
This work. .. will be an effort to vindicate the 
traditional liberalism derived from Mill's On 
Liberty, not by slavishly adhering to its every 
contention and argument, but by salvaging a central 
part of it, qualified and reformulated in the light 
of the many accumulated difficulties and criticisms.
Joel Feinberg, The moral limits of the criminal law1.
. . . the liberal hope that one day a satisfactory 
principle indicating either necessary and/or
sufficient conditions for legal or social
interference will be formulated.
H.J. McCloskey, John Stuart Mill: a critical study2.
Was Mill a socialist?
That, of course, largely depends on how "socialism"
is defined. Mill's own definition, that "what is
characteristic of socialism" is
the joint ownership by all the members of the
community of the instruments and means of
production... with... the consequence that the 
division of the produce among the body of owners 
must be a public act, performed according to rules 
laid down by the community3 
probably serves just as well as any for present purposes. 
There is no doubt that Mill regarded the issue as 
important. In much the same way as in On Liberty he 
proposed the very simple principle as a solution to "the 
practical question" of where to place the limit between 
individual independence and social control4, so likewise 
he wrote in a letter that
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I regard the purely abstract investigations of 
political economy... as of very minor importance 
compared with the great practical questions which 
the progress of democracy and the spread of 
socialist opinions are pressing on5*.
Were they, however, the same "practical question" for 
Mill? Did he consider the concerns addressed by the very 
simple principle about liberty and the limits of social 
control of a piece with the issue of socialism? Alan Ryan 
thinks not, and contends that it is a "misunderstanding" 
to believe that the purpose of On Liberty was "to consider 
'what is the function of the state'"6. But textual 
analysis of Mill's writings suggests a different views 
that Mill regarded the arguments deployed in On Liberty as 
highly relevant to the extent of the state's functions, 
and hence to the question of socialism. In book II of 
Principles of Political Economy, written in 1848 at a time 
when he was flirting with socialist ideas, Mill 
nonetheless wondered how far socialism was compatible with 
what he considered to be "the perfection both of social 
arrangements and of practical morality", namely:
to secure to all persons complete independence and 
freedom of action, subject to no restriction but 
that of not doing injury to others’7.
This is language which almost exactly mirrors the terms of 
the very simple principle itself, with its requirement 
that "the sole end for which mankind are warranted, 
individually or collectively, in interfering with the 
liberty of action of any of their number is... to prevent 
harm to others"s: it shows Mill applying the standard of
the very simple principle to socialism.
At the time he wrote Principles, Mill considered that 
"it remains to be discovered"7 how compatible socialism 
was with this standard. Later in his life, he was to come
* Emphasis added.
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out more strongly against socialism - precisely because he 
felt it difficult to reconcile with the sort of concerns 
for freedom expressed in On Liberty, Thus, in his 
chapters on socialism, published posthumously in 1879, 
Mill deployed arguments against socialism which strongly 
echo the words of On Liberty. His concern in On Liberty 
about "the tyranny of the majority"9 is paralleled by his 
statement in the chapters on socialism that, in the sort 
of property-less society advocated by many socialists, 
there would be "a delusive unanimity produced by the 
prostration of all individual opinions and wishes before 
the decree of the majority”10. Attacking such a society, 
Mill wrote in the chapters that, whereas human nature 
ought to have "freedom to expand spontaneously in various 
directions"10, in a property-less society there would be 
less scope for "the development of individual character 
and individual preferences"10: therefore, he concluded,
the tendency towards this state of affairs should be 
avoided, particularly now when "already in all societies 
the compression of individuality by the majority is a 
great and growing evil"10. These words closely resemble 
the arguments advanced in On Liberty for the very simple 
principle - the anxiety that "the tendency of all the 
changes taking place in the world is to strengthen society 
and diminish the power of the individual"11 with the 
resulting "pinched and hidebound type of human 
character"12, "wearing down into uniformity"13 and 
"compression"14 of human nature; and the insistence that 
"it is only the cultivation of individuality which 
produces, or can produce, well-developed human beings"14. 
In short: the concerns which animated Mill's advocacy of
freedom in On Liberty likewise made him critical of 
socialism as potentially inimical to freedom.
This attitude carried through, to some extent at 
least, into Mill's views on specific policy questions. 
Although he expressed himself in favour of public health 
legislation, he made clear that this was purely because it
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could be justified on grounds of state intervention in 
"other-regarding" conduct. He utterly rejected
intervention which was motivated by social paternalism, as 
being inimical to the requirements of liberty. Thus, 
writing in 1859, Mill declared:
The proper object of sanitary laws is not to compel 
people to take care of their own health, but to 
prevent them from endangering the health of others. 
To prescribe by law, what they should do for their 
own health alone, would by most people be regarded 
as something very like tyranny*5*.
The natural implication of this statement is a far more 
limited scope for state welfarism than socialists normally 
allow: unless social legislation can be justified on the
fairly narrow grounds of being necessary to restrain the 
effects of other-regarding conduct, it is illegitimate and 
impermissible. At a stroke, much of the raison d'etre for 
the welfare state thereby evaporates. And it does indeed 
seem to be the case from textual evidence that Mill 
envisaged a fairly limited role for state welfare 
assistance: acceptable (he wrote in The claims of labour
in 1859) only if it is "of such a kind, and given in such 
a manner, as to render [the recipient] ultimately
independent of similar assistance"3-6.
Similarly, Mill came out against nationalisation,
again largely out of considerations of liberty. In On 
Liberty he wrote that, were the roads, railways, banks, 
insurance companies, major industries, universities and
public charities to be nationalised**,
not all the freedom of the press and popular
constitution of the legislature would make this or 
any other country free otherwise than in name3-7.
* Emphasis added.
** something very much like what was to happen in England under the 
1945 Labour Government.
341
In the same vein, in an essay called Centralism which was 
published in 1859, Mill described the idea that
governments can do better than individuals anything which 
individuals are able and willing to do, as "both a 
mathematical and a moral absurdity"16.
Inequality - the great bete noire of socialism - was 
considered by Mill in his posthumously-published chapters 
on socialism. he wrote there that equality of reward
would be unjust, because different types of labour are 
unequal and therefore deserve different rewards18; while 
any attempt by socialists to distribute remuneration 
according to deserts would be both very difficult to 
achieve19 and liable to promote precisely that resentment 
and disharmony which socialism is supposed to relieve
society of19.
In book IV of Principles Mill identified socialists' 
opposition to competition as "the most vehement and
conspicuous part of their teaching", from which, he said, 
"I utterly dissent"20. In the chapters on socialism, he 
rejected the argument that free-market competition is 
detrimental to the working classes in setting workers 
ferociously against each other to the detriment of all 
(pushing down prices, and hence wages): he pointed out
that, on the contrary, competition works two ways, such 
that "the buyers of labour and of commodities compete with 
one another as well as the sellers"; and, moreover, that 
when competition pushes down prices, any detriment to the 
interests of workers as producers is offset by the 
advantage to them as consumers21. Perhaps most
interesting is Mill's argument in Principles that
to be protected against competition is to be 
protected in idleness, in mental dulness; to be 
saved the necessity of being as active and as 
intelligent as other people22
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- a clear echo of Mill's arguments, in chapter 2 of On 
Liberty, for free competition in ideas and opinions,
necessary to ensure that all received opinions, even true 
ones are constantly challenged and thus do not lapse into 
dead dogmas, "a mere formal profession, inefficacious for 
good, but cumbering the ground and preventing the growth 
of any real and heartfelt conviction from reason or 
personal experience... deprived of its vital effect on the 
character and conduct"23. Here, then, the case for
freedom of thought and expression is at one with that for
freedom of economic activity.
Lastly there is the question of industrial
organisation. It is true that Mill expressed unease at
the employer/employee relationship forming the basis of
industrial capitalism and frequently suggested alternative 
forms of industrial organisation in which the status and 
rights of workers would be enhanced. In book IV of
Principles he envisaged that "the relation of masters and 
workpeople" would be gradually superseded either by 
"association of the labourers with the capitalist" or "in 
other [cases], and perhaps finally in all, association of 
labourers among themselves"24. But how much this
represents a repudiation of "capitalist individualism" in 
favour of "the co-operative principle" may be open to
doubt. Mill did, indeed, refer approvingly to "the 
progressive advance of the co-operative movement"25, but 
his main point seems to have been that, with existing 
employer/employee relations, workers had little personal 
incentive to produce and that therefore some form of new 
"industrial partnership" was needed26. The fact is that 
employee share-ownership no less than socialist co­
operatives could fulfil that need - and, indeed, Sidney 
Webb was to tell fellow Fabians in 1899 that this aspect 
of Mill's thinking was not so much socialism as "joint- 
stock individualism"2*7; in a later day, it might well be 
called "popular capitalism". And in all Mill's
consideration of this question there was an anxiety that
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new forms of industrial organisation should not displace 
individual enterprise and initiative. In book IV of 
Principles he cautioned that:
A private capitalist... is considerably more likely 
than almost any association to run judicious risks, 
and originate costly improvements. Co-operative 
societies may be depended on for adopting 
improvements after they have been tested by 
success, but individuals are more likely to 
commence things previously untried30.
Once again, there is an echo of the arguments for freedom 
put forward in On Liberty. Mill's point that
individuality should be given free rein because "the 
initiation of all wise or noble things comes and must come 
from individuals; generally at first from some one 
individual"3X.
The picture which emerges from the quotations set out 
above is of a Mill committed to the very simple principle, 
hence to freedom - including economic freedom - and hence 
opposed to socialism. But, as is ever the case with Mill, 
things are far from being so clear. The characterisation 
of Mill's writings in general, and On Liberty in 
particular, as "anti-socialist" is by no means universally 
accepted by commentators. On the one hand, A.L. Harris 
depicts Mill as committed to economic liberty as "an 
essential... ingredient of freedom"20 and affirms that 
"state socialism was always abhorrent to Mill, for he 
believed it inimical to liberty"32. Likewise, John 
Skorupski contends that Mill was "far from thinking that 
the state could play the role of bringing people to their 
best selves"33, and H.J. McCloskey insists that Mill "was 
never a socialist"34. On the other hand, however, Sidney 
Webb wrote in 1948 that Mill had been "a convinced 
socialist"35; Bertrand Russell, who in fact „was actually 
Mill's godson36, identified Mill's ideas with those of 
"pre-Marxian socialism", in which there continues to be
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free competition, but "between rival societies of workers, 
not between rival capitalists"37; while Alan Ryan has 
placed Mill among the "critics of capitalism and defenders 
of a socialist alternative"38, and indeed has suggested 
that "it is hard to believe that Marx and Mill would have 
been far apart on most practical issues"39. More subtle 
colours have been painted by Noel Annan - who writes that 
over the years On Liberty has "troubled the conscience of 
converted Marxists and... mellowed the convictions of 
British socialists"40 - and by Hayek, portraying Mill as 
sympathetic to the "ultimate aims" of socialism but at 
odds with its "concrete suggestions" for abolishing 
competition and private property43-.
The cause of all this confusion on the part of the 
commentators is, as might be expected, traceable to 
ambiguities on the part of Mill himself. Mill was not as 
unequivocally opposed to state socialism as some of the 
commentators claim; but neither was he as unequivocally 
in favour as others make out. Indeed, his position on 
this "great practical question"5 is characterised, above 
all, by equivocation. In book IV of Principles, he wrote 
of "communism" (a word which he used interchangeably with 
"socialism") that, if weighed against "the present state 
of society", "the difficulties, great or small, of
communism would be as dust in the balance"42. Yet this 
view is directly contradicted by Mill's own statement in 
the posthumously-published chapters on socialism that
The present system is not, as many socialists 
believe, hurrying us into a state of general 
indigence and slavery from which only socialism can 
save us. The evils and injustices suffered under 
the present system are great, but they are not 
increasing; on the contrary, the general tendency 
is towards their slow diminution43.
It is fair to point out that the passage in Principles was 
written relatively early in Mill's career, in the 1840s, 
whereas the chapters on socialism were written towards the
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end of his career almost a quarter of a century later. It 
would not be surprising or illegitimate if Mill had 
changed his mind about socialism in that time, or if 
circumstances had changed and facts had become clear so as 
to cause him to alter his view. However the lapse of time 
cannot explain away contradictions within the same works 
by Mill. At the same time as Mill was writing, in 
Principles, that communism's difficulties were "as dust" 
compared to those of capitalism - and classing himself, 
according to the Autobiography, "under the general 
designation of socialists"44 - he was also, elsewhere in 
Principles, advocating laissez-faire as a maxim of public 
policy:
letting alone... should be the general practice: 
every departure from it, unless required by some 
great good, is a certain evil45.
(Interestingly, Mill was apparently45 the first English 
classical economist to use the expression "laissez-faire" 
in the context of government interventionism.)
More plausible than attempting to trace a shift over 
time from a pro- to an anti-socialist position, or than 
placing Mill firmly in one camp or the other, is the 
proposition that he did not stand firmly in either camp on 
the issue. It seems likely that just as Mill appears to 
have done everything he could in his life to reconcile the 
conflicting doctrines of liberty and utilitarianism (see 
chapter one of this thesis, and especially section 2.2.), 
so too he engaged on the equally doomed eclectic exercise 
of trying to marry socialism with his commitment to 
freedom and individuality. Donald Winch quotes Mill as 
saying that the "social problem of the future" would be 
"how to unite the greatest individual liberty of action 
with a common ownership of the raw materials of the globe, 
and an equal participation of all in the benefits of 
combined labour"46. In 1859 Mill wrote in his Vindication 
of the French revolution of February 1848 that governments 
must "make the scale turn in favour of equality, whenever
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this can be done without impairing the security of the 
property which is the product and reward of personal 
exertion"47. Similarly, there is a revealing passage in 
chapter 2 of On Liberty where Mill argued that
unless opinions favourable to democracy and to 
aristocracy, to property and to equality, to 
cooperation and to competition... are... enforced 
and defended with equal talent and energy, there is 
no chance of both elements obtaining their due... 
Truth, in the great practical concerns of life, is 
so much a question of the reconciling and combining 
of opposites...4S*.
The result of this attempt by Mill to "reconcile and 
combine" socialism and liberty - as of his attempt to 
reconcile utilitarianism and liberty is a mess.
Possibly the best way to describe Mill's position on the 
question of socialism or free-market liberalism is to say 
that he was a pragmatic social-democrat. He wrote in the 
chapters on socialism that "the intellectual and moral 
grounds of socialism" offered "in many cases" the guiding 
principles for "improvements necessary to give the present 
economic system of society its best chance"49**. He added 
that the socialist case should be considered fully for 
ways of enabling the institution of private property "to 
work in a manner more beneficial to that large portion of 
society which at present enjoys the least share of its 
direct benefits"50. And, in the Autobiography, with an 
unnerving lack of precision he declared that his views 
could best be described as having "a greater 
approximation" to a "qualified socialism"53-.
* Emphasis added.
** Emphasis added.
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Many will find this undoctrinaire stance attractive 
and, indeed, laudable. Gray writes approvingly that Mill 
"softened the tension between the moral individualism of 
the liberal outlook and the collectivist implications of 
the classical utilitarian goal of general welfare"32. 
Halliday observes that
for Mill, neither laissez-faire nor socialism was a 
complete policy or theory in itself; such theories 
were not possible without an unacceptable 
dogmatism16.
The point is, however, that no matter how "unacceptable" 
dogmatism may be in the eyes of Halliday or others, it 
makes little sense to describe it as unacceptable to Mill 
- when the very simple principle is, after all, a 
statement of dogma: "one very simple principle... entitled 
to govern absolutely..."8. No matter how appealing an 
undoctrinaire stance on the question of socialism may be, 
it is inconsistent with the objectives of the very simple 
principle. To recapitulate: in the introductory chapter
of On Liberty Mill presented the very simple principle as 
something necessary to fill a major lacuna - "the absence 
of rule or principle... as to what things are fit to be 
done by a government"8. The difference between socialism 
and free-market liberalism is about what things are fit to 
be done by a government: whether governments should run 
industrial enterprises, subsidise prices, "redistribute" 
wealth, and so on. Also in the introductory chapter of On 
Liberty Mill lamented the fact that, faced with such 
issues, "men range themselves on one or the other side in 
any particular case, according to this general direction 
of their sentiments, or according to the degree of 
interest they feel in the particular thing which it is 
proposed that the government should do... but very rarely 
on account of any opinion to which they consistently 
adhere"8. The very simple principle was supposed to 
reverse this situation, and replace pragmatism with 
consistent adherence to a principle in deciding what 
things are fit to be done by governments. It was supposed
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to give clear and unambiguous answers to those questions 
which are the very stuff of the tension between socialism 
and laissez-faire. To end up, as Mill did, with 
ambiguities and equivocations which "soften" that tension 
is a failure for the very simple principle, not a success.
★ * *
That there should be so much uncertainty about 
Mill's attitude to socialism - both on the part of the 
commentators and of Mill himself - is hardly to be 
wondered at, given the three fundamental ambiguities at 
the heart of his very simple principle which have been the 
subject of each of the three chapters of this thesis. The 
ambiguity identified in chapter one was whether the 
liberty of the very simple principle is justified 
intrinsically, or on grounds of rule-consequentialism: 
liberty's instrumentality in procuring utilitarian ends. 
This was shown to be significant because, if liberty is 
justified by virtue of its ability to achieve the general 
welfare, then it can easily be sacrificed if ever the 
requirements of general welfare conflict with those of 
liberty. Saddled with this ambiguity, the very simple 
principle could therefore be interpreted as permitting 
socialist and paternalist policies to override 
considerations of liberty. In chapter two, consideration 
was given to the ambiguity of Mill's qualification to the 
very simple principle, that intervention in individual 
freedom may be permissible to prevent "harm to others". 
It was argued that "harm" is such a nebulous concept that, 
in an interdependent society, there is virtually no limit 
on the range of human activities which could be said to 
harm others, and hence almost infinite scope for 
interpreting the principle as permitting any kind of 
dirigiste or socialistic interventionism. Finally,
chapter three examined ambiguities in the use of the word
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"liberty", and Mill's failure to define it precisely for 
the purposes of the principle. Without such definition, a 
"liberty" principle might be interpreted as sanctioning 
the promotion of classical ("negative") liberty, and hence 
economic liberalism - or alternatively the promotion of 
ability ("positive liberty") and hence the advancement of 
state socialism and the diminution of classical liberty. 
Mill fails to give sufficient indication as to which he 
means. The result is, as Gray puts it, that Mill's very 
simple principle
is compatible with some variants of socialism and 
social democracy, and no less compatible with some 
doctrines of the minimum functions of the state53. 
On the question of socialism or liberalism, of "what 
things are fit to be done by a government", Mill's very 
simple principle is compatible with everything and 
anything. Contrary to its pretensions it offers people no 
clear guidance. It tells them nothing.
Is it inevitable that this should be so? Are the 
"difficulties and criticisms" to which Feinberg refers in 
the epigraph to this conclusion3- inherent in, and hence
ultimately fatal to, any attempt to formulate a principle 
of liberty? Or is it possible that, on the contrary, a 
satisfactory principle can be formulated - the hope
expressed by McCloskey in the epigraph2?
In the early 1980s Feinberg embarked on an attempt to 
draw up a satisfactory principle which, in his own words, 
would delineate "the zone in which the citizen has a moral 
claim to be at liberty, that is, free of legal action"54. 
He averred that, although similar in intention to Mill's 
very simple principle, this was actually a less ambitious, 
more modest, project:
This book is an attempt to find a general answer, 
albeit a complicated one, to the question: What
sorts of conduct may the state rightly make
criminal? Its subject, though broad, is still
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narrower than John Stuart Mill's famous concern in 
On Liberty with 'the nature and limits of the power 
which can be legitimately exercised by society over 
the individual', since our concern is only with 
power exercised by the state by means of the 
criminal law55.
A "narrower" concern than that of the very simple 
principle, and yet one which required four volumes for 
Feinberg to expound. And at the end of all that, it 
seemed that the subtleties and modifications and 
refinements which Feinberg had felt compelled to introduce 
had quite overwhelmed the principle itself, so that it was 
impossible to see the wood for the trees. The "answer" to 
Feinberg's question was indeed "complicated", but it was 
scarcely "general"; and it elicited the following gloomy 
comment from a reviewer, referring to the writings of both 
Feinberg and Raz, "thinkers, whose work together 
constitutes the high-water mark of recent liberal 
theorising":
...the project of giving liberalism a universally 
compelling foundation has been abandoned, and the 
attempt to formulate definitive and uniquely 
determinate liberty-limiting principles given up or 
severely qualified. Foundationless and virtually 
contentless, liberalism has then the aspect of the 
Cheshire Cat, becoming the vanishing spectre of a 
once-living doctrine56.
It is tempting to conclude from this that formulating 
a liberty principle is a futile business - and hence to 
agree with Isaiah Berlin's pragmatic view that limitations 
on liberty should be drawn on the basis of "practical 
compromise" and "not always for reasons which can be 
clearly stated, let alone generalised into rules or 
universal maxims"57. Berlin writes:
...to be rational is to follow the course of 
conduct which least obstructs the general pattern 
of life in which we believe. The right policy
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cannot be arrived at in a mechanical or deductive 
fashion; there are no hard-and-fast rules to guide 
us5S.
But, however compelling such an approach may seem, 
however tempting it may be to abandon the idea of a 
liberty principle, it is a temptation that ought to be 
resisted. This thesis has been highly critical of Mill 
for the way in which he formulated the "very simple 
principle", and in particular for its many ambiguities. 
However, the criticisms should not be allowed to detract 
from acknowledgement of Mill's central achievement in On 
Liberty, which was to understand, more clearly than most 
other theorists, the necessity of having some sort of 
principle: "a recognized principle by which the propriety 
or impropriety of government interference is customarily 
tested"59, as he puts it in the opening paragraphs of the 
essay. In the absence of such a guiding principle, which 
can serve as a point of reference for the governing and 
the governed alike, there are no outer limits to the range 
of functions which the state may accumulate, no 
acknowledged constraints on the state's right to make 
incursions into the liberties of its citizens and no 
grounds for resisting such incursions. A policy of 
"practical compromise" without "hard-and-fast rules to 
guide us" means that it is difficult for a government to 
know whether or not it is entitled to interfere in any 
given situation, and impossible to act with consistency. 
It is a recipe for ad hoc, arbitrary, and potentially 
tyrannical rule.
Mill rightly laments the absence of a proper 
principle of liberty. His own attempt to formulate one 
proves to be less than wholly satisfactory. But that 
still does not remove the imperative to devise a better 
one.
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The basic contours of a more satisfactory principle 
than Mill's are implicit in the criticisms which have been 
made in this thesis.
First of all, it must be clear from the outset that 
the principle is upholding liberty for its own sake, and 
absolutely, rather than conditionally on its propensity to 
produce some other objective such as the "happiness" or 
"general welfare" sought by utilitarians*.
Next, the limitation on an individual's entitlement 
to liberty must be set clearly and unambiguously: 
interference in someone's liberty is not warranted on such 
a nebulous and expandable ground as preventing harm to 
others, but only on the narrow, specific ground of 
preventing infringements to the liberty of others. It is 
only ever justifiable to constrain freedom where doing so 
is necessary to protect freedom. This is what was 
referred to in chapter two of this thesis as the "Berlin 
principle", in contradistinction to the "Mill 
principle"**. It can best be regarded as a principle to 
maximise liberty. Anarchists argue that, since the state 
interferes in the liberties of individuals, the way to 
give people the most liberty they can possibly have 
("absolute liberty") is to be rid of the state altogether. 
That argument ignores the fact that individuals' liberties 
can be infringed by persons other than the state - by 
fellow citizens, or by foreign invaders - and that such 
infringements are more likely to occur in the absence of 
the state whose police force, judiciary and penal service 
protect against criminal attack, and whose military forces 
protect against external, foreign attack. Removing these 
infringements of liberty requires the existence of a state 
which interferes. By interfering to limit X 's freedom to 
plant bombs in the road, the state upholds Y's freedom to
* See chapter one, passim.
** See chapter two, sections 1.1. and 1.5.1.
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walk down that road. By conscripting A into the army at a 
time of imminent invasion (as in Britain in 1940), the 
state limits A's freedom to choose how he spends his time, 
where he works, and so on - but also upholds the freedom 
of B, C and D, which is threatened by the foreign invader. 
Taxation, as was seen in section 1.3.3. of chapter three, 
infringes people's liberties, but in financing the police, 
judiciary, penal service and army, it also helps prevent 
other people's liberties being infringed. In short, 
contrary to the claims of anarchists, the state's 
interference in liberty is sometimes required to protect 
and enhance liberty (which would be threatened in the 
absence of the state). But a principle of liberty- 
maximisation means that the state's interference must be 
limited to what is necessary to prevent interference in 
others' liberty: it must not interfere any more than
this: it must not over-police, or over-imprison, or over­
militarise, or over-tax. Maximising liberty justifies the 
state in policing, imprisoning, arming and taxing just 
sufficiently to protect its citizens' liberty; neither 
more nor less. This is the proper "fitting adjustment 
between individual independence and social control"4: a
principle whereby people are entitled to freedom up to the 
point where exercising their freedom infringes the freedom 
of others, and (which is the other side of the same coin) 
the state may only interfere in a person's freedom to 
protect the freedom of others. It is a principle which
differs from Mill's - and ensures a greater degree of
liberty than Mill's: indeed, a maximal degree of liberty.
But it is not a novel idea. In the late nineteenth
century, Herbert Spencer (who was actually a friend of 
Mill's60) argued that an individual's liberty should be 
restrained only to the extent
needful for preventing him from directly or 
indirectly aggressing on his fellows - needful, 
that is, for maintaining the liberties of his 
fellows against his invasions of them61.
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More recently, and from a conservative perspective, 
Michael Oakeshott similarly advocated
an understanding of government as the prevention of 
coercion62.
The time is long overdue for displacing Mill as the point 
of departure for formulating a principle of liberty: the
Spencer/Oakeshott doctrine is a surer basis from which to 
proceed.
But, that having been done, there remains a third 
ingredient which must go into any new principle of 
liberty. It must be made quite clear precisely what is 
meant by "liberty" in the context of the principle. What 
is the "liberty" which is to be maximised? The state must 
not violate a person's "liberty", except to protect the 
"liberty" of others: but what kind of "liberty"? It must 
be unambiguously understood that this is liberty in its 
classical meaning: a person's entitlement to take his own 
decisions without external influence from other people, be 
they the state, fellow citizens or foreign invaders*. The 
state must respect, uphold and protect that liberty. It 
is a necessary implication of this that the state must 
also ensure that each individual has the necessary 
prerequisites of such classical liberty - sustenance, by 
way of health, food, clothing and shelter, and the basic 
education required for the meaningful exercise of free 
choices** - and the state is entitled to interfere, 
including by way of taxation, to do so. But it must be 
clear that the state's responsibilities for promoting 
liberty and its prerequisites do not extend to promoting 
ability. There must be no ambiguity about the meaning of 
liberty under the principle: it is not to be conflated
with ability, which, while masquerading as a "positive"
* See chapter three, section 1.2.1.
** See chapter two, section 1.5.1.A and chapter three, section 1.2.1.
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form of liberty, can in fact only be advanced by the state 
through the diminution of liberty in its classical 
sense***.
These, then, are the basic elements which should go 
into a new principle of liberty. But they still leave a 
number of difficulties to be resolved.
One such difficulty will be immediately apparent. A 
principle of restricting liberty only to protect liberty 
(coercing to prevent coercion) - even if it is clear that 
the liberty meant is classical liberty, and that it is not 
contingent on externalities such as utilitarianism 
contains a fundamental paradox. A 's liberty to act in a 
certain way might infringe B 's liberty: the principle
requires that A 's liberty must therefore be restrained.
But this only means that B's liberty is infringing A ’s
liberty, so should B 's liberty be restrained? In other 
words, when two liberties conflict, how does one decide 
which to protect and which to restrain?
There are some cases where the answer is obvious - as 
between the liberty of A to plant bombs in the street and 
the liberty of B to walk down that street; or between a 
person's liberty not to be conscripted into the army and 
the liberty of his fellow citizens at a time of imminent 
invasion, for instance in England of 1940. Mill makes the 
same point in On Liberty when he notes that there is "no 
parity"
between the feeling of a person for his own opinion
and the feeling of another who is offended at his
holding it, no more than between the desire of a 
thief to take a purse and the desire of the right 
owner to keep it63.
*** See chapter three, section 1.3.3.
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But in other cases it is more difficult to decide which of 
two conflicting freedoms should prevail. Shadia Drury 
points to the "inevitable clash of different but equally 
'inviolable' rights" where, for example, "someone's right 
to life may conflict with another's right to property, in 
the case of a famine"64. Somewhat more prosaically, 
Feinberg wonders how one can adjudicate between a 
motorcyclist's interest in speed, excitement and 
economical transport, and the interest of a professional 
scholar residing in the suburbs in the peace and quiet of 
his neighbourhood63. The dilemma often arises in 
practical politics, as in the Spycatcher controversy in 
England in the mid-1980s where the freedom of the press to 
publish a former intelligence officer's memoirs had to be 
balanced against the freedom of the country's citizens 
from foreign invasion ("national security") which might be 
more at risk unless publication were restrained. If the 
state intervened to prohibit publication, one kind of 
freedom would be infringed; but if it did not, another 
kind of freedom would be threatened. Which freedom should 
prevail?
A principle of liberty, according to which "the 
propriety or impropriety of government interference is 
customarily tested"19, ought to be able to furnish an 
answer. It is at this point that the thesis may appear to 
turn full-circle for, having in chapter one insisted on 
the importance of a liberty principle being independent of 
utilitarianism, it will now be argued that something can 
be salvaged from utilitarianism which can greatly assist 
the formulation of a liberty principle. The point is 
this. There are essentially two propositions at the heart 
of utilitarianisms first, that choices between actions 
should be made on the basis of their consequences, and, 
secondly, that consequences should be assessed in terms of 
"happiness" or "welfare"66. The utility principle is an 
act-consequentialist formula for promoting
happiness/weIfare. In chapter one of this thesis, it will
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be recalled, the second limb - promoting happiness/welfare 
- was rejected as an inappropriate basis for a liberty 
principle, because maximising happiness is not always 
consistent with promoting liberty*. However, the first 
limb - act-consequentialism - was not rejected; on the 
contrary, it was seen to be the only moral basis for 
saving one of the children in the extract from the novel 
Sophie's Choice, or for Duncan Sandys's policy in 1943 of
feeding the Germans false information as to the landing of
their VI and V2 missiles and thereby sparing London 
massive destruction and loss of life**. A principle of 
liberty, formulated to maximise liberty, can make good use 
of act-consequentialisms freedom will be maximised if, in 
any choice as to whether the state should intervene or 
not, the decision is taken by assessing the consequences 
of either course of action in terms of liberty. In any 
given case, is the loss of liberty consequent on
restraining A ’s freedom greater or less than the loss of 
liberty consequent on permitting A to infringe B 's
freedom? A number of factors need to be taken into
account in calculating either set of consequences,
including the number of people whose liberty is infringed 
and the extent or depth of the infringement sustained by 
each person. The result in either case must be multiplied 
by the risk - whether it is a virtual certainty (almost 
100 per cent) or a remote possibility (a much lower 
percentage). Thus, in the Spycatcher case, an act- 
consequentialist principle of liberty would involve
balancing the loss of press freedom consequent on
prohibiting publication against the potential loss of
* See chapter one, sections 3.3.1. and 3.3.3.A - in particular the 
example of the child with a virus liable to infect every other person 
on earth such that they each had a headache for a day (but were never 
troubled again), and the difference between the responses which 
utilitarians (on the one hand) and those primarily concerned with 
liberty (on the other) would give to the question of whether to 
sacrifice the child.
** See chapter one, section 3.2., for details of these examples and 
their ethical applications. See also section 3.3.3.A  of chapter one 
in this connection.
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freedom in terms of breakdown of national security and 
foreign conquest consequent on not prohibiting publication 
(a greater number of people affected, a more serious 
deprivation of liberty, but a much less certain, more 
remote, possibility). Quantifying such factors in 
assessing the consequences of actions is obviously 
extremely difficult and, even with the best will in the
world (and the greatest foresight), it can only ever be
approximate. But it is the approach which needs to be
adopted if liberty is to be maximised.
Hitching act-consequentialism to the principle of 
liberty which has been outlined here also helps to resolve 
another difficulty. This is highlighted by the old debate 
about whether a principle of liberty should permit 
slavery. As noted in section 1.4.1. of chapter two, it is 
characteristic of a free society that people should be 
free to enter binding contracts with each other. Ought 
they therefore be free to contract into slavery? Nozick, 
for one, believes that consistent application of a 
commitment to liberty requires that such slavery contracts 
should be allowed - and, like any other contract, legally 
enforceable67. But this argument is only tenable if one 
is prepared to carry the consistency to its logical 
conclusion, and legally enforce contracts under which 
(say) a man desperate to obtain a pop record ''buys" one 
from someone in return for agreeing to have one of his 
arms and one of his legs chopped off. (Nozick offers no 
clues as to what his position would be on this. ) Such a 
situation, in which the law enforces contracts to mutilate 
people, seems entirely incompatible with anything that 
could sensibly be called a free society. On the other 
side of the debate, Mill in On Liberty expresses the view 
that an individual should not be allowed to contract into 
slavery:
...by selling himself for a slave, he abdicates his
liberty... The principle of freedom cannot require
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that he should be free not to be free. It is not 
freedom to be allowed to alienate his freedom68.
But this argument is also unsatisfactory, because every 
contract - indeed, every choice - involves people to some 
extent alienating their freedom. If I enter a five-year 
employment contract, working from nine till five-thirty, 
forty-eight weeks a year, I am not free to spend those 
hours over the next five years as I choose; I must spend 
them working for my employer. If I sell you my car, I am 
no longer free to sell it to someone else. If I have a 
choice between living in New York and living in 
Massachusetts, and I freely choose Massachusetts, then I 
have alienated my freedom to make the choices available 
only to those who live in New York (at least for the time 
that I stay in Massachusetts; but time of course is 
irreversible, and the choice of how to spend time is
therefore an irrevocable choice, freedom alienated)69. As 
Kenneth Minogue puts it
freedom is like money: we delight in spending it. 
We contract marriages, enter into contracts, pledge 
our service, get jobs and make arrangements. Our 
favourite use of freedom, it would seem, is to get 
rid of it-70.
So if all choices and contracts involve individuals 
"getting rid of" their freedom, it cannot be a valid
objection to a slavery contract (or a mutilation contract) 
that one should not be free to alienate one's freedom. It 
is here that act-consequentialism comes to the rescue. 
There is a choice of actions. Either an individual is 
prohibited from entering into binding contract x, in which 
case his freedom to make contracts is restrained; or
alternatively he is permitted to enter into binding
contract x, in which case his freedom to act is restrained 
by the terms of the contract (he must be a slave for life, 
or work for the same employer for the next five years, or 
sell his car to one person rather than another). The 
question to be asked is which course of action
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prohibiting or permitting - has as its consequence the 
greater loss of freedom. That of course will depend on 
the terms of the contract x. A principle of maximising 
liberty requires permitting people to enter enforceable 
contracts where the alienation of liberty involved in 
enforcing the terms of the contract x is less than the 
restraint of liberty which would be involved in forbidding 
the person to enter the contract (as for example in a 
contract to sell my house to someone); but intervening to 
forbid people entering enforceable contracts where the 
liberty lost by enforcing the contract is greater than the 
liberty lost by forbidding it (as in a mutilation contract 
and, almost certainly, a slavery contract).
What we are left with, then, is something rather 
different from Mill's very simple principle. It is a 
liberty-maximising principle - using "liberty" in the 
classical sense - which is not conditional on any external 
objectives, and under which people are fully entitled to 
exercise liberty, with the state being permitted to 
restrict liberty only where, and to the extent that, such 
restriction is necessary to prevent a greater loss of 
liberty (either infringement of others' liberty or 
alienation of their own).
This is of course a framework only, and there are 
many gaps to fill in, many questions which remain 
unanswered. Should the state impose on its citizens only 
"passive duties" of non-interference in another's liberty, 
or in addition "active duties" to protect the liberties of 
others? Ought a man, in other words, be held legally 
answerable for doing nothing while he watches a stranger 
drowning in a river before his very eyes? When someone 
violates the liberty of someone else, should the state 
intervene by punishing the offender, or merely by awarding 
compensation from the offender to the victim, as and when 
the victim requests it? That is to says should offences 
be criminal or civil? - trespass over property, for
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example? insider dealing? And when the state does 
restrain liberties, should it do so preventatively (before 
the event) or only by way of punishment after the event?71
Answering these questions, filling in the gaps, is 
obviously beyond the scope of this thesis. It is enough 
to note their existence, which serves as a reminder that 
in considering the proper relationship between the state 
and its citizens, "between individual independence and 
social control", much work remains to be done. The 
principle sketched out in the preceding paragraphs offers 
no final answers. What it does offer, however, is the 
prospect that, by avoiding some of the ambiguities which 
bedevil Mill's very simple principle, it may serve as a 
firmer foundation for the task Mill set himself: to
delineate clearly "what things are fit to be done by a 
government", and thereby to limit the incursions which may 
be made on the liberty of individuals.
London, 1991
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